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THE  EGO  AND  HIS 
OWN 


BY 

MAX  STIRNER 


TRANSLATED  FHOJI  THE  GERMAN  BY 
STEVEN  T.  BYINGTON 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 
J.  L.  WALKER 


NEW  YORK 

BENJ.  R.  TUCKER,  PUBLISHES 
1907 


Copyright.  1907,  by 
BENJAMIN  R.  TUCKER 


Stack 
Annex 

m 

(36- 


TO  MY  SWEETHEART 

MARIE  DAHNHARDT 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE                  .                .  .  vii 

INTRODUCTION                .                .                .  .  xii 
TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE                ....     xix 

ALL  THINGS  ARE  NOTHING  TO  ME             .  .  .3 

PART  FIRST:  MAN.                   .                .  .  .7 

I. — A  HUMAN  LIFE            .                .  .  .9 

II. — MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW     .  .       17 

I.— THE  ANCIENTS       .                 .  .  .17 

II.— THE  MODERNS       .                .  .  .30 

§1.— THE  SPIRIT  .                 .  .  .34 

§2.— THE  POSSESSED              .  .  .42 

§3. — THE  HIERARCHY           .  .  .85 

III.— THE  FREE                .                 .  .  .127 

§  1. — POLITICAL  LIBERALISM  .  .     128 

§2. — SOCIAL  LIBERALISM      .  .  .152 

§3. — HUMANE  LIBERALISM  .  .  .163 

PART  SECOND:  1                            .                 .  .  .201 

I.— OWNNKSS        .                 .                 .  .  .203 

II.— THE  OWNKH                     .                 .  .  .225 

I.— MY  POWER           .                 .  .  .242 

II. — MY  INTERCOURSE                 .  .  .     275 

III. — MY  SELF-ENJOYMENT          .  .  .425 

III.— THE  UNIQUE  ONE      .                 .  .  .484 

INDEX  .     491 


PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE 

For  more  than  twenty  years  I  have  entertained  the  design  of 
publishing  an  English  translation  of  "  Der  Einzige  und  sein 
Eigentum.1"     When  I  formed  this  design,  the  number  of 
English-speaking  persons  who  had  ever  heard  of  the  book  was 
very  limited.     The  memory  of  Max  Stirner  had  been  virtually 
extinct  for  an  entire  generation.     But  in  the  last  two  decades 
there  has  been  a  remarkable  revival  of  interest  both  in  the  book 
and  in  its  author.     It  began  in  this  country  with  a  discussion  in 
the  pages  of  the  Anarchist  periodical,  "  Liberty,"  in  which 
Stirner's  thought  was  clearly  expounded  and  vigorously  cham- 
pioned by  Dr.  James  L.  Walker,  who  adopted  for  this  discussion 
the  pseudonym  "  Tak  Kak."     At  that  time  Dr.  Walker  was  the 
chief  editorial  writer  for  the  Galveston  "  News."     Some  years 
later  he  became  a  practising  physician  in  Mexico,  where  he  died 
in  1904.     A  series  of  essays  which  he  began  in  an  Anarchist 
periodical,  "  Egoism,"  and  which  he  lived  to  complete,  was 
published  after  his  death  in  a  small  volume,  "  The  Philosophy 
of  Egoism."     It  is  a  very  able  and  convincing  exposition  of 
Stirner's  teachings,  and  almost  the  only  one  that  exists  in  the 
English  language.     But  the  chief  instrument  in  the  revival  of 
Stirnerism  was  and  is  the  German  poet,  John  Henry  Mackay. 
Very  early  in  his  career  he  met  Stirner's  name  in  Lange's  "  His- 
tory of  Materialism,"  and  was  moved  thereby  to  read  his  book. 
The  work  made  such  an  impression  on  him  that  he  resolved  to 
devote  a  portion  of  his  life  to  the  rediscovery  and  rehabilitation 
of  the  lost  and  forgotten  genius.     Through  years  of  toil  and  cor- 
respondence and  travel,  and  triumphing  over  tremendous  ob- 


viii  PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE 

stacles,  he  carried  his  task  to  completion,  and  his  biography  of 
Stirner  appeared  in  Berlin  in  1898.    It  is  a  tribute  to  the  thor- 
oughness of  Mackay's  work  that  since  its  publication  not  one  im- 
portant fact  about  Stirner  has  been  discovered  by  anybody. 
During  his  years  of  investigation  Mackay's  advertising  for  infor- 
mation had  created  a  new  interest  in  Stimer,  which  was  enhanced 
by  the  sudden  fame  of  the  writings  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  an 
author  whose  intellectual  kinship  with  Stirner  has  been  a  subject 
of  much  controversy.    "  Der  Einzige,"  previously  obtainable  only 
in  an  expensive  form,  was  included  in  Philipp  Reclam's  Uni- 
versal-Bibliothek,  and  this  cheap  edition  has  enjoyed  a  wide  and 
ever-increasing  circulation.     During  the  last  dozen  years  the 
book  has  been  translated  twice  into  French,  once  into  Italian, 
once  into  Russian,  and  possibly  into  other  languages.     The 
Scandinavian  critic,  Brandes,  has  written  on  Stirner.     A  large 
and  appreciative  volume,  entitled  "  L' '  Individnalisme  Anar- 
chiste:  Max  Stirner"  from  the  pen  of  Prof.  Victor  Basch,  of  the 
University  of  Rennes,  has  appeared  in  Paris.     Another  large 
and  sympathetic  volume,  "  Max  Stirner,"  written  by  Dr. 
Anselm  Ruest,  has  been  published  very  recently  in  Berlin.     Dr. 
Paul  Eltzbacher,  in  his  work,  "  Der  Anarchismus,"  gives  a 
chapter  to  Stirner,  making  him  one  of  the  seven  typical 
Anarchists,  beginning  with  William  Godwin  and  ending  with 
Tolstoi,  of  whom  his  book  treats.     There  is  hardly  a  notable 
magazine  or  a  review  on  the  Continent  that  has  not  given  at 
least  one  leading  article  to  the  subject  of  Stirner.     Upon  the 
initiative  of  Mackay  and  with  the  aid  of  other  admirers  a  suit- 
able stone  has  been  placed  above  the  philosopher's  previously- 
neglected  grave,  and  a  memorial  tablet  upon  the  house  in 
Berlin  where  he  died  in  1856 ;  and  this  spring  another  is  to 
be  placed  upon  the  house  in  Bayreuth  where  he  was  bom 
in  1806.     As  a  result  of  these  various  efforts,  and  though  but 
little  has  been  written  about  Stirner  in  the  English  language, 
his  name  is  now  known  at  least  to  thousands  in  America  and 
England  where  formerly  it  was  known  only  to  hundreds. 


PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE  ix 

Therefore  conditions  are  now  more  favorable  for  the  reception 
of  this  volume  than  they  were  when  I  formed  the  design  of 
publishing  it,  more  than  twenty  years  ago. 

The  problem  of  securing  a  reasonably  good  translation  (for  in 
the  case  of  a  work  presenting  difficulties  so  enormous  it  was  idle 
to  hope  for  an  adequate  translation)  was  finally  solved  by  en- 
trusting the  task  to  Steven  T.  Byington,  a  scholar  of  remark- 
able attainments,  whose  specialty  is  philology,  and  who  is 
also  one  of  the  ablest  workers  in  the  propaganda  of  Anarch- 
ism.    But,  for  further  security  from  error,  it  was  agreed  with 
Mr.  Byington  that  his  translation  should  have  the  benefit  of 
revision  by  Dr.  Walker,  the  most  thorough  American  student  of 
Stirner,  and  by  Emma  Heller  Schumm  and  George  Schumm, 
who  are  not  only  sympathetic  with  Stirner,  but  familiar  with  the 
history  of  his  time,  and  who  enjoy  a  knowledge  of  English  and 
German  that  makes  it  difficult  to  decide  which  is  their  native 
tongue.     It  was  also  agreed  that,  upon  any  point  of  difference 
between  the  translator  and  his  revisers  which  consultation 
might  fail  to  solve,  the  publisher  should  decide.     This  method 
has  been  followed,  and  in  a  considerable  number  of  instances  it 
has  fallen  to  me  to  make  a  decision.     It  is  only  fair  to  say, 
therefore,  that  the  responsibility  for  special  errors  and  imperfec- 
tions properly  rests  on  my  shoulders,  whereas,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  credit  for  whatever  general  excellence  the  translation  may 
possess  belongs  with  the  same  propriety  to  Mr.  Byington  and  his 
coadjutors.     One  thing  is  certain :  its  defects  are  due  to  no  lack 
of  loving  care  and  pains.     And  I  think  I  may  add  with  confi- 
dence, while  realizing  fully  how  far  short  of  perfection  it  neces- 
sarily falls,  that  it  may  safely  challenge  comparison  with  the 
translations  that  have  been  made  into  other  languages. 

In  particular,  I  am  responsible  for  the  admittedly  erroneous 
rendering  of  the  title.     "  The  Ego  and  His  Own  "  is  not  an  exact 
English  equivalent  of  "  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigenium."     But 
then,  there  is  no  exact  English  equivalent.     Perhaps  the  nearest 
U  "  The  Unique  One  and  His  Property."     But  the  unique  one  is 


x  PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE 

not  strictly  the  Einzige,  for  uniqueness  connotes  not  only  single- 
ness but  an  admirable  singleness,  while  Stirner's  Einzigkeit  is  ad- 
mirable in  his  eyes  only  as  such,  it  being  no  part  of  the  purpose 
of  his  book  to  distinguish  a  particular  Einzigkeit  as  more  excel- 
lent than  another.    Moreover,  "  The  Unique  One  and  His  Prop- 
erty "  has  no  graces  to  compel  our  forgiveness  of  its  slight  inac- 
curacy.   It  is  clumsy  and  unattractive.     And  the  same  objections 
may  be  urged  with  still  greater  force  against  all  the  other  render- 
ings that  have  been  suggested, — "  The  Single  One  and  His 
Property,"  "  The  Only  One  and  His  Property,"  "  The  Lone  One 
and  His  Property,"  "  The  Unit  and  His  Property,"  and,  last 
and  least  and  worst,  "  The  Individual  and  His  Prerogative." 
"  The  Ego  and  His  Own,"  on  the  other  hand,  if  not  a  precise 
rendering,  is  at  least  an  excellent  title  in  itself;  excellent  by  its 
euphony,  its  monosyllabic  incisiveness,  and  its  telling — Einzigkeit. 
Another  strong  argument  in  its  favor  is  the  emphatic  correspond- 
ence of  the  phrase  "his  own  "  with  Mr.  Byington's  renderings 
of  the  kindred  words,  Eigenheit  and  Signer.     Moreover,  no 
reader  will  be  led  astray  who  bears  in  mind  Stirner's  distinction  : 
"  I  am  not  an  ego  along  with  other  egos,  but  the  sole  ego; 
I  am  unique."     And,  to  help  the  reader  to  bear  this  in  mind,  the 
various  renderings  of  the  word  Einzige  that  occur  through  the 
volume  a.re  often  accompanied  by  foot-notes  showing  that,  in  the 
German,  one  and  the  same  word  does  duty  for  all. 

If  the  reader  finds  the  first  quarter  of  this  book  somewhat 
forbidding  and  obscure,  he  is  advised  nevertheless  not  to 
falter.     Close  attention  will  master  almost  every  difficulty, 
and,  if  he  will  but  give  it,  he  will  find  abundant  reward  in  what 
follows.     For  his  guidance  I  may  specify  one  defect  in  the 
author's  style.     When  controverting  a  view  opposite  to  his  own, 
he  seldom  distinguishes  with  sufficient  clearness  his  statement  of 
his  own  view  from  his  re-statement  of  the  antagonistic  view. 
As  a  result,  the  reader  is  plunged  into  deeper  and  deeper  mystifi- 
cation, until  something  suddenly  reveals  the  cause  of  his  mis- 
understanding, after  which  he  must  go  back  and  read  again.     I 


PUBLISHER'S  PREFACE  xi 

therefore  put  him  on  his  guard.     The  other  difficulties  lie,  as  a 
rule,  in  the  structure  of  the  work.     As  to  these  I  can  hardly  do 
better  than  translate  the  following  passage  from  Prof.  Basch's 
book,  alluded  to  above:  "There  is  nothing  more  disconcerting 
than  the  first  approach  to  this  strange  work.     Stirner  does  not 
condescend  to  inform  us  as  to  the  architecture  of  his  edifice,  or 
furnish  us  the  slightest  guiding  thread.     The  apparent  divisions 
of  the  book  are  few  and  misleading.     From  the  first  page  to  the 
last  a  unique  thought  circulates,  but  it  divides  itself  among  an 
infinity  of  vessels  and  arteries  in  each  of  which  runs  a  blood  so 
rich  in  ferments  that  one  is  tempted  to  describe  them  all.     There 
is  no  progress  in  the  development,  and  the  repetitions  are  in- 
numerable      The  reader  who  is  not  de- 
terred by  this  oddity,  or  rather  absence,  of  composition  gives 
proof  of  genuine  intellectual  courage.     At  first  one  seems  to  be 
confronted  with  a  collection  of  essays  strung  together,  with  a 

throng  of  aphorisms But,  if  you  read  this 

book  several  times;  if,  after  having  penetrated  the  intimacy  of 
each  of  its  parts,  you  then  traverse  it  as  a  whole,— gradually 
the  fragments  weld  themselves  together,  and  Stirner's  thought 
is  revealed  in  all  its  unity,  in  all  its  force,  and  in  all  its  depth." 

A  word  about  the  dedication.     Mackay's  investigations  have 
brought  to  light  that  Marie  Daehnhardt  had  nothing  whatever 
in  common  with  Stirner,  and  so  was  unworthy  of  the  honor  con- 
ferred upon  her.     She  was  no  Eigene.     I  therefore  reproduce  the 
dedication  merely  in  the  interest  of  historical  accuracy. 

Happy  as  I  am  in  the  appearance  of  this  book,  my  joy  is  not 
unmixed  with  sorrow.     The  cherished  project  was  as  dear  to  the 
heart  of  Dr.  Walker  as  to  mine,  and  I  deeply  grieve  that  he  is 
no  longer  with  us  to  share  our  delight  in  the  fruition.     Nothing, 
however,  can  rob  us  of  the  masterly  introduction  that  he  wrote 
for  this  volume  (in  1903,  or  perhaps  earlier),  from  which  I  will 
not  longer  keep  the  reader.     This  introduction,  no  more  than 
the  book  itself,  shall  that  Elnzige,  Death,  make  his  Eigeiittim. 

February,  1907.  B.  R.  T. 


INTRODUCTION 

Fifty  years  sooner  or  later  can  make  little  difference  in  the 
case  of  a  book  so  revolutionary  as  this. 

It  saw  the  light  when  a  so-called  revolutionary  movement  was 
preparing  in  men's  minds,  which  agitation  was,  however,  only  a 
disturbance  due  to  desires  to  participate  in  government,  and  to 
govern  and  to  be  governed,  in  a  manner  different  to  that  which 
prevails.     The  "  revolutionists  "  of  1848  were  bewitched  with  an 
idea.     They  were  not  at  all  the  masters  of  ideas.     Most  of  those 
who  since  that  time  have  prided  themselves  upon  being  revolu- 
tionists have  been  and  are  likewise  but  the  bondmen  of  an  idea, 
—  that  of  the  different  lodgment  of  authority. 

The  temptation  is,  of  course,  present  to  attempt  an  explana- 
tion of  the  central  thought  of  this  work;  but  such  an  effort  ap- 
pears to  be  unnecessary  to  one  who  has  the  volume  in  his  hand. 
The  author's  care  in  illustrating  his  meaning  shows  that  he  real- 
ized how  prone  the  possessed  man  is  to  misunderstand  whatever 
is  not  moulded  according  to  the  fashions  in  thinking.     The 
author's  learning  was  considerable,  his  command  of  words  and 
ideas  may  never  be  excelled  by  another,  and  he  judged  it  needful 
to  develop  his  argument  in  manifold  ways.     So  those  who  enter 
into  the  spirit  of  it  will  scarcely  hope  to  impress  others  with  the 
same  conclusion  in  a  more  summary  manner.     Or,  if  one  might 
deem  that  possible  after  reading  Stirner,  still  one  cannot  think 
that  it  could  be  done  so  surely.     The  author  has  made  certain 
work  of  it,  even  though  he  has  to  wait  for  his  public ;  but  still, 
the  reception  of  the  book  by  its  critics  amply  proves  the  truth  of 
the  saying  that  one  can  give  another  arguments,  but  not  under- 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

standing.     The  system-makers  and  system-believers  thus  far  can- 
not get  it  out  of  their  heads  that  any  discourse  about  the  nature 
of  an  ego  must  turn  upon  the  common  characteristics  of  egos,  to 
make  a  systematic  scheme  of  what  they  share  as  a  generality. 
The  critics  inquire  what  kind  of  man  the  author  is  talking  about. 
They  repeat  the  question :  What  does  he  believe  in  ?     They  fail 
to  grasp  the  purport  of  the  recorded  answer:   "  I  believe  in  my- 
self " ;  which  is  attributed  to  a  common  soldier  long  before  the 
time  of  Stirner.     They  ask,  What  is  the  principle  of  the  self- 
conscious  egoist, — the  Einzige  ?    To  this  perplexity  Stirner  says : 
Change  the  question ;  put  "  who  ?"  instead  of  "  what  ?  "  and  an 
answer  can  then  be  given  by  naming  him  ! 

This,  of  course,  is  too  simple  for  persons  governed  by  ideas, 
and  for  persons  in  quest  of  new  governing  ideas.     They  wish  to 
classify  the  man.     Now,  that  in  me  which  you  can  classify  is  not 
my  distinguishing  self.     "  Man  "  is  the  horizon  or  zero  of  my 
existence  as  an  individual.     Over  that  I  rise  as  I  can.     At  least 
I  am  something  more  than  "man  in  general."     Pre-existing  wor- 
ship of  ideals  and  disrespect  for  self  had  made  of  the  ego  at  the 
very  most  a  Somebody,  oftener  an  empty  vessel  to  be  filled  with 
the  grace  or  the  leavings  of  a  tyrannous  doctrine ;  thus  a  No- 
body.    Stirner  dispels  the  morbid  subjection,  and  recognizes 
each  one  who  knows  and  feels  himself  as  his  own  property  to  be 
neither  humble  Nobody  nor  befogged  Somebody,  but  henceforth 
flat-footed  and  level-headed  Mr.  Thisbody,  who  has  a  character 
and  good  pleasure  of  his  own,  just  as  he  has  a  name  of  his  own. 

The  critics  who  attacked  this  work  and  were  answered  in  the 
author's  minor  writings,  rescued  from  oblivion  by  John  Henry 
Mackay,  nearly  all  display  the  most  astonishing  triviality  and 
impotent  malice. 

We  owe  to  Dr.  Eduard  von  Hartmann  the  unquestionable 
service  which  he  rendered  by  directing  attention  to  this  book  in 
his  "  Philoaophie  des  Unbewussten ,"  the  first  edition  of  which 
was  published  in  1869,  and  in  other  writings.     I  do  not  begrudge 
Dr.  von  Hartmann  the  liberty  of  criticism  which  he  used ;  and  I 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

think  the  admirers  of  Stirner's  teaching  must  quite  appreciate 
one  thing  which  Von  Hartmann  did  at  a  much  later  date.  In 
"  Der  Eigene  "  of  August  10,  1896,  there  appeared  a  letter  writ- 
ten by  him  and  giving,  among  other  things,  certain  data  from 
which  to  judge  that,  when  Friedrich  Nietzsche  wrote  his  later 
essays,  Nietzsche  was  not  ignorant  of  Stirner's  book. 

Von  Hartmann  wishes  that  Stirner  had  gone  on  and  developed 
his  principle.     Von  Hartmann  suggests  that  you  and  I  are  really 
the  same  spirit,  looking  out  through  two  pairs  of  eyes.     Then, 
one  may  reply,  I  need  not  concern  myself  about  you,  for  in  my- 
self I  have— us ;  and  at  that  rate  Von  Hartmann  is  merely  accus- 
ing himself  of  inconsistency :  for,  when  Stirner  wrote  this  book, 
Von  Hartmann's  spirit  was  writing  it;  and  it  is  just  the  pity  that 
Von  Hartmann  in  his  present  form  does  not  indorse  what  he  said 
in'  the  form  of  Stirner, — that  Stirner  was  different  from  any  other 
man ;  that  his  ego  was  not  Fichte's  transcendental  generality, 
but  "  this  transitory  ego  of  flesh  and  blood."     It  is  not  as  a  gen- 
erality that  you  and  I  differ,  but  as  a  couple  of  facts  which  are 
not  to  be  reasoned  into  one.     "  I  "  is  somewise  Hartmann,  and 
thus  Hartmann  is  "  I  " ;  but  I  am  not  Hartmann,  and  Hartmann 
is  not— I.     Neither  am  I  the  "  I  "  of  Stirner;  only  Stirner  him- 
self was  Stirner's  "I."     Note  how  comparatively  indifferent  a 
matter  it  is  with  Stirner  that  one  is  an  ego,  but  how  all-impor- 
tant it  is  that  one  be  a  self-conscious  ego, — a  self-conscious,  self- 
willed  person. 

Those  not  self-conscious  and  self-willed  are  constantly  acting 
from  self-interested  motives,  but  clothing  these  in  various  garbs. 
Watch  those  people  closely  in  the  light  of  Stirner's  teaching, 
and  they  seem  to  be  hypocrites,  they  have  so  many  good  moral 
and  religious  plans  of  which  self-interest  is  at  the  end  and  bot- 
tom ;  but  they,  we  may  believe,  do  not  know  that  this  is  more 
than  a  coincidence. 

In  Stirner  we  have  the  philosophical  foundation  for  political 
liberty.  His  interest  in  the  practical  development  of  egoism  to 
the  dissolution  of  the  State  and  the  union  of  free  men  is  clear 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

and  pronounced,  and  harmonizes  perfectly  with  the  economic 
philosophy  of  Josiah  Warren.     Allowing  for  difference  of  tem- 
perament and  language,  there  is  a  substantial  agreement  be- 
tween Stirner  and  Proudhon.     Each  would  be  free,  and  sees  in 
every  increase  of  the  number  of  free  people  and  their  intelli- 
gence an  auxiliary  force  against  the  oppressor.     But,  on  the 
other  hand,  will  any  one  for  a  moment  seriously  contend  that 
Nietzsche  and  Proudhon  march  together  in  general  aim  and  ten- 
dency,— that  they  have  anything  in  common  except  the  daring 
to  profane  the  shrine  and  sepulchre  of  superstition  ? 

Nietzsche  has  been  much  spoken  of  as  a  disciple  of  Stirner, 
and,  owing  to  favorable  cullings  from  Nietzsche's  writings,  it 
has  occurred  that  one  of  his  books  has  been  supposed  to  contain 
more  sense  than  it  really  does — so  long  as  one  had  read  only  the 
extracts. 

Nietzsche  cites  scores  or  hundreds  of  authors.     Had  he  read 
everything,  and  not  read  Stirner  ? 

But  Nietzsche  is  as  unlike  Stirner  as  a  tight-rope  performance 
is  unlike  an  algebraic  equation. 

Stirner  loved  liberty  for  himself,  and  loved  to  see  any  and  all 
men  and  women  taking  liberty,  and  he  had  no  lust  of  power. 
Democracy  to  him  was  sham  liberty,  egoism  the  genuine  liberty. 

Nietzsche,  on  the  contrary,  pours  out  his  contempt  upon 
democracy  because  it  is  not  aristocratic.     He  is  predatory  to 
the  point  of  demanding  that  those  who  must  succumb  to  feline 
rapacity  shall  be  taught  to  submit  with  resignation.     When  he 
speaks  of  "  Anarchistic  dogs  "  scouring  the  streets  of  great  civi- 
lized cities,  it  is  true,  the  context  shows  that  he  means  the  Com- 
munists ;  but  his  worship  of  Napoleon,  his  bathos  of  anxiety  for 
the  rise  of  an  aristocracy  that  shall  rule  Europe  for  thousands  of 
years,  his  idea  of  treating  women  in  the  oriental  fashion,  show 
that  Nietzsche  has  struck  out  in  a  very  old  path — doing  the 
apotheosis  of  tyranny.     We  individual  egoistic  Anarchists,  how- 
ever, may  say  to  the  Nietzsche  school,  so  as  not  to  be  misunder- 
•tood  :  We  do  not  ask  of  the  Napoleons  to  have  pity,  nor  of  the 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

predatory  barons  to  do  justice.     They  will  find  it  convenient  for 
their  own  welfare  to  make  terms  with  men  who  have  learned  of 
Stirner  what  a  man  can  be  who  worships  nothing,  bears  alle- 
giance to  nothing.     To  Nietzsche's  rhodomontade  of  eagles  in 
baronial  form,  bom  to  prey  on  industrial  lambs,  we  rather  taunt 
ingly  oppose  the  ironical  question  :  Where  are  your  claws  ? 
What  if  the  "  eagles  "  are  found  to  be  plain  barnyard  fowls  on 
which  more  silly  fowls  have  fastened  steel  spurs  to  hack  the  vic- 
tims, who,  however,  have  the  power  to  disarm  the  sham 
"  eagles  "  between  two  suns  ? 

Stirner  shows  that  men  make  their  tyrants  as  they  make  theii 
gods,  and  his  purpose  is  to  unmake  tyrants. 

Nietzsche  dearly  loves  a  tyrant. 

In  style  Stirner's  work  offers  the  greatest  possible  contrast  to 
the  puerile,  padded  phraseology  of  Nietzsche's  "  Zarathustra  " 
and  its  false  imagery.     Who  ever  imagined  such  an  unnatural 
conjuncture  as  an  eagle  "  toting  "  a  serpent  in  friendship  ?  which 
performance  is  told  of  in  bare  words,  but  nothing  comes  of  it. 
In  Stirner  we  are  treated  to  an  enlivening  and  earnest  discussion 
addressed  to  serious  minds,  and  every  reader  feels  that  the  word 
i3  to  him,  for  his  instruction  and  benefit,  so  far  as  he  has  mental 
independence  and  courage  to  take  it  and  use  it.    The  startling 
intrepidity  of  this  book  is  infused  with  a  whole-hearted  love  for 
all  mankind,  as  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  author  shows  not 
one  iota  of  prejudice  or  any  idea  of  division  of  men  into  ranks. 
He  would  lay  aside  government,  but  would  establish  any  regula- 
tion deemed  convenient,  and  for  this  only  our  convenience  is 
consulted.    Thus  there  will  be  general  liberty  only  when  the  dis- 
position toward  tyranny  is  met  by  intelligent  opposition  that  will 
po  longer  submit  to  such  a  rule.     Beyond  this  the  manly  sym- 
pathy and  philosophical  bent  of  Stirner  are  such  that  rulership 
appears  by  contrast  a  vanity,  an  infatuation  of  perverted  pride. 
We  know  not  whether  we  more  admire  our  author  or  more  love 
him. 

Stimer's  attitude  toward  woman  is  not  special.    She  is  an  in- 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

dividual  if  she  can  be,  not  handicapped  by  anything  he  says, 
feels,  thinks,  or  plans.     This  was  more  fully  exemplified  in  his 
life  than  even  in  this  book ;  but  there  is  not  a  line  in  the  book  to 
put  or  keep  woman  in  an  inferior  position  to  man,  neither  is 
there  anything  of  caste  or  aristocracy  in  the  book. 

Likewise  there  is  nothing  of  obscurantism  or  affected  mystic- 
ism about  it.     Everything  in  it  is  made  as  plain  as  the  author 
could  make  it.     He  who  does  not  so  is  not  Stirner's  disciple  nor 
successor  nor  co-worker. 

Some  one  may  ask  :  How  does  plumb-line  Anarchism  train 
with  the  unbridled  egoism  proclaimed  by  Stirner  ?     The  plumb- 
line  is  not  a  fetish,  but  an  intellectual  conviction,  and  egoism  is 
a  universal  fact  of  animal  life.     Nothing  could  seem  clearer  to 
my  mind  than  that  the  reality  of  egoism  must  first  come  into  the 
consciousness  of  men,  before  we  can  have  the  unbiased  Einziye 
in  place  of  the  prejudiced  biped  who  lends  himself  to  the  sup- 
port of  tyrannies  a  million  times  stronger  over  me  than  the  nat- 
ural self-interest  of  any  individual.     When  plumb-line  doctrine 
is  misconceived  as  duty  between  unequal-minded  men, — as  a  reli- 
gion of  humanity, —  it  is  indeed  the  confusion  of  trying  to  read 
without  knowing  the  alphabet  and  of  putting  philanthropy  in 
place  of  contract.     But,  if  the  plumb-line  be  scientific,  it  is  or 
can  be  my  possession,  my  property,  and  I  choose  it  for  its  use — 
when  circumstances  admit  of  its  use.     I  do  not  feel  bmind  to  use 
it  because  it  is  scientific,  in  building  my  house;  but,  as  my  will, 
to  be  intelligent,  is  not  to  be  merely  wilful,  the  adoption  of  the 
plumb-line  follows  the  discarding  of  incantations.     There  is  no 
plumb-line  without  the  unvarying  lead  at  the  end  of  the  line ; 
not  a  fluttering  bird  or  a  clawing  cat. 

On  the  practical  side  of  the  question  of  egoism  versus  self-sur- 
render and  for  a  trial  of  egoism  in  politics,  this  may  be  said :  the 
belief  that  men  not  moved  by  a  sense  of  duty  will  be  unkind  or 
unjust  to  others  is  but  an  indirect  confession  that  those  who  hold 
that  belief  are  greatly  interested  in  having  others  live  for  them 
rather  than  for  themselves.     But  I  do  not  ask  or  expect  so  much. 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

I  am  content  if  others  individually  live  for  themselves,  and  thus 
cease  in  so  many  ways  to  act  in  opposition  to  my  living  for  my- 
self,— to  our  living  for  ourselves. 

If  Christianity  has  failed  to  turn  the  world  from  evil,  it  is  not 
to  be  dreamed  that  rationalism  of  a  pious  moral  stamp  will  suc- 
ceed in  the  same  task.     Christianity,  or  all  philanthropic  love,  is 
tested  in  non-resistance.     It  is  a  dream  that  example  will  change 
the  hearts  of  rulers,  tyrants,  mobs.     If  the  extremest  self-surren- 
der fails,  how  can  a  mixture  of  Christian  love  and  worldly  cau- 
tion succeed  ?     This  at  least  must  be  given  up.     The  policy  of 
Christ  and  Tolstoi  can  soon  be  tested,  but  Tolstoi's  belief  is  not 
satisfied  with  a  present  test  and  failure.     He  has  the  infatuation 
of  one  who  persists  because  this  ought  to  be.     The  egoist  who 
thinks  "  I  should  like  this  to  be  "  still  has  the  sense  to  perceive 
that  it  is  not  accomplished  by  the  fact  of  some  believing  and 
submitting,  inasmuch  as  others  are  alert  to  prey  upon  the  un- 
resisting.    The  Pharaohs  we  have  ever  with  us. 

Several  passages  in  this  most  remarkable  book  show  the  au- 
thor as  a  man  full  of  sympathy.  When  we  reflect  upon  his  de- 
liberately expressed  opinions  and  sentiments, — his  spurning  of 
the  sense  of  moral  obligation  as  the  last  form  of  superstition, — 
may  we  not  be  warranted  in  thinking  that  the  total  disappear- 
ance of  the  sentimental  supposition  of  duty  liberates  a  quantity 
of  nervous  energy  for  the  purest  generosity  and  clarifies  the  in- 
tellect for  the  more  discriminating  choice  of  objects  of  merit  ? 

J.  L.  WALKER. 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE 

If  the  style  of  this  book  is  found  unattractive,  it  will  show 
that  I  have  done  my  work  ill  and  not  represented  the  author 
truly ;  but,  if  it  is  found  odd,  I  beg  that  I  may  not  bear  all  the 
blame.     I  have  simply  tried  to  reproduce  the  author's  own  mix- 
ture of  colloquialisms  and  technicalities,  and  his  preference  for 
the  precise  expression  of  his  thought  rather  than  the  word  con- 
ventionally expected. 

One  especial  feature  of  the  style,  however,  gives  the  reason 
why  this  preface  should  exist.     It  is  characteristic  of  Stirner's 
writing  that  the  thread  of  thought  is  carried  on  largely  by  the 
repetition  of  the  same  word  in  a  modified  form  or  sense.     That 
connection  of  ideas  which  has  guided  popular  instinct  in  the 
formation  of  words  is  made  to  suggest  the  line  of  thought  which 
the  writer  wishes  to  follow.     If  this  echoing  of  words  is  missed, 
the  bearing  of  the  statements  on  each  other  is  in  a  measure  lost ; 
and,  where  the  ideas  are  very  new,  one  cannot  afford  to  throw 
away  any  help  in  following  their  connection.     Therefore,  where 
a  useful  echo  (and  there  are  few  useless  ones  in  the  b»ok)  could 
not  be  reproduced  in  English,  I  have  generally  called  attention 
to  it  in  a  note.     My  notes  are  distinguished  from  the  author's  by 
being  enclosed  in  brackets. 

One  or  two  of  such  coincidences  of  language,  occurring  in 
words  which  are  prominent  throughout  the  book,  should  be 
borne  constantly  in  mind  as  a  sort  of  Keri  perpetuum  :  for  in- 
stance, the  identity  in  the  original  of  the  words  "  spirit"  and 
"  mind,"  and  of  the  phrases  "  supreme  being  "  and  "  highest 
essence."     In  such  cases  I  have  repeated  the  note  where  it 


xx  TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE 

seemed  that  such  repetition  might  be  absolutely  necessary,  but 
have  trusted  the  reader  to  carry  it  in  his  head  where  a  failure  of 
his  memory  would  not  be  ruinous  or  likely. 

For  the  same  reason, — that  is,  in  order  not  to  miss  any  indi- 
cation of  the  drift  of  the  thought, — I  have  followed  the  original 
in  the  very  liberal  use  of  italics,  and  in  the  occasional  eccentric 
use  of  a  punctuation  mark,  as  I  might  not  have  done  in  transla- 
ting a  work  of  a  different  nature. 

I  have  set  my  face  as  a  flint  against  the  temptation  to  add 
notes  that  were  not  part  of  the  translation.     There  is  no  telling 
how  much  I  might  have  enlarged  the  book  if  I  had  put  a  note  at 
every  sentence  which  deserved  to  have  its  truth  brought  out  by 
fuller  elucidation, — or  even  at  every  one  which  I  thought  needed 
correction.     It  might  have  been  within  my  province,  if  I  had 
been  able,  to  explain  all  the  allusions  to  contemporary  events, 
but  I  doubt  whether  any  one  could  do  that  properly  without 
having  access  to  the  files  of  three  or  four  well-chosen  German 
newspapers  of  Stirner's  time.     The  allusions  are  clear  enough, 
without  names  and  dates,  to  give  a  vivid  picture  of  certain 
aspects  of  German  life  then.     The  tone  of  some  of  them  is  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  that  the  book  was  published  under 
censorship. 

I  have  usually  preferred,  for  the  sake  of  the  connection,  to 
translate  Biblical  quotations  somewhat  as  they  stand  in  the  Ger- 
man, rather  than  conform  them  altogether  to  the  English  Bible. 
I  am  sometimes  quite  as  near  the  original  Greek  as  if  I  had  fol- 
lowed the  current  translation. 

Where  German  books  are  referred  to,  the  pages  cited  are 
those  of  the  German  editions  even  when  (usually  because  of 
some  allusions  in  the  text)  the  titles  of  the  books  are  translated. 

STEVEN  T.  BYINGTON. 


THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


All  Things  are  Nothing  to  Me  * 

What  is  not  supposed  to  be  my  concern  f!      First 
and  foremost,  the  Good  Cause,:}:  then  God's  cause,  the 
cause  of  mankind,  of  truth,  of  freedom,  of  humanity, 
of  justice;   further,  the  cause  of  my  people,  my  prince, 
my  fatherland;  finally,  even  the  cause  of  Mind,  and  a 
thousand  other  causes.     Only  my  cause  is  never  to  be 
my  concern.     "  Shame  on  the  egoist  who  thinks  only 
of  himself!" 

Let  us  look  and  see,  then,  how  they  manage  their 
concerns — they  for  whose  cause  we  are  to  labor,  devote 
ourselves,  and  grow  enthusiastic. 

You  have  much  profound  information  to  give 
about  God,  and  have  for  thousands  of  years  "  searched 
the  depths  of  the  Godhead,"  and  looked  into  its  heart, 
so  that  you  can  doubtless  tell  us  how  God  himself  at- 
tends to  "  God's  cause,"  which  we  are  called  to  serve. 
And  you  do  not  conceal  the  Lord's  doings,  either. 
Now,  what  is  his  cause  ?      Has  he,  as  is  demanded  .of 
us,  made  an  alien  cause,  the  cause  of  truth  or  love,  his 
own  ?     You  are  shocked  by  this  misunderstanding, 


*L"Ich  hab'  Mein'  Sach'  aufNichts  gestellt,"  first  line  of  Goethe's 
poem,  Vanitas !  Vanitatum  Vanitas  !  "  Literal  translation  :  "  I  have 
my  affair  on  nothing."] 

t  [Sache]  t  [Sache] 


4  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

and  you  instruct  us  that  God's  cause  is  indeed  the 
cause  of  truth  and  love,  but  that  this  cause  cannot  be 
called  alien  to  him,  because  God  is  himself  truth  and 
love;  you  are  shocked  by  the  assumption  that  God 
could  be  like  us  poor  worms  in  furthering  an  alien 
cause  as  his  own.     "  Should  God  take  up  the  cause  of 
truth  if  he  were  not  himself  truth?"     He  cares  only 
for  his  cause,  but,  because  he  is  all  in  all,  therefore  all 
is  his  cause!      But  we,  we  are  not  all  in  all,  and  our 
cause  is  altogether  little  and  contemptible;  therefore 
we  must  "  serve  a  higher  cause." — Now  it  is  clear, 
God  cares  only  for  what  is  his,  busies  himself  only 
with  himself,  thinks  only  of  himself,  and  has  only 
himself  before  his  eyes;  woe  to  all  that  is  not  well- 
pleasing  to  him!      He  serves  no  higher  person,  and 
satisfies  only  himself.     His  cause  is — a  purely  egoistic 


How  is  it  with  mankind,  whose  cause  we  are  to 
make  our  own  ?     Is  its  cause  that  of  another,  and  does 
mankind  serve  a  higher  cause  ?      No,  mankind  looks 
only  at  itself,  mankind  will  promote  the  interests  of 
mankind  only,  mankind  is  its  own  cause.     That  it 
may  develop,  it  causes  nations  and  individuals  to  wear 
themselves  out  in  its  service,  and,  when  they  have  ac- 
complished what  mankind  needs,  it  throws  them  on  the 
dung-heap  of  history  in  gratitude.     Is  not  mankind's 
cause — a  purely  egoistic  cause  ? 

I  have  no  need  to  take  up  each  thing  that  wants  to 
throw  its  cause  on  us  and  show  that  it  is  occupied  only 
with  itself,  not  with  us,  only  with  its  good,  not  with 
ours.     Look  at  the  rest  for  yourselves.     Do  truth, 
freedom,  humanity,  justice,  desire  anything  else  than 


ALL  THINGS  ARE  NOTHING  TO  ME       5 

that  you  grow  enthusiastic  and  serve  them  ? 

They  all  have  an  admirable  time  of  it  when  they 
receive  zealous  homage.     Just  observe  the  nation  that 
is  defended  by  devoted  patriots.     The  patriots  fall  in 
bloody  battle  or  in  the  fight  with  hunger  and  want; 
what  does  the  nation  care  for  that  ?     By  the  manure  of 
their  corpses  the  nation  comes  to  "  its  bloom !  "     The 
individuals  have  died  "  for  the  great  cause  of  the  na- 
tion," and  the  nation  sends  some  words  of  thanks  after 
them  and — has  the  profit  of  it.     I  call  that  a  paying 
kind  of  egoism. 

But  only  look  at  that  Sultan  who  cares  so  lovingly 
for  his  people.      Is  he  not  pure  unselfishness  itself,  and 
does  he  not  hourly  sacrifice  himself  for  his  people  ? 
Oh,  yes,  for  "  his  people."     Just  try  it;  show  yourself 
not  as  his,  but  as  your  own;    for  breaking  away  from 
his  egoism  you  will  take  a  trip  to  jail.     The  Sultan 
has  set  his  cause  on  nothing  but  himself;  he  is  to 
himself  all  in  all,  he  is  to  himself  the  only  one,  and 
tolerates  nobody  who  would  dare  not  to  be  one  of  "  his 
people." 

And  will  you  not  learn  by  these  brilliant  examples 
that  the  egoist  gets  on  best  ?      I  for  my  part  take 
a  lesson  from  them,  and  propose,  instead  of  further 
unselfishly  serving  those  great  egoists,  rather  to  be  the 
egoist  myself. 

God  and  mankind  have  concerned  themselves  for 
nothing,  for  nothing  but  themselves.  Let  me  then 
likewise  concern  myself  for  myself,  who  am  equally 
with  God  the  nothing  of  all  others,  who  am  my  all, 
who  am  the  only  one.* 

*  [d«r  Einzige] 


6  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

If  God,  if  mankind,  as  you  affirm,  have  substance 
enough  in  themselves  to  be  all  in  all  to  themselves, 
then  I  feel  that  /  shall  still  less  lack  that,  and  that  I 
shall  have  no  complaint  to  make  of  my  "  emptiness." 
I  am  nothing  in  the  sense  of  emptiness,  but  I  am  the 
creative  nothing,  the  nothing  out  of  which  I  myself  as 
creator  create  everything. 

Away,  then,  with  every  concern  that  is  not  alto- 
gether my  concern !      You  think  at  least  the  "  good 
cause  "  must  be  my  concern  ?     What's  good,  what's 
bad  ?      Why,  I  myself  am  my  concern,  and  I  am  nei- 
ther good  nor  bad.     Neither  has  meaning  for  me. 

The  divine  is  God's  concern  ;  the  human,  man's. 
My  concern  is  neither  the  divine  nor  the  human,  not 
the  true,  good,  just,  free,  etc.,  but  solely  what  is  mine, 
and  it  is  not  a  general  one,  but  is — unique,*  as  I  am 
unique. 

Nothing  is  more  to  me  than  myself ! 

*  [einzip] 


Part  First 


Man  is  to  man  the  supreme  beisui ,  says  Feuerbach. 
Man  has  just  been  discovered,  says  Bruno  Bauer. 

Then  let  us  take  a  more  careful  look  at  this  supreme  being  and 

this  new  discovery. 


A  HUMAN  LIFE 

From  the  moment  when  he  catches  sight  of  the  light 
of  the  world  a  man  seeks  to  find  out  himself  a,nd  get 
hold  of  himself  out  of  its  confusion,  in  which  he,  with 
everything  else,  is  tossed  about  in  motley  mixture. 

But  everything  that  comes  in  contact  with  the  child 
defends  itself  in  turn  against  his  attacks,  and  asserts 
its  own  persistence. 

Accordingly,  because  each  thing  cares  for  itself 
and  at  the  same  time  comes  into  constant  collision 
with  other  things,  the  combat  of  self-assertion  is  un- 
avoidable. 

Victory  or  defeat — between  the  two  alternatives  the 
fate  of  the  combat  wavers.     The  victor  becomes  the 
lord,  the  vanquished  one  the  subject :  the  former  exer- 
cises supremacy  and  "  rights  of  supremacy,"  the  latter 
fulfils  in  awe  and  deference  the  "  duties  of  a  subject." 

But  both  remain  enemies,  and  always  lie  in  wait: 
they  watch  for  each  other's  weaknesses — children  for 
those  of  their  parents  and  parents  for  those  of  their 
children  (e.  g.  their  fear) ;  either  the  stick  conquers 
the  man,  or  the  man  conquers  the  stick. 

In  childhood  liberation  takes  the  direction  of  trying 
to  get  to  the  bottom  of  things,  to  get  at  what  is  "  back 


10  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

of"  things;  therefore  we  spy  out  the  weak  points  ol 
everybody,  for  which,  it  is  well  known,  children  have  a 
sure  instinct;  therefore  we  like  to  smash  things,  like  to 
rummage  through  hidden  corners,  pry  after  what  is 
covered  up  or  out  of  the  way,  and  try  what  we  can  do 
with  everything.     When  we  once  get  at  what  is  back 
of  the  things,  we  know  we  are  safe;  when,  e.  g.,  we 
have  got  at  the  fact  that  the  rod  is  too  weak  against 
our  obduracy,  then  we  no  longer  fear  it,  "  have  out- 
grown it." 

Back  of  the  rod,  mightier  than  it,  stands  our — ob- 
duracy, our  obdurate  courage.     By  degrees  we  get  at 
what  is  back  of  everything  that  was  mysterious  and 
uncanny  to  us,  the  mysteriously-dreaded  might  of  the 
rod,  the  father's  stern  look,  etc.,  and  back  of  all  we 
find  our — ataraxy,  i.  e.  imperturbability,  intrepidity, 
our  counter  force,  our  odds  of  strength,  our  invinci- 
bility.    Before  that  which  formerly  inspired  in  us  fear 
and  deference  we  no  longer  retreat  shyly,  but  take 
courage.     Back  of  everything  we  find  our  courage^ 
our  superiority;  back  of  the  sharp  command  of 
parents  and  authorities  stands,  after  all,  our  courage- 
ous choice  or  our  outwitting  shrewdness.     And  the 
more  we  feel  ourselves,  the  smaller  appears  that  which 
before  seemed  invincible.     And  what  is  our  trickery, 
shrewdness,  courage,  obduracy  ?     What  else  but — 
mind!* 

Through  a  considerable  time  we  are  spared  a  fight 
that  is  so  exhausting  later — the  fight  against  reason. 
The  fairest  part  of  childhood  passes  without  the  ne- 

*  [Geist.    This  word  will  be  translated  sometimes  "  mind  "  and  sometimes 
spirit"  in  the  following  pages.  J 


A  HUMAN  LIFE  11 

cessity  of  coming  to  blows  with  reason.     We  care 
nothing  at  all  about  it,  do  not  meddle  with  it,  admit 
no  reason.     We  are  not  to  be  persuaded  to  anything 
by  conviction,  and  are  deaf  to  good  arguments,  princi- 
ples, etc. ;  on  the  other  hand,  coaxing,  punishment, 
and  the  like  are  hard  for  us  to  resist. 

This  stern  life-and-death  combat  with  reason  enter* 
later,  and  begins  a  new  phase;  in  childhood  we 
scamper  about  without*  racking  our  brains  much. 

Mind  is  the  name  of  the  first  self-discovery,  the  first 
undeification  of  the  divine,  i.  e.  of  the  uncanny,  the 
spooks,  the  "powers  above."     Our  fresh  feeling  of 
youth,  this  feeling  of  self,  now  defers  to  nothing;  the 
world  is  discredited,  for  we  are  above  it,  we  are  mind. 

Now  for  the  first  time  we  see  that  hitherto  we  have 
not  looked  at  the  world  intelligently  at  all,  but  only 
stared  at  it. 

We  exercise  the  beginnings  of  our  strength  on 
natural  powers.     We  defer  to  parents  as  a  natural 
power;  later  we  say  :  Father  and  mother  are  to  be 
forsaken,  all  natural  power  to  be  counted  as  riven. 
They  are  vanquished.     For  the  rational,  i.  e.  "intel- 
lectual "  man  there  is  no  family  as  a  natural  power; 
a  renunciation  of  parents,  brothers,  etc.,  makes  its  ap- 
pearance.     If  these  are  "  born  again  "  as  intellectual, 
rational  powers,  they  are  no  longer  at  all  what  they 
were  before. 

And  not  only  parents,  but  men  in  general,  are 
conquered  by  the  young  man;  they  are  no  hindrance 
to  him,  and  are  no  longer  regarded;  for  now  he  says: 
One  must  obey  God  rather  than  men. 

From  this  high  standpoint  everything  "  earthly  " 


12  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

recedes  into  contemptible  remoteness;  for  the  stand- 
point is — the  heavenly. 

The  attitude  is  now  altogether  reversed;  the  youth 
takes  up  an  intellectual  position,  while  the  boy,  who 
did  not  yet  feel  himself  as  mind,  grew  up  in  mindless 
learning.     The  former  does  not  try  to  get  hold  of 
things  (e.  g.  to  get  into  his  head  the  data  of  history), 
but  of  the  thoughts  that  lie  hidden  in  things,  and  so, 
e.  g.,  of  the  spirit  of  history.     On  the  other  hand,  the 
boy  understands  connections  no  doubt,  but  not  ideas, 
the  spirit;  therefore  he  strings  together  whatever  can 
be  learned,  without  proceeding  a  priori  and  theoretic- 
ally, i.  e.  without  looking  for  ideas. 

As  in  childhood  one  had  to  overcome  the  resistance 
of  the  laws  of  the  world,  so  now  in  everything  that  he 
proposes  he  is  met  by  an  objection  of  the  mind,  of 
reason,  of  his  own  conscience.      "  That  is  unreasonable, 
unchristian,  unpatriotic,"  and  the  like,  cries  conscience 
to  us,  and — frightens  us  away  from  it.     Not  the  might 
of  the  avenging  Eumenides,  not  Poseidon's  wrath,  not 
God,  far  as  he  sees  the  hidden,  not  the  father's  rod  of 
punishment,  do  we  fear,  but — conscience. 

We  "  run  after  our  thoughts  "  now,  and  follow 
their  commands  just  as  before  we  followed  parental, 
human  ones.     Our  course  of  action  is  determined  by 
our  thoughts  (ideas,  conceptions,  faith)  as  it  is  in 
childhood  by  the  commands  of  our  parents. 

For  all  that,  we  were  already  thinking  when  we 
were  children,  only  our  thoughts  were  not  fleshless, 
abstract,  absolute,  i.  e.  NOTHING  BUT  THOUGHTS,  a 
heaven  in  themselves,  a  pure  world  of  thought,  logical 
thoughts. 


A  HUMAN  LIFE  13 

On  the  contrary,  they  had  been  only  thoughts  that 
we  had  about  a  thing ;  we  thought  of  the  thing  so  or 
so.     Thus  we  may  have  thought  "  God  made  the 
world  that  we  see  there,"  but  we  did  not  think  of 
("  search  ")  the  "  depths  of  the  Godhead  itself  "  ;  we 
may  have  thought  "  that  is  the  truth  about  the  mat- 
ter," but  we  did  not  think  of  Truth  itself,  nor  unite 
into  one  sentence  "  God  is  truth."     The  "  depths  of 
the  Godhead,  who  is  truth,"  we  did  not  touch.     Over 
such  purely  logical,  i.  e.  theological  questions,  "  What 
is  truth?"  Pilate  does  not  stop,  though  he  does  not 
therefore  hesitate  to  ascertain  in  an  individual  case 
"  what  truth  there  is  in  the  thing,"  i.  e.  whether  the 
thing-  is  true. 

Any  thought  bound  to  a  thing  is  not  yet  nothing 
but  a  thought,  absolute  thought. 

To  bring  to  light  the  pure  thought,  or  to  be  of  its 
party,  is  the  delight  of  youth;  and  all  the  shapes  of 
light  in  the  world  of  thought,  like  truth,  freedom, 
humanity,  Man,  etc.,  illumine  and  inspire  the  youth- 
ful soul. 

But,  when  the  spirit  is  recognized  as  the  essential 
thing,  it  still  makes  a  difference  whether  the  spirit  is 
poor  or  rich,  and  therefore  one  seeks  to  become  rich 
in  spirit;  the  spirit  wants  to  spread  out  so  as  to  found 
its  empire — an  empire  that  is  not  of  this  world,  the 
world  just  conquered.     Thus,  then,  it  longs  to  become 
all  in  all  to  itself;  i.  e.,  although  I  am  spirit,  I  am  not 
yet  perfected  spirit,  and  must  first  seek  the  complete 
spirit.  , 

But  with  that  I,  who  had  just  now  found  myself  as 
spirit,  lose  myself  again  at  once,  bowing  before  the    « 


14  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

complete  spirit  as  one  not  my  own  but  supernal,  and 
feeling  my  emptiness. 

Spirit  is  the  essential  point  for  everything,  to  be 
sure;  but  then  is  every  spirit  the  "  right"  spirit  ? 
The  right  and  true  spirit  is  the  ideal  of  spirit,  the 
"  Holy  Spirit."     It  is  not  my  or  your  spirit,  but  just 
— an  ideal,  supernal  one,  it  is  "  God."     "  God  is 
spirit."     And  this  supernal  "  Father  in  heaven  gives 
it  to  those  that  pray  to  him."  * 

The  man  is  distinguished  from  the  youth  by  the 
fact  that  he  takes  the  world  as  it  is,  instead  of  every- 
where fancying  it  amiss  and  wanting  to  improve  it, 
i.  e.  model  it  after  his  ideal;  in  him  the  view  that 
one  must  deal  with  the  world  according  to  his  interest, 
not  according  to  his  ideals,  becomes  confirmed. 

So  long  as  one  knows  himself  only  as  spirit,  and 
feels  that  all  the  value  of  his  existence  consists  in  be- 
ing spirit  (it  becomes  easy  for  the  youth  to  give  his 
life,  the  "  bodily  life,"  for  a  nothing,  for  the  silliest 
point  of  honor),  so  long  it  is  only  thoughts  that  one 
has,  idaas  that  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  realize  some  day 
when  he  has  found  a  sphere  of  action ;  thus  one  has 
meanwhile  only  ideals,  unexecuted  ideas  or  thoughts. 

Not  till  one  has  fallen  in  love  with  his  corporeal 
self,  and  takes  a  pleasure  in  himself  as  a  living  flesh- 
and-blood  person, — but  it  is  in  mature  years,  in  the 
man,  that  we  find  it  so, — not  till  then  has  one  a 
personal  or  egoistic  interest,  *.  e.  an  interest  not  only 
of  our  spirit,  for  instance,  but  of  total  satisfaction, 
satisfaction  of  the  whole  chap,  a  selfish  interest.     Just 

*  Luke  11.  13. 


A  HUMAN  LIFE  15 

compare  a  man  with  a  youth,  and  see  if  he  will  not 
appear  to  you  harder,  less  magnanimous,  more  selfish. 
Is  he  therefore  worse  ?      No,  you  say;  he  has  only  be- 
come more  definite,  or,  as  you  also  call  it,  more  "  prac- 
tical."    But  the  main  point  is  this,  that  he  makes 
himself  more  the  centre  than  does  the  youth,  who  is 
infatuated  about  other  things,  e.  g.  God,  fatherland, 
and  so  on. 

Therefore  the  man  shows  a  second  self-discovery. 
The  youth  found  himself  as  spirit  and  lost  himself 
again  in  the  general  spirit,the  complete,  holy  spirit, 
Man,  mankind, — in  short,  all  ideals;  the  man  finds 
himself  as  embodied  spirit. 

Boys  had  only  unintellectual  interests  (i.  e.  interests 
devoid  of  thoughts  and  ideas),  youthj  only  intellectual 
ones;  the  man  has  bodily,  personal,  egoistic  interests. 

If  the  child  has  not  an  object  that  it  can  occupy 
itself  with,  it  feels  ennui ;  for  it  does  not  yet  know  how 
to  occupy  itself  with  itself.     The  youth,  on  the  con- 
trary, throws  the  object  aside,  because  for  him  thoughts 
arose  out  of  the  object;    he  occupies  himself  with  his 
thoughts,  his  dreams,  occupies  himself  intellectually,  or 
"  his  mind  is  occupied." 

The  young  man  includes  everything  not  intellectual 
under  the  contemptuous  name  of  "  externalities."     If 
he  nevertheless  sticks  to  the  most  trivial  externalities 
(e.  g.  the  customs  of  students'  clubs  and  other  formali- 
ties), it  is  because,  and  when,  he  discovers  mind  in 
them,  i.  e.  when  they  are  symbols  to  him. 

As  I  find  myself  back  of  things,  and  that  as  mind, 
so  I  must  later  find  myself  also  back  of  thoughts, — to 
wit,  as  their  creator  and  owner.  In  the  time  of  spirits 


16  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

thoughts  grew  till  they  overtopped  my  head,  whose 
offspring  they  yet  were;  they  hovered  about  me  and 
convulsed  me  like  fever-phantasies — an  awful  power. 
The  thoughts  had  become  corporeal  on  their  own  ac- 
count, were  ghosts,  such  as  God,  Emperor,  Pope, 
Fatherland,  etc.     If  I  destroy  their  corporeity,  then 
I  take  them  back  into  mine,  and  say:  "  I  alone  am 
corporeal."     And  now  I  take  the  world  as  what  it  is 
to  me,  as  mine,  as  my  property;  I  refer  all  to  myself. 

If  as  spirit  I  had  thrust  away  the  world  in  the 
deepest  contempt,  so  as  owner  I  thrust  spirits  or  ideas 
away  into  their  "  vanity."     They  have  no  longer  any 
power  over  me,  as  no  "  earthly  might "  has  power 
over  the  spirit. 

The  child  was  realistic,  taken  up  with  the  things  of 
this  world,  till  little  by  little  he  succeeded  in  getting  at 
what  was  back  of  these  very  things;  the  youth  was 
idealistic,  inspired  by  thoughts,  till  he  worked  his  way 
up  to  where  he  became  the  man,  the  egoistic  man,  who 
deals  with  things  and  thoughts  according  to  his  heart's 
pleasure,  and  sets  his  personal  interest  above  every- 
thing.    Finally,  the  old  man  ?      When  I  become  one, 
there  will  still  be  time  enough  to  speak  of  that. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          17 


II. 

MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW 

How  each  of  us  developed  himself,  what  he  strove 
for,  attained,  or  missed,  what  objects  he  formerly  pur- 
sued and  what  plans  and  wishes  his  heart  is  now  set 
on,  what  transformations  his  views  have  experienced, 
what  perturbations  his  principles, — in  short,  how  he 
has  to-day  become  what  yesterday  or  years  ago  he  was 
not, — this  he  brings  out  again  from  his  memory  with 
more  or  less  ease,  and  he  feels  with  especial  vividness 
what  changes  have  taken  place  in  himself  when  he  has 
before  his  eyes  the  unrolling  of  another's  life. 

Let  us  therefore  look  into  the  activities  our  fore- 
fathers busied  themselves  with. 


I.— THE  ANCIENTS 

Custom  having  once  given  the  name  of  "  the 
ancients  "  to  our  pre-Christian  ancestors,  we  will  not 
throw  it  up  against  them  that,  in  comparison  with  us 
experienced  people,  they  ought  properly  to  be  called 
children,  but  will  rather  continue  to  honor  them  as  our 
good  old  fathers.     But  how  have  they  come  to  be 
antiquated,  and  who  could  displace  them  through  his 
pretended  newness  ? 

We  know,  of  course,  the  revolutionary  innovator  and 


18  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

disrespectful  heir,  who  even  took  away  the  sanctity  of 
the  fathers'  sabbath  to  hallow  his  Sunday,  and  inter- 
rupted the  course  of  time  to  begin  at  himself  with  a 
new  chronology;  we  know  him,  and  know  that  it  is — 
the  Christian.     But  does  he  remain  forever  young,  and 
is  he  to-day  still  the  new  man,  or  will  he  too  be  super- 
seded, as  he  has  superseded  the  "  ancients  "  ? 

The  fathers  must  doubtless  have  themselves  begotten 
the  young  one  who  entombed  them.  Let  us  then  peep 
at  this  act  of  generation. 

"  To  the  ancients  the  world  was  a  truth,"  says 
Feuerbach,  but  he  forgets  to  make  the  important  ad- 
dition, "  a  truth  whose  untruth  they  tried  to  get  back 
of,  and  at  last  really  did."     What  is  meant  by  those 
words  of  Feuerbach  will  be  easily  recognized  if  they 
are  put  alongside  the  Christian  thesis  of  the  "  vanity 
and  transitoriness  of  the  world."     For,  as  the  Chris- 
tian can  never  convince  himself  of  the  vanity  of  the 
divine  word,  but  believes  in  its  eternal  and  unshake- 
able  truth,  which,  the  more  its  depths  are  searched, 
must  all  the  more  brilliantly  come  to  light  and 
triumph,  so  the  ancients  on  their  side  lived  in  the  feel- 
ing that  the  world  and  mundane  relations  (e.  g.  the 
natural  ties  of  blood)  were  the  truth  before  which 
their  powerless  "  I  "  must  bow.     The  very  thing  on 
which  the  ancients  set  the  highest  value  is  spurned  by 
Christians  as  the  valueless,  and  what  they  recognized 
as  truth  these  brand  as  idle  lies;  the  high  significance 
of  the.  fatherland  disappears,  and  the  Christian  must 
regard  himself  as  "  a  stranger  on  earth";  *  the  sanc- 


•  Heb.  11.  18. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         19 

tity  of  funeral  rites,  from  which  sprang  a  work  of  art 
like  the  Antigone  of  Sophocles,  is  designated  as  a 
paltry  thing  ("  Let  the  dead  bury  their  dead  ") ;  the 
infrangible  truth  of  family  ties  is  represented  as  an 
untruth  which  one  cannot  promptly  enough  get  clear 
of  ;  *  and  so  in  everything. 

If  we  now  see  that  to  the  two  sides  opposite  things 
appear  as  truth,  to  one  the  natural,  to  the  other  the 
intellectual,  to  one  earthly  things  and  relations,  to  the 
other  heavenly  (the  heavenly  fatherland,  "  Jerusalem 
that  is  above,"  etc.),  it  still  remains  to  be  considered 
how  the  new  time  and  that  undeniable  reversal  could 
come  out  of  antiquity.      But  the  ancients  themselves 
worked  toward  making  their  truth  a  lie. 

Let  us  plunge  at  once  into  the  midst  of  the  most 
brilliant  years  of  the  ancients,  into  the  Periclean  cen- 
tury.    Then  the  Sophistic  culture  was  spreading,  and 
Greece  made  a  pastime  of  what  had  hitherto  been  to 
her  a  monstrously  serious  matter. 

The  fathers  had  been  enslaved  by  the  undisturbed 
power  of  existing  things  too  long  for  the  posterity  not 
to  have  to  learn  by  bitter  experience  iojtel  themselves. 
Therefore  the  Sophists,  with  courageous  sauciness, 
pronounce  the  reassuring  words,  "  Don't  be  bluffed! " 
and  diffuse  the  rationalistic  doctrine,  "  Use  your 
understanding,  your  wit,  your  mind,  against  every- 
thing; it  is  by  having  a  good  and  well-drilled  under- 
standing that  one  gets  through  the  world  best,  pro- 
vides for  himself  the  best  lot,  the  pleasantest  life." 
Thus  they  recognize  in  mind  man's  true  weapon 

*  Mark  10.  29. 


20  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

against  the  world.    This  is  why  they  lay  such  stress  on 
dialectic  skill,  command  of  language,  the  art  of  dispu- 
tation, etc.     They  announce  that  mind  is  to  be  used 
against  everything;  but  they  are  still  far  removed 
from  the  holiness  of  the  Spirit,  for  to  them  it  is  a 
means,  a  weapon,  as  trickery  and  defiance  serve  chil- 
dren for  the  same  purpose;  their  mind  is  the  unbriba- 
ble  understanding. 

To-day  we  should  call  that  a  one-sided  culture  of 
the  understanding,  and  add  the  warning,  "  Cultivate 
not  only  your  understanding,  but  also,  and  especially, 
your  heart."     Socrates  did  the  same.     For,  if  the 
heart  did  not  become  free  from  its  natural  impulses, 
but  remained  filled  with  the  most  fortuitous  contents 
and,  as  an  uncriticised  avidity,  altogether  in  the 
power  of  things,  i.  e.  nothing  but  a  vessel  of  the  most 
various  appetites, — then  it  was  unavoidable  that  the 
free  understanding  must  serve  the  "  bad  heart "  and 
was  ready  to  justify  everything  that  the  wicked  heart 
desired. 

Therefore  Socrates  says  that  it  is  not  enough  for  one 
to  use  his  understanding  in  all  things,  but  it  is  a 
question  of  what  cause  one  exerts  it  for.     We  should 
now  say,  one  must  serve  the  "  good  cause."     But 
serving  the  good  cause  is — being  moral.     Hence 
Socrates  is  the  founder  of  ethics. 

Certainly  the  principle  of  the  Sophistic  doctrine 
must  lead  to  the  possibility  that  the  blindest  and  most 
dependent  slave  of  his  desires  might  yet  be  an  excel- 
lent sophist,  and,  with  keen  understanding,  trim  and 
expound  everything  in  favor  of  his  coarse  heart. 
What  could  there  be  for  which  a  "  good  reason  " 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          21 

might  not  be  found,  or  which  might  not  be  defended 
through  thick  and  thin  ? 

Therefore  Socrates  says:    "  You  must  be  '  pure- 
hearted  '  if  your  shrewdness  is  to  be  valued."     At  this 
point  begins  the  second  period  of  Greek  liberation  of 
the  mind,  the  period  of  purity  of  heart.     For  the  first 
was  brought  to  a  close  by  the  Sophists  in  their  pro- 
claiming the  omnipotence  of  the  understanding.     But 
the  heart  remained  worldly-minded,  remained  a  servant 
of  the  world,  always  affected  by  worldly  wishes.    This 
coarse  heart  was  to  be  cultivated  from  now  on — the 
era  of  culture  of  the  heart.     But  how  is  the  heart  to 
be  cultivated  ?     What  the  understanding,  this  one  side 
of  the  mind,  has  reached, — to  wit,  the  capability  of 
playing  freely  with  and  over  every  concern, — awaits 
the  heart  also;  everything  worldly  must  come  to  grief 
before  it,  so  that  at  last  family,  commonwealth,  father- 
land, and  the  like,  are  given  up  for  the  sake  of  the 
heart,  i.  e.  of  blessedness,  the  heart's  blessedness. 

Daily  experience  confirms  the  truth  that  the  under- 
standing may  have  renounced  a  thing  many  years 
before  the  heart  has  ceased  to  beat  for  it.     So  the 
Sophistic  understanding  too  had  so  far  become  mas- 
ter over  the  dominant,  ancient  powers  that  they  now 
needed  only  to  be  driven  out  of  the  heart,  in  which 
they  dwelt  unmolested,  to  have  at  last  no  part  at  all 
left  in  man. 

This  war  is  opened  by  Socrates,  and  not  till  the 
dying  day  of  the  old  world  does  it  end  in  peace. 

The  examination  of  the  heart  takes  its  start  with 
Socrates,  and  all  the  contents  of  the  heart  are  sifted. 
In  their  last  and  extremest  struggles  the  ancients 


22  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

threw  all  contents  out  of  the  heart  and  let  it  no 
longer  beat  for  anything;  this  was  the  deed  of  the 
Skeptics.     The  same  purgation  of  the  heart  was  now 
achieved  in  the  Skeptical  age,  as  the  understanding 
had  succeeded  in  establishing  in  the  Sophistic  age. 

The  Sophistic  culture  has  brought  it  to  pass  that 
one's  understanding  no  longer  stands  still  before  any- 
thing, and  the  Skeptical,  that  his  heart  is  no  longer 
moved  by  anything. 

So  long  as  man  is  entangled  in  the  movements  of 
the  world  and  embarrassed  by  relations  to  the  world, — 
and  he  is  so  till  the  end  of  antiquity,  because  his 
heart  still  has  to  struggle  for  independence  from  the 
worldly, — so  long  he  is  not  yet  spirit;  for  spirit  is 
without  body,  and  has  no  relations  to  the  world  and 
corporality;  for  it  the  world  does  not  exist,  nor 
natural  bonds,  but  only  the  spiritual,  and  spiritual 
bonds.     Therefore  man  must  first  become  so  com- 
pletely unconcerned  and  reckless,  so  altogether  without 
relations,  as  the  Skeptical  culture  presents  him, — so 
altogether  indifferent  to  the  world  that  even  its  falling 
in  ruins  would  not  move  him, — before  he  could  feel 
himself  as  worldless,  i.  e.  as  spirit.     And  this  is  the 
result  of  the  gigantic  work  of  the  ancients:  that  man 
knows  himself  as  a  being  without  relations  and  without 
a  world,  as  spirit. 

Only  now,  after  all  worldly  care  has  left  him,  is  he 
all  in  all  to  himself,  is  he  only  for  himself,  i.  e.  he  is 
spirit  for  the  spirit,  or,  in  plainer  language,  he  cares 
only  for  the  spiritual. 

In  the  Christian  wisdom  of  serpents  and  innocence 
of  doves  the  two  sides — understanding  and  heart — of 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          2S 

the  ancient  liberation  of  mind  are  so  completed  that 
they  appear  young  and  new  again,  and  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other  lets  itself  be  bluffed  any  longer  by 
the  worldly  and  natural. 

Thus  the  ancients  mounted  to  spirit,  and  strove  to 
become  spiritual.     But  a  man  who  wishes  to  be  active 
as  spirit  is  drawn  to  quite  other  tasks  than  he  was  able 
to  set  himself  formerly :  to  tasks  which  really  give 
something  to  do  to  the  spirit  and  not  to  mere  sense 
or  acuteness,*  which  exerts  itself  only  to  become 
master  of  things.     The  spirit  busies  itself  solely  about 
the  spiritual,  and  seeks  out  the  "  traces  of  mind  "  in 
everything;  to  the  believing-  spirit  "everything  comes 
from  God,"  and  interests  him  only  to  the  extent  that 
it  reveals  this  origin ;  to  the  philosophic  spirit  every- 
thing appears  with  the  stamp  of  reason,  and  interests 
him  only  so  far  as  he  is  able  to  discover  in  it  reason, 
i.  e.  spiritual  content. 

Not  the  spirit,  then,  which  has  to  do  with  absolutely 
nothing  unspiritual,  with  no  thing,  but  only  with  the 
essence  which  exists  behind  and  above  things,  with 
thoughts, — not  that  did  the  ancients  exert,  for  they 
did  not  yet  have  it;  no,  they  had  only  reached  the 
point  of  struggling  and  longing  for  it,  and  therefore 
sharpened  it  against  their  too-powerful  foe,  -the  world 
of  sense  (but  what  would  not  have  been  sensuous  for 
them,  since  Jehovah  or  the  gods  of  the  heathen  were 
yet  far  removed  from  the  conception  "  God  is  spirit," 
since  the  "  heavenly  fatherland  "  had  not  yet  stepped 
into  the  place  of  the  sensuous,  etc.?) — they  sharpened 

•  Italicized  in  the  original  for  the  sake  of  its  etymology,  Scharfsinn— 
"  sharp-sense."    Compare  next  paragraph. 


24  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

against  the  world  of  sense  their  sense,  their  acuteness. 
To  this  day  the  Jews,  those  precocious  children  of  an- 
tiquity, have  got  no  farther;  and  with  all  the  subtlety 
and  strength  of  their  prudence  and  understanding, 
which  easily  becomes  master  of  things  and  forces  them 
to  obey  it,  they  cannot  discover  spirit,  which  takes  no 
account  whatever  of  things. 

The  Christian  has  spiritual  interests,  because  he  al- 
lows himself  to  be  a  spiritual  man ;  the  Jew  does  not 
even  understand  these  interests  in  their  purity,  because 
he  does  not  allow  himself  to  assign  no  value  to  things. 
He  does  not  arrive  at  pure  spirituality,  a  spirituality 
such  as  is  religiously  expressed,  e.  g-.,  in  the  faith  of 
Christians,  which  alone  (i.  e.  without  works)  justifies. 
Their  unspirituality  sets  Jews  forever  apart  from 
Christians;  for  the  spiritual  man  is  incomprehensible 
to  the  unspiritual,  as  the  unspiritual  is  contemptible  to 
the  spiritual.     But  the  Jews  have  only  "  the  spirit  of 
this  world." 

The  ancient  acuteness  and  profundity  lies  as  far 
from  the  spirit  and  the  spirituality  of  the  Christian 
world  as  earth  from  heaven. 

He  who  feels  himself  as  free  spirit  is  not  oppressed 
and  made  anxious  by  the  things  of  this  world,  because 
he  does  not  care  for  them ;  if  one  is  still  to  feel  their 
burden,  he  must  be  narrow  enough  to  attach  weight  to 
them, — as  is  evidently  the  case,  for  instance,  when  one 
is  still  concerned  for  his  "  dear  life."      He  to  whom 
everything  centres  in  knowing  and  conducting  himself 
as  a  free  spirit  gives  little  heed  to  how  scantily  he  is 
supplied  meanwhile,  and  does  not  reflect  at  all  on  how 
he  must  make  his  arrangements  to  have  a  thoroughly 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          25 

free  or  enjoyable  life.     He  is  not  disturbed  by  the  in- 
conveniences of  the  life  that  depends  on  things,  because 
he  lives  only  spiritually  and  on  spiritual  food,  while 
aside  from  this  he  only  gulps  things  down  like  a 
beast,  hardly  knowing  it,  and  dies  bodily,  to  be  sure, 
when  his  fodder  gives  out,  but  knows  himself  immor- 
tal as  spirit,  and  closes  his  eyes  with  an  adoration  or  a 
thought.     His  life  is  occupation  with  the  spiritual,  is 
— thinking ;  the  rest  does  not  bother  him;  let  him 
busy  himself  with  the  spiritual  in  any  way  that  he  can 
and  chooses, — in  devotion,  in  contemplation,  or  in 
philosophic  cognition, — his  doing  is  always  thinking; 
and  therefipe  Descartes,  to  whom  this  had  at  last  be- 
come quite  clear,  could  lay  down  the  proposition :   "  I 
think,  that  is — I  am."     This  means,  my  thinking  is 
my  being  or  my  life ;  only  when  I  live  spiritually  do  I 
live;  only  as  spirit  am  I  really,  or — I  am  spirit 
through  and  through  and  nothing  but  spirit.     Un- 
lucky Peter  Schlemihl,  who  has  lost  his  shadow,  is  the 
portrait  of  this  man  become  a  spirit;  for  the  spirit's 
body  is  shadowless. — Over  against  this,  how  different 
among  the  ancients!      Stoutly  and  manfully  as  they 
might  bear  themselves  against  the  might  of  things, 
they  must  yet  acknowledge  the  might  itself,  and  got  no 
farther  than  to  protect  their  life  against  it  as  well  as 
possible.     Only  at  a  late  hour  did  they  recognize  that 
their  "  true  life  "  was  not  that  which  they  led  in  the 
fight  against  the  things  of  the  world,  but  the  ft  spiritual 
life,"  "turned  away"  from  these  things;  and,  when 
they  saw  this,  they  became — Christians,  i.  e.  the 
moderns,  and  innovators  upon  the  ancients.      But  the 
life  turned  away  from  things,  the  spiritual  life,  no 


26  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

longer  draws  any  nourishment  from  nature,  but  "  lives 
only  on  thoughts,"  and  therefore  is  no  longer  *'  life," 
but — thinking. 

Yet  it  must  not  be  supposed  now  that  the  ancients 
were  without  thoughts,  just  as  the  most  spiritual  man 
is  not  to  be  conceived  of  as  if  he  could  be  without  life. 
Rather,  they  had  their  thoughts  about  everything, 
about  the  world,  man,  the  gods,  etc.,  and  showed  them- 
selves keenly  active  in  bringing  all  this  to  their  con- 
sciousness.     But  they  did  not  know  thought,  even 
though  they  thought  of  all  sorts  of  things  and  "  wor- 
ried themselves  with  their  thoughts."     Compare  with 
their  position  the  Christian  saying,  "  My  thoughts  are 
not  your  thoughts;  as  the  heaven  is  higher  than  the 
earth,  so  are  my  thoughts  higher  than  your  thoughts," 
and  remember  what  was  said  above  about  our  child- 
thoughts. 

What  is  antiquity  seeking,  then  ?     The  true  enjoy- 
ment of  life!     You  will  find  that  at  bottom  it  is  all 
the  same  as  "  the  true  life." 

The  Greek  poet  Simonides  sings:  "  Health  is  the 
noblest  good  for  mortal  man,  the  next  to  this  is  beauty, 
the  third  riches  acquired  without  guile,  the  fourth  the 
enjoyment  of  social  pleasures  in  the  company  of  young 
friends."     These  are  all  good  things  of  life,  pleasures 
of  life.     What  else  was  Diogenes  of  Sinope  seeking  for 
than  the  true  enjoyment  of  life,  which  he  discovered  in 
having  the  least  possible  wants  ?     What  else  Aristip- 
pus,  who  found  it  in  a  cheery  temper  under  all  circum- 
stances ?     They  are  seeking  for  cheery,  unclouded  life- 
courage,  for  cheeriness ;  they  are  seeking  to  "  be  of 
good  cheer" 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          27 

The  Stoics  want  to  realize  the  wise  man,  the  man 
with  practical  philosophy,  the  man  who  knows  how  to 
live, — a  wise  life,  therefore;  they  find  him  in  contempt 
for  the  world,  in  a  life  without  development,  without 
spreading  out,  without  friendly  relations  with  the 
world,  i.  e.  in  the  isolated  life,  in  life  as  life,  not  in  life 
with  others;  only  the  Stoic  lives,  all  else  is  dead  for 
him.     The  Epicureans,  on  the  contrary,  demand  a 
moving  life. 

The  ancients,  as  they  want  to  be  of  good  cheer,  de- 
sire good  living  (the  Jews  especially  a  long  life, 
blessed  with  children  and  goods),  eudaemonia,  well- 
being  in  the  most  various  forms.     Democritus,  e.  g., 
praises  as  such  the  "  calm  of  the  soul  "  in  which  one 
"  lives  smoothly,  without  fear  and  without 
excitement." 

So  what  he  thinks  is  that  with  this  he  gets  on  best, 
provides  for  himself  the  best  lot,  and  gets  through  the 
world  best.      But  as  he  cannot  get  rid  of  the  world, — 
and  in  fact  cannot  for  the  very  reason  that  his  whole 
activity  is  taken  up  in  the  effort  to  get  rid  of  it,  that 
is,  in  repelling  the  world  (for  which  it  is  yet  necessary 
that  what  can  be  and  is  repelled  should  remain  exist- 
ing, otherwise  there  would  no  longer  be  anything  to 
repel), — he  reaches  at  most  an  extreme  degree  of  liber- 
ation, and  is  distinguishable  only  in  degree  from  the 
less  liberated.      If  he  even  got  as  far  as  the  deadening 
of  the  earthly  sense,  which  at  last  admits  only  the 
monotonous  whisper  of  the  word  "  Brahm,"  he  never- 
theless would  not  be  essentially  distinguishable  from 
the  sensual  man. 

Even  the  Stoic  attitude  and  manly  virtue  amounts 


28  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

only  to  this, — that  one  must  maintain  and  assert  him- 
self against  the  world;  and  the  ethics  of  the  Stoics 
(their  only  science,  since  they  could  tell  nothing  about 
the  spirit  but  how  it  should  behave  toward  the  world, 
and  of  nature  [physics]  only  this,  that  the  wise  man 
must  assert  himself  against  it)  is  not  a  doctrine  of  the 
spirit,  but  only  a  doctrine  of  the  repelling  of  the  world 
and  of  self-assertion  against  the  world.     And  this  con- 
sists in  "  imperturbability  and  equanimity  of  life,"  and 
so  in  the  most  explicit  Roman  virtue. 

The  Romans  too  (Horace,  Cicero,  etc.)  went  no 
further  than  this  practical  philosophy. 

The  comfort  (hedone)  of  the  Epicureans  is  the  same 
practical  philosophy  the  Stoics  teach,  only  trickier, 
more  deceitful.     They  teach  only  another  behavior  to- 
ward the  world,  exhort  us  only  to  take  a  shrewd  atti- 
tude toward  the  world;  the  world  must  be  deceived, 
for  it  is  my  enemy. 

The  break  with  the  world  is  completely  carried 
through  by  the  Skeptics.     My  entire  relation  to  the 
world  is  "  worthless  and  truthless."    Timon  says,  "  The 
feelings  and  thoughts  which  we  draw  from  the  world 
contain  no  truth."      "  What  is  truth  ?  "  cries  Pilate. 
According  to  Pyrrho's  doctrine  the  world  is  neither 
good  nor  bad,  neither  beautiful  nor  ugly,  etc.,  but 
these  are  predicates  which  I  give  it.     Timon  says  that 
"in  itself  nothing  is  either  good  or  bad,  but  man  only 
thinks  of  it  thus  or  thus  "  ;  to  face  the  world  only  ata- 
raxia  (unmovednes.,)  and  aphasia  (speech lessness — or, 
in  other  words,  isolated  inwardness}  are  left.     There 
is  "  no  longer  any  truth  to  be  recognized  "  in  the 
world;  things  contradict  themselves;  thoughts  about 


MKNT  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          29 

things  are  without  distinction  (good  and  bad  are  all 
the  same,  so  that  what  one  calls  good  another  finds 
bad) ;  here  the  recognition  of  "  truth  "  is  at  an  end, 
and  only  the  man  without  power  of  recognition,  the 
man  who  finds  in  the  world  nothing  to  recognize,  is 
left,  and  this  man  just  leaves  the  truth-vacant  world 
where  it  is  and  takes  no  account  of  it. 

So  antiquity  gets  through  with  the  world  of  things, 
the  order  of  the  world,  the  world  as  a  whole;  but  to 
the  order  of  the  world,  or  the  things  of  this  world,  be- 
long not  only  nature,  but  all  relations  in  which  man 
sees  himself  placed  by  nature,  e.  g.  the  family,  the 
community, — in  short,  the  so-called  "  natural  bonds." 
With  the  world  of  the  spirit  Christianity  then  begins. 
The  man  who  still  faces  the  world  armed  is  the  an- 
cient, the — heatlien  (to  which  class  the  Jew,  too,  as 
non-Christian,  belongs) ;  the  man  who  has  come  to  be 
led  by  nothing  but  his  "  heart's  pleasure,"  the  interest 
he  takes,  his  fellow-feeling,  his — spirit,  is  the  modern, 
the — Christian. 

As  the  ancients  worked  toward  the  conquest  of  the 
world  and  strove  to  release  man  from  the  heavy  tram- 
mels of  connection  with  other  things,  at  last  they  came 
also  to  the  dissolution  of  the  State  and  giving  prefer- 

L'  to  everything  private.     Of  course  community, 
family,  etc.,  as  natural  relations,  are  burdensome  hin- 
drances which  diminish  my  spiritual  freedom. 


30  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

II.-THE  MODERNS 

"  If  any  man  be  in  Christ,  he  is  a  new  creature ;  the 
old  is  passed  away,  behold,  all  is  become  new.'1''* 

As  it  was  said  above,  "To  the  ancients  the  world 
was  a  truth,"  we  must  say  here,  "  To  the  moderns  the 
spirit  was  a  truth  " ;  but  here,  as  there,  we  must  not 
omit  the  supplement,  "  a  truth  whose  untruth  they 
tried  to  get  back  of,  and  at  last  they  really  do." 

A  course  similar  to  that  which  antiquity  took  may 
be  demonstrated  in  Christianity  also,  in  that  the  un- 
derstanding was  held  a  prisoner  under  the  dominion 
of  the  Christian  dogmas  up  to  the  time  preparatory  to 
the  Reformation,  but  in  the  pre- Reformation  century 
asserted  itself  sopliistically  and  played  heretical  pranks 
with  all  tenets  of  the  faith.     And  the  talk  then  was, 
especially  in  Italy  and  at  the  Roman  court,  "  If  only 
the  heart  remains  Christian-minded,  the  understanding 
may  go  right  on  taking  its  pleasure." 

Long  before  the  Reformation  people  were  so  tho- 
roughly accustomed  to  fine-spun  "  wranglings  "  that 
the  pope,  and  most  others,  looked  on  Luther's  appear- 
ance too  as  a  mere  "  wrangling  of  monks  "  at  first. 
Humanism  corresponds  to  Sophisticism,  and,  as  in  the 
time  of  the  Sophists  Greek  life  stood  in  its  fullest 
bloom  (the  Periclean  age),  so  the  most  brilliant  things 
happened  in  the  time  of  Humanism,  or,  as  one  might 
perhaps  also  say,  of  Machiavellianism  (printing,  the 
New  World,  etc.).     At  this  time  the  heart  was  still 
far  from  wanting  to  relieve  itself  of  its  Christian 

*  2  Cor.  5. 17.  [The  words  "  new  "  and  "  modern  "  are  the  same  in  Ger- 
man.] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          31 

contents. 

But  finally  the  Reformation,  like  Socrates,  took 
hold  seriously  of  the  heart  itself,  and  since  then  hearts 
have  kept  growing  visibly — more  unchristian.     As 
with  Luther  people  began  to  take  the  matter  to  heart, 
the  outcome  of  this  step  of  the  Reformation  must  be 
that  the  heart  also  gets  lightened  of  the  heavy  burden 
of  Christian  faith.     The  heart,  from  day  to  day  more 
unchristian,  loses  the  contents  with  which  it  had 
busied  itself,  till  at  last  nothing  but  empty  warm- 
heartedness is  left  it,  the  quite  general  love  of  men,  the 
love  of  Man,  the  consciousness  of  freedom,  "  self- 
consciousness." 

Only  so  is  Christianity  complete,  because  it  has  be- 
come bald,  withered,  and  void  of  contents.     There 
are  now  no  contents  whatever  against  which  the  heart 
does  not  mutiny,  unless  indeed  the  heart  unconsciously 
or  without  "self-consciousness"  lets  them  slip  in.     The 
heart  criticises  to  death  with  hard-hearted  mercilessness 
everything  that  wants  to  make  its  way  in,  and  is  ca- 
pable (except,  as  before,  unconsciously  or  taken  by 
surprise)  of  no  friendship,  no  love.     What  could  there 
be  in  men  to  love,  since  they  are  all  alike  "  egoists," 
none  of  them  man  as  such,  i.  e.  none  spirit  only  ? 
The  Christian  loves  only  the  spirit;  but  where  could 
one  be  found  who  should  be  really  nothing  but  spirit  ? 

To  have  a  liking  for  the  corporeal  man  with  hide 
and  hair, — why,  that  would  no  longer  be  a  "  spirit- 
ual "  warm-heartedness,  it  would  be  treason  against 
"  pure  "  warm-heartedness,  the  "  theoretical  regard." 
For  pure  warm-heartedness  is  by  no  means  to  be  con- 
ceived as  like  that  kindliness  that  gives  everybody  a 


32  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

friendly  hand-shake;  on  the  contrary,  pure  warm- 
heartedness is  warm-hearted  toward  nobody,  it  is  only 
a  theoretical  interest,  concern  for  man  as  man,  not  as  a 
person.     The  person  is  repulsive  to  it  because  of  being 
"  egoistic,"  because  of  not  being  that  abstraction,  Man. 
But  it  is  only  for  the  abstraction  that  one  can  have  a 
theoretical  regard.     To  pure  warm-heartedness  or  pure 
theory  men  exist  only  to  be  criticised,  scoffed  at,  and 
thoroughly  despised;  to  it,  no  less  than  to  the  fanatical 
parson,  they  are  only  "  filth  "  and  other  such  nice 
things. 

Pushed  to  this  extremity  of  disinterested  warm-heart- 
edness, we  must  finally  become  conscious  that  the  spirit, 
which  alone  the  Christian  loves,  is  nothing  ;  in  other 
words,  that  the  spirit  is — a  lie. . 

What  has  here  been  set  down  roughly,  summarily, 
and  doubtless  as  yet  incomprehensibly,  will,  it  is  to  be 
hoped,  become  clear  as  we  go  on. 

Let  us  take  up  the  inheritance  left  by  the  ancients, 
and,  as  active  workmen,  do  with  it  as  much  as — can 
be  done  with  it!      The  world  lies  despised  at  our  feet, 
far  beneath  us  and  our  heaven,  into  which  its  mighty 
arms  are  no  longer  thrust  and  its  stupefying  breath 
does  not  come.     Seductively  as  it  may  pose,  it  can  de- 
lude nothing  but  our  sense ;  it  cannot  lead  astray  the 
spirit — and  spirit  alone,  after  all,  we  really  are.     Hav- 
ing once  got  back  of  things,  the  spirit  has  also  got 
above  them,  and  become  free  from  their  bonds,  eman- 
cipated, supernal,  free.     So  speaks  "  spiritual 
freedom." 

To  the  spirit  which,  after  long  toil,  has  got  rid  of 
the  world,  the  worldless  spirit,  nothing  is  left  after  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          33 

loss  of  the  world  and  the  worldly  but — the  spirit  and 
the  spiritual. 

Yet,  as  it  has  only  moved  away  from  the  world  and 
made  of  itself  a  being  free  from  the  world,  without 
being  able  really  to  annihilate  the  world,  this  remains 
to  it  a  stumbling-block  that  cannot  be  cleared  away,  a 
discredited  existence;  and,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
knows  and  recognizes  nothing  but  the  spirit  and  the 
spiritual,  it  must  perpetually  carry  about  with  it  the 
longing  to  spiritualize  the  world,  i.  e.  to  redeem  it 
from  the  "  black  list."     Therefore,  like  a  youth,  it 
goes  about  with  plans  for  the  redemption  or  improve- 
ment of  the  world. 

The  ancients,  we  saw,  served  the  natural,  the 
worldly,  the  natural  order  of  the  world,  b'jt  they  in- 
cessantly asked  themselves  whether  they  could  not, 
then,  relieve  themselves  of  this  service;  and,  when  they 
had  tired  themselves  to  death  in  ever-renewed  attempts" 
at  revolt,  then,  among  their  last  sighs,  was  born  to 
them  the  God,  the  "  conqueror  of  the  world."     All 
their  doing  had  been  nothing  but  wisdom  of  the  world, 
an  effort  to  get  back  of  the  world  and  above  it.     And 
what  is  the  wisdom  of  the  many  following  centuries  ? 
What  did  the  moderns  try  to  get  back  of  ?     No 
longer  to  get  back  of  the  world,  for  the  ancients  had 
accomplished  that ;  but  back  of  the  God  whom  the 
ancients  bequeathed  to  them,  back  of  the  God  who  "  is 
spirit,"  back  of  everything  that  is  the  spirit's,  the 
spiritual.     But  the  activity  of  the  spirit,  which 
"  searches  even  the  depths  of  the  Godhead,"  is 
theology.     If  the  ancients  have  nothing  to  show  but 
wisdom  of  the  world,  the  moderns  never  did  nor  do 


34  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

make  their  way  further  than  to  theology.  We  shall 
see  later  that  even  the  newest  revolts  against  God  are 
nothing  but  the  extremest  efforts  of  "  theology,"  i.  e. 
theological  insurrections. 

§  1.— THE  SPIRIT 

The  realm  of  spirits  is  monstrously  great,  there  is 
an  infinite  deal  of  the  spiritual ;  yet  let  us  look  and  see 
what  the  spirit,  this  bequest  of  the  ancients,  properly 
is. 

Out  of  their  birth-pangs  it  came  forth,  but  they 
themselves  could  not  utter  themselves  as  spirit;  they 
could  give  birth  to  it,  it  itself  must  speak.     The 
"  born  God,  the  Son  of  Man,"  is  the  first  to  utter  the 
word  that  the  spirit,  i.  e.  he,  God,  has  to  do  with  no- 
thing earthly  and  no  earthly  relationship,  but  solely 
with  the  spirit  and  spiritual  relationships. 

Is  my  courage,  indestructible  under  all  the  world's 
blows,  my  inflexibility  and  my  obduracy,  perchance 
already  spirit  in  the  full  sense,  because  the  world  can- 
not touch  it  ?     Why,  then  it  would  not  yet  be  at  en- 
mity with  the  world,  and  all  its  action  would  consist 
merely  in  not  succumbing  to  the  world  !      No,  so  long 
as  it  does  not  busy  itself  with  itself  alone,  so  long  as  it 
does  not  have  to  do  with  its  world,  the  spiritual,  alone, 
it  is  not  free  spirit,  but  only  the  "  spirit  of  this  world," 
the  spirit  fettered  to  it.     The  spirit  is  free  spirit,  i.  e. 
really  spirit,  only  in  a  world  of  its  own;  in  "this,"  the 
earthly  world,  it  is  a  stranger.     Only  through  a  spirit- 
ual world  is  the  spirit  really  spirit,  for  "  this  "  world 
does  not  understand  it  and  does  not  know  how  to  keep 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          35 

"the  maiden  from  a  foreign  land"*  from  departing. 

But  where  is  it  to  get  this  spiritual  world  ?      Where 
but  out  of  itself  ?     It  must  reveal  itself;  and  the  words 
that  it  speaks,  the  revelations  in  which  it  unveils  itself, 
these  are  its  world.     As  a  visionary  lives  and  has  his 
world  only  in  the  visionary  pictures  that  he  himself 
creates,  as  a  crazy  man  generates  for  himself  his  own 
dream-world,  without  which  he  could  not  be  crazy,  so 
the  spirit  must  create  for  itself  its  spirit  world,  and  is 
not  spirit  till  it  creates  it. 

Thus  its  creations  make  it  spirit,  and  by  its  crea- 
tures we  know  it,  the  creator;  in  them  it  lives,  they 
are  its  world. 

Now,  what  is  the  spirit  ?      It  is  the  creator  of  a  spi- 
ritual world  !      Even  in  you  and  me  people  do  not  re- 
cognize spirit  till  they  see  that  we  have  appropriated 
to  ourselves  something  spiritual, — i.  e.,  though 
thoughts  may  have  been  set  before  us,  we  have  at  least 
brought  them  to  life  in  ourselves;  for,  as  long  as  we 
were  children,  the  most  edifying  thoughts  might  have 
been  laid  before  us  without  our  wishing,  or  being  able 
to  reproduce  them  in  ourselves.     So  the  spirit  also 
exists  only  when  it  creates  something  spiritual;  it  is 
real  only  together  with  the  spiritual,  its  creature. 

As,  then,  we  know  it  by  its  works,  the  question  is 
what  these  works  are.  But  the  works  or  children  of 
the  spirit  are  nothing  else  but — spirits: 

If  I  had  before  me  Jews,  Jews  of  the  true  metal,  I 
should  have  to  stop  here  and  leave  them  standing  be- 
fore this  mystery  as  for  almost  two  thousand  years 

*  [Title  of  a  poem  by  Schiller.] 


36  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

they  have  remained  standing  before  it,  unbelieving 
and  without  knowledge.     But,  as  you,  my  dear  reader, 
are  at  least  not  a  full-blooded  Jew, — for  such  a  one 
will  not  go  astray  as  far  as  this, — we  will  still  go 
along  a  bit  of  road  together,  till  perhaps  you  too  turn 
your  back  on  me  because  I  laugh  in  your  face. 

If  somebody  told  you  you  were  altogether  spirit, 
you  would  take  hold  of  your  body  and  not  believe 
him,  but  answer:  "  I  have  a  spirit,  no  doubt,  but  do 
not  exist  only  as  spirit,  but  am  a  man  with  a  body." 
You  would  still  distinguish  yourself  from  "your  spi- 
rit."    "  But,"  replies  he,  "  it  is  your  destiny,  even 
though  now  you  are  yet  going  about  in  the  fetters  of 
the  body,  to  be  one  day  a  '  blessed  spirit,'  and,  how- 
ever you  may  conceive  of  the  future  aspect  of  your 
spirit,  so  much  is  yet  certain,  that  in  death  you  will 
put  off  this  body  and  yet  keep  yourself,  i.  e.  your 
spirit,  for  all  eternity;  accordingly  your  spirit  is  the 
eternal  and  true  in  you,  the  body  only  a  dwelling  here 
below,  which  you  may  leave  and  perhaps  exchange  for 
another." 

Now  you  believe  him  !      For  the  present,  indeed, 
you  are  not  spirit  only;  but,  when  you  emigrate  from 
the  mortal  body,  as  one  day  you  must,  then  you  will 
have  to  help  yourself  without  the  body,  and  therefore 
it  is  needful  that  you  be  prudent  and  care  in  time  for 
your  proper  self.     '*  What  should  it  profit  a  man  if  he 
gained  the  whole  world  and  yet  suffered  damage  in 
his  soul  ?" 

But,  even  granted  that  doubts,  raised  in  the  course 
of  time  against  the  tenets  of  the  Christian  faith,  have 
long  since  robbed  you  of  faith  in  the  immortality  of 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW    37 

your  spirit,  you  have  nevertheless  left  one  tenet  un- 
disturbed, and  still  ingenuously  adhere  to  the  one 
truth,  that  the  spirit  is  your  better  part,  and  that  the 
spiritual  has  greater  claims  on  you  than  anything  else. 
Despite  all  your  atheism,  in  zeal  against  egoism  you 
concur  with  the  believers  in  immortality. 

But  whom  do  you  think  of  under  the  name  of  ego- 
ist ?      A  man  who,  instead  of  living  to  an  idea, — i.  e. 
a  spiritual  thing — and  sacrificing  to  it  his  personal 
advantage,  serves  the  latter.     A  good  patriot,  e.  g., 
brings  his  sacrifice  to  the  altar  of  the  fatherland ;  but 
it  cannot  be  disputed  that  the  fatherland  is  an  idea, 
since  for  beasts  incapable  of  mind,*  or  children  as  yet 
without  mind,  there  is  no  fatherland  and  no  patriot- 
ism.    Now,  if  any  one  does  not  approve  himself  as  a 
good  patriot,  he  betrays  his  egoism  with  reference  to 
the  fatherland.     And  so  the  matter  stands  in  innumer- 
able other  cases:  he  who  in  human  society  takes  the 
benefit  of  a  prerogative  sins  egoistically  against  the 
idea  of  equality ;  he  who  exercises  dominion  is  blamed 
as  an  egoist  against  the  idea  of  liberty, — etc. 

You  despise  the  egoist  because  he  puts  the  spiritual 
in  the  background  as  compared  with  the  personal,  and 
has  his  eyes  on  himself  where  you  would  like  to  see 
him  act  to  favor  an  idea.     The  distinction  between 
you  is  that  he  makes  himself  the  central  point,  but 
you  the  spirit;  or  that  you  cut  your  identity  in  two 


*  [The  reader  will  remember  (it  is  to  be  hoped  he  has  never  forgotten) 
that  "  mind  "  and  "  spirit "  are  one  and  the  same  word  in  German.    For  se- 
veral pages  back  the  connection  of  the  discourse  has  seemed  to  require  the 
almost  exclusive  use  of  the  translation  "spirit,"  but  to  complete  the  sense 
it  has  often  been  necessary  that  the  reader  recall  the  thought  of  its  iden- 
tity with  "  mind."  as  stated  in  a  previous  note.] 


38  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

and  exalt  your  "  proper  self,"  the  spirit,  to  be 
ruler  of  the  paltrier  remainder,  while  he  will  hear 
nothing  of  this  cutting  in  two,  and  pursues  spiritual 
and  material  interests  just  a*  he  pleases.     You  think, 
to  be  sure,  that  you  are  falling  foul  of  those  only  who 
enter  into  no  spiritual  interest  at  all,  but  in  fact  you 
curse  at  everybody  who  does  not  look  on  the  spiritual 
interest  as  his  ''  true  and  highest "  interest.     You 
carry  your  knightly  service  for  this  beauty  so  far  that 
you  affirm  her  to  be  the  only  beauty  of  the  world. 
You  live  not  to  yourself,  but  to  your  spirit  and  to 
what  is  the  spirit's — i.  e.  ideas. 

As  the  spirit  exists  only  in  its  creating  of  the  spirit- 
ual, let  us  take  a  look  about  us  for  its  first  creation. 
If  only  it  has  accomplished  this,  there  follows  thence- 
forth a  natural  propagation  of  creations,  as  according 
to  the  myth  only  the  first  human  beings  needed  to  be 
created,  the  rest  of  the  race  propagating  of  itself. 
The  first  creation,  on  the  other  hand,  must  come  forth 
"  out  of  nothing," — 4.  e.,  the  spirit  has  toward  its  re- 
alization nothing  but  itself,  or  rather  it  has  not  yet 
even  itself,  but  must  create  itself;   hence  its  first  cre- 
ation is  itself,  the  spirit.     Mystical  as  this  sounds,  we 
yet  go  through  it  as  an  every-day  experience.     Are 
you  a  thinking  being  before  you  think  ?      In  creating 
the  first  thought  you  create  yourself,  the  thinking 
one;  for  you  do  not  think  before  you  think  a  thought, 
i.  e.  have  a  thought.      Is  it  not  your  singing  that  first 
makes  you  a  singer,  your  talking  that  makes  you  a 
talker  ?      Now,  so  too  it  is  the  production  of  the  spirit- 
ual that  first  makes  you  a  spirit. 

Meantime,  as  you  distinguish  yourself  from  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          39 

thinker,  singer,  and  talker,  so  you  no  less  distinguish 
yourself  from  the  spirit,  and  feel  very  clearly  that  you 
are  something  beside  spirit.     But,  as  in  the  thinking 
ego  hearing  and  sight  easily  vanish  in  the  enthusiasm 
of  thought,  so  you  also  have  been  seized  by  the  spirit- 
enthusiasm,  and  you  now  long  with  all  your  might  to 
become  wholly  spirit  and  to  be  dissolved  in  spirit. 
The  spirit  is  your  ideal,  the  unattained,  the  other- 
worldly; spirit  is  the  name  of  your — god,  "  God  is 
spirit." 

Against  all  that  is  not  spirit  you  are  a  zealot,  and 
therefore  you  play  the  zealot  against  yourself  who 
cannot  get  rid  of  a  remainder  of  the  non-spiritual. 
Instead  of  saying,  "  I  am  more  than  spirit,"  you  say 
with  contrition,  "  I  am  less  than  spirit;  and  spirit, 
pure  spirit,  or  the  spirit  that  is  nothing  but  spirit,  I 
can  only  think  of,  but  am  not;  and,  since  I  am  not  it, 
it  is  another,  exists  as  another,  whom  I  call  '  God '." 

It  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  case  that  the  spirit  that 
is  to  exist  as  pure  spirit  must  be  an  otherworldly  one, 
for,  since  I  am  not  it,  it  follows  that  it  can  only  be 
outside  me;  since  in  any  case  a  human  being  is  not 
fully  comprehended  in  the  concept  "  spirit,"  it  follows 
that  the  pure  spirit,  the  spirit  as  such,  can  only  be 
outside  of  men,  beyond  the  human  world, — not 
earthly,  but  heavenly. 

Only  from  this  disunion  in  which  I  and  the  spirit 
lie;  only  because  "  I "  and  "  spirit"  are  not  names  for 
one  and  the  same  thing,  but  different  names  for  com- 
pletely different  things;  only  because  I  am  not  spirit 
and  spirit  not  I, — only  from  this  do  we  get  a  quite 
tautological  explanation  of  the  necessity  that  the  spirit 


*0  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

dwells  in  the  other  world,  i.  e.  is  God. 

But  from  this  it  also  appears  how  thoroughly  theo- 
logical is  the  liberation  that  Feuerbach*  is  laboring  to 
give  us.     What  he  says  is  that  we  had  only  mistaken 
our  own  essence,  and  therefore  looked  for  it  in  the 
other  world,  but  that  now,  when  we  see  that  God  was 
only  our  human  essence,  we  must  recognize  it  again  as 
ours  and  move  it  back  out  of  the  other  world  into  this. 
To  God,  who  is  spirit,  Feuerbach  gives  the  name 
*'  Our  Essence."     Can  we  put  up  with  this,  that  w  Our 
Essence  "  is  brought  into  opposition  to  us, — that  we 
are  split  into  an  essential  and  an  unessential  self  ? 
Do  we  not  therewith  go  back  into  the  dreary  misery 
of  seeing  ourselves  banished  out  of  ourselves  ? 

What  have  we  gained,  then,  when  for  a  variation 
we  have  transferred  into  ourselves  the  divine  outside 
us  ?     Are  we  that  which  is  in  us  ?     As  little  as  we  are 
that  which  is  outside  us.      I  am  as  little  my  heart  as  I 
am  my  sweetheart,  this  "other  self"  of  mine.     Just 
because  we  are  not  the  spirit  that  dwells  in  us,  just  for 
that  reason  we  had  to  take  it  and  set  it  outside  us;  it 
was  not  we,  did  not  coincide  with  us,  and  therefore  we 
could  not  think  of  it  as  existing  otherwise  than  outside 
us,  on  the  other  side  from  us,  in  the  other  world. 

With  the  strength  of  despair  Feuerbach  clutches  at 
the  total  substance  of  Christianity,  not  to  throw  it 
away,  no,  to  drag  it  to  himself,  to  draw  it,  the  long- 
yearned-for,  ever-distant,  out  of  its  heaven  with  a  last 
effort,  and  keep  it  by  him  forever.     Is  not  that  a 
clutch  of  the  uttermost  despair,  a  clutch  for  life  or 

*  "  Essence  of  Christianity." 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW    41 

death,  and  is  it  not  at  the  same  time  the  Christian 
yearning  and  hungering  for  the  other  world  ?     The 
hero  wants  not  to  go  into  the  other  world,  but  to  draw 
the  other  world  to  him,  and  compel  it  to  become  this 
world  !      And  since  then  has  not  all  the  world,  with 
more  or  less  consciousness,  been  crying  that  "  this 
world  "  is  the  vital  point,  and  heaven  must  come  down 
on  earth  and  be  experienced  even  here  ? 

Let  us,  in  brief,  set  Feuerbach's  theological  view 
and  our  contradiction  over  against  each  other  ! 
"The  essence  of  man  is  man's  supreme  being;  *  now 
by  religion,  to  be  sure,  the  supreme  being  is  called 
God  and  regarded  as  an  objective  essence,  but  in  truth 
it  is  only  man's  own  essence;  and  therefore  the  turn- 
ing point  of  the  world's  history  is  that  henceforth 
no  longer  God,  but  man,  is  to  appear  to  man  as 
God."f 

To  this  we  reply:  The  supreme  being  is  indeed  the 
sence  of  man,  but,  just  because  it  is  his  essence  and 
not  he  himself,  it  remains  quite  immaterial  whether  we 
see  it  outside  him  and  view  it  as  "  God,"  or  find  it  in 
him  and  call  it  "  Essence  of  Man  "  or  "  Man."     /  am 
neither  God  nor  Man,  $  neither  the  supreme  essence 
nor  my  essence,  and  therefore  it  is  all  one  in  the  main 
whether  I  think  of  the  essence  as  in  me  or  outside  me. 
Nay,  we  really  do  always  think  of  the  supreme  being 
as  in  both  kinds  of  otherworldliness,  the  inward  and 

*  [Or.  "  highest  essence."    The  word  Wesen,  which  means  both  "  es- 
ence  "  and  "  being,"  will  be  translated  now  one  way  and  now  the  other  in 
the  following  pages.    The  reader  must  bear  in  mind  that  these  two  words 
are  identical  in  German:  and  so  are  "  supreme  "  and  "  highest."] 

tCf.  «•.  g.  "  Essence  of  Christianity,"  p.  +02. 

\  [That  is,  the  abstract  conception  of  man,  as  in  the  preceding  sentence.) 


42  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

outward,  at  once;  for  the  "  Spirit  of  God  "  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  Christian  view,  also  "  our  spirit,"  and 
"  dwells  in  us."*     It  dwells  in  heaven  and  dwells  in 
us;  we  poor  things  are  just  its  "  dwelling,"  and,  if 
Feuerbach  goes  on  to  destroy  its  heavenly  dwelling 
and  force  it  to  move  to  us  bag  and  baggage,  then  we, 
its  earthly  apartments,  will  be  badly  overcrowded. 

But  after  this  digression  (which,  if  we  were  at  all 
proposing  to  work  by  line  and  level,  we  should  have 
had  to  save  for  later  pages  in  order  to  avoid  repeti- 
tion) we  return  to  the  spirit's  first  creation,  the  spirit 
itself. 

The  spirit  is  something  other  than  myself.      But 
this  other,  what  is  it  ? 

§  2.— THE  POSSESSED. 

Have  you  ever  seen  a  spirit  ?      "  No,  not  I,  but  my 
grandmother."     Now,  you  see,  it's  just  so  with  me 
too;   I  myself  haven't  seen  any,  but  my  grandmother 
had  them  running  between  her  feet  all  sorts  of  ways, 
and  out  of  confidence  in  our  grandmothers'  honesty 
we  believe  in  the  existence  of  spirits. 

But  had  we  no  grandfathers  then,  and  did  they  not 
shrug  their  shoulders  every  time  our  grandmothers 
told  about  their  ghosts  ?      Yes,  those  were  unbelieving 
men  who  have  harmed  our  good  religion  much,  those 
rationalists  !      We  shall  feel  that !      What  else  lies 
at  the  bottom  of  this  warm  faith  in  ghosts,  if  not  the 
faith  in  "  the  existence  of  spiritual  beings  in  general," 
and  is  not  this  latter  itself  disastrously  unsettled  if 

*  E.  <?.,  Rom.  8.  9, 1  Cor.  3.  16,  John  20.  22,  and  innumerable  other  passages. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  43 

saucy  men  of  the  understanding  may  disturb  the 
former  ?      The  Romanticists  were  quite  conscious  what 
a  blow  the  very  belief  in  God  suffered  by  the  laying 
aside  of  the  belief  in  spirits  or  ghosts,  and  they  tried 
to  help  us  out  of  the  baleful  consequences  not  only  by 
their  reawakened  fairy  world,  but  at  last,  and 
especially,  by  the  "  intrusion  of  a  higher  world,"  by 
their  somnambulists,  prophetesses  of  Prevorst,  etc. 
The  good  believers  and  fathers  of  the  church  did  not 
suspect  that  with  the  belief  in  ghosts  the  foundation 
of  religion  was  withdrawn,  and  that  since  then  it  had 
been  floating  in  the  air.      He  who  no  longer  believes 
in  any  ghost  needs  only  to  travel  on  consistently  in 
his  unbelief  to  see  that  there  is  no  separate  being  at 
all  concealed  behind  things,  no  ghost  or — what  is 
naively  reckoned  as  synonymous  even  in  our  use  of 
words — no  "spirit." 

'*  Spirits  exist ! "     Look  about  in  the  world,  and 
say  for  yourself  whether  a  spirit  does  not  gaze  upon 
you  out  of  everything.     Out  of  the  lovely  little  flower 
there  speaks  to  you  the  spirit  of  the  Creator,  who  has 
shaped  it  so  wonderfully;  the  stars  proclaim  the  spirit 
that  established  their  order;  from  the  mountain-tops  a 
spirit  of  sublimity  breathes  down;  out  of  the  waters  a 
spirit  of  yearning  murmurs  up;  and — out  of  men  mil- 
lions of  spirits  speak'.     The  mountains  may  sink,  the 
flowers  fade,  the  world  of  stars  fall  in  ruins,  the  men 
die — what  matters  the  wreck  of  these  visible  bodies  ? 
The  spirit,  the  "  invisible  spirit,"  abides  eternally  ! 

Yes,  the  whole  world  is  haunted  !      Only  is 
haunted  ?      Nay,  it  itself  "  walks,"  it  is  uncanny 
through  and  through,  it  is  the  wandering  seeming- 


44  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

body  of  a  spirit,  it  is  a  spook.     What  else  should  a 
ghost  be,  then,  than  an  apparent  body,  but  real 
spirit  ?      Well,  the  world  is  "  empty,"  is  "  naught,"  is 
only  glamorous  "  semblance  " ;  its  truth  is  the  spirit 
alone ;  it  is  the  seeming-body  of  a  spirit. 

Look  out  near  or  far,  a  ghostly  world  surrounds 
you  everywhere;  you  are  always  having  "  appari- 
tions "  or  visions.      Everything  that  appears  to  you  is 
only  the  phantasm  of  an  indwelling  spirit,  is  a  ghostly 
"  apparition  " ;  the  world  is  to  you  only  a  "  world  of 
appearances,"  behind  which  the  spirit  walks.     You 
"  see  spirits." 

Are  you  perchance  thinking  of  comparing  yourself 
with  the  ancients,  who  saw  gods  everywhere  ?  Gods, 
my  dear  modern,  are  not  spirits;  gods  do  not  degrade 
the  world  to  a  semblance,  and  do  not  spiritualize  it. 

But  to  you  the  whole  world  is  spiritualized,  and  has 
become  an  enigmatical  ghost;  therefore  do  not  wonder 
if'you  likewise  find  in  yourself  nothing  but  a  spook. 
Is  not  your  body  haunted  by  your  spirit,  and  is  not 
the  latter  alone  the  true  and  real,  the  former  only  the 
"  transitory,  naught "  or  a  "  semblance  "  ?      Are  we 
not  all  ghosts,  uncanny  beings  that  wait  for  "  deliver- 
ance,"— to  wit,  "spirits"? 

Since  the  spirit  appeared  in  the  world,  since  "  the 
Word  became  flesh,"  since  then  the  world  has  been 
spiritualized,  enchanted,  a  spook. 

You  have  spirit,  for  you  have  thoughts.     What  are 
your  thoughts  ?      "  Spiritual  entities."     Not  things, 
then  ?      "  No,  but  the  spirit  of  things,  the  main  point 
in  all  things,  the  inmost  in  them,  their — idea."     Con- 
sequently what  you  think  is  not  only  your  thought  ? 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          45 

"  On  the  contrary,  it  is  that  in  the  world  which  is 
most  real,  that  which  is  properly  to  be  called  true;  it 
is  the  truth  itself;  if  I  only  think  truly,  I  think  the 
truth.     I  may,  to  be  sure,  err  with  regard  to  the  truth, 
a.ndfail  to  recognize  it;  but,  if  I  recognize  truly, 
the  object  of  my  cognition  is  the  truth."     So,  I  sup- 
pose, you  strive  at  all  times  to  recognize  the  truth  ? 
"  To  me  the  truth  is  sacred.      It  may  well  happen  that 
I  find  a  truth  incomplete  and  replace  it  with  a  better, 
but  the  truth  I  cannot  abrogate.     I  believe  in  the 
truth,  therefore  I  search  in  it;  nothing  transcends  it,  it 
is  eternal." 

Sacred,  eternal  is  the  truth;  it  is  the  Sacred,  the 
Eternal.      But  you,  who  let  yourself  be  filled  and  led 
by  this  sacred  thing,  are  yourself  hallowed.     Further, 
the  sacred  is  not  for  your  senses, — and  you  never  as  a 
sensual  man  discover  its  trace, — but  for  your  faith,  or, 
more  definitely  still,  for  your  spirit ;  for  it  itself,  you 
know,  is  a  spiritual  thing,  a  spirit, — is  spirit  for  the 
spirit. 

The  sacred  is  by  no  means  so  easily  to  be  set  aside 
as  many  at  present  affirm,  who  no  longer  take  this 
"  unsuitable  "  word  into  their  mouths.      If  even  in  a 
single  respect  I  am  still  n pb raided  as  an  "  egoist," 
there  is  left  the  thought  of  something  else  which  I 
should  serve  more  than  myself,  and  which  must  be  to 
me  more  important  than  everything;  in  short,  some- 
what in  which  I  should  have  to  seek  my  true  welfare,* 
something — "  sacred. "f     However  human  this  sacred 
thing  may  look,  though  it  be  the  Human  itself,  that 

*  [Heil]  t  [foiling] 


16  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

does  not  take  away  its  sacredness,  but  at  most  changes 
it  from  an  unearthly  to  an  earthly  sacred  thing,  from 
a  divine  one  to  a  human. 

Sacred  things  exist  only  for  the  egoist  who  does  not 
acknowledge  himself,  the  involuntary  egoist,  for  him 
who  is  always  looking  after  his  own  and  yet  does  not 
count  himself  as  the  highest  being,  who  serves  only 
himself  and  at  the  same  time  always  thinks  he  is  serv- 
ing a  higher  being,  who  knows  nothing  higher  than 
himself  and  yet  is  infatuated  about  something  higher; 
in  short,  for  the  egoist  who  would  like  not  to  be  an 
egoist,  and  abases  himself  (z.  e.  combats  his  egoism), 
but  at  the  same  time  abases  himself  only  for  the  sake 
of  "  being  exalted,"  and  therefore  of  gratifying  his 
egoism.     Because  he  would  like  to  cease  to  be  an 
egoist,  he  looks  about  in  heaven  and  earth  for  higher 
beings  to  serve  and  sacrifice  himself  to;  but,  however 
much  he  shakes  and  disciplines  himself,  in  the  end  he 
does  all  for  his  own  sake,  and  the  disreputable  egoism 
will  not  come  off  him.     On  this  account  I  call  him  thi 
involuntary  egoist. 

His  toil  and  care  to  get  away  from  himself  is  noth- 
ing but  the  misunderstood  impulse  to  self-dissolution. 
If  you  are  bound  to  your  past  hour,  if  you  must  bab- 
ble to-day  because  you  babbled  yesterday,*  if  you  can 
not  transform  yourself  each  instant,  you  feel  yourself 


'  How  the  priests  tinkle  !  how  important  they 
Would  make  it  out,  that  men  should  come  their  way 
And  babble,  just  as  yesterday,  to-day ! 

Oh  !  blame  them  not !    They  know  man's  need,  I  say; 
For  he  takes  all  his  happiness  this  way, 
To  babble  just  to-morrow  as  to-day. 

—Translated  from  Goethe's  "  Ywftwn  Epigrams.  ' 


.MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          47 

fettered  in  slavery  and  benumbed.     Therefore  over 
each  minute  of  jour  existence  a  fresh  minute  of  the 
future  beckons  to  you,  and,  developing  yourself,  you 
get  away  "  from  yourself," — i.  e.  from  the  self  that 
was  at  that  moment.     As  you  are  at  each  instant,  you 
are  your  own  creature,  and  in  this  very  "  creature  " 
you  do  not  wish  to  lose  yourself,  the  creator.     You 
are  yourself  a  higher  being  than  you  are,  and  surpass 
yourself.     But  that  you  are  the  one  who  is  higher 
than  you, — i.  e.  that  you  are  not  only  creature,  but 
likewise  your  creator, — just  this,  as  an  involuntary 
egoist,  you  fail  to  recognize;  and  therefore  the 
"  higher  essence  "  is  to  you — an  alien*  essence.     Every 
higher  essence,  such  as  truth,  mankind,  etc.,  is  an 
essence  over  us. 

Alienness  is  a  criterion  of  the  "  sacred."      In  every- 
thing sacred  there  lies  something  "  uncanny,"  i.  e. 
strange,!  such  as  we  are  not  quite  familiar  and  at 
home  in.     What  is  sacred  to  me  is  not  my  own ;  and 
if,  e.  g-.  the  property  of  others  was  not  sacred  to  me,  I 
should  look  on  it  as  mine,  which  I  should  take  to  my- 
self when  occasion  offered.     Or,  on  the  other  side,  if  I 
regard  the  face  of  the  Chinese  emperor  as  sacred,  it 
remains  strange  to  my  eye,  which  I  close  at  its 
appearance. 

Why  is  an  incontrovertible  mathematical  truth, 
which  might  even  be  called  eternal  according  to  the 
common  understanding  of  words,  not — sacred  ?      Be- 
cause it  is  not  revealed,  or  not  the  revelation  of  a 
higher  being.      If  by  revealed  we  understand  only  the 

*  [fremd]  t  [frond] 


48  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

so-called  religious  truths,  we  go  far  astray,  and  en- 
tirely fail  to  recognize  the  breadth  of  the  concept 
"  higher  being."     Atheists  keep  up  their  scoffing  at 
the  higher  being,  which  was  also  honored  under  the 
name  of  the  "  highest  "  or  etre  supreme,  and  trample 
in  the  dust  one  "  proof  of  his  existence  "  after  another 
without  noticing  that  they  themselves,  out  of  need  for 
a  higher  being,  only  annihilate  the  old  to  make  room 
for  a  new.      Is  "  Man  "  perchance  not  a  higher  essenc< 
than  an  individual  man,  and  must  not  the  truths, 
rights,  and  ideas  which  result  from  the  concept  of  him 
be  honored  and — counted  sacred,  as  revelations  of  thii 
very  concept  ?      For,  even  though  we  should  abrogate 
again  many  a  truth  that  seemed  to  be  made  manifest 
by  this  concept,  yet  this  would  only  evince  a  mis- 
understanding on  our  part,  without  in  the  least  de- 
gree harming  the  sacred  concept  itself  or  taking  their 
sacredness  from  those  truths  that  must  "  rightly  "  be 
looked  upon  as  its  revelations.     Man  reaches  beyond 
every  individual  man,  and  yet — though  he  be  "his 
essence  " — is  not  in  fact  his  essence  (which  rather 
would  be  as  single*  as  he  the  individual  himself),  but 
a  general  and  ''  higher,"  yes,  for  atheists  "  the  highest 
essence."!     And,  as  the  divine  revelations  were  not 
written  down  by  God  with  his  own  hand,  but  made 
public  through  "  the  Lord's  instruments,"  so  also  the 
new  highest  essence  does  not  write  out  its  revelations 
itself,  but  lets  them  come  to  our  knowledge  through 
"true  men."     Only  the  new  essence  betrays,  in  fact,  a 
more  spiritual  style  of  cqnception  than  the  old  God, 

*  [emziflr]  t  ["  the  supreme  being."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  49 

because  the  latter  was  still  represented  in  a  sort  of 
em  bod  ied  ness  or  form,  while  the  undimmed  spiritual- 
ity of  the  new  is  retained,  and  no  special  material 
body  is  fancied  for  it.     And  withal  it  does  not  lack 
corporeity,  which  even  takes  on  a  yet  more  seductive 
appearance  because  it  looks  more  natural  and  mun- 
dane and  consists  in  nothing  less  than  in  every  bodily 
man, — yes,  or  outright  in  "  humanity  "  or  "  all  men." 
Thereby  the  spectralness  of  the  spirit  in  a  seeming- 
body  has  once  again  become  really  solid  and  popular. 

Sacred,  then,  is  the  highest  essence  and  everything 
in  which  this  highest  essence  reveals  or  will  reveal  it- 
self; but  hallowed  are  they  who  recognize  this  highest 
essence  together  with  its  own,  i.  e.  together  with  its 
revelations.     The  sacred  hallows  in  turn  its  reverer, 
who  by  his  worship  becomes  himself  a  saint,  as  like- 
wise what  he  does  is  saintly,  a  saintly  walk,  saintly 
thoughts  and  actions,  imaginations  and  aspirations, 
etc. 

It  is  easily  understood  that  the  conflict  over  what  is 
revered  as  the  highest  essence  can  be  significant  only 
so  long  as  even  the  most  embittered  opponents  concede 
to  each  other  the  main  point, — that  there  is  a  highest 
essence  to  which  worship  or  service  is  due.      If  one 
should  smile  compassionately  at  the  whole  struggle 
over  a  highest  essence,  as  a  Christian  might  at  the  war 
of  words  between  a  Shiite  and  a  Sunnite  or  between  a 
Brahman  and  a  Buddhist,  then  the  hypothesis  of  a 
highest  essence  would  be  null  in  his  eyes,  and  the  con- 
flict on  this  basis  an  idle  play.     Whether  then  the  one 
God  or  the  three  in  one,  whether  the  Lutheran  God  or 
the  etrc  supreme  or  not  God  at  all,  but  "  Man,"  may 


50  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

represent  the  highest  essence,  that  makes  no  difference 
at  all  for  him  who  denies  the  highest  essence  itself,  for 
in  his  eyes  those  servants  of  a  highest  essence  are  one 
and  all — pious  people,  the  most  raging  atheist  not  less 
than  the  most  faith-filled  Christian. 

In  the  foremost  place  of  the  sacred,*  then,  stands 
the  highest  essence  and  the  faith  in  this  essence,  our 
"  holyf  faith." 

THE  SPOOK 

With  ghosts  we  arrive  in  the  spirit-realm,  in  the 
realm  of  essences. 

What  haunts  the  universe,  and  has  its  occult,  "  in- 
comprehensible "  being  there,  is  precisely  the  myste- 
rious spook  that  we  call  highest  essence.     And  to  get 
to  the  bottom  of  this  spook,  to  comprehend  it,  to  dis- 
cover reality  in  it  (to  prove  "  the  existence  of  God  ") 
— this  task  men  set  to  themselves  for  thousands  of 
years;  with  the  horrible  impossibility,  the  endless 
Danaid-labor,  of  transforming  the  spook  into  a  non- 
spook,  the  unreal  into  something  real,  the  spirit  into 
an  entire  and  corporeal  person, — with  this  they  tor- 
mented themselves  to  death.     Behind  the  existing 
world  they  sought  the  "  thing  in  itself,"  the  essence; 
behind  the  thing-  they  sought  the  un-thing. 

When  one  looks  to  the  bottom  of  anything,  i.  e. 
searches  out  its  essence,  one  often  discovers  something 
quite  other  than  what  it  seems  to  be;  honeyed  speech 
and  a  lying  heart,  pompous  words  and  beggarly 
thoughts,  etc.     By  bringing  the  essence  into  promi- 

*  Iheilig]  t  [heilig] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          51 

nence  one  degrades  the  hitherto  misapprehended  ap- 
pearance to  a  bare  semblance,  a  deception.     The 
essence  of  the  world,  so  attractive  and  splendid,  is  for 
him  who  looks  to  the  bottom  of  it — emptiness;  empti- 
ness is  =  world's  essence  (world's  doings).     Now,  he 
who  is  religious  does  not  occupy  himself  with  the  de- 
ceitful semblance,  with  the  empty  appearances,  but 
looks  upon  the  essence,  and  in  the  essence  has — the 
truth. 

The  essences  which  are  deduced  from  some  appear- 
ances are  the  evil  essences,  and  conversely  from  others 
the  good.     The  essence  of  human  feeling,  e.  g.,  is 
love;  the  essence  of  human  will  is  the  good;  that  of 
one's  thinking,  the  true;  etc. 

What  at  first  passed  for  existence,  such  as  the  world 
and  its  like,  appears  now  as  bare  semblance,  and  the 
truly  eawtent  is  much  rather  the  essence,  whose  realm 
is  filled  with  gods,  spirits,  demons,  i.  e.  with  good  or 
bad  essences.     Only  this  inverted  world,  the  world  of 
essences,  truly  exists  now.     The  human  heart  may  be 
loveless,  but  its  essence  exists,  God,  "  who  is  love  "; 
human  thought  may  wander  in  error,  but  its  essence, 
truth,  exists;  "God  is  truth," — etc. 

To  know  and  acknowledge  essences  alone  and 
nothing  but  essences,  that  is  religion;  its  realm  is  a 
realm  of  essences,  spooks,  and  ghosts. 

The  longing  to  make  the  spook  comprehensible,  or 
to  realize  non-xcmc,  has  brought  about  a  corporeal 
ghost,  a  ghost  or  spirit  with  a  real  body,  an  embodied 
ghost.     How  the  strongest  and  most  talented  Chris- 
tians have  tortured  themselves  to  get  a  conception  of 
this  ghostly  apparition  !      But  there  always  remained 


52  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  contradiction  of  two  natures,  the  divine  and 
human,  i.  e.  the  ghostly  and  sensual;  there  remained 
the  most  wondrous  spook,  a  thing  that  was  not  a 
thing.     Never  yet  was  a  ghost  more  soul-torturing, 
and  no  shaman,  who  pricks  himself  to  raving  fury  and 
nerve-lacerating  cramps  to  conjure  a  ghost,  can  endure 
such  soul-torment  as  Christians  suffered  from  that  most 
incomprehensible  ghost. 

But  through  Christ  the  truth  of  the  matter  had  at 
the  same  time  come  to  light,  that  the  veritable  spirit 
or  ghost  is — man.     The  corporeal  or  embodied  spirit 
is  just  man ;  he  himself  is  the  ghastly  being  and  at  the 
same  time  the  being's  appearance  and  existence. 
Henceforth  man  no  longer,  in  typical  cases,  shudders 
at  ghosts  outside  him,  but  at  himself;  he  is  terrified  at 
himself.     In  the  depth  of  his  breast  dwells  the  spirit 
of  sin;  even  the  faintest  thought  (and  this  is  itself  a 
spirit,  you  know)  may  be  a  devil,  etc. — The  ghost  has 
put  on  a  body,  God  has  become  man,  but  now  man  is 
himself  the  gruesome  spook  which  he  seeks  to  get  back 
of,  to  exorcise,  to  fathom,  to  bring  to  reality  and  to 
speech;  man  is — spirit.     What  matter  if  the  body 
wither,  if  only  the  spirit  is  saved  ?  everything  rests  on 
the  spirit,  and  the  spirit's  or  "  soul's  "  welfare  becomes 
the  exclusive  goal.     Man  has  become  to  himself  a 
ghost,  an  uncanny  spook,  to  which  there  is  even  as- 
signed a  distinct  seat  in  the  body  (dispute  over  the 
seat  of  the  soul,  whether  in  the  head,  etc.). 

You  are  not  to  me,  and  I  am  not  to  you,  a  higher 
essence.     Nevertheless  a  higher  essence  may  be  hidden 
in  each  of  us,  and  call  forth  a  mutual  reverence.     To 
take  at  once  the  most  general,  Man  lives  in  you  and 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  53 

me.      If  I  did  not  see  Man  in  you,  what  occasion 
should  I  have  to  respect  you  ?     To  be  sure,  you  are 
not  Man  and  his  true  and  adequate  form,  but  only  a 
mortal  veil  of  his,  from  which  he  can  withdraw  with- 
out himself  ceasing;  but  yet  for  the  present  this  gen- 
eral and  higher  essence  is  housed  in  you,  and  you  pre- 
sent before  me  (because  an  imperishable  spirit  has  in 
you  assumed  a  perishable  body,  so  that  really  your 
form  is  only  an  "  assumed  "  one)  a  spirit  that  appears, 
appears  in  you,  without  being  bound  to  your  body 
and  to  this  particular  mode  of  appearance, — therefore 
a  spook.      Hence  I  do  not  regard  you  as  a  higher 
essence,  but  only  respect  that  higher  essence  which 
"  walks  "  in  you;   I  "  respect  Man  in  you."     The 
ancients  did  not  observe  anything  of  this  sort  in  their 
slaves,  and  the  higher  essence  "  Man  "  found  as  yet 
little  response.     To  make  up  for  this,  they  saw  in  each 
other  ghosts  of  another  sort.     The  People  is  a  higher 
essence  than  an  individual,  and,  like  Man  or  the  Spirit 
of  Man,  a  spirit  haunting  the  individual, — the  Spirit 
of  the  People.     For  this  reason  they  revered  this 
spirit,  and  only  so  far  as  he  served  this  or  else  a  spirit 
related  to  it  (e.  g.  the  Spirit  of  the  Family,  etc.) 
could  the  individual  appear  significant;  only  for  the 
sake  of  the  higher  essence,  the  People,  was  considera- 
tion allowed  to  the  "  member  of  the  people."     As  you 
are  hallowed  to  us  by  "  Man  "  who  haunts  you,  so  at 
every  time  men  have  been  hallowed  by  some  higher 
essence  or  other,  like  People,  Family,  and  such. 
Only  for  the  sake  of  a  higher  essence  has  any  one  been 
honored  from  of  old,  only  as  a  ghost  has  he  been  re- 
garded in  the  light  of  a  hallowed,  i.  e.,  protected  and 


•Si  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

recognized  person.     If  I  cherish  you  because  I  hold 
you  dear,  because  in  you  my  heart  finds  nourishment, 
my  need  satisfaction,  then  it  is  not  done  for  the  sake 
of  a  higher  essence  whose  hallowed  body  you  are,  not 
on  account  of  my  beholding  in  you  a  ghost,  i.  e.  an 
appearing  spirit,  but  from  egoistic  pleasure;    you 
yourself  with  your  essence  are  valuable  to  me,  for  your 
essence  is  not  a  higher  one,  is  not  higher  and  more 
general  than  you,  is  unique*  like  you  yourself,  be- 
cause it  is  you. 

But  it  is  not  only  man  that  "  haunts";  so  does 
everything.     The  higher  essence,  the  spirit,  that  walks 
in  everything,  is  at  the  same  time  bound  to  nothing, 
and  only — "  appears"  in  it.     Ghosts  in  every  corner  ! 

Here  would  be  the  place  to  pass  the  haunting  spirits 
in  review,  if  they  were  not  to  come  before  us  again 
further  on  in  order  to  vanish  before  egoism.      Hence 
let  only  a  few  of  them  be  particularized  by  way  of  ex- 
ample, in  order  to  bring  us  at  once  to  our  attitude 
toward  them. 

Sacred  above  all,  e.  g.,  is  the  "  holy  Spirit,"  sacred 
the  truth,  sacred  are  right,  law,  a  good  cause,  majesty, 
marriage,  the  common  good,  order,  the  fatherland, 
etc. 

WHEELS  IN  THE  HEAD. 

Man,  your  head  is  haunted;  you  have  wheels  in 
your  head  !      You  imagine  great  things,  and  depict  to 
yourself  a  whole  world  of  gods  that  has  an  existence 
for  you,  a  spirit-realm  to  which  you  suppose  yourself 

*  leinzig] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          5i' 

to  be  called,  an  ideal  that  beckons  to  you.     You  have 
a  fixed  idea  ! 

Do  not  think  that  I  am  jesting  or  speaking  figura- 
tively when  I  regard  those  persons  who  cling  to  the 
Higher,  and  (because  the  vast  majority  belongs  under 
this  head)  almost  the  whole  world  of  men,  as  veritable 
fools,  fools  in  a  madhouse.     What  is  it,  then,  that  is 
called  a  "  fixed  idea  "  ?      An  idea  that  has  subjected 
the  man  to  itself.     When  you  recognize,  with  regard 
to  such  a  fixed  idea,  that  it  is  a  folly,  you  shut  its 
slave  up  in  an  asylum.     And  is  the  truth  of  the  faith, 
say,  which  we  are  not  to  doubt;  the  majesty  of  (e.  g.) 
the  people,  which  we  are  not  to  strike  at  (he  who  does 
is  guilty  of — lese-majesty) ;  virtue,  against  which  the 
censor  is  not  to  let  a  word  pass,  that  morality  may  be 
kept  pure;  etc., — are  these  not  "  fixed  ideas"?      Is 
not  all  the  stupid  chatter  of  (e.  g\)  most  of  our  news- 
papers the  babble  of  fools  who  suffer  from  the  fixed 
idea  of  morality,  legality,  Christianity,  etc.,  and  only 
seem  to  go  about  free  because  the  madhouse  in  which 
they  walk  takes  in  so  broad  a  space  ?     Touch  the 
fixed  idea  of  such  a  fool,  and  you  will  at  once  have  to 
guard  your  back  against  the  lunatic's  stealthy  malice. 
For  these  great  lunatics  are  like  the  little  so-called 
lunatics  in  this  point  too, — that  they  assail  by  stealth 
him  who  touches  their  fixed  idea.     They  first  steal  his 
weapon,  steal  free  speech  from  him,  and  then  they  fall 
upon  him  with  their  nails.     Every  day  now  lays  bare 
the  cowardice  and  vindictiveness  of  these  maniacs,  and 
the  stupid  populace  hurrahs  for  their  crazy  measures. 
One  must  read  the  journals  of  this  period,  and  must 
hear  the  Philistines  talk,  to  get  the  horrible  conviction 


56  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

that  one  is  shut  up  in  a  house  with  fools.     "  Thou 
shalt  not  call  thy  brother  a  fool;  if  thou  dost — etc." 
But  I  do  not  fear  the  curse,  and  I  say,  my  brothers 
are  arch-fools.     Whether  a  poor  fool  of  the  insane 
asylum  is  possessed  by  the  fancy  that  he  is  God  the 
Father,  Emperor  of  Japan,  the  Holy  Spirit,  etc.,  or 
whether  a  citizen  in  comfortable  circumstances  con- 
ceives that  it  is  his  mission  to  be  a  good  Christian,  a 
faithful  Protestant,  a  loyal  citizen,  a  virtuous  man, 
etc., — both  these  are  one  and  the  same  "  fixed  idea." 
He  who  has  never  tried  and  dared  not  to  be  a  good 
Christian,  a  faithful  Protestant,  a  virtuous  man,  etc., 
is  possessed  and  prepossessed*  by  faith,  virtuousness, 
etc.     Just  as  the  schoolmen  philosophized  only  inside 
the  belief  of  the  church;  as  Pope  Benedict  XIV  wrote 
fat  books  inside  the  papist  superstition,  without  ever 
throwing  a  doubt  upon  this  belief;  as  authors  fill 
whole  folios  on  the  State  without  calling  in  question 
the  fixed  idea  of  the  State  itself;  as  our  newspapers 
are  crammed  with  politics  because  they  are  conjured 
into  the  fancy  that  man  was  created  to  be  a  zoon 
pdliticon, — so  also  subjects  vegetate  in  subjection,  vir- 
tuous people  in  virtue,  liberals  in  humanity,  etc.,  with- 
out ever  putting  to  these  fixed  ideas  of  theirs  the 
searching  knife  of  criticism.     Undislodgeable,  like  a 
madman's  delusion,  those  thoughts  stand  on  a  firm 
footing,  and  he  who  doubts  them — lays  hands  on  the 
sacred!     Yes,  the  "  fixed  idea,"  that  is  the  truly 
sacred  ! 

Is  it  perchance  only  people  possessed  by  the  devil 

*  [gefangen  und  befangen,  literally  "imprisoned  and  prepossessed."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          57 

that  meet  us,  or  do  we  as  often  come  upon  people 
possessed  in  the  contrary  way, — possessed  by  "  the 
good,"  by  virtue,  morality,  the  law,  or  some  "  princi- 
ple "  or  other  ?      Possessions  of  the  devil  are  not  the 
only  ones.     God  works  on  us,  and  the  devil  does;  the 
former  "  workings  of  grace,"  the  latter  "  workings  of 
the  devil."     Possessed*  people  are  sef\  in  their 
opinions. 

If  the  word  "  possession  "  displeases  you,  then  call  it 
prepossession;  yes,  since  the  spirit  possesses  you,  and 
all  "  inspirations  "  come  from  it,  call  it — inspiration 
and  enthusiasm.      I  add  that  complete  enthusiasm — 
for  we  cannot  stop  with  the  sluggish,  half-way  kind — 
is  called  fanaticism. 

It  is  precisely  among  cultured  people  that  fanaticism 
is  at  home;  for  man  is  cultured  so  far  as  he  takes  an 
interest  in  spiritual  things,  and  interest  in  spiritual 
things,  when  it  is  alive,  is  and  must  be  fanaticism ;  it 
is  a  fanatical  interest  in  the  sacred  (fanuni).     Ob- 
serve our  liberals,  look  into  the  Saechsischen  Vater- 
lanchblaetter,  hear  what  Schlosser  says:  J  "  Holbach's 
company  constituted  a  regular  plot  against  the  tradi- 
tional doctrine  and  the  existing  system,  and  its  mem- 
bers were  as  fanatical  on  behalf  of  their  unbelief  as 
monks  and  priests,  Jesuits  and  Pietists,  Methodists, 
missionary  and  Bible  societies,  commonly  are  for  me- 
chanical worship  and  orthodoxy." 

Take  notice  how  a  "  moral  man  "  behaves,  who  to- 
day often  thinks  he  is  through  with  God  and  throws 
off  Christianity  as  a  bygone  thing.      If  you  ask  him 

*  [besessene]          t  iversessen]  *  "Achtzehntes  Jahrhundert, "  II,  518. 


58  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

whether  he  has  ever  doubted  that  the  copulation  of 
brother  and  sister  is  incest,  that  monogamy  is  the 
truth  of  marriage,  that  filial  piety  is  a  sacred  duty, 
etc.,  then  a  moral  shudder  will  come  over  him  at  the 
conception  of  one's  being  allowed  to  touch  his  sister  as 
wife  also,  etc.     And  whence  this  shudder  ?      Because 
he  believes  in  those  moral  commandments.     This 
moral  faith  is  deeply  rooted  in  his  breast.     Much  as 
he  rages  against  the  pious  Christians,  he  himself  has 
nevertheless  as  thoroughly  remained  a  Christian, — to 
wit,  a  moral  Christian.      In  the  form  of  morality 
Christianity  holds  him  a  prisoner,  and  a  prisoner 
under  faith.     Monogamy  is  to  be  something  sacred, 
and  he  who  may  live  in  bigamy  is  punished  as  a  crim- 
inal; he  who  commits  incest  suffers  as  a  criminal. 
Those  who  are  always  crying  that  religion  is  not  to  be 
regarded  in  the  State,  and  the  Jew  is  to  be  a  citizen 
equally  with  the  Christian,  show  themselves  in  accord 
with  this.     Is  not  this  of  incest  and  monogamy  a 
dogma  of  faith  ?     Touch  it,  and  you  will  learn  by  ex- 
perience how  this  moral  man  is  a  hero  of  faith  too,  not 
less  than  Krummacher,  not  less  than  Philip  II.     These 
fight  for  the  faith  of  the  Church,  he  for  the  faith  of 
the  State,  or  the  moral  laws  of  the  State;  for  articles 
of  faith,  both  condemn  him  who  acts  otherwise  than 
their  faith  will  allow.     The  brand  of  "  crime  "  is 
stamped  upon  him,  and  he  may  languish  in  reformato- 
ries, in  jails.     Moral  faith  is  as  fanatical  as  religious 
faith  !      They  call  that  "  liberty  of  faith  "  then,  when 
brother  and  sister,  on  account  of  a  relation  that  they 
should  have  settled  with  their  "  conscience,"  are 
thrown  into  prison,     "  But  they  set  a  pernicious  exam- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          59 

pie."     Yes,  indeed:  others  might  have  taken  the  no- 
tion that  the  State  had  no  business  to  meddle  with 
their  relation,  and  thereupon  "  purity  of  morals  " 
would  go  to  ruin.     So  then  the  religious  heroes  of 
faith  are  zealous  for  the  "  sacred  God,"  the  moral  ones 
for  the  "  sacred  good." 

Those  who  are  zealous  for  something  sacred  often 
look  very  little  like  each  other.     How  the  strictly  or- 
thodox, or  old-style  believers  differ  from  the  fighters 
for  "  truth,  light,  and  justice,"  from  the  Philalethes, 
the  Friends  of  Light,  the  Rationalists,  etc.     And  yet, 
how  utterly  unessential  is  this  difference  !      If  one 
buffets  single  traditional  truths  (e.  g.  miracles,  un- 
limited power  of  princes,  etc.),  then  the  rationalists 
buffet  them  too,  and  only  the  old-style  believers  wail. 
But,  if  one  buffets  truth  itself,  he  immediately  has 
both,  as  believers,  for  opponents.      So  with  moralities; 
the  strict  believers  are  relentless,  the  clearer  heads  are 
more  tolerant.     But  he  who  attacks  morality  itself 
gets  both  to  deal  with.     "  Truth,  morality,  justice, 
light,  etc.,"  are  to  be  and  remain  "  sacred."     What 
any  one  finds  to  censure  in  Christianity  is  simply  sup- 
posed to  be  "  unchristian  "  according  to  the  view  of 
these  rationalists;  but  Christianity  must  remain  a 
"  fixture,"  to  buffet  it  is  outrageous,  "  an  outrage." 
To  be  sure,  the  heretic  against  pure  faith  no  longer 
exposes  himself  to  the  earlier  fury  of  persecution,  but 
so  much  the  more  does  it  now  fall  upon  the  heretic 
against  pure  morals. 

Piety  has  for  a  century  received  so  many  blows,  and 
had  to  hear  its  superhuman  essence  reviled  as  an  "  in- 


60  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

human  "  one  so  often,  that  one  cannot  feel  tempted  to 
draw  the  sword  against  it  again.     And  yet  it  has  al- 
most always  been  only  moral  opponents  that  have  ap- 
peared in  the  arena,  to  assail  the  supreme  essence  in 
favor  of — another  supreme  essence.     So  Proudhon,  un- 
abashed, says:  *  "  Man  is  destined  to  live  without 
religion,  but  the  moral  law  is  eternal  and  absolute. 
Who  would  dare  to-day  to  attack  morality  ?"     Moral 
people  skimmed  off  the  best  fat  from  religion,  ate  it 
themselves,  and  are  now  having  a  tough  job  to  get  rid 
of  the  resulting  scrofula.     If,  therefore,  we  point  out 
that  religion  has  not  by  any  means  been  hurt  in  its 
inmost  part  so  long  as  people  reproach  it  only  with  its 
superhuman  essence,  and  that  it  takes  its  final  appeal 
to  the  "  spirit"  alone  (for  God  is  spirit),  then  we 
have  sufficiently  indicated  its  final  accord  with  moral- 
ity, and  can  leave  its  stubborn  conflict  with  the  latter 
lying  behind  us.     It  is  a  question  of  a  supreme  essen 
with  both,  and  whether  this  is  a  superhuman  or  a 
human  one  can  make  (since  it  is  in  any  case  an  es- 
sence over  me,  a  super-mine  one,  so  to  speak)  but  little 
difference  to  me.     In  the  end  the  relation  to  the 
human  essence,  or  to  "  Man,"  as  soon  as  ever  it  has 
shed  the  snake-skin  of  the  old  religion,  will  yet  wear  a 
religious  snake-skin  again. 

So  Feuerbach  instructs  us  that,  "  if  one  only  inverts 
speculative  philosophy,  i.  e.  always  makes  the  predi- 
cate the  subject,  and  so  makes  the  subject  the  object 
and  principle,  one  has  the  undraped  truth,  pure  and 
clean."!     Herewith,  to  be  sure,  we  lose  the  narrow 


*"  De  la  Creation  del'Ordre"  etc.,  p.  36.  t  "Anekdota,"  II,  64. 


:- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  61 

religious  standpoint,  lose  the  God,  who  from  this 
standpoint  is  subject;  but  we  take  in  exchange  for  it 
the  other  side  of  the  religious  standpoint,  the  moral 
standpoint.     E.  g.,  we  no  longer  say  "  God  is  love," 
but  "  Love  is  divine."      If  we  further  put  in  place  of 
the  predicate  "  divine •"  the  equivalent  "  sacred,"  then, 
as  far  as  concerns  the  sense,  all  the  old  comes  back 
again.     According  to  this,  love  is  to  be  the  good  in 
man,  his  divineness,  that  which  does  him  honor,  his 
true  humanity  (it  w  makes  him  Man  for  the  first 
time,"  makes  for  the  first  time  a  man  out  of  him). 
So  then  it  would  be  more  accurately  worded  thus: 
Love  is  what  is  human  in  man,  and  what  is  inhuman 
is  the  loveless  egoist.      But  precisely  all  that  which 
Christianity  and  with  it  speculative  philosophy  (i.  e. 
theology)  offers  as  the  good,  the  absolute,  is  to  self- 
ownership  simply  not  the  good  (or,  what  means  the 
same,  it  is  only  the  good).     Consequently,  by  the 
transformation  of  the  predicate  into  the  subject,  the 
Christian  essence  (and  it  is  the  predicate  that  contains 
the  essence,  you  know)  would  only  be  fixed  yet  more 
oppressively.     God  and  the  divine  would  entwine 
themselves  all  the  more  inextricably  with  me.     To 
expel  God  from  his  heaven  and  to  rob  him  of  his 
"  transcendence  "  cannot  yet  support  a  claim  of  com- 
plete victory,  if  therein  he  is  only  chased  into  the  hu- 
man breast  and  gifted  with  indelible  immanence. 
Now  they  say,  "  The  divine  is  the  truly  human  !  " 

The  same  people  who  oppose  Christianity  as  the  ba- 
sis of  the  State,  i.  e.  oppose  the  so-called  Christian 
State,  do  not  tire  of  repeating  that  morality  is  "  the 
fundamental  pillar  of  social  life  and  of  the  State." 


62  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

As  if  the  dominion  of  morality  were  not  a  complete 
dominion  of  the  sacred,  a  "  hierarchy." 

So  we  may  here  mention  by  the  way  that  rationalist 
movement  which,  after  theologians  had  long  insisted 
that  only  faith  was  capable  of  grasping  religious 
truths,  that  only  to  believers  did  God  reveal  himself, 
etc.,  and  that  therefore  only  the  heart,  the  feelings,  the 
believing  fancy  was  religious,  broke  out  with  the  asser- 
tion that  the  ""  natural  understanding,"  human  reason, 
was  also  capable  of  discerning  God.     What  does  that 
mean  but  that  the  reason  laid  claim  to  be  the  same 
visionary  as  the  fancy  ?  *     In  this  sense  Reimarus 
wrote  his  "  Most  Notable  Truths  of  Natural  Religion." 
It  had  to  come  to  this, — that  the  whole  man  with  all 
his  faculties  was  found  to  be  religious ;  heart  and 
affections,  understanding  and  reason,  feeling,  know- 
ledge, and  will, — in  short,  everything  in  man, — 
appeared  religious.     Hegel  has  shown  that  even  phi- 
losophy is  religious.     And  what  is  not  called  religion 
to-day  ?     The  "  religion  of  love,"  the  "  religion  of 
freedom,"  "  political  religion," — in  short,  every  enthu- 
siasm.    So  it  is,  too,  in  fact. 

To  this  day  we  use  the  Romance  word  "  religion," 
which  expresses  the  concept  of  a  condition  of  being 
bound.     To  be  sure,  we  remain  bound,  so  far  as  reli- 
gion takes  possession  of  our  inward  parts;  but  is  the 
mind  also  bound  ?      On  the  contrary,  that  is  free,  is 
sole  lord,  is  not  our  mind,  but  absolute.     Therefore 
the  correct  affirmative  translation  of  the  word  religion 
would  be  "freedom  of  mind  "/     In  whomsoever  the 

*  [difgeJb-  1'hanidstin  vie  die  Phuntusie] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          63 

mind  is  free,  he  is  religious  in  just  the  same  way  as  he 
in  whom  the  senses  have  free  course  is  called  a  sensual 
man.     The  mind  binds  the  former,  the  desires  the  lat- 
ter.    Religion,  therefore,  is  boundness  or  religio  with 
reference  to  me, — I  am  bound ;  it  is  freedom  with  re- 
ference to  the  mind, — the  mind  is  free,  or  has  freedom 
of  mind.     Many  know  from  experience  how  hard  it 
is  on  us  when  the  desires  run  away  with  us,  free  and 
unbridled;  but  that  the  free  mind,  splendid  intellect- 
uality, enthusiasm  for  intellectual  interests,  or  however 
this  jewel  may  in  the  most  various  phrase  be  named, 
brings  us  into  yet  more  grievous  straits  than  even  the 
wildest  impropriety,  people  will  not  perceive;  nor  can 
they  perceive  it  without  being  consciously  egoists. 

Reimarus,  and  all  who  have  shown  that  our  reason, 
our  heart,  etc.,  also  lead  to  God,  have  therewithal 
shown  that  we  are  possessed  through  and  through. 
To  be  sure,  they  vexed  the  theologians,  from  whom 
they  took  away  the  prerogative  of  religious  exaltation ; 
but  for  religion,  for  freedom  of  mind,  they  thereby 
only  conquered  yet  more  ground.     For,  when  the 
mind  is  no  longer  limited  to  feeling  or  faith,  but  also, 
as  understanding,  reason,  and  thought  in  general,  be- 
longs to  itself  the  mind, — when,  therefore,  it  may  take 
part  in  the  spiritual*  and  heavenly  truths  in  the  form 
of  understanding,  etc.,  as  well  as  in  its  other  forms, — 
then  the  whole  mind  is  occupied  only  with  spiritual 
things,  i.  e.  with  itself,  and  is  therefore  free.     Now  we 
are  so  through-and-through  religious  that  "jurors," 
i.  e.  "  sworn  men,"  condemn  us  to  death,  and  every 

*  inn-same  word  ;us  "  ititi-lKvlii^"  as  "  mind;'  and  "spirit"  arc  tin- 


64  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

policeman,  as  a  good  Christian,  takes  us  to  the  lock-u 
by  virtue  of  an  "  oath  of  office." 

Morality  could  not  come  into  opposition  with  piety 
till  after  the  time  when  in  general  the  boisterous  hate 
of  everything  that  looked  like  an  "  order  "  (decrees, 
commandments,  etc.)  spoke  out  in  revolt,  and  the  per 
sonal  "  absolute  lord  "  was  scoffed  at  and  persecuted ; 
consequently  it  could  arrive  at  independence  only 
through  liberalism,  whose  first  form  acquired  signifi- 
cance in  the  world's  history  as  "  citizenship,"  and 
weakened  the  specifically  religious  powers  (see  "  Lib- 
eralism "  below).     For,  when  morality  not  merely 
goes  alongside  of  piety,  but  stands  on  feet  of  its  own, 
then  its  principle  lies  no  longer  in  the  divine  com- 
mandments, but  in  the  law  of  reason,  from  which  the 
commandments,  so  far  as  they  are  still  to  remain 
valid,  must  first  await  justification  for  their  validity. 
In  the  law  of  reason  man  determines  himself  out  of 
himself,  for  "  Man  "  is  rational,  and  out  of  the 
"  essence  of  Man  "  those  laws  follow  of  necessity. 
Piety  and  morality  part  company  in  this, — that  the 
former  makes  God  the  lawgiver,  the  latter  Man. 

From  a  certain  standpoint  of  morality  people  reaso 
about  as  follows:  Either  man  is  .led  by  his  sensuality, 
and  is,  following  it,  immoral,  or  he  is  led  by  the  goo( 
which,  taken  up  into  the  will,  is  called  moral  senti- 
ment (sentiment  and  prepossession  in  favor  of  the 
good) ;  then  he  shows  himself  moral.     From  this 
point  of  view  how,  e.  g.,  can  Sand's  act  against 
Kotzebue  be  called  immoral  ?     What  is  commonly 
understood  by  unselfish  it  certainly  was,  in  the  same 
measure  as  (among  other  things)  St.  Crispin's  thiev- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  65 

eries  in  favor  of  the  poor.      "  He  should  not  have 
murdered,  for  it  stands  written,  Thou  shalt  not  mur- 
der !  "     Then  to  serve  the  good,  the  welfare  of  the 
people,  as  Sand  at  least  intended,  or  the  welfare  of 
the  poor,  like  Crispin, — is  moral;  but  murder  and 
theft  are  immoral;  the  purpose  moral,  the  means  im- 
moral.    Why  ?      "  Because  murder,  assassination,  is 
something  absolutely  bad."     When  the  Guerrillas  en- 
ticed the  enemies  of  the  country  into  ravines  and  shot 
them  down  unseen  from  the  bushes,  do  you  suppose 
that  was  not  assassination  ?      According  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  morality,  which  commands  us  to  serve  the 
good,  you  could  really  ask  only  whether  murder  could 
never  in  any  case  be  a  realization  of  the  good,  and 
would  have  to  endorse  that  murder  which  realized  the 
good.     You  cannot  condemn  Sand's  deed  at  all;  it 
was  moral,  because  in  the  service  of  the  good,  because 
unselfish;  it  was  an  act  of  punishment,  which  the  indi- 
vidual inflicted,  an — execution  inflicted  at  the  risk  of 
the  executioner's  life.     What  else  had  his  scheme 
been,  after  all,  but  that  he  wanted  to  suppress  writings 
by  brute  force  ?      Are  you  not  acquainted  with  the 
same  procedure  as  a  "  legal "  and  sanctioned  one  ? 
And  what  can  be  objected  against  it  from  your  prin- 
ciple of  morality  ? —  "But  it  was  an  illegal  execu- 
tion."    So  the  immoral  thing  in  it  was  the  illegality, 
the  disobedience  to  law  ?     Then  you  admit  that  the 
good  is  nothing  else  than — law,  morality  nothing  else 
than  loyalty.     And  to  this  externality  of  "  loyalty  " 
your  morality  must  sink,  to  this  righteousness  of 
works  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  law,  only  that  the  latter 
is  at  once  more  tyrannical  and  more  revolting  than 


66  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  old-time  righteousness  of  works.     For  in  the  latte 
only  the  act  is  needed,  but  you  require  the  disposition 
too;  one  must  carry  in  himself  ihe  law,  the  statute; 
and  he  who  is  most  legally  disposed  is  the  most  moral 
Even  the  last  vestige  of  cheerfulness  in  Catholic  life 
must  perish  in  this  Protestant  legality.     Here  at  last 
the  domination  of  the  law  is  for  the  first  time  com- 
plete.    "  Not  I  live,  but  the  law  lives  in  me."     Thus 
I  have  really  come  so  far  as  to  be  only  the  "  vessel  of 
its  glory."     "  Every  Prussian  carries  his  gendarme  ir 
his  breast,"  says  a  high  Prussian  officer. 

Why  do  certain  opposition  parties  fail  to  flourish  ? 
Solely  for  the  reason  that  they  refuse  to  forsake  the 
path  of  morality  or  legality.     Hence  the  measureless 
hypocrisy  of  devotion,  love,  etc.,  from  whose  repulsiv< 
ness  one  may  daily  get  the  most  thorough  nausea  at 
this  rotten  and  hypocritical  relation  of  a  "  lawful  op- 
position."— In  the  moral  relation  of  love  and  fidelity 
divided  or  opposed  will  cannot  have  place;  the  beaut 
ful  relation  is  disturbed  if  the  one  wills  this  and  the 
other  the  reverse.     But  now,  according  to  the  practic 
hitherto  and  the  old  prejudice  of  the  opposition,  the 
moral  relation  is  to  be  preserved  above  all.     What  is 
then  left  to  the  opposition  ?      Perhaps  the  will  to  hav 
a  lioerty,  if  the  beloved  one  sees  fit  to  deny  it  ?      Not 
a  bit !      It  may  not  mil  to  have  the  freedom,  it  can 
only  wish  for  it,  "  petition  "  for  it,  lisp  a  "  Please, 
please  !  "     What  would  come  of  it,  if  the  opposition 
really  willed,  willed  with  the  full  energy  of  the  will  ? 
No,  it  must  renounce  will  in  order  to  live  to  love,  re- 
nounce liberty — for  love  of  morality.     It  may  never 
"  claim  as  a  right  "  what  it  is  permitted  only  to  "  beg 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          67 

as  a  favor."     Love,  devotion,  etc.,  demand  with  unde- 
viating  definiteness  that  there  be  only  one  will  to 
which  the  others  devote  themselves,  which  they  serve, 
follow,  love.     Whether  this  will  is  regarded  as  reason- 
able or  as  unreasonable,  in  both  cases  one  acts  morally 
when  one  follows  it,  and  immorally  when  one  breaks 
away  from  it.     The  will  that  commands  the  censorship 
seems  to  many  unreasonable;  but  he  who  in  a  land  of 
censorship  evades  the  censoring  of  his  book  acts  im- 
morally, and  he  who  submits  it  to  the  censorship  acts 
morally.     If  some  one  let  his  moral  judgment  go,  and 
set  up  e.  g.  a  secret  press,  one  would  have  to  call  him 
immoral,  and  imprudent  into  the  bargain  if  he  let 
himself  be  caught;  but  will  such  a  man  lay  claim  to  a 
value  in  the  eyes  of  the  "  moral  "  ?      Perhaps  !  — That 
is,  if  he  fancied  he  was  serving  a  "  higher  morality." 

The  web  of  the  hypocrisy  of  to-day  hangs  on  the 
frontiers  of  two  domains,  between  which  our  time 
swings  back  and  forth,  attaching  its  fine  threads  of 
deception  and  self-deception.     No  longer  vigorous 
enough  to  serve  morality  without  doubt  or  weakening, 
not  yet  reckless  enough  to  live  wholly  to  egoism,  it 
trembles  now  toward  the  one  and  now  toward  the 
other  in  the  spider-web  of  hypocrisy,  and,  crippled  by 
the  curse  of  halfness,  catches  only  miserable,  stupid 
flies.     If  one  has  once  dared  to  make  a  "  free  "  mo- 
tion, immediately  one  waters  it  again  with  assurances 
of  love,  and — shams  resignation ;  if,  on  the  other  side, 
they  have  had  the  face  to  reject  the  free  motion  with 
moral  appeals  to  confidence,  etc.,  immediately  the 
moral  courage  also  sinks,  and  they  assure  one  how 
they  hear  the  free  words  with  special  pleasure,  etc.; 


68  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

they — sham  approval.     In  short,  people  would  like  to 
have  the  one,  but  not  go  without  the  other;  they 
would  like  to  have  &jree  will,  but  not  for  their  lives 
lack  the  moral  will.     Just  come  in  contact  with  a  ser- 
vile loyalist,  you  Liberals.     You  will  sweeten  every 
word  of  freedom  with  a  look  of  the  most  loyal  confi- 
dence, and  he  will  clothe  his  servilism  in  the  most  flat- 
tering phrases  of  freedom.     Then  you  go  apart,  and 
he,  like  you,  thinks  "  I  know  you,  fox  ! "     He  scents 
the  devil  in  you  as  much  as  you  do  the  dark  old  Lord 
God  in  him. 

A  Nero  is  a  "  bad  "  man  only  in  the  eyes  of  the 
"good";  in  mine  he  is  nothing  but  a, possessed  man, 
as  are  the  good  too.     The  good  see  in  him  an  arch- 
villain,  and  relegate  him  to  hell.     Why  did  nothing 
hinder  him  in  his  arbitrary  course  ?      Why  did  people 
put  up  with  so  much  ?      Do  you  suppose  the  tame 
Romans,  who  let  all  their  will  be  bound  by  such  a 
tyrant,  were  a  hair  the  better  ?      In  old  Rome  they 
would  have  put  him  to  death  instantly,  would  never 
have  been  his  slaves.     But  the  contemporary  "  good  " 
among  the  Romans  opposed  to  him  only  moral  de- 
mands, not  their  will;  they  sighed  that  their  emperor 
did  not  do  homage  to  morality,  like  them ;  they  them- 
selves remained  "  moral  subjects,"  till  at  last  one 
found  courage  to  give  up  "  moral,  obedient  subjec- 
tion."    And  then  the  same  "  good  Romans  "  who,  as 
"  obedient  subjects,"  had  borne  all  the  ignominy  of 
having  no  will,  hurrahed  over  the  nefarious,  immoral 
act  of  the  rebel.     Where  then  in  the  "  good  "  was  the 
courage  for  the  revolution,  that  courage  which  they 
now  praised,  after  another  had  mustered  it  up  ?     The 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          69 

good  could  not  have  this  courage,  for  a  revolution, 
and  an  insurrection  into  the  bargain,  is  always  some- 
thing "  immoral,"  which  one  can  resolve  upon  only 
when  one  ceases  to  be  "  good  "  and  becomes  either 
"  bad  "  or — neither  of  the  two.     Nero  was  no  viler 
than  his  time,  in  which  one  could  only  be  one  of  the 
two,  good  or  bad.     The  judgment  of  his  time  on  him 
had  to  be  that  he  was  bad,  and  this  in  the  highest 
degree:  not  a  milksop,  but  an  arch-scoundrel.     All 
moral  people  can  pronounce  only  this  judgment  on 
him.      Rascals  such  as  he  was  are  still  living  here  and 
there  to-day  (see  e.  g.  the  Memoirs  of  Ritter  von 
Lang)  in  the  midst  of  the  moral.     It  is  not  convenient 
to  live  among  them  certainly,  as  one  is  not  sure  of  his 
life  for  a  moment;  but  can  you  say  that  it  is  more 
convenient  to  live  among  the  moral  ?      One  is  just  as 
little  sure  of  his  life  there,  only  that  one  is  hanged  "  in 
the  way  of  justice,"  but  least  of  all  is  one  sure  of  his 
honor,  and  the  national  cockade  is  gone  before  you 
can  say  Jack  Robinson.     The  hard  fist  of  morality 
treats  the  noble  nature  of  egoism  altogether  without 
compassion. 

"  But  surely  one  cannot  put  a  rascal  and  an  honest 
man  on  the  same  level  ! "     Now,  no  human  being  does 
that  oftener  than  you  judges  of  morals;  yes,  still  more 
than  that,  you  imprison  as  a  criminal  an  honest  man 
who  speaks  openly  against  the  existing  constitution, 
against  the  hallowed  institutions,  etc.,  and  you  en- 
trust portfolios  and  still  more  important  things  to  a 
crafty  rascal.     So  in  praxi  you  have  nothing  to  re- 
proach me  with.     "  But  in  theory  ! "     Now  there  I  do 
put  both  on  the  same  level,  as  two  opposite  poles, — to 


70  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

wit,  both  on  the  level  of  the  moral  law.     Both  have 
meaning  only  in  the  "  moral  "  world,  just  as  in  the 
pre-Christian  time  a  Jew  who  kept  the  law  and  one 
who  broke  it  had  meaning  and  significance  only  in  re- 
spect to  the  Jewish  law;  before  Jesus  Christ,  on  the 
contrary,  the  Pharisee  was  no  more  than  the  "  sinner 
and  publican."     So  before  self-ownership  the  moral 
Pharisee  amounts  to  as  much  as  the  immoral  sinner. 

Nero  became  very  inconvenient  by  his  possessedness. 
But  a  self-owning  man  would  not  sillily  oppose  to  him 
the  "  sacred,"  and  whine  if  the  tyrant  does  not  regard 
the  sacred;  he  would  oppose  to  him  his  will.     How 
often  the  sacredness  of  the  inalienable  rights  of  man 
has  been  held  up  to  their  foes,  and  some  liberty  or 
other  shown  and  demonstrated  to  be  a  "  sacred  right 
of  man  " !      Those  who  do  that  deserve  to  be  laughed 
out  of  court-«-as  they  actually  are, — were  it  not  that 
in  truth  they  do,  even  though  unconsciously,  take  the 
road  that  leads  to  the  goal.     They  have  a  presenti- 
ment that,  if  only  the  majority  is  once  won  for  that 
liberty,  it  will  also  will  the  liberty,  and  will  then  take 
what  it  will  have.     The  sacredness  of  the  liberty,  and 
all  possible  proofs  of  this  sacredness,  will  never  pro- 
cure it;  lamenting  and  petitioning  only  shows  beggars. 

The  moral  man  is  necessarily  narrow  in  that  he 
knows  no  other  enemy  than  the  "  immoral "  man. 
"  He  who  is  not  moral  is  immoral  ! "  and  accordingly 
reprobate,  despicable,  etc.     Therefore  the  moral  man 
can  never  comprehend  the  egoist.     Is  not  unwedded 
cohabitation  an  immorality  ?     The  moral  man  may 
turn  as  he  pleases,  he  will  have  to  stand  by  this  ver- 
dict; Emilia  Galotti  gave  up  her  life  for  this  moral 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          71 

truth.     And  it  is  true,  it  is  an  immorality.     A  vir- 
tuous girl  may  become  an  old  maid;  a  virtuous  man 
may  pass  the  time  in  fighting  his  natural  impulses  till 
he  has  perhaps  dulled  them,  he  may  castrate  himself 
for  the  sake  of  virtue  as  St.  Origen  did  for  the  sake 
of  heaven  :  he  thereby  honors  sacred  wedlock,  sacred 
chastity,  as  inviolable ;  he  is — moral.     Unchastity  can 
never  become  a  moral  act.     However  indulgently  the 
moral  man  may  judge  and  excuse  him  who  committed 
it,  it  remains  a  transgression,  a  sin  against  a  moral 
commandment;  there  clings  to  it  an  indelible  stain. 
As  chastity  once  belonged  to  the  monastic  vow,  so  it 
does  to  moral  conduct.     Chastity  is  a — good. — For 
the  egoist,  on  the  contrary,  even  chastity  is  not  a  good 
without  which  he  could  not  get  along;  he  cares  noth- 
ing at  all  about  it.     What  now  follows  from  this  for 
the  judgment  of  the  moral  man  ?     This  :  that  he 
throws  the  egoist  into  the  only  class  of  men  that  he 
knows  besides  moral  men,  into  that  of  the — immoral. 
He  cannot  do  otherwise;  he  must  find  the  egoist  im- 
moral in  everything  in  which  the  egoist  disregards 
morality.     If  he  did  not  find  him  so,  then  he  would 
already  have  become  an  apostate  from  morality  with- 
out confessing  it  to  himself,  he  would  already  no 
longer  be  a  truly  moral  man.     One  should  not  let 
himself  be  led  astray  by  such  phenomena,  which  at  the 
present  day  are  certainly  no  longer  to  be  classed  as 
rare,  but  should  reflect  that  he  who  yields  any  point  of 
morality  can  as  little  be  counted  among  the  truly 
moral  as  Lessing  was  a  pious  Christian  when,  in  the 
Well-known  parable,  he  compared  the  Christian  re- 
ligion, as  well  as  the  Mohammedan  and  Jewish,  to  a 


72  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

"  counterfeit  ring."     Often  people  are  already  further 
than  they  venture  to  confess  to  themselves.     For 
Socrates,  because  in  culture  he  stood  on  the  level  of 
morality,  it  would  have  been  an  immorality  if  he  had 
been  willing  to  follow  Crito's  seductive  incitement  and 
escape  from  the  dungeon;  to  remain  was  the  only 
moral  thing.     But  it  was  solely  because  Socrates  was 
— a  moral  man.     The  "  unprincipled,  sacrilegious  " 
men  of  the  Revolution,  on  the  contrary,  had  sworn 
fidelity  to  Louis  XVI,  and  decreed  his  deposition,  yes, 
his  death;  but  the  act  was  an  immoral  one,  at  which 
moral  persons  will  be  horrified  to  all  eternity. 

Yet  all  this  applies,  more  or  less,  only  to  "  civic 
morality,"  on  which  the  freer  look  down  with  con- 
tempt.    For  it  (like  civism,  its  native  ground,  in  gen- 
eral) is  still  too  little  removed  and  free  from  the  reli- 
gious heaven  not  to  transplant  the  latter's  laws  with- 
out criticism  or  further  consideration  to  its  domain  in- 
stead of  producing  independent  doctrines  of  its  own. 
Morality  cuts  a  quite  different  figure  when  it  arrives 
at  the  consciousness  of  its  dignity,  and  raises  its  prin- 
ciple, the  essence  of  man,  or  "  Man,"  to  be  the  only 
regulative  power.     Those  who  have  worked  their  way 
through  to  such  a  decided  consciousness  break  entirely 
with  religion,  whose  God  no  longer  finds  any  place 
alongside  their  "  Man,"  and,  as  they  (see  below) 
themselves  scuttle  the  ship  of  State,  so  too  they  crum- 
ble away  that  "  morality  "  which  flourishes  only  in 
the  State,  and  logically  have  no  right  to  use  even  its 
name  any  further.     For  what  this  "  critical "  party 
calls  morality  is  very  positively  distinguished  from  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          73 

so-called  "  civic  or  political  morality,"  and  must  ap- 
pear to  the  citizen  like  an  "  insensate  and  unbridled 
liberty."     But  at  bottom  it  has  only  the  advantage  ol 
the  "  purity  of  the  principle,"  which,  freed  from  its  d* 
filement  with  the  religious,  has  now  reached  universal 
power  in  its  clarified  definiteness  as  "  humanity." 
Therefore  one  should  not  wonder  that  the  name 
"  morality  "  is  retained  along  with  others,  like  free- 
dom, benevolence,  self-consciousness,  etc.,  and  is  only 
garnished  now  and  then  with  the  addition,  a  "  free  " 
morality, — just  as,  though  the  civic  State  is  abused, 
yet  the  State  is  to  arise  again  as  a  "  free  State,"  or,  if 
not  even  so,  yet  as  a  "  free  society." 

Because  this  morality  completed  into  humanity  has 
fully  settled  its  accounts  with  the  religion  out  of  which 
it  historically  came  forth,  nothing  hinders  it  from  be- 
coming a  religion  on  its  own  account.     For  a  distinc- 
tion prevails  between  religion  and  morality  only  so 
long  as  our  dealings  with  the  world  of  men  are  regu- 
lated and  hallowed  by  our  relation  to  a  superhuman 
being,  or  so  long  as  our  doing  is  a  doing  "  for  God"s 
sake."     If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  comes  to  the  point 
that  "man  is  to  man  the  supreme  being,"  then  that 
distinction  vanishes,  and  morality,  being  removed  from 
its  subordinate  position,  is  completed  into — religion. 
For  then  the  higher  being  who  had  hitherto  been  sub- 
ordinated to  the  highest,  Man,  has  ascended  to  abso- 
lute height,  and  we  are  related  to  him  as  one  is  related 
to  the  highest  being,  i.  e.  religiously.     Morality  and 
piety  are  now  as  synonymous  as  in  the  beginning  of 
Christianity,  and  it  is  only  because  the  supreme  being 
has  come  to  be  a  different  one  that  a  holy  walk  is  no 


74  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

longer  called  a  "  holy  "  one,  but  a  "  human  "  one.     If 
morality  has  conquered,  then  a  complete — change  of 
masters  has  taken  place. 

After  the  annihilation  of  faith  Feuerbach  thinks  to 
put  in  to  the  supposedly  safe  harbor  of  love.     "  The 
first  and  highest  law  must  be  the  love  of  man  to  man. 
Homo  homini  Deus  est — this  is  the  supreme  practical 
maxim,  this  the  turning  point  of  the  world's  history."* 
But,  properly  speaking,  only  the  god  is  changed, — 
the  deus ;  love  has  remained:  there  love  to  the  super- 
human God,  here  love  to  the  human  God,  to  homo  as 
Deus.     Therefore  man  is  to  me — sacred.     And  every- 
thing "  truly  human  "  is  to  me — sacred!      "  Marriage 
is  sacred  of  itself.     And  so  it  is  with  all  moral  rela- 
tions.     Friendship  is  and  must  be  sacred  for  you,  and 
property,  and  marriage,  and  the  good  of  every  man, 
but  sacred  In  and  of  itself."^     Haven't  we  the  priest 
again  there  ?      Who  is  his  God  ?      Man  with  a  great 
M  !      What  is  the  divine  ?     The  human  !      Then  the 
predicate  has  indeed  only  been  changed  into  the  sub- 
ject, and,  instead  of  the  sentence  "  God  is  love,"  they 
say  "  love  is  divine  ";  instead  of  "  God  has  become 
man,"  "  Man  has  become  God,"  etc.      It  is  nothing 
more  or  less  than  a  new — religion.     "  All  moral  rela- 
tions are  ethical,  are  cultivated  with  a  moral  mind, 
only  where  of  themselves  (without  religious  consecra- 
tion by  the  priest's  blessing)  they  are  counted  reli- 
gious.'*    Feuerbach's  proposition,  "Theology  is  an- 
thropology," means  only  "  religion  must  be  ethics, 
ethics  alone  is  religion." 

*  "  Essence  of  Christianity,"  second  edition,  p.  402.  t  P.  403. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          75 

Altogether  Feuerbach  accomplishes  only  a  trans- 
position of  subject  and  predicate,  a  giving  of  prefer- 
ence to  the  latter.     But,  since  he  himself  says,  "  Love 
is  not  (and  has  never  been  considered  by  men)  sacred 
through  being  a  predicate  of  God,  but  it  is  a  predicate 
of  God  because  it  is  divine  in  and  of  itself,"  he  might 
judge  that  the  fight  against  the  predicates  themselves, 
against  love  and  all  sanctities,  must  be  commenced. 
How  could  he  hope  to  turn  men  away  from  God  when 
he  left  them  the  divine  ?      And  if,  as  Feuerbach  says, 
God  himself  has  never  been  the  main  thing  to  them, 
but  only  his  predicates,  then  he  might  have  gone  on 
leaving  them  the  tinsel  longer  yet,  since  the  doll,  the 
real  kernel,  was  left  at  any  rate.     He  recognizes,  too, 
that  with  him  it  is  "  only  a  matter  of  annihilating  an 
illusion  " ;  *  he  thinks,  however,  that  the  effect  of  the 
illusion  on  men  is  "  downright  ruinous,  since  even 
love,  in  itself  the  truest,  most  inward  sentiment,  be- 
comes an  obscure,  illusory  one  through  religiousness, 
since  religious  love  loves  manf  only  for  God's  sake, 
therefore  loves  man  only  apparently,  but  in  truth  God 
only."     Is  this  different  with  moral  love  ?      Does  it 
love  the  man,  this  man  for  this  man's  sake,  or  for  mo- 
rality's sake,  for  Mail's  sake,  and  so — for  homo  homini 
Deus — for  God's  sake  ? 


The  wheels  in  the  head  have  a  number  of  other 
formal  aspects,  some  of  which  it  may  be  useful  to  in- 
dicate here. 

Thus  self-renunciation  is  common  to  the  holy  with 

*  P.  408.  t  [Literally  "  the  man."] 


76  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  unholy,  to  the  pure  and  the  impure.     The  impure 
man  renounces  all  "  better  feelings,"  all  shame,  even 
natural  timidity,  and  follows  only  the  appetite  that 
rules  him.     The  pure  man  renounces  his  natural  rela- 
tion to  the  world  ("  renounces  the  world  ")  and  follows 
only  the  "  desire  "  which  rules  him.      Driven  by  the 
thirst  for  money,  the  avaricious  man  renounces  all  ad- 
monitions of  conscience,  all  feeling  of  honor,  all 
gentleness  and  all  compassion;  he  puts  all  considera- 
tions out  of  sight ;  the  appetite  drags  him  along.    The 
holy  man  beKaves  similarly.      He  makes  himself  the 
"  laughing-stock  of  the  world,"  is  hard-hearted  and 
"  strictly  just " ;  for  the  desire  drags  him  along.     As 
the  unholy  man  renounces  himself  before  Mammon,  so 
the  holy  man  renounces  himself  before  God  and  the 
divine  laws.     We  are  now  living  in  a  time  when  the 
sliamelessness  of  the  holy  is  every  day  more  and  more 
felt  and  uncovered,  whereby  it  is  at  the  same  time 
compelled  to  unveil  itself,  and  lay  itself  bare,  more 
and  more  every  day.     Have  not  the  shamelessness  and 
stupidity  of  the  reasons  with  which  men  antagonize 
the  "  progress  of  the  age  "  long  surpassed  all  measure 
and  all  expectation  ?      But  it  must  be  so.     The  self- 
renouncers  must,  as  holy  men,  take  the  same  course 
that  they  do  as  unholy  men;  as  the  latter  little  by 
little  sink  to  the  fullest  measure  of  self-renouncing  vul- 
garity and  lowness,  so  the  former  must  ascend  to  the 
most  dishonorable  exaltation.     The  mammon  of  the 
earth  and  the  God  of  heaven  both  demand  exactly  the 
same  degree  of — self-renunciation.     The  low  man,  like 
the  exalted  one,  reaches  out  for  a  "  good," — the 
former  for  the  material  good,  the  latter  for  the  ideal, 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  77 

the  so-called  "  supreme  good  " ;  and  at  last  both  com- 
plete each  other  again  too,  as  the  "  materially- 
minded  "  man  sacrifices  everything  to  an  ideal  phan- 
tasm, his  vanity,  and  the  "  spiritually-minded  "  man 
to  a  material  gratification,  the  life  of  enjoyment. 

Those  who  exhort  men  to  "  unselfishness  "*  think 
they  are  saying  an  uncommon  deal.     What  do  they 
understand  by  it  ?      Probably  something  like  what 
they  understand  by  "  self-renunciation."     But  who  is 
this  self  that  is  to  be  renounced  and  to  have  no  bene- 
fit ?      It  seems  that  you  yourself  are  supposed  to  be  it. 
And  for  whose  benefit  is  unselfish  self-renunciation 
recommended  to  you  ?      Again  for  your  benefit  and 
behoof,  only  that  through  unselfishness  you  are  pro- 
curing your  "  true  benefit." 

You  are  to  benefit  yourself,  and  yet  you  are  not  to 
seek  your  benefit. 

People  regard  as  unselfish  the  benefactor  of  men,  a 
Franke  who  founded  the  orphan  asylum,  an  O'Con- 
nell  who  works  tirelessly  for  his  Irish  people;  but  also 
the  fanatic  who,  like  St.  Boniface,  hazards  his  life  for 
the  conversion  of  the  heathen,  or,  like  Robespierre, 
sacrifices  everything  to  virtue, — like  Koerner,  dies  for 
God,  king,  and  fatherland.     Hence,  among  others, 
O'Connell's  opponents  try  to  trump  up  against  him 
some  selfishness  or  mercenariness,  for  which  the  O'Con- 
nell  fund  seemed  to  give  them  a  foundation;  for,  if 
they  were  successful  in  casting  suspicion  on  his  "  un- 
selfishness," they  would  easily  separate  him  from  his 
adherents. 

*  [l.'ni.-ioi'nnucti.igkeit,  literally  "  un-self-bencfltingness."] 


78  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Yet  what  could  they  show  further  than  that  O'Con- 
nell  was  working  for  another  end  than  the  ostensible 
one  ?      But,  whether  he  may  aim  at  making  money  or 
at  liberating  the  people,  it  still  remains  certain,  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other,  that  he  is  striving  for  an  end,  and 
that  his  end;  selfishness  here  as  there,  only  that  his 
national  self-interest  would  be  beneficial  to  others  too, 
and  so  would  be  for  the  common  interest. 

Now,  do  you  suppose  unselfishness  is  unreal  and 
nowhere  extant  ?      On  the  contrary,  nothing  is  more 
ordinary  !      One  may  even  call  it  an  article  of  fashion 
in  the  civilized  world,  which  is  considered  so  indispen- 
sable that,  if  it  costs  too  much  in  solid  material,  pso- 
ple  at  least  adorn  themselves  with  its  tinsel  counterfeit 
and  feign  it.     Where  does  unselfishness  begin  ? 
Right  where  an  end  ceases  to  be  our  end  and  our 
property,  which  we,  as  owners,  can  dispose  of  at  pleas- 
ure; where  it  becomes  a  fixed  end  or  a — fixed  idea: 
where  k  begins  to  inspire,  enthuse,  fanaticize  us;  in 
short,  where  it  passes  into  our  stubbornness  and  be- 
comes our — master.     One  is  not  unselfish  so  long  as 
he  retains  the  end  in  his  power;  one  becomes  so  only 
at  that  "  Here  I  stand,  I  cannot  do  otherwise,"  the 
fundamental  maxim  of  all  the  possessed ;  one  becomes 
so  in  the  case  of  a  sacred  end,  through  the  correspond- 
ing sacred  zeal. — 

I  am  not  unselfish  so  long  as  the  end  remains  my 
own,  and  I,  instead  of  giving  myself  up  to  be  the 
blind  means  of  its  fulfilment,  leave  it  always  an  open 
question.     My  zeal  need  not  on  that  account  be 
slacker  than  the  most  fanatical,  but  at  the  same  time  I 
remain  toward  it  frostily  cold,  unbelieving,  and  its 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  79 

most  irreconcilable  enemy;  I  remain  \\sjudge,  because 
I  am  its  owner. 

Unselfishness  grows  rank  as  far  as  possessedness 
reaches,  as  much  on  possessions  of  the  devil  as  on  those 
of  a  good  spirit :  there  vice,  folly,  etc. ;  here  humility, 
devotion,  etc. 

Where  could  one  look  without  meeting  victims  of 
self-renunciation  ?     There  sits  a  girl  opposite  me,  who 
perhaps  has  been  making  bloody  sacrifices  to  her  soul 
for  ten  years  already.     Over  the  buxom  form  droops  a 
deathly-tired  head,  and  pale  cheeks  betray  the  slow 
bleeding  away  of  her  youth.     Poor  child,  how  often 
the  passions  may  have  beaten  ^,t  your  heart,  and  the 
rich  powers  of  youth  have  demanded  their  right  ! 
When  your  head  rolled  in  the  soft  pillow,  how 
awakening  nature  quivered  through  your  limbs,  the 
blood  swelled  your  veins,  and  fiery  fancies  poured  the 
gleam  of  voluptuousness  into  your  eyes  !      Then  ap- 
peared the  ghost  of  the  soul  and  its  eternal  bliss. 
You  were  terrified,  your  hands  folded  themselves,  your 
tormented  eye  turned  its  look  upward,  you — prayed. 
The  storms  of  nature  were  hushed,  a  calm  glided  over 
the  ocean  of  your  appetites.     Slowly  the  weary  eyelids 
sank  over  the  life  extinguished  under  them,  the  ten- 
sion crept  out  un  perceived  from  the  rounded  limbs, 
the  boisterous  waves  dried  up  in  the  heart,  the  folded 
hands  themselves  rested  a  powerless  weight  on  the  un- 
resisting bosom,  one  last  faint  "  Oh  dear  ! "  moaned  it- 
self away,  and — the  soul  was  at  rest.     You  fell  asleep, 
to  awake  in  the  morning  to  a  new  combat  and  a  new 
— prayer.     Now  the  habit  of  renunciation  cools  the 
heat  of  your  desire,  and  the  roses  of  your  youth  are 


80  THE  EGO  AND   HIS  OWN 

growing  pale  in  the — chlorosis  of  your  heavenliness. 
The  soul  is  saved,  the  body  may  perish  !      O  Lais,  O 
Ninon,  how  well  you  did  to  scorn  this  pale  virtue  ! 
One  free  grisette  against  a  thousand  virgins  grown 
gray  in  virtue  ! 

The  fixed  idea  may  also  be  perceived  as  "  maxim," 
"  principle,"  "  standpoint,"  and  the  like.     Archi- 
medes, to  move  the  earth,  asked  for  a  standpoint  out- 
side it.     Men  sought  continually  for  this  standpoint, 
and  every  one  seized  upon  it  as  well  as  he  was  able. 
This  foreign  standpoint  is  the  world  of  mind,  of  ideas, 
thoughts,  concepts,  essences,  etc.;  it  is  heaven. 
Heaven  is  the  "  standpoint "  from  which  the  earth  is 
moved,  earthly  doings  surveyed  and — despised;    To 
assure  to  themselves  heaven,  to  occupy  the  heavenly 
standpoint  firmly  and  for  ever, — how  painfully  and 
tirelessly  humanity  struggled  for  this  ! 

Christianity  has  aimed  to  deliver  us  from  a  life  de- 
termined by  nature,  from  the  appetites  as  actuating 
us,  and  so  has  meant  that  man  should  not  let  himself 
be  determined  by  his  appetites.     This  does  not  in- 
volve the  idea  that  he  was  not  to  have  appetites,  but 
that  the  appetites  were  not  to  have  him,  that  they 
were  not  to  become  Jixed,  uncontrollable,  indissoluble. 
Now,  could  not  what  Christianity  (religion)  contrived 
against  the  appetites  be  applied  by  us  to  its  own  pre- 
cept that  mind  (thought,  conceptions,  ideas,  faith, 
etc.)  must  determine  us;  could  we  not  ask  that  neither 
should  mind,  or  the  conception,  the  idea,  be  allowed 
to  determine  us,  to  become  fixed  and  inviolable  or 
"  sacred  "  ?     Then  it  would  end  in  the  dissolution  of 
mind,  the  dissolution  of  all  thoughts,  of  all  concep- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          81 

tions.     As  we  there  had  to  say  "  We  are  indeed  to 
have  appetites,  but  the  appetites  are  not  to  have  us," 
so  we  should  now  say  "  We  are  indeed  to  have  mind, 
but  mind  is  not  to  have  us."     If  the  latter  seems  lack- 
ing in  sense,  think  e.  g.  of  the  fact  that  with  so  many 
a  man  a  thought  becomes  a  "  maxim,"  whereby  he 
himself  is  made  prisoner  to  it,  so  that  it  is  not  he  that 
has  the  maxim,  but  rather  it  that  has  him.     And  with 
the  maxim  he  has  a  "  permanent  standpoint "  again. 
The  doctrines  of  the  catechism  become  our  principles 
before  we  find  it  out,  and  no  longer  brook  rejection. 
Their  thought,  or — mind,  has  the  sole  power,  and  no 
protest  of  the  "  flesh  "  is  further  listened  to.     Never- 
theless it  is  only  through  the  "  flesh  "  that  I  can  break 
the  tyranny  of  mind;  for  it  is  only  when  a  man  hears 
his  flesh  along  with  the  rest  of  him  that  he  hears  him- 
self wholly,  and  it  is  only  when  he  wholly  hears  }nm- 
•w^that  he  is  a  hearing  or  rational*  being.     The 
Christian  does  not  hear  the  agony  of  his  enthralled 
nature,  but  lives  in  "  humility";  therefore  he  does  not 
grumble  at  the  wrong  which  befalls  his  person ;  he 
thinks  himself  satisfied  with  the  "  freedom  of  the 
spirit."     But,  if  the  flesh  once  takes  the  floor,  and  its 
tone  is  "  passionate,"  "  indecorous,"  "  not  well-dis- 
posed," "  spiteful,"  etc.  (as  it  cannot  be  otherwise), 
then  he  thinks  he  hears  voices  of  devils,  voices  against 
the  spirit  (for  decorum,  passionlessness,  kindly  disposi- 
tion, and  the  like,  is — spirit),  and  is  justly  zealous 
against  them.     He  could  not  be  a  Christian  if  he  were 
willing  to  endure  them.     He  listens  only  to  morality, 

*  [vernuenftig,  derived  from  vernehmen,  to  hear.] 


82  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

and  slaps  immorality  in  the  mouth;  he  listens  only  to 
legality,  and  gags  the  lawless  word.     The  spirit  of 
morality  and  legality  holds  him  a  prisoner;  a  rigid, 
unbending  master.     They  call  that  the  "  mastery  of 
the  spirit," — it  is  at  the  same  time  the  standpoint  of 
the  spirit. 

And  now  whom  do  the  ordinary  liberal  gentlemen 
mean  to  make  free  ?      Whose  freedom  is  it  that  they 
cry  out  and  thirst  for  ?     The  spirit's !     That  of  the 
spirit  of  morality,  legality,  piety,  the  fear  of  God,  etc. 
That  is  what  the  anti-liberal  gentlemen  also  want,  and 
the  whole  contention  between  the  two  turns  on  a  mat- 
ter of  advantage, — whether  the  latter  are  to  be  the 
only  speakers,  or  the  former  are  to  receive  a  "  share  in 
the  enjoyment  of  the  same  advantage."     The  spirit  re- 
mains the  absolute  lord  for  both,  and  their  only  quar- 
rel is  over  who  shall  occupy  the  hierarchical  throne 
that  pertains  to  the  "  Vicegerent  of  the  Lord."     The 
best  of  it  is  that  one  can  calmly  look  upon  the  stir 
with  the  certainty  that  the  wild  beasts  of  history  will 
tear  each  other  to  pieces  just  like  those  of  nature; 
their  putrefying  corpses  fertilize  the  ground  for — our 
crops. 

We  shall  come  back  later  to  many  another  wheel  in 
the  head, — for  instance,  those  of  vocation,  truthful- 
ness, love,  etc. 

When  one's  own  is  contrasted  with  what  is  imparted 
to  him,  there  is  no  use  in  objecting  that  we  cannot 
have  anything  isolated,  but  receive  everything  as  a 
part  of  the  universal  order,  and  therefore  through  the 
impression  of  what  is  around  us,  and  that  consequently 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  83 

we  have  it  as  something  "  imparted  ";  for  there  is  a 
great  difference  between  the  feelings  and  thoughts 
which  are  aroused  in  me  by  other  things  and  those 
which  are  given  to  me.     God,  immortality,  freedom, 
humanity,  etc.,  are  drilled  into  us  from  childhood  as 
thoughts  and  feelings  which  move  our  inner  being 
more  or  less  strongly,  either  ruling  us  without  our 
knowing  it,  or  sometimes  in  richer  natures  manifesting 
themselves  in  systems  and  works  of  art;  but  are  al- 
ways not  aroused,  but  imparted,  feelings,  because  we 
must  believe  in  them  and  cling  to  them.     That  an 
Absolute  existed,  and  that  it  must  be  taken  in,  felt, 
and  thought  by  us,  was  settled  as  a  faith  in  the  minds 
of  those  who  spent  all  the  strength  of  their  mind  on 
recognizing  it  and  setting  it  forth.     The  feeling  for 
the  Absolute  exists  there  as  an  imparted  one,  and 
thenceforth  results  only  in  the  most  manifold  revela- 
tions of  its  own  self.     So  in  Klopstock  the  religious 
feeling  was  an  imparted  one,  which  iij  the  "  Messiad  " 
simply  found  artistic  expression.      If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  religion  with  which  he  was  confronted  had 
been  for  him  only  an  incitation  to  feeling  and 
thought,  and  if  he  had  known  how  to  take  an  attitude 
completely  hi?  oicn  toward  it,  then  there  would  have 
resulted,  instead  of  religious  inspiration,  a  dissolution 
and  consumption  of  the  religion  itself.      Instead  of 
that,  he  only  continued  in  mature  years  his  childish 
feelings  received  in  childhood,  and  squandered  the 
powers  of  his  manhood  in  decking  out  his  childish 
trifles. 

The  difference  is,  then,  whether  feelings  are  im- 
parted to  me  or  only  aroused.     Those  which  are 


84  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

aroused  are  my  own,  egoistic,  because  they  are  not  as 
feelings  drilled  into  me,  dictated  to  me,  and  pressed 
upon  me;  but  those  which  are  imparted  to  me  I  re- 
ceive, with  open  arms, — I  cherish  them  in  me  as  a 
heritage,  cultivate  them,  and  am  possessed  by  them. 
Who  is  there  that  has  never,  more  or  less  consciously, 
noticed  that  our  whole  education  is  calculated  to  pro- 
duce  feelings  in  us,  i.  e.  impart  them  to  us,  instead  of 
leaving  their  production  to  ourselves  however  they 
may  turn  out  ?      If  we  hear  the  name  of  God,  we  are 
to  feel  veneration ;  if  we  hear  that  of  the  prince's  ma- 
jesty, it  is  to  be  received  with  reverence,  deference, 
submission ;  if  we  hear  that  of  morality,  we  are  to 
think  that  we  hear  something  inviolable;  if  we  hear  of 
the  Evil  One  or  evil  ones,  we  are  to  shudder;  etc. 
The  intention  is  directed  to  these  feelings,  and  he  who 
e.  g.  should  hear  with  pleasure  the  deeds  of  the 
"  bad  "  would  have  to  be  "  taught  what's  what "  with 
the  rod  of  discipline.     Thus  stuffed  with  imparted  feel- 
ings, we  appear  before  the  bar  of  majority  and  are 
"  pronounced  of  age."     Our  equipment  consists  of 
"  elevating  feelings,  lofty  thoughts,  inspiring  maxims, 
eternal  principles,"  etc.     The  young  are  of  age  when 
they  twitter  like  the  old;  they  are  driven  through 
school  to  learn  the  old  song,  and,  when  they  have  this 
by  heart,  they  are  declared  of  age. 

We  must  not  feel  at  every  thing  and  every  name 
that  comes  before  us  what  we  could  and  would  like  to 
feel  thereat;  e.  g.,  at  the  name  of  God  we  must  think 
of  nothing  laughable,  feel  nothing  disrespectful,  it  be- 
ing prescribed  and  imparted  to  us  what  and  how  we 
are  to  feel  and  think  at  mention  of  that  name. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  85 

That  is  the  meaning  of  the  care  of  souls, — that  my 
soul  or  my  mind  be  tuned  as  others  think  right,  not  as 
I  myself  would  like  it.     How  much  trouble  does  it  not 
cost  one,  finally  to  secure  to  oneself  a  feeling  of  one's 
own  at  the  mention  of  at  least  this  or  that  name,  and 
to  laugh  in  the  face  of  many  who  expect  from  us  a 
holy  face  and  a  composed  expression  at  their  speeches. 
What  is  imparted  is  alien  to  us,  is  not  our  own,  and 
therefore  is  "  sacred,"  and  it  is  hard  work  to  lay  aside 
the  "  sacred  dread  of  it." 

To-day  one  again  hears  "  seriousness  "  praised, 
"  seriousness  in  the  presence  of  highly  important  sub- 
jects and  discussions,"  "  German  seriousness,"  etc. 
This  sort  of  seriousness  proclaims  clearly  how  old  and 
grave  lunacy  and  possession  have  already  become. 
For  there  is  nothing  more  serious  than  a  lunatic  when 
he  comes  to  the  central  point  of  his  lunacy;  then  his 
great  earnestness  incapacitates  him  for  taking  a  joke. 
(See  madhouses.) 

§  3. — THE  HIERARCHY 

The  historical  reflections  on  our  Mongolism  which  I 
propose  to  insert  episodically  at  this  place  are  not 
given  with  the  claim  of  thoroughness,  or  even  of  ap- 
proved soundness,  but  solely  because  it  seems  to  me 
that  they  may  contribute  toward  making  the  rest 
clear. 

The  history  of  the  world,  whose  shaping  properly 
belongs  altogether  to  the  Caucasian  race,  seems  till 
now  to  have  run  through  two  Caucasian  ages,  in  the 
first  of  which  we  had  to  work  out  and  work  off  our 


86  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

innate  negroidity ;  this  was  followed  in  the  second  by 
Mongoloidity  (Chineseness),  which  must  likewise  be 
terribly  made  an  end  of.     Negroidity  represents 
antiquity,  the  time  of  dependence  on  things  (on  cocks' 
eating,  birds'  flight,  on  sneezing,  on  thunder  and 
lightning,  on  the  rustling  of  sacred  trees,  etc.) ;  Mon- 
goloidity  the  time  of  dependence  on  thoughts,  the 
Christian  time.     Reserved  for  the  future  are  the  words 
"  I  am  owner  of  the  world  of  things,  and  I  am  owner 
of  the  world  of  mind." 

In  the  negroid  age  fall  the  campaigns  of  Sesostris 
and  the  importance  of  Egypt  and  of  northern  Africa 
in  general.     To  the  Mongoloid  age  belong  the  in- 
vasions of  the  Huns  and  Mongols,  up  to  the  Russians. 

The  value  of  me  cannot  possibly  be  rated  high  so 
long  as  the  hard  diamond  of  the  not-me  bears  so 
enormous  a  price  as  was  the  case  both  with  God  and 
with  the  world.     The  not-me  is  still  too  stony  and 
indomitable  to  be  consumed  and  absorbed  by  me; 
rather,  men  only  creep  about  with  extraordinary  bustle 
on  this  immovable  entity,  i.  e.  on  this  substance,  like 
parasitic  animals  on  a  body  from  whose  juices  they 
draw  nourishment,  yet  without  consuming  it.     It  is 
the  bustle  of  vermin,  the  assiduity  of  Mongolians. 
Among  the  Chinese,  we  know,  everything  remains  as 
it  used  to  be,  and  nothing  "  essential  "  or  "  substan- 
tial" suffers  a  change;  all  the  more  actively  do  they 
work  away  at  that  which  remains,  which  bears  the 
name  of  the  "  old,"  "  ancestors,"  etc. 

Accordingly,  in  our  Mongolian  age  all  change  has 
been  only  reformatory  or  ameliorative,  not  destructive 
or  consuming  and  annihilating.  The  substance,  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  87 

object,  remain*.     All  our  assiduity  was  only  the 
activity  of  ants  and  the  hopping  of  fleas,  jugglers' 
tricks  on  the  immovable  tight-rope  of  the  objective, 
cort'ee-service  under  the  lordship  of  the  unchangeable 
or  "  eternal."     The  Chinese  are  doubtless  the  most 
jMtiitive  nation,  because  totally  buried  in  precepts;  but 
neither  has  the  Christian  age  come  out  from  the  posi- 
tive, i.  e.  from  "  limited  freedom,"  freedom  "  within 
certain  limits."     In  the  most  advanced  stage  of  civili- 
zation this  activity  earns  the  name  of  scientific  activ- 
ity, of  working  on  a  motionless  presupposition,  a 
hypothesis  that  is  not  to  be  upset. 

In  its  first  and  most  unintelligible  form  morality 
shows  itself  as  habit.     To  act  according  to  the  habit 
and  usage  (inoreui)  of  one's  country — is  to  be  moral 
there.     Therefore  pure  moral  action,  clear,  unadulter- 
ated morality,  is  most  straightforwardly  practised  in 
China;  they  keep  to  the  old  habit  and  usage,  and  hate 
each  innovation  as  a  crime  worthy  of  death.     For 
innovation  is  the  deadly  enemy  of  habit,  of  the  old,  of 
permanence.      In  fact,  too,  it  admits  of  no  doubt  that 
through  habit  man  secures  himself  against  the  ob- 
trusiveness  of  tilings,  of  the  world,  and  founds  a  world 
of  his  own  in  which  alone  he  is  and  feels  at  home,  i.  e. 
builds  himself  a  heaven.     Why,  heaven  has  no  other 
meaning  than  that  it  is  man's  proper  home,  in  which 
nothing  alien  regulates  and  rules  him  any  longer,  no 
influence  of  the  earthly  any  longer  makes  him  himself 
alien;  in  short,  in  which  the  dross  of  the  earthly  is 
thrown  off,  and  the  combat  against  the  world  has 
found  an  end, — in  which,  therefore,  nothing  is  any 
longer  denied  him.     Heaven  is  the  end  of  abnegation, 


88  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

it  \sfree  enjoyment.     There  man  no  longer  denies 
himself  anything,  because  nothing  is  any  longer  alien 
and  hostile  to  him.     But  now  habit  is  a  "  second 
nature,"  which  detaches  and  frees  man  from  his  first 
and  original  natural  condition,  in  securing  him 
against  every  casualty  of  it.     The  fully  elaborated 
habit  of  the  Chinese  has  provided  for  all  emergencies, 
and  everything  is  "  looked  out  for  " ;  whatever  may 
come,  the  Chinaman  always  knows  how  he  has  to  be- 
have, and  does  not  need  to  decide  first  according  to 
the  circumstances;  no  unforeseen  case  throws  him 
down  from  the  heaven  of  his  rest.     The  morally  habit- 
uated and  inured  Chinaman  is  not  surprised  and  taken 
off  his  guard;  he  behaves  with  equanimity  (i.  e.  with 
equal  spirit  or  temper)  toward  everything,  because  his 
temper,  protected  by  the  precaution  of  his  traditional 
usage,  does  not  lose  its  balance.     Hence,  on  the  ladder 
of  culture  or  civilization  humanity  mounts  the  first 
round  through  habit;  and,  as  it  conceives  that,  in 
climbing  to  culture,  it  is  at  the  same  time  climbing  to 
heaven,  the  realm  of  culture  or  second  nature,  it  really 
mounts  the  first  round  of  the — ladder  to  heaven. 

If  Mongoldom  has  settled  the  existence  of  spiritual 
beings, — if  it  has  created  a  world  of  spirits,  a  heaven, 
— the  Caucasians  have  wrestled  for  thousands  of  years 
with  these  spiritual  beings,  to  get  to  the  bottom  of 
them.      What  were  they  doing,  then,  but  building  on 
Mongolian  ground  ?     They  have  not  built  on  sand, 
but  in  the  air;  they  have  wrestled  with  Mongolism, 
stormed  the  Mongolian  heaven,  Tien.     When  will 
they  at  last  annihilate  this  heaven  ?     When  will  they 
at  last  become  really  Caucasians,  and  find  themselves? 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  89 

When  will  the  "  immortality  of  the  soul,"  which  in 
these  latter  days  thought  it  was  giving  itself  still  more 
security  if  it  presented  itself  as  "  immortality  of 
mind,"  at  last  change  to  the  mortality  of  mind? 
It  was  when,  in  the  industrious  struggle  of  the 
Mongolian  race,  men  had  built  a  heaven,  that  those  of 
the  Caucasian  race,  since  in  their  Mongolian  com- 
plexion they  have  to  do  with  heaven,  took  upon  them- 
selves the  opposite  task,  the  task  of  storming  that 
heaven  of  custom,  heaven-storming*  activity.     To  dig 
under  all  human  ordinance,  in  order  to  set  up  a  new 
and — better  one  on  the  cleared  site,  to  wreck  all 
customs  in  order  to  put  new  and — better  customs  in 
their  place,  etc., — their  act  is  limited  to  this.     But  is 
it  thus  already  purely  and  really  what  it  aspires  to  be, 
and  does  it  reach  its  final  aim  ?      No,  in  this  creation 
of  a  "  better  "  it  is  tainted  with  Mongolism.     It  storms 
heaven  only  to  make  a  heaven  again,  it  overthrows  an 
old  power  only  to  legitimate  a  new  power,  it  only — 
improves.      Nevertheless  the  point  aimed  at,  often  as  it 
may  vanish  from  the  eyes  at  every  new  attempt,  is  the 
real,  complete  downfall  of  heaven,  customs,  etc., — in 
short,  of  man  secured  only  against  the  world,  of  the 
isolation  or  inwardness  of  man.     Through  the  heaven 
of  culture  man  seeks  to  isolate  himself  from  the  world, 
to  break  its  hostile  power.     But  this  isolation  of 
heaven  must  likewise  be  broken,  and  the  true  end  of 
heaven-storming  is  the — downfall  of  heaven,  the  anni- 
hilation of  heaven.     Improving  and  reforming  is  the 
Mongolism  of  the  Caucasian,  because  thereby  he  is  al- 

*[A  German  idiom  for  destructive  radicalism.] 


90  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ways  setting  up  again  what  already  existed, — to  wit,  a 
precept,  a  generality,  a  heaven.     He  harbors  the  most 
irreconcilable  enmity  to  heaven,  and  yet  builds  new 
heavens  daily ;  piling  heaven  on  heaven,  he  only 
crushes  one  by  another;  the  Jews'  heaven  destroys  the 
Greeks',  the  Christians'  the  Jews',  the  Protestants'  the 
Catholics',  etc. — If  the  heaven-storming  men  of  Cau- 
casian blood  throw  off  their  Mongolian  skin,  they  will 
bury  the  emotional  man  under  the  ruins  of  the  mon- 
strous world  of  emotion,  the  isolated  man  under  his 
isolated  world,  Ikr  paradisiacal  man  under  his  heaven. 
And  heaven  is  the  realm  of  spirits,  the  realm  of  free- 
dom of  the  spirit. 

The  realm  of  heaven,  the  realm  of  spirits  and 
ghosts,  has  found  its  right  standing  in  the  speculative 
philosophy.     Here  it  was  stated  as  the  realm  of 
thoughts,  concepts,  and  ideas;  heaven  is  peopled  with 
thoughts  and  ideas,  and  this  "  realm  of  spirits  "  is 
then  the  true  reality. 

To  want  to  win  freedom  for  the  spirit  is  Mon- 
golism;  freedom  of  the  spirit  is  Mongolian  freedom, 
freedom  of  feeling,  moral  freedom,  etc. 

We  may  find  the  word  "  morality  "  taken  as  syn- 
onymous with  spontaneity,  self-determination.     But 
'that  is  not  involved  in  it;  rather  has  the  Caucasian 
shown  himself  spontaneous  only  in  spite  of  his  Mon- 
golian morality.     The  Mongolian  heaven,  or  morals,* 
remained  the  strong  castle,  and  only  by  storming  in- 
cessantly at  this  castle  did  the  Caucasian  show  him- 
self moral;  if  he  had  not  had  to  do  with  morals  at  all 

*  [The  same  word  that  has  been  translated  "  custom  "  several  times  in 
this  section.] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          91 

any  longer,  if  he  had  not  had  therein  his  indomitable, 
continual  enemy,  the  relation  to  morals  would  cease, 
and  consequently  morality  would  cease.     That  his 
spontaneity  is  still  a  moral  spontaneity,  therefore,  is 
just  the  Mongoloidity  of  it, — is  a  sign  that  in  it  he  has 
not  arrived  at  himself.     "  Moral  spontaneity  "  cor- 
responds entirely  with  "  religious  and  orthodox  phil- 
osophy," "  constitutional  monarchy,"  "  the  Christian 
State,"  "  freedom  within  certain  limits,"  "  the  limited 
freedom  of  the  press,"  or,  in  a  figure,  to  the  hero  fet- 
tered to  a  sick-bed. 

Man  has  not  really  vanquished  Shamanism  and  its 
spooks  till  he  possesses  the  strength  to  lay  aside  not 
only  the  belief  in  ghosts  or  in  spirits,  but  also  the  be- 
lief in  the  spirit. 

He  who  believes  in  a  spook  no  more  assumes  the 
"  introduction  of  a  higher  world  "  than  he  who 
believes  in  the  spirit,  and  both  seek  behind  the  sensual 
world  a  supersensual  one;  in  short,  they  produce  and 
believe  anotlier  world,  and  this  other  world,  the  pro- 
duct of  their  mind,  is  a  spiritual  world;  for  their 
senses  grasp  and  know  nothing  of  another,  a  non- 
sensual  world,  only  their  spirit  lives  in  it.     Going  on 
from  this  Mongolian  belief  in  the  existence  of  spiritual 
beings  to  the  point  that  the  proper  being  of  man  too 
is  his  spirit,  and  that  all  care  must  be  directed  to  this 
alone,  to  the  "  welfare  of  his  soul,"  is  not  hard.     In- 
fluence on  the  spirit,  so-called  "  moral  influence,"  is 
hereby  assured. 

Hence  it  is  manifest  that  Mongolism  represents 
utter  absence  of  any  rights  of  the  sensuous,  represents  ^ 
non-sensuousness  and  unnature,  and  that  sin  and  the 


92  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

consciousness  of  sin  was  our  Mongolian  torment  that 
lasted  thousands  of  years. 

But  who,  then,  will  dissolve  the  spirit  into  its  noth- 
ing ?  He  who  by  means  of  the  spirit  set  forth  nature 
as  the  null,  finite,  transitory,  he  alone  can  bring  down 
the  spirit  too  to  like  nullity.  /  can;  each  one  among 
you  can,  who  does  his  will  as  an  absolute  I;  in  a 
word,  the  egoist  can. 

Before  the  sacred,  people  lose  all  sense  of  power  and 
all  confidence;   they  occupy  a.  powerless  and  humble 
attitude  toward  it.     And  yet  no  thing  is  sacred  of  it- 
self, but  by  my  declaring  it  sacred,  by  my  declaration, 
my  judgment,  my  bending  the  knee;  in  short,  by  my 
— conscience. 

Sacred  is  everything  which  for  the  egoist  is  to  be 
unapproachable,  not  to  be  touched,  outside  his  power, 
— i.  e.  above  him ;  sacred,  in  a  word,  is  every  matter 
of  conscience,  for  "  this  is  a  matter  of  conscience  to 
me  "  means  simply  "  I  hold  this  sacred." 

For  little  children,  just  as  for  animals,  nothing 
sacred  exists,  because,  in  order  to  make  room  for  this 
conception,  one  must  already  have  progressed  so  far  in 
understanding  that  he  can  make  distinctions  like 
"  good  and  bad,"  "  warranted  and  unwarranted," 
etc. ;  only  at  such  a  level  of  reflection  or  intelligence — 
the  proper  standpoint  of  religion — can  unnatural 
(i.  e.  brought  into  existence  by  thinking)  reverence, 
"  sacred  dread,"  step  into  the  place  of  naturaiy^ar. 
To  this  sacred  dread  belongs  holding  something  out- 
side oneself  for  mightier,  greater,  better  warranted, 
better,  etc.;  i.  e.  the  attitude  in  which  one  acknowl- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  93 

edges  the  might  of  something  alien — not  merely  feels 
it,  then,  but  expressly  acknowledges  it,  i.  e.  admits  it, 
yields,  surrenders,  lets  himself  be  tied  (devotion, 
humility,  servility,  submission,  etc.)      Here  walks  the 
whole  ghostly  troop  of  the  "  Christian  virtues." 

Everything  toward  which  you  cherish  any  respect 
or  reverence  deserves  the  name  of  sacred;  you  your- 
selves, too,  say  that  you  would  feel  a  "  sacred  dread  " 
of  laying  hands  on  it.     And  you  give  this  tinge  even 
to  the  unholy  (gallows,  crime,  etc.)     You  have  a  hor- 
ror of  touching  it.     There  lies  in  it  something  un- 
canny, i.  e.  unfamiliar  or  not  your  own. 

"  If  something  or  other  did  not  rank  as  sacred  in  a 
man's  mind,  why,  then  all  bars  would  be  let  down  to 
self-will,  to  unlimited  subjectivity  ! "     Fear  makes  the 
beginning,  and  one  can  make  himself  fearful  to  the 
coarsest  man ;  already,  therefore,  a  barrier  against  his 
insolence.     But  in  fear  there  always  remains  the  at- 
tempt to  liberate  oneself  from  what  is  feared,  by  guile, 
deception,  tricks,  etc.     In  reverence,*  on  the  contrary, 
it  is  quite  otherwise.     Here  something  is  not  only 
feared,!  but  also  honored  J:  what  is  feared  has  become 
an  inward  power  which  I  can  no  longer  get  clear  of;   I 
honor  it,  am  captivated  by  it  and  devoted  to  it,  be- 
long to  it;  by  the  honor  which  I  pay  it  I  am  com- 
pletely in  its  power,  and  do  not  even  attempt  libera- 
tion any  longer.     Now  I  am  attached  to  it  with  all 
the  strength  of  faith ;  I  believe.     I  and  what  I  fear 
are  one;  "  not  I  live,  but  the  respected  lives  in  me  !  " 
Because  the  spirit,  the  infinite,  does  not  allow  of  com- 

*[Ehrfnrrlit]  ^[gefuercMet]  t[oeehrt] 


94  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ing  to  any  end,  therefore  it  is  stationary;  it  fears 
dying,  it  cannot  let  go  its  dear  Jesus,  the  greatness  o 
finiteness  is  no  longer  recognized  by  its  blinded  eye; 
the  object  of  fear,  now  raised  to  veneration,  may  no 
longer  be  handled;  reverence  is  made  eternal,  the  re- 
spected is  deified.     The  man  is  now  no  longer  em- 
ployed in  creating,  but  in  learning  (knowing,  investi 
gating,  etc.),  i.  e.  occupied  with  a  fixed  object,  losing 
himself  in  its  depths,  without  return  to  himself.     Th< 
relation  to  this  object  is  that  of  knowing,  fathoming, 
basing,  etc.,  not  that  of  dissolution  (abrogation,  etc.) 
"  Man  is  to  be  religious,"  that  is  settled;  therefore 
people  busy  themselves  only  with  the  question  how 
this  is  to  be  attained,  what  is  the  right  meaning  of 
religiousness,  etc.     Quite  otherwise  when  one  makes 
the  axiom  itself  doubtful  and  calls  it  in  question,  evei 
though  it  should  go  to  smash.     Morality  too  is  such 
sacred  conception;  one  must  be  moral,  and  must  lool 
only  for  the  right  "  how."  the  right  way  to  be  so. 
One  dares  not  go  at  morality  itself  with  the  question 
whether  it  is  not  itself  an  illusion;  it  remains  exalted 
above  all  doubt,  unchangeable.     And  so  we  go  on 
with  the  sacred,  grade  after  grade,  from  the  "  holy  " 
to  the  "  holy  of  holies." 

Men  are  sometimes  divided  into  two  classes,  culture 
and  uncultured.     The  former,  so  far  as  they  were 
worthy  of  their  name,  occupied  themselves  with 
thoughts,  with  mind,  and  (because  in  the  time  since 
Christ,  of  which  the  very  principle  is  thought,  they 
were  the  ruling  ones)  demanded  a  servile  respect  for 
the  thoughts  recognized  by  them.     State,  emperor, 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          95 

church,  God,  morality,  order,  etc.,  are  such  thoughts 
or  spirits,  that  exist  only  for  the  mind.     A  merely  liv- 
ing being,  an  animal,  cares  as  little  for  them  as  a 
child.      But  the  uncultured  are  really  nothing  but 
children,  and  he  who  attends  only  to  the  necessities  of 
his  life  is  indifferent  to  those  spirits;  but,  because  he 
is  also  weak  before  them,  he  succumbs  to  their  power, 
and  is  ruled  by — thoughts.     This  is  the  meaning  of 
hierarchy. 

Hierarchy  is  dominion  of  thoughts,  dominion  of 
mind ! 

We  are  hierarchic  to  this  day,  kept  down  by  those 
who  are  supported  by  thoughts.     Thoughts  are  the 
sacred. 

But  the  two  are  always  clashing,  now  one  and  now 
the  other  giving  the  offence;  and  this  clash  occurs,  not 
only  in  the  collision  of  two  men,  but  in  one  and  the 
same  man.     For  no  cultured  man  is  so  cultured  as  not 
to  find  enjoyment  in  things  too,  and  so  be  uncultured; 
and  no  uncultured  man  is  totally  without  thoughts. 
In  Hegel  it  comes  to  light  at  last  what  a  longing  for 
things  even  the  most  cultured  man  has,  and  what  a 
horror  of  every  "  hollow  theory  "  he  harbors.     With 
him  reality,  the  world  of  things,  is  altogether  to  cor- 
respond to  the  thought,  and  no  concept  to  be  without 
reality.     This  caused  Hegel's  system  to  be  known  as 
the  most  objective,  as  if  in  it  thought  and  thing  cele- 
brated their  union.     But  this  was  simply  the  extremest 
case  of  violence  on  the  part  of  thought,  its  highest 
pitch  of  despotism  and  sole  dominion,  the  triumph  of 
mind,  and  with  it  the  triumph  of  philosophy.      Philo- 
sophy cannot  hereafter  achieve  anything  higher,  for  its 


96  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

highest  is  the  omnipotence  of  mind,  the  almightiness  ( 
mind.* 

Spiritual  men  have  taken  into  their  head  something 
that  is  to  be  realized.     They  have  concepts  of  love, 
goodness,  and  the  like,  which  they  would  like  to  see 
realized ;  therefore  they  want  to  set  up  a  kingdom  of 
love  on  earth,  in  which  no  one  any  longer  acts  from 
selfishness,  but  each  one  "  from  love."      Love  is  to 
rule.     What  they  have  taken  into  their  head,  what 
shall  we  call  it  toA—ftsed  idea  ?     Why,  "  their  head 
is  haunted.1"     The  most  oppressive  spook  is  Man. 
Think  of  the  proverb,  "  The  road  to  ruin  is  paved 
with  good  intentions."     The  intention  to  realize 
humanity  altogether  in  oneself,  to  become  altogether 
man,  is  of  such  ruinous  kind ;  here  belong  the  inten- 
tions to  become  good,  noble,  loving,  etc. 

In  the  sixth  part  of  the  " '  Denkiauerdigkeiten^  p.  ' 
Bruno  Bauer  says:  "That  middle  class,  which  was  t( 
receive  such  a  terrible  importance  for  modern  history 
is  capable  of  no  self-sacrificing  action,  no  enthusiasm 
for  an  idea,  no  exaltation;  it  devotes  itself  to  nothing 
but  the  interests  of  its  mediocrity ;  i.  e.  it  remains  al- 
ways limited  to  itself,  and  conquers  at  last  only 
through  its  bulk,  with  which  it  has  succeeded  in  tirin 
out  the  efforts  of  passion,  enthusiasm,  consistency, — 
through  its  surface,  into  which  it  absorbs  a  part  of  tl 
new  ideas."     And  (p.  6)  "  It  has  turned  the  revolu- 
tionary ideas,  for  which  not  it,  but  unselfish  or  impas 
sioned  men  sacrificed  themselves,  solely  to  its  own  prc 

.  *  Rousseau,  the  Philanthropists,  and  others  were  hostile  to  culture  and 
intelligence,  but  they  overlooked  the  fact  that  this  is  present  in  all  men  < 
the  Christian  type,  and  assailed  only  learned  and  refined  culture. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          97 

fit,  has  turned  spirit  into  money. — That  is,  to  be  sure, 
after  it  had  taken  away  from  those  ideas  their  point, 
their  consistency,  their  destructive  seriousness,  fanatical 
against  all  egoism."     These  people,  then,  are  not  self- 
sacrificing,  not  enthusiastic,  not  idealistic,  not  consis- 
tent, not  zealots;  they  are  egoists  in  the  usual  sense, 
selfish  people,  looking  out  for  their  advantage,  sober, 
calculating,  etc. 

Who,  then,  is  "  self-sacrificing  "  ?  *     In  the  full 
sense,  surely,  he  who  ventures  everything  else  for  one 
thing,  one  object,  one  will,  one  passion,  etc.     Is  not 
the  lover  self-sacrificing  who  forsakes  father  and 
mother,  endures  all  dangers  and  privations,  to  reach 
his  goal  ?      Or  the  ambitious  man,  who  offers  up  all 
his  desires,  wishes,  and  satisfactions  to  the  single 
passion,  or  the  avaricious  man  who  denies  himself 
everything  to  gather  treasures,  or  the  pleasure-seeker, 
etc.?      He  is  ruled  by  a  passion  to  which  he  brings 
the  rest  as  sacrifices. 

And  are  these  self-sacrificing  people  perchance  not 
selfish,  not  egoists  ?      As  they  have  only  one  ruling 
passion,  so  they  provide  for  only  one  satisfaction,  but 
for  this  the  more  strenuously;  they  are  wholly  ab- 
sorbed in  it.     Their  entire  activity  is  egoistic,  but 
it  is  a  one-sided,  unopened,  narrow  egoism;  it  is 
possessedness. 

"  Why,  those  are  petty  passions,  by  which,  on  the 
contrary,  man  must  not  let  himself  be  enthralled. 
Man  must  make  sacrifices  for  a  great  idea,  a  great 
cause  ! "     A  "  great  idea,"  a  "  good  cause,"  is,  it  may 

*  [Literally,  "  sacrificing  ";  the  German  word  has  not  the  prefix  "  self."] 


98  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

be,  the  honor  of  God,  for  which  innumerable  people 
have  met  death;  Christianity,  which  has  found  its 
willing  martyrs;  the  Holy  Catholic  Church,  which 
has  greedily  demanded  sacrifices  of  heretics;  liberty 
and  equality,  which  were  waited  on  by  bloody 
guillotines. 

He  who  lives  for  a  great  idea,  a  good  cause,  a  doc- 
trine, a  system,  a  lofty  calling,  may  not  let  any 
worldly  lusts,  any  self-seeking  interest,  spring  up  in 
him.     Here  we  have  the  concept  of  clericalism,  or,  as 
it  may  also  be  called  in  its  pedagogic  activity,  school- 
masterliness;  for  the  idealists  play  the  schoolmaster 
over  us.     The  clergyman  is  especially  called  to  live  t< 
the  idea  and  to  work  for  the  idea,  the  truly  good 
cause.     Therefore  the  people  feel  how  little  it  befits 
him  to  show  worldly  haughtiness,  to  desire  good  liv- 
ing, to  join  in  such  pleasures  as  dancing  and  gaming, 
— in  short,  to  have  any  other  than  a  "  sacred  inter- 
est."    Hence  too,  doubtless,  is  derived  the  scanty 
salary  of  teachers,  who  are  to  feel  themselves  repaid  b 
the  sacredness  of  their  calling  alone,  and  to  "  re- 
nounce "  other  enjoyments. 

Even  a  directory  of  the  sacred  ideas,  one  or  more  < 
which  man  is  to  look  upon  as  his  calling,  is  not  lack- 
ing. Family,  fatherland,  science,  etc.,  may  find  in  rr 
a  servant  faithful  to  his  calling. 

Here  we  come  upon  the  old,  old  craze  of  the  world 
which  has  not  yet  learned  to  do  without  clericalism, - 
that  to  live  and  workybr  an  idea  is  man's  calling, 
and  according  to  the  faithfulness  of  its  fulfilment  his 
human  worth  is  measured. 

This  is  the  dominion  of  the  idea;  in  other  words,  i 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          99 

is  clericalism.     E.  g.,  Robespierre,  St.  Just,  etc.,  were 
priests  through  and  through,  inspired  by  the  idea,  en- 
thusiasts, consistent  instruments  of  this  idea,  idealistic 
men.     So  St.  Just  exclaims  in  a  speech,  "  There  is 
something  terrible  in  the  sacred  love  of  country ; 
it  is  so  exclusive  that  it  sacrifices  everything  to  the 
public  interest  without  mercy,  without  fear,  without 
human  consideration.     It  hurls  Manlius  down  the 
precipice;  it  sacrifices  its  private  inclinations;  it  leads 
Regulus  to  Carthage,  throws  a  Roman  into  the  chasm, 
and  sets  Marat,  as  a  victim  of  his  devotion,  in  the 
Pantheon." 

Now,  over  against  these  representatives  of  ideal  or 
sacred  interests  stands  a  world  of  innumerable  "  per- 
sonal "  profane  interests.     No  idea,  no  system,  no 
sacred  cause  is  so  great  as  never  to  be  outrivaled  and 
modified  by  these  personal  interests.     Even  if  they  are 
silent  momentarily,  and  in  times  of  rage  and  fanati- 
cism, yet  they  soon  come  uppermost  again  through 
"  the  sound  sense  of  the  people."     Those  ideas  do  not 
completely  conquer  till  they  are  no  longer  hostile  to 
personal  interests,  i.  e.  till  they  satisfy  egoism. 

The  man  who  is  just  now  crying  herrings  in  front 
of  my  window  has  a  personal  interest  in  good  sales, 
and,  if  his  wife  or  anybody  else  wishes  him  the  like, 
this  remains  a  personal  interest  all  the  same.     If,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  thief  deprived  him  of  his  basket, 
then  there  would  at  ones  arise  an  interest  of  many,  of 
the  whole  city,  of  the  whole  country,  or,  in  a  word,  of 
all  who  abhor  theft;  an  interest  in  which  the  herring- 
seller's  person  would  become  indifferent,  and  in  its 
place  the  category  of  the  "  robbed  man  "  would  come 


100  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

into  the  foreground.     But  even  here  all  might  yet  re- 
solve itself  into  a  personal  interest,  each  of  the  par- 
takers reflecting  that  he  must  concur  in  the  punish- 
ment of  the  thief  because  unpunished  stealing  might 
otherwise  become  general  and  cause  him  too  to  lose 
his  own.     Such  a  calculation,  however,  can  hardly  be 
assumed  on  the  part  of  many,  and  we  shall  rather 
hear  the  cry  that  the  thief  is  a  "  criminal."     Here  we 
have  before  us  a  judgment,  the  thief's  action  receiving 
its  expression  in  the  concept  "  crime."     Now  the 
matter  stands  thus :  even  if  a  crime  did  not  cause  the 
slightest  damage  either  to  me  or  to  any  of  those  in 
whom  I  take  an  interest,  I  should  nevertheless  de- 
nounce it.     Why  ?      Because  I  am  enthusiastic  for 
morality,  filled  with  the  idea  of  morality ;  what  is 
hostile  to  it  I  everywhere  assail.     Because  in  his  mind 
theft  ranks  as  abominable  without  any  question, 
Proudhon,  e.  g.,  thinks  that  with  the  sentence 
"  Property  is  theft  "  he  has  at  once  put  a  brand  on 
property.     In  the  sense  of  the  priestly,  theft  is  always 
a  crime,  or  at  least  a  misdeed. 

Here  the  personal  interest  is  at  an  end.     This  par- 
ticular person  who  has  stolen  the  basket  is  perfectly 
indifferent  to  my  person;  it  is  only  the  thief,  this  con- 
cept of  which  that  person  presents  a  specimen,  that  I 
take  an  interest  in.     The  thief  and  man  are  in  my 
mind  irreconcilable  opposites;  for  one  is  not  truly 
man  when  one  is  a  thief;  one  degrades  Man  or 
"  humanity  "  in  himself  when  one  steals.     Dropping 
out  of  personal  concern,  one  gets  into  philanthropism, 
friendliness  to  man,  which' is  usually  misunderstood  as 
if  it  was  a  love  to  men,  to  each  individual,  while  it  is 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  101 

nothing  but  a  love  of  Man,  the  unreal  concept,  the 
spook.     It  is  not  TOU<;  dcv0pwxou<;,  men,  but  T&V 
av6po)7:ov,  Man,  that  the  philanthropist  carries  in  his 
heart.     To  be  sure,  he  cares  for  each  individual,  but 
only  because  he  wants  to  see  his  beloved  ideal  realized 
everywhere. 

So  there  is  nothing  said  here  of  care  for  me,  you, 
us;  that  would  be  personal  interest,  and  belongs  under 
the  head  of  "  worldly  love."      Philanthropism  is  a 
heavenly,  spiritual,  a — priestly  love.     Man  must  be 
restored  in  us,  even  if  thereby  we  poor  devils  should 
come  to  grief.      It  is  the  same  priestly  principle  as 
that  famous  fiat  justitia,  pereat  mundus ;  man  and 
justice  are  ideas,  ghosts,  for  love  of  which  everything 
is  sacrificed;  therefore  the  priestly  spirits  are  the 
"  self-sacrificing  "  ones. 

He  who  is  infatuated  with  Man  leaves  persons  out 
of  account  so  far  as  that  infatuation  extends,  and 
floats  in  an  ideal,  sacred  interest.     Man,  you  see,  is 
not  a  person,  but  an  ideal,  a  spook. 

Now,  things  as  different  as  possible  can  belong  to 
Man  and  be  so  regarded.      If  one  finds  Man's  chief 
requirement  in  piety,  there  arises  religious  clericalism  ; 
if  one  sees  it  in  morality,  then  moral  clericalism  raises 
its  head.     On  this  account  the  priestly  spirits  of  our 
day  want  to  make  a  "  religion  "  of  everything,  a  "  re- 
ligion of  liberty,"  "  religion  of  equality,"  etc.,  and  for 
them  every  idea  becomes  a  "  sacred  cause,"  e.  g.  even 
citizenship,  politics,  publicity,  freedom  of  the  press, 
trial  by  jury,  etc. 

Now,  what  does  "  unselfishness  "  mean  in  this 
sense  ?      Having  only  an  ideal  interest,  before  which 


102  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

no  respect  of  persons  avails  ! 

The  stiff  head  of  the  worldly  man  opposes  this,  but 
for  centuries  has  always  been  worsted  at  least  so  far  as 
to  have  to  bend  the  unruly  neck  and  "  honor  the 
higher  power  " ;  clericalism  pressed  it  down.     When 
the  worldly  egoist  had  shaken  off  a  higher  power 
(e.  g.  the  Old  Testament  law,  the  Roman  pope,  etc.), 
then  at  once  a  seven  times  higher  one  was  over  him 
again,  e.  g.  faith  in  the  place  of  the  law,  the  trans- 
formation of  all  laymen  into  divines  in  place  of  the 
limited  body  of  clergy,  etc.      His  experience  was  like 
that  of  the  possessed  man  into  whom  seven  devils 
passed  when  he  thought  he  had  freed  himself  from 
one. 

In  the  passage  quoted  above  all  ideality,  etc.,  is 
denied  to  the  middle  class.     It  certainly  schemed 
against  the  ideal  consistency  with  which  Robespierre 
wanted  to  carry  out  the  principle.     The  instinct  of  its 
interest  told  it  that  this  consistency  harmonized  too 
little  with  what  its  mind  was  set  on,  and  that  it  would 
be  acting  against  itself  if  it  were  willing  to  further  the 
enthusiasm  for  principle.     Was  it  to  behave  so  unself- 
ishly as  to  abandon  all  its  aims  in  order  to  bring  a 
harsh  theory  to  its  triumph  ?      It  suits  the  priests  ad- 
mirably, to  be  sure,  when  people  listen  to  their  sum- 
mons, "  Cast  away  everything  and  follow  me,"  or 
"  Sell  all  that  thou  hast  and  give  to  the  poor,  and 
thou  shalt  have  treasure  in  heaven;  and  come,  follow 
me."     Some  decided  idealists  obey  this  call;  but  most 
act  like  Ananias  and  Sapphira,  maintaining  a 
behavior  half  clerical  or  religious  and  half  worldly, 
serving  God  and  Mammon. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         103 

I  do  not  blame  the  middle  class  for  not  wanting  to 
let  its  aims  be  frustrated  by  Robespierre,  i.  e.  for  in- 
quiring of  its  egoism  how  far  it  might  give  the  revo- 
lutionary idea  a  chance.     But  one  might  blame  (if 
blame  were  in  place  here  anyhow)  those  who  let  their 
own  interests  be  frustrated  by  the  interests  of  the  mid- 
dle class.     However,  will  not  they  likewise  sooner  or 
later  learn  to  understand  what  is  to  their  advantage  ? 
August  Becker  says  :  *  "  To  win  the  producers  (pro- 
letarians) a  negation  of  the  traditional  conception  of 
right  is  by  no  means  enough.     Folks  unfortunately 
care  little  for  the  theoretical  victory  of  the  idea.     One 
must  demonstrate  to  them  ad  oculos  how  this  victory 
can  be  practically  utilized  in  life."     And  (p.  32) : 
"  You  must  get  hold  of  folks  by  their  real  interests  if 
you  want  to  work  upon  them."     Immediately  after 
this  he  shows  how  a  fine  looseness  of  morals  is  already 
spreading  among  our  peasants,  because  they  prefer  to 
follow  their  real  interests  rather  than  the  commands 
of  morality. 

Because  the  revolutionary  priests  or  schoolmasters 
served  Man,  they  cut  off  the  heads  of  men.     The  revo- 
lutionary laymen,  those  outside  the  sacred  circle,  did 
not  feel  any  greater  horror  of  cutting  off  heads,  but 
were  less  anxious  about  the  rights  of  Man  than  about 
their  own. 

How  comes  it,  though,  that  the  egoism  of  those  who 
affirm  personal  interest,  and  always  inquire  of  it,  is 
nevertheless  forever  succumbing  to  a  priestly  or 
schoolmasterly  (i.  e.  an  ideal)  interest  ?      Their  per- 

*  '  Volksphilosophie  unserer  Tage,"  p.  22. 


104  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

son  seems  to  them  too  small,  too  insignificant, — and  is 
so  in  fact, — to  lay  claim  to  everything  and  be  able  to 
put  itself  completely  in  force.     There  is  a  sure  sign  of 
this  in  their  dividing  themselves  into  two  persons,  an 
eternal  and  a  temporal,  and  always  caring  either  only 
for  the  one  or  only  for  the  other,  on  Sunday  for  the 
eternal,  on  the  work -day  for  the  temporal,  in  prayer 
for  the  former,  in  work  for  the  latter.     They  have  the 
priest  in  themselves,  therefore  they  do  not  get  rid  of 
him,  but  hear  themselves  lectured  inwardly  every 
Sunday. 

How  men  have  struggled  and  calculated  to  get  at  a 
solution  regarding  these  dualistic  essences  !      Idea  fol- 
lowed upon  idea,  principle  upon  principle,  system  up- 
on system,  and  none  knew  how  to  keep  down  perma- 
nently the  contradiction  of  the  "  worldly  "  man,  the 
so-called  "  egoist."     Does  not  this  prove  that  all  those 
ideas  were  too  feeble  to  take  up  my  whole  will  into 
themselves  and  satisfy  it  ?     They  were  and  remained 
hostile  to  me,  even  if  the  hostility  lay  concealed  for  a 
considerable  time.     Will  it  be  the  same  with  self- 
ownership  ?     Is  it  too  only  an  attempt  at  mediation  ? 
Whatever  principle  I  turned  to,  it  might  be  to  that  of 
reason,  I  always  had  to  turn  away  from  it  again.     Or 
can  I  always  be  rational,  arrange  my  life  according  to 
reason  in  everything  ?      I  can,  no  doubt,  strive  after 
rationality,  I  can  love  it,  just  as  I  can  also  love  God 
and  every  other  idea.     I  can  be  a  philosopher,  a  lover 
of  wisdom,  as  I  love  God.     But  what  I  love,  what  I 
strive  for,  is  only  in  my  idea,  my  conception,  my 
thoughts;  it  is  in  my  heart,  my  head,  it  is  in  me  like 
the  heart,  but  it  is  not  I,  I  am  not  it. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         105 

To  the  activity  of  priestly  minds  belongs  especially 
what  one  often  hears  called  "  moral  influence" 

Moral  influence  takes  its  start  where  humiliation  be- 
gins; yes,  it  is  nothing  else  than  this  humiliation  it- 
self, the  breaking  and  bending  of  the  temper  *  down 
to  humility.^     If  I  call  to  some  one  to  run  away  when 
a  rock  is  to  be  blasted,  I  exert  no  moral  influence  by 
this  demand;  if  I  say  to  a  child  "  You  will  go  hungry 
if  you  will  not  eat  what  is  put  on  the  table,"  this  is 
not  moral  influence.     But,  if  I  say  to  it  "  You  will 
pray,  honor  your  parents,  respect  the  crucifix,  speak 
the  truth,  etc.,  for  this  belongs  to  man  and  is  man's 
calling,"  or  even  "  this  is  God's  will,"  then  moral  in- 
fluence is  complete;  then  a  man  is  to  bend  before  the 
calling  of  man,  be  tractable,  become  humble,  give  up 
his  will  for  an  alien  one  which  is  set  up  as  rule  and 
law ;  he  is  to  abase  himself  before  something  higher: 
self-n basement.     "  He  that  abaseth  himself  shall  be 
exalted."     Yes,  yes,  children  must  early  be  made  to 
practise  piety,  godliness,  and  propriety;  a  person  of 
good  breeding  is  one  into  whom  "  good  maxims  "  have 
been  instilled  and  impressed,  poured  in  through  a  fun- 
nel, thrashed  in  and  preached  in. 

If  one  shrugs  his  shoulders  at  this,  at  once  the  good 
wring  their  hands  despairingly,  and  cry  :   "  But,  for 
heaven's  sake,  if  one  is  to  give  children  no  good  in- 
struction, why,  then  they  will  run  straight  into  the 
jaws  of  sin,  and  become  good-for-nothing  hoodlums  ! " 
Gently,  you  prophets  of  evil.     Good-for-nothing  in 
your  sense  they  certainly  will  become;  but  your  sense 

*  [.VK//I]  t  iDemuth] 


106  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

happens  to  be  a  very  good-for-nothing  sense.     The 
impudent  lads  will  no  longer  let  anything  be  whined 
and  chattered  into  them  by  you,  and  will  have  no 
sympathy  for  all  the  follies  for  which  you  have  been 
raving  and  driveling  since  the  memory  of  man  began ; 
they  will  abolish  the  law  of  inheritance,  i.  e.  they  will 
not  be  willing  to  inherit  your  stupidities  as  you  in- 
herited them  from  your  fathers;  they  destroy  inherited 
sin.*     If  you  command  them,  "  Bend  before  the  Most 
High,"  they  will  answer  :  "  If  he  wants  to  bend  us, 
let  him  come  himself  and  do  it;  we,  at  least,  will  not 
bend  of  our  own  accord."     And,  if  you  threaten  them 
with  his  wrath  and  his  punishment,  they  will  take  it 
like  being  threatened  with  the  bogie-man.     If  you  are 
no  longer  successful  in  making  them  afraid  of  ghosts, 
then  the  dominion  of  ghosts  is  at  an  end,  and  nurses' 
tales  find  no— faith. 

And  is  it  not  precisely  the  liberals  again  that  press 
for  good  education  and  improvement  of  the  educa- 
tional system  ?      For  how  could  their  liberalism,  their 
"  liberty  within  the  bounds  of  law,"  come  about  with- 
out discipline  ?      Even  if  they  do  not  exactly  educate 
to  the  fear  of  God,  yet  they  demand  thejtear  of  Man 
all  the  more  strictly,  and  awaken  "  enthusiasm  for 
the  truly  human  calling"  by  discipline. 


A  long  time  passed  away,  in  which  people  were 
satisfied  with  the  fancy  that  they  had  the  truth,  with- 
out thinking  seriously  whether  perhaps  they  them- 
selves must  be  true  to  possess  the  truth.     This  time 

*  [Called  in  English  theology  "  original  sin."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         107 

was  the  Middle  Ages.     With  the  common  conscious- 
ness— i.  e.  the  consciousness  which  deals  with  things, 
that  consciousness  which  has  receptivity  only  for 
things,  or  for  what  is  sensuous  and  sense-moving — 
they  thought  to  grasp  what  did  not  deal  with  things 
and  was  not  perceptible  by  the  senses.     As  one  does 
indeed  also  exert  his  eye  to  see  the  remote,  or  labori- 
ously exercise  his  hand  till  its  fingers  have  become 
dexterous  enough  to  press  the  keys  correctly,  so  they 
chastened  themselves  in  the  most  manifold  ways,  in 
order  to  become  capable  of  receiving  the  supersensual 
wholly  into  themselves.      But  what  they  chastened 
was,  after  all,  only  the  sensual  man,  the  common  con- 
sciousness, so-called  finite  or  objective  thought.     Yet 
as  this  thought,  this  understanding,  which  Luther  de- 
cries under  the  name  of  reason,  is  incapable  of  com- 
prehending the  divine,  its  chastening  contributed  just 
as  much  to  the  understanding  of  the  truth  as  if  one 
exercised  the  feet  year  in  and  year  out  in  dancing,  and 
hoped  that  in  this  way  they  would  finally  learn  to 
play  the  flute.     Luther,  with  whom  the  so-called  Mid- 
dle Ages  end,  was  the  first  who  understood  that  the 
man  Ktmself  must  become  other  than  he  was  if  he 
wanted  to  comprehend  truth, — must  become  as  true  as 
truth  itself.     Only  he  who  already  has  truth  in  his 
belief,  only  he  who  believes  in  it,  can  become  a  par- 
taker of  it;  i.  e.,  only  the  believer  finds  it  accessible 
and  sounds  its  depths.     Only  that  organ  of  man  which 
is  able  to  blow  can  attain  the  further  capacity  of  flute- 
playing,  and  only  that  man  can  become  a  partaker  of 
truth  who  has  the  right  organ  for  it.      He  who  is 
capable  of  thinking  only  what  is  sensuous,  objective, 


108  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

pertaining  to  things,  figures  to  himself  in  truth  only 
what  pertains  to  things.     But  truth  is  spirit,  stuff  al- 
together inappreciable  by  the  senses,  and  therefore 
only  for  the  "  higher  consciousness,"  not  for  that  which 
is  "  earthly-minded." 

With  Luther,  accordingly,  dawns  the  perception 
that  truth,  because  it  is  a  thought,  is  only  for  the 
thinking  man.     And  this  is  to  say  that  man  must 
henceforth  take  an  utterly  different  standpoint, 
viz.,  the  heavenly,  believing,  scientific  standpoint, 
or  that  of  thought  in  relation  to  its  object,  the — 
thought, — that  of  mind  in  relation  to  mind.     Con- 
sequently: only  the  like  apprehend  the  like.     "  You 
are  like  the  spirit  that  you  understand."* 

Because  Protestantism  broke  the  mediaeval  hier- 
archy, the  opinion  could  take  root  that  hierarchy  in 
general  had  been  shattered  by  it,  and  it  could  be 
wholly  overlooked  that  it  was  precisely  a  "  reforma- 
tion," and  so  a  reinvigoration  of  the  antiquated  hier- 
archy.    That  mediaeval  hierarchy  had  been  only  a 
weakly  one,  as  it  had  to  let  all  possible  barbarism  of 
unsanctified  things  run  on  uncoerced  beside  it,  and  it 
was  the  Reformation  that  first  steeled  the  powe^of 
hierarchy.     If  Bruno  Bauer  thinks:  f  "  As  the  Re- 
formation was  mainly  the  abstract  rending  of  the  re- 
ligious principle  from  art,  State,  and  science,  and  so 
its  liberation  from  those  powers  with  which  it  had 
joined  itself  in  the  antiquity  of  the  church  and  in  the 
hierarchy  of  the  Middle  Ages,  so  too  the  theological 
and  ecclesiastical  movements  which  proceeded  from  the 

*  [Goethe,  "  Faust."]  t  "  Anekdola,"  II,  152. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  109 

Reformation  are  only  the  consistent  carrying  out  of 
this  abstraction  of  the  religious  principle  from  the 
other  powers  of  humanity,"  I  regard  precisely  the  op- 
posite as  correct,  and  think  that  the  dominion  of 
spirits,  or  freedom  of  mind  (which  comes  to  the  same 
thing),  was  never  before  so  all-embracing  and  all- 
powerful,  because  the  present  one,  instead  of  rending 
the  religious  principle  from  art,  State,  and  science, 
lifted  the  latter  altogether  out  of  secularity  into  the 
"  realm  of  spirit "  and  made  them  religious. 

Luther  and  Descartes  have  been  appropriately  put 
side  by  side  in  their  "  He  who  believes  is  a  God  "  and 
"  I  think,  therefore  I  am  "  (cogito,  ergo  sum).     Man's 
heaven  is  thought, — mind.     Everything  can  be 
wrested  from  him,  except  thought,  except  faith. 
Particular  faith,  like  faith  in  Zeus,  Astarte,  Jehovah, 
Allah,  etc.,  may  be  destroyed,  but  faith  itself  is  in- 
destructible.    In  thought  is  freedom.     What  I  need 
and  what  I  hunger  for  is  no  longer  granted  to  me  by 
any  grace,  by  the  Virgin  Mary,  by  intercession  of  the 
saints,  or  by  the  binding  and  loosing  church,  but  I 
procure  it  for  myself.     In  short,  my  being  (the  sum) 
is  a  livthg  in  the  heaven  of  thought,  of  mind,  a 
cogitare.     But  I  myself  am  nothing  else  than  mind, 
thinking  mind  (according  to  Descartes),  believing 
mind  (according  to  Luther).     My  body  I  am  not; 
my  flesh  may  suffer  from  appetites  or  pains.     I  am 
not  my  flesh,  but  7  am  miiid,  only  mind. 

This  thought  runs  through  the  history  of  the  Re- 
formation till  to-day. 

Only  by  the  more  modern  philosophy  since 
Descartes  has  a  serious  effort  been  made  to  bring 


110  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Christianity  to  complete  efficacy,  by  exalting  the 
"  scientific  consciousness  "  to  be  the  only  true  and 
valid  one.     Hence  it  begins  with  absolute  doubt,  du- 
bitare,  with  grinding  common  consciousness  to  atoms, 
with  turning  away  from  everything  that  "mind," 
"  thought,"  does  not  legitimate.     To  it  Nature  counts 
for  nothing;  the  opinion  of  men,  their  "  human  pre- 
cepts," for  nothing:  and  it  does  not  rest  till  it  has 
brought  reason  into  everything,  and  can  say  "  The 
real  is  the  rational,  and  only  the  rational  is  the  real." 
Thus  it  has  at  last  brought  mind,  reason,  to  victory; 
and  everything  is  mind,  because  everything  is  rational, 
because  all  nature,  as  well  as  even  the  perversest  opin- 
ions of  men,  contains  reason;  for  "  all  must  serve  for 
the  best,"  i.  e,  lead  to  the  victory  of  reason. 

Descartes's  dubitare  contains  the  decided  statement 
that  only  cogitare,  thought,  mind, — is.     A  complete 
break  with  "  common  "  consciousness,  which  ascribes 
reality  to  irrational  things  !      Only  the  rational  is, 
only  mind  is  !      This  is  the  principle  of  modern  phil- 
osophy, the  genuine  Christian  principle.     Descartes  in 
his  own  time  discriminated  the  body  sharply  from  the 
mind,  and  "the  spirit  'tis  that  builds  itself  thedbody," 
says  Goethe. 

But  this  philosophy  itself,  Christian  philosophy,  still 
docs  not  get  rid  of  the  rational,  and  therefore  inveighs 
against  the  "  merely  subjective,"  against  "  fancies, 
fortuities,  arbitrariness,"  etc.     What  it  wants  is  that 
the  diiine  should  become  visible  in  everything,  and  all 
consciousness  become  a  knowing  of  the  divine,  and 
man  behold  God  everywhere;  but  God  never  is,  with- 
out the  devil. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         111 

For  this  very  reason  the  name  of  philosopher  is  not 
to  be  given  to  him  who  has  indeed  open  eyes  for  the 
things  of  the  world,  a  clear  and  undazzled  gaze,  a  cor- 
rect judgment  about  the  world,  but  who  sees  in  the 
world  just  the  world,  in  objects  only  objects,  and,  in 
short,  everything  prosaically  as  it  is;  but  he  alone  is  a 
philosopher  who  sees,  and  points  out  or  demonstrates, 
heaven  in  the  world,  the  supernal  in  the  earthly,  the  — 
divine  in  the  mundane.     The  former  may  be  ever  so 
wise,  there  is  no  getting  away  from  this: 

What  wise  men  see  not  by  their  wisdom's  art 
Is  practised  simply  by  a  childlike  heart.* 

It  takes  this  childlike  heart,  this  eye  for  the  divine,  to 
make  a  philosopher.     The  first-named  man  has  only  a 
"  common  "  consciousness,  but  he  who  knows  the 
divine,  and  knows  how  to  tell  it,  has  a  "  scientific  " 
one.     On  this  ground  Bacon  was  turned  out  of  the 
realm  of  philosophers.     And  certainly  what  is  called 
English  philosophy  seems  to  have  got  no  further  than 
to  the  discoveries  of  so-called  "  clear  heads,"  such  as 
Bacon  and  Hume.     The  English  did  not  know  how  to 
exalt  the  simplicity  of  the  childlike  heart  to  philo- 
sophic significance,  did  not  know  how  to  make — phil- 
osophers out  of  childlike  hearts.     This  is  as  much  as 
to  say,  their  philosophy  was  not  able  to  become  theo- 
logical or  theology,  and  yet  it  is  only  as  theology  that 
it  can  really  live  itself  out,  complete  itself.     The  field 
of  its  battle  to  the  death  is  in  theology.      Bacon  did 
not  trouble  himself  about  theological  questions  and 
cardinal  points. 

*  [Schiller,  "  Die  Worte  des  Cflaubens."] 


112  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Cognition  has  its  object  in  life.     German  thought 
seeks,  more  than  that  of  others,  to  reach  the  begin- 
nings and  fountain-heads  of  life,  and  sees  no  life  till  it 
sees  it  in  cognition  itself.     Descartes's  cogito,  ergo 
sum  has  the  meaning  "  One  lives  only  when  one 
thinks."     Thinking  life  is  called  "  intellectual  life  " ! 
Only  mind  lives,  its  life  is  the  true  life.     Then,  just  so 
in  nature  only  the  "  eternal  laws,"  the  mind  or  the 
reason  of  nature,  are  its  true  life.     In  man,  as  in  na- 
ture, only  the  thought  lives;  everything  else  is  dead  ! 
To  this  abstraction,  to  the  life  of  generalities  or  of 
that  which  is  lifeless,  the  history  of  mind  had  to  come. 
God,  who  is  spirit,  alone  lives.     Nothing  lives  but  the 
ghost. 

How  can  one  try  to  assert  of  modern  philosophy  or 
modern  times  that  they  have  reached  freedom,  since 
they  have  not  freed  us  from  the  power  of  objectivity  ? 
Or  am  I  perhaps  free  from  a  despot  when  I  am  not 
afraid  of  the  personal  potentate,  to  be  sure,  but  of 
every  infraction  of  the  loving  reverence  which  I  fancy 
I  owe  him  ?     The  case  is  the  same  with  modern  times. 
They  only  changed  the  existing  objects,  the  real  ruler 
etc.,  into  conceived  objects,  i.  e.  into  ideas,  before 
which  the  old  respect  not  only  was  not  lost,  but  in- 
creased in  intensity.     Even  if  people  snapped  their  fin 
gers  at  God  and  the  devil  in  their  former  crass  reality 
people  devoted  only  the  greater  attention  to  their 
ideas.     "  They  are  rid  of  the  Evil  One;  evil  is  left."* 
The  decision  having  once  been  made  not  to  let  oneself 
be  imposed  on  any  longer  by  the  extant  and  palpable, 


*  I  Parodied  from  the  words  of  Mepliistopheles  in  the  witch's  kitchen  in 
Faust."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          113 

little  scruple  was  felt  about  revolting  against  the  exist- 
ing State  or  overturning  the  existing  laws;  but  to  sin 
against  the  idea  of  the  State,  not  to  submit  to  the  idea 
of  law,  who  would  have  dared  that  ?      So  one  re- 
mained a  "  citizen  "  and  a  "  law-respecting,"  loyal 
man;  yes,  one  seemed  to  himself  to  be  only  so  much 
more  law-respecting,  the  more  rationalistically  one 
abrogated  the  former  defective  law  in  order  to  do  hom- 
age to  the  "  spirit  of  the  law."     In  all  this  the  objects 
had  only  suffered  a  change  of  form ;  they  had  re- 
mained in  their  prepollence  and  pre-eminence;  in 
short,  one  was  still  involved  in  obedience  and  pos- 
sessedness,  lived  in  reflection,  and  had  an  object  on 
which  one  reflected,  which  one  respected,  and  before 
which  one  felt  reverence  and  fear.     One  had  done  no- 
thing but  transform  the  things  into  conceptions  of  the 
things,  into  thoughts  and  ideas,  whereby  one's  depend- 
ence became  all  the  more  intimate  and  indissoluble. 
So,  e.  g.,  it  is  not  hard  to  emancipate  oneself  from  the 
commands  of  parents,  or  to  set  aside  the  admonitions 
of  uncle  and  aunt,  the  entreaties  of  brother  and  sister; 
but  the  renounced  obedience  easily  gets  into  one's  con- 
science, and  the  less  one  does  give  way  to  the  individ- 
ual demands,  because  he  rationalistically,  by  his  own 
reason,  recognizes  them  to  be  unreasonable,  so  much 
the  more  conscientiously  does  he  hold  fast  to  filial 
piety  and  family  love,  and  so  much  the  harder  is  it  for 
him  to  forgive  himself  a  trespass  against  the  conception 
which  he  has  formed  of  family  love  and  of  filial  duty. 
Released  from  dependence  as  regards  the  existing 
family,  one  falls  into  the  more  binding  dependence  on 
the  idea  of  the  family;  one  is  ruled  by  the  spirit  of 


114  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  family.     The  family  consisting  of  John,  Maggie, 
etc.,  whose  dominion  has  become  powerless,  is  only 
internalized,  being  left  as  "  family"  in  general,  to 
which  one  just  applies  the  old  saying,  "  We  must  obey 
God  rather  than  man,"  whose  significance  here  is 
this :  "  I  cannot,  to  be  sure,  accommodate  myself  to 
your  senseless  requirements,  but,  as  my  '  family,'  you 
still  remain  the  object  of  my  love  and  care  " ;    for  "  the 
family  "  is  a  sacred  idea,  which  the  individual  must 
never  offend  against. — And  this  family  internalized 
and  desensualized  into  a  thought,  a  conception,  now 
ranks  as  the  "  sacred,"  whose  despotism  is  tenfold  more 
grievous  because  it  makes  a  racket  in  my  conscience. 
This  despotism  is  broken  only  when  the  conception, 
family,  also  becomes  a  nothing  to  me.     The  Christian 
dicta,  "  Woman,  what  have  I  to  do  with  thee  ?"*     "  I 
am  come  to  stir  up  a  man  against  his  father,  and  a 
daughter  against  her  mother,"  f  and  others,  are  accom- 
panied by  something  that  refers  us  to  the  heavenly  or 
true  family,  and  mean  no  more  than  the  State's  de- 
mand, in  case  of  a  collision  between  it  and  the  family, 
that  we  obey  its  commands. 

The  case  of  morality  is  like  that  of  the  family. 
Many  a  man  renounces  morals,  but  with  great  diffi- 
culty the  conception,  "  morality."     Morality  is  the 
"  idea  "  of  morals,  their  intellectual  power,  their  power 
over  the  conscience;  on  the  other  hand,  morals  are 
too  material  to  rule  the  mind,  and  do  not  fetter  an 
"  intellectual "  man,  a  so-called  independent,  a 
"  freethinker." 


t  Matt.  10.  35. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  115 

The  Protestant  may  put  it  as  he  will,  the  "  holy  * 
Scripture,"  the  "  Word  of  God,"  still  remains  sacredf 
for  him.     He  for  whom  this  is  no  longer  "  holy  "  has 
ceased  to — be  a  Protestant.     But  herewith  what  is 
"  ordained  "  in  it,  the  public  authorities  appointed  by 
God,  etc.,  also  remain  sacred  for  him.     For  him  these 
things  remain  indissoluble,  unapproachable,  "  raised 
above  all  doubt " ;  and,  as  doubt,  which  in  practice 
becomes  a  buffeting,  is  what  is  most  man's  own,  these 
things  remain  "  raised  "  above  himself.     He  who  can- 
not get  away  from  them  will — believe ;  for  to  believe 
in  them  is  to  be  bound  to  them.     Through  the  fact 
that  in  Protestantism  the  faith  became  a  more  inward 
faith,  the  servitude  has  also  become  a  more  inward 
servitude;  one  has  taken  those  sanctities  up  into  him- 
self, entwined  them  with  all  his  thoughts  and  en- 
deavors, made  them  a  '*  matter  of  conscience,"  con- 
structed out  of  them  a  "sacred  duty'1''  for  himself. 
Therefore  what  the  Protestant's  conscience  cannot  get 
away  from  is  sacred  to  him,  and  conscientiousness  most 
clearly  designates  his  character. 

Protestantism  has  actually  put  a  man  in  the  posi- 
tion of  a  country  governed  by  secret  police.     The  spy 
and  eavesdropper,  "  conscience,"  watches  over  every 
motion  of  the  mind,  and  all  thought  and  action  is  for 
it  a  "  matter  of  conscience,"  i.  e.  police  business. 
This  tearing  apart  of  man  into  "  natural  impulse  " 
and  "  conscience  "  (inner  populace  and  inner  police) 
is  what  constitutes  the  Protestant.     The  reason  of  the 
Bible  (in  place  of  the  Catholic  "  reason  of  the 

•Iheiliff]  \[heilig] 


116  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

church  ")  ranks  as  sacred,  and  this  feeling  and  con- 
sciousness that  the  word  of  the  Bible  is  sacred  is  called 
— conscience.     With  this,  then,  sacredness  is  "  laid 
upon  one's  conscience."     If  one  does  not  free  himself 
from  conscience,  the  consciousness  of  the  sacred,  he 
may  act  unconscientiously  indeed,  but  never 
consciencelessly. 

The  Catholic  finds  himself  satisfied  when  he  fulfils 
the  command ;  the  Protestant  acts  according  to  his 
"  best  judgment  and  conscience."     For  the  Catholic  is 
only  a  layman;  the  Protestant  is  himself  a  clergyman.* 
Just  this  is  the  progress  of  the  Reformation  period 
beyond  the  Middle  Ages,  and  at  the  same  time  its 
curse, — that  the  spiritual  became  complete. 

What  else  was  the  Jesuit  moral  philosophy  than  a 
continuation  of  the  sale  of  indulgences  ?  only  that  the 
.man  who  was  relieved  of  his  burden  of  sin  now  gained 
also  an  insight  into  the  remission  of  sins,  and  con- 
vinced himself  how  really  his  sin  was  taken  from  him, 
since  in  this  or  that  particular  case  (Casuists)  it  was 
so  clearly  no  sin  at  all  that  he  committed.     The  sale 
of  indulgences  had  made  all  sins  and  transgressions 
permissible,  and  silenced  every  movement  of  con- 
science.    All  sensuality  might  hold  sway,  if  it  was 
only  purchased  from  the  church.     This  favoring  of 
sensuality  was  continued  by  the  Jesuits,  while  the 
strictly  moral,  dark,  fanatical,  repentant,  contrite, 
praying  Protestants  (as  the  true  completers  of  Chris- 
tianity, to  be  sure)  acknowledged  only  the  intellectual 
and  spiritual  man.     Catholicism,  especially  the 

*  [Geistlicher,  literally  "  spiritual  man."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         117 

Jesuits,  gave  aid  to  egoism  in  this  way,  found  involun- 
tary and  unconscious  adherents  within  Protestantism 
itself,  and  saved  us  from  the  subversion  and  extinction 
of  sensuality.     Nevertheless  the  Protestant  spirit 
spreads  its  dominion  farther  and  farther;  and,  as, 
beside  it  the  "  divine,"  the  Jesuit  spirit  represents 
only  the  "  diabolic  "  which  is  inseparable  from  every- 
thing divine,  the  latter  can  never  assert  itself  alone, 
but  must  look  on  and  see  how  in  France,  e.  g.,  the 
Philistinism  of  Protestantism  wins  at  last,  and  mind  is 
on  top. 

Protestantism  is  usually  complimented  on  having 
brought  the  mundane  into  repute  again,  e.  g.  mar- 
riage, the  State,  etc.     But  the  mundane  itself  as  mun- 
dane, the  secular,  is  even  more  indifferent  to  it  than  to 
Catholicism,  which  lets  the  profane  world  stand,  yes, 
and  relishes  its  pleasures,  while  the  rational,  consist- 
ent Protestant  sets  about  annihilating  the  mundane 
altogether,  and  that  simply  by  hallowing  it.     So  mar- 
riage has  been  deprived  of  its  naturalness  by  becoming 
sacred,  not  in  the  sense  of  the  Catholic  sacrament, 
where  it  only  receives  its  consecration  from  the  church 
and  so  is  unholy  at  bottom,  but  in  the  sense  of  being 
something  sacred  in  itself  to  begin  with,  a  sacred  re- 
lation.    Just  so  the  State,  etc.     Formerly  the  pope 
gave  consecration  and  his  blessing  to  it  and  its  prin- 
ces; now  the  State  is  intrinsically  sacred,  majesty  is 
sacred  without  needing  the  priest's  blessing.     The  or- 
der of  nature,  or  natural  law,  was  altogether  hallowed 
as  "  God's  ordinance."     Hence  it  is  said  e.  g.  in  the 
Augsburg  Confession,  Art.  11:    "So  now  we  reason- 
ably abide  by  the  saying,  as  the  jurisconsults  have 


118  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

wisely  and  rightly  said :  that  man  and  woman  should 
be  with  each  other  is  a  natural  law.     Now,  if  it  is  a 
natural  law,  then  it  is  God's  ordinance,  therefore  im- 
planted in  nature,  and  therefore  a  divine  law  also." 
And  is  it  anything  more  than  Protestantism  brought 
up  to  date,  when  Feuerbach  pronounces  moral  rela- 
tions sacred,  not  as  God's  ordinance  indeed,  but,  in- 
stead, for  the  sake  of  the  spirit  that  dwells  in  them  ? 
"  But  marriage — as  a  free  alliance  of  love,  of  course — 
is  sacred  of  itself,  by  the  nature  of  the  union  that  is 
formed  here.      That  marriage  alone  is  a  religious  one 
that  is  a  true  one,  that  corresponds  to  the  essence  of 
marriage,  love.     And  so  it  is  with  all  moral  relations. 
They  are  ethical,  are  cultivated  with  a  moral  mind, 
only  where  they  rank  as  religious  of  themselves. 
True  friendship  is  only  where  the  limits  of  friendship 
are  preserved  with  religious  conscientiousness,  with  the 
same  conscientiousness  with  which  the  believer  guards 
the  dignity  of  his  God.      Friendship  is  and  must  be 
sacred  for  you,  and  property,  and  marriage,  and  the 
good  of  every  man,  but  sacred  in  and  of  itself."* 

That  is  a  very  essential  consideration.      In  Cathol- 
icism the  mundane  can  indeed  be  consecrated  or  hal- 
lowed, but  it  is  not  sacred  without  this  priestly  bless- 
ing; in  Protestantism,  on  the  contrary,  mundane  rela- 
tions are  sacred  of  themselves,  sacred  by  their  mere 
existence.     The  Jesuit  maxim,  "  the  end  hallows  the 
means,"  corresponds  precisely  to  the  consecration  by 
which  sanctity  is  bestowed.     No  means  are  holy  or  un- 
holy in  themselves,  but  their  relation  to  the  church, 

*"  Essence  of  Christianity,"  p.  403. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          119 

their  use  for  the  church,  hallows  the  means.     Regicide 
\v;is  named  as  such;  if  it  was  committed  for  the 
church's  behoof,  it  could  be  certain  of  being  hallowed 
by  the  church,  even  if  the  hallowing  was  not  openly 
pronounced.     To  the  Protestant,  majesty  ranks  as 
sacred;  to  the  Catholic  only  that  majesty  which  is 
consecrated  by  the  pontiff  can  rank  as  such;  and  it 
does  rank  as  such  to  him  only  because  the  pope,  even 
though  it  be  without  a  special  act,  confers  this  sacred- 
ness  on  it  once  for  all.      If  he  retracted  his  consecra- 
tion, the  king  would  be  left  only  a  "  man  of  the  world 
or  layman,"  an  "  unconsecrated  "  man,  to  the 
Catholic. 

If  the  Protestant  seeks  to  discover  a  sacredness  in 
the  sensual  itself,  that  he  may  then  be  linked  only  to 
what  is  holy,  the  Catholic  strives  rather  to  banish  the 
sensual  from  himself  into  a  separate  domain,  where  it, 
like  the  rest  of  nature,  keeps  its  value  for  itself.     The 
Catholic  church  eliminated  mundane  marriage  from  its 
consecrated  order,  and  withdrew  those  who  were  its 
own  from  the  mundane  family;  the  Protestant  church 
declared  marriage  and  family  ties  to  be  holy,  and 
therefore  not  unsuitable  for  its  clergymen. 

A  Jesuit  may,  as  a  good  Catholic,  hallow  every- 
thing.    He  needs  only  e.  g.  to  say  to  himself :  "  I  as 
a  priest  am  necessary  to  the  church,  but  serve  it  more 
zealously  when  I  appease  my  desires  properly;  conse- 
quently I  will  seduce  this  girl,  have  my  enemy  there 
poisoned,  etc. ;  my  end  is  holy  because  it  is  a  priest's, 
consequently  it  hallows  the  means."     For  in  the  end 
it  is  still  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  church.     Why 
should  the  Catholic  priest  shrink  from  handing  Em- 


120  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

peror  Henry  VII  the  poisoned  wafer  for  the — church's 
welfare  ? 

The  genuinely — churchly  Protestants  inveighed 
against  every  "  innocent  pleasure,"  because  only  the 
sacred,  the  spiritual,  could  be  innocent.     What  they 
could  not  point  out  the  holy  spirit  in,  the  Protestants 
had  to  reject, — dancing,  the  theatre,  ostentation  (e.  g. 
in  the  church),  and  the  like. 

Compared  with  this  puritanical  Calvinism,  Luther- 
anism  is  again  more  on  the  religious,  i.  e.  spiritual, 
track, — is  more  radical.      For  the  former  excludes  at 
once  a  great  number  of  things  as  sensual  and  worldly, 
and  purifies  the  church;   Lutheranism,  on  the  con- 
trary, tries  to  bring  spirit  into  all  things  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, to  recognize  the  holy  spirit  as  an  essence  in 
everything,  and  so  to  hallow  everything  worldly. 
("  No  one  can  forbid  a  kiss  in  honor."     The  spirit  of 
honor  hallows  it.)      Hence  it  was  that  the  Lutheran 
Hegel  (he  declares  himself  such  in  some  passage  or 
other :  he  "  wants  to  remain  a  Lutheran  ")  was  com- 
pletely successful  in  carrying  the  idea  through  every- 
thing.    In  everything  there  is  reason,  i.  e.  holy  spirit, 
or  "  the  real  is  rational."     For  the  real  is  in  fact 
everything,  as  in  each  thing,  e.  g.  each  lie,  the  truth 
can  be  detected:  there  is  no  absolute  lie,  no  absolute 
evil,  and  the  like. 

Great  "  works  of  mind  "  were  created  almost  solely 
by  Protestants,  as  they  alone  were  the  true  disciples 
and  consummators  of  mind. 


How  little  man  is  able  to  control  !      He  must  let 
the  sun  run  its  course,  the  sea  roll  its  waves,  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  121 

mountains  rise  to  heaven.     Thus  he  stands  powerless 
before  the  uncontrollable.     Can  he  keep  off  the  im- 
pression that  he  is  helpless  against  this  gigantic  world? 
It  is  a  fixed  law  to  which  he  must  submit,  it  deter- 
mines his  fate.     Now,  what  did  pre-Christian  human- 
ity work  toward  ?     Toward  getting  rid  of  the  irrup- 
tions of  the  destinies,  not  letting  oneself  be  vexed  by 
them.     The  Stoics  attained  this  in  apathy,  declaring 
the  attacks  of  nature  indifferent,  and  not  letting  them- 
selves be  affected  by  them.     Horace  utters  the  famous 
Nil  admirari,  by  which  he  likewise  announces  the  in- 
difference of  the  other,  the  world ;  it  is  not  to  influence 
us,  not  to  arouse  our  astonishment.     And  that 
impavidurnfericnt  r ulnae  expresses  the  very  same  im- 
perturbability as  Ps.  46.  3:  "  We  do  not  fear,  though 
the  earth  should  perish."     In  all  this  there  is  room 
made  for  the  Christian  proposition  that  the  world  is 
empty,  for  the  Christian  contempt  of  the  world. 

The  imperturbable  spirit  of  "  the  wise  man,"  with 
which  the  old  world  worked  to  prepare  its  end,  now 
underwent  an  inner  perturbation  against  which  no 
ataraxy,  no  Stoic  courage,  was  able  to  protect  it. 
The  spirit,  secured  against  all  influence  of  the  world, 
insensible  to  its  shocks  and  exalted  above  its  attacks, 
admiring  nothing,  not  to  be  disconcerted  by  any 
downfall  of  the  world, — foamed  over  irrepressibly 
again,  because  gases  (spirits)  were  evolved  in  its  own 
interior,  and,  after  the  mechanical  shock  that  comes 
from  without  had  become  ineffective,  chemical  tensions, 
that  agitate  within,  began  their  wonderful  play. 

In  fact,  ancient  history  ends  with  this, — that  /  have 
struggled  till  I  won  my  ownership  of  the  world. 


122  THE   EGO  AND   HIS  OWN 

"  All  things  have  been  delivered  to  me  by  my 
Father"  (Matt.  11.  27).     It  has  ceased  to  be  over- 
powering, unapproachable,  sacred,  divine,  etc.,  for 
me;  it  is  undeified,  and  now  I  treat  it  so  entirely  as  I 
please  that,  if  I  cared,  I  could  exert  on  it  all  miracle- 
working  power,  L  e.  power  of  mind, — remove  moun- 
tains, command  mulberry  trees  to  tear  themselves  up 
and  transplant  themselves  into  the  sea  (Luke  17.  6), 
and  do  everything  possible,  i.  e.  thinkable :    "All 
things  are  possible  to  him  who  believes."*     I  am  the 
lord  of  the  world,  mine  is  the  " glory. ,"f     The  world 
has  become  prosaic,  for  the  divine  has  vanished  from 
it:  it  is  my  property,  which  I  dispose  of  as  I  (to  wit, 
the  mind)  choose. 

When  I  had  exalted  myself  to  be  the  owner  of  the 
world,  egoism  had  won  its  first  complete  victory,  had 
vanquished  the  world,  had  become  worldless,  and  put 
the  acquisitions  of  a  long  age  under  lock  and  key. 

The  first  property,  the  first  "  glory,"  has  been 
acquired  ! 

But  the  lord  of  the  world  is  not  yet  lord  of  his 
thoughts,  his  feelings,  his  will :  he  is  not  lord  and 
owner  of  the  spirit,  for  the  spirit  is  still  sacred,  the 
"  Holy  Spirit,"  and  the  "  worldless  "  Christian  is  not 
able  to  become  "  godless."     If  the  ancient  struggle 
was  a  struggle  against  the  world,  the  mediaeval 
(Christian)  struggle  is  a  struggle  against  self,  the 
mind;  the  former  against  the  outer  world,  the  latter 
against  the  inner  world.     The  mediaeval  man  is  the 


*  Mark  9.  23. 

t  [Herrlichkeit,  which,  according  to  its  derivation,  means  "lordliness."] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         123 

man  "whose  gaze  is. turned  inward,"  the  thinking, 
meditative  man. 

All  wisdom  of  the  ancients  is  the  science  of  the 
rc'orW,  all  wisdom  of  the  moderns  is  the  science  of  God. 

The  heathen  (Jews  included)  got  through  with  the 
icorld ;  but  now  the  thing  was  to  get  through  with 
self,  the  spirit,  too;  i.  e.  to  become  spiritless  or 
godless. 

For  almost  two  thousand  years  we  have  been  work- 
ing at  subjecting  the  Holy  Spirit  to  ourselves,  and 
little  by  little  we  have  torn  off  and  trodden  under  foot 
many  bits  of  sacredness ;  but  the  gigantic  opponent  is 
constantly  rising  anew  under  a  changed  form  and 
name.     The  spirit  has  not  yet  lost  its  divinity,  its 
holiness,  its  sacredness.     To  be  sure,  it  has  long  ceased 
to  flutter  over  our  heads  as  a  dove;  to  be  sure,  it  no 
longer  gladdens  its  saints  alone,  but  lets  itself  be 
caught  by  the  laity  too,  etc. ;  but  as  spirit  of  human- 
ity, as  spirit  of  Man,  it  remains  still  an  alien  spirit  to 
me  or  you,  still  far  from  becoming  our  unrestricted 
property,  which  we  dispose  of  at  our  pleasure.     How- 
ever, one  thing  certainly  happened,  and  visibly  guided 
the  progress  of  post-Christian  history :  this  one  thing 
was  the  endeavor  to  make  the  Holy  Spirit  more  hu- 
man, and  bring  it  nearer  to  men,  or  men  to  it. 
Through  this  it  came  about  that  at  last  it  could  be 
conceived  as  the  "  spirit  of  humanity,"  and,  under  dif- 
ferent expressions  like  "  idea  of  humanity,  mankind, 
humaneness,  general  philanthropy,"  etc.,  appeared 
more  attractive,  more  familiar,  and  more  accessible. 

Would  not  one  think  that  now  everybody  could         ' 
possess  the  Holy  Spirit,  take  up  into  himself  the  idea 


124  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

of  humanity,  bring  mankind  to  form  and  existence  in 
himself  ? 

No,  the  spirit  is  not  stripped  of  its  holiness  and 
robbed  of  its  unapproachableness,  is  not  accessible  to 
us,  not  our  property;  for  the  spirit  of  humanity  is  not 
my  spirit.     My  ideal  it  may  be,  and  as  a  thought  I 
call  it  mine;  the  thought  of  humanity  is  my  property, 
and  I  prove  this  sufficiently  by  propounding  it  quite 
according  to  my  views,  and  shaping  it  to-day  so, 
to-morrow  otherwise ;  we  represent  it  to  ourselves  in 
the  most  manifold  ways.      But  it  is  at  the  same  time 
an  entail,  which  I  cannot  alienate  nor  get  rid  of. 

Among  many  transformations,  the  Holy  Spirit  be- 
came in  time  the  "  absolute  idea,'^  which  again  in 
manifold  refractions  split  into  the  different  ideas  of 
philanthropy,  reasonableness,  civic  virtue,  etc. 

But  can  I  call  the  idea  my  property  if  it  is  the  idea 
of  humanity,  and  can  I  consider  the  Spirit  as  van- 
quished if  I  am  to  serve  it,  "  sacrifice  myself"  to  it  ? 
Antiquity,  at  its  close,  had  gained  its  ownership  of  the 
world  only  when  it  had  broken  the  world's  overpower- 
ingness  and  "  divinity,"  recognized  the  world's  power- 
lessness  and  "  vanity." 

The  case  with  regard  to  the  spirit  corresponds. 
When  I  have  degraded  it  to  a  spook  and  its  control 
over  me  to  a  cranky  notion,  then  it  is  to  be  looked 
upon  as  having  lost  its  sacredness,  its  holiness,  its 
divinity,  and  then  I  use  it,  as  one  uses  nature  at 
pleasure  without  scruple. 

The  "  nature  of  the  case,"  the  "  concept  of  the  re- 
lationship," is  to  guide  me  in  dealing  with  the  case  or 
in  contracting  the  relation.     As  if  a  concept  of  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         125 

case  existed  on  its  own  account,  and  was  not  rather 
the  concept  that  one  forms  of  the  case  !      As  if  a  rela- 
tion which  we  enter  into  was  not,  by  the  uniqueness  of 
those  who  enter  into  it,  itself  unique  !      As  if  it  de- 
pended on  how  others  stamp  it  !      But,  as  people  sep- 
arated the  "  essence  of  Man  "  from  the  real  man,  and 
judged  the  latter  by  the  former,  so  they  also  separate 
his  action  from  him,  and  appraise  it  by  "  human 
value."     Concepts  are  to  decide  everywhere,  concepts 
to  regulate  life,  concepts  to  rule.     This  is  the  religious 
world,  to  which  Hegel  gave  a  systematic  expression, 
bringing  method  into  the  nonsense  and  completing  the 
conceptual  precepts  into  a  rounded,  firmly-based  dog- 
matic.    Everything  is  sung  according  to  concepts,  and 
the  real  man,  i.  e.  I,  am  compelled  to  live  according  to 
these  conceptual  laws.     Can  there  be  a  more  grievous 
dominion  of  law,  and  did  not  Christianity  confess  at 
the  very  beginning  that  it  meant  only  to  draw  Juda- 
ism's dominion  of  law  tighter  ?      ("  Not  a"  letter  of 
the  law  shall  be  lost ! ") 

Liberalism  simply  brought  other  concepts  on  the 
carpet,  tiz.,  human  instead  of  divine,  political  in- 
stead of  ecclesiastical,  "  scientific  "  instead  of  doctrinal, 
or,  more  generally,  real  concepts  and  eternal  laws  in- 
stead of  "  crude  dogmas  "  and  precepts. 

Now  nothing  but  mind  rules  in  the  world.     An  in- 
numerable multitude  of  concepts  buzz  about  in  peo- 
ple's heads,  and  what  are  those  doing  who  endeavor  to 
get  further  ?     They  are  negating  these  concepts  to  put 
new  ones  in  their  place  !      They  are  saying:    "  You 
form  a  false  concept  of  right,  of  the  State,  of  man,  of 
liberty,  of  truth,  of  marriage,  etc. ;  the  concept  of 


126  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

right,  etc.,  is  rather  that  one  which  we  now  set  up.*" 
Thus  the  confusion  of  concepts  moves  forward. 

The  history  of  the  world  has  dealt  cruelly  with  us, 
and  the  spirit  has  obtained  an  almighty  power.     You 
must  have  regard  for  my  miserable  shoes,  which  could 
protect  your  naked  foot,  my  salt,  by  which  your  pota- 
toes would  become  palatable,  and  my  state-carriage, 
whose  possession  would  relieve  you  of  all  need  at 
once;  you  must  not  reach  out  after  them.     Man  is  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  all  these  and  innumer- 
able other  things :  they  are  to  rank  in  his  mind  as 
something  that  cannot  be  seized  or  approached,  are  to 
be  kept  away  from  him.     He  must  have  regard 
for  it,  respect  it;  woe  to  him  if  he  stretches  out  his 
fingers  desirously;  we  call  that  "being  light- 
fingered!" 

How  beggarly  little  is  left  us,  yes,  how  really 
nothing  !      Everything  has  been  removed,  we  must 
not  venture  on  anything  unless  it  is  given  us;  we  con- 
tinue to  live  only  by  the  grace  of  the  giver.     You 
must  not  pick  up  a  pin,  unless  indeed  you  have  got 
leave  to  do  so.     And  got  it  from  whom  ?      From 
respect !     Only  when  this  lets  you  have  it  as  property, 
only  when  you  can  respect  it  as  property,  only  then 
may  you  take  it.     And  again,  you  are  not  to  conceive 
a  thought,  speak  a  syllable,  commit  an  action,  that 
should  have  their  warrant  in  you  alone,  instead  of  re- 
ceiving it  from  morality  or  reason  or  humanity. 
Happy  unconstraint  of  the  desirous  man,  how  merci- 
lessly people  have  tried  to  slay  you  on  the  altar  of 
constraint ! 

But  around  the  altar  rise  the  arches  of  a  church, 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          127 

and  its  walls  keep  moving  further  and  further  out. 
What  they  enclose  is — sacred.     You  can  no  longer 
get  to  it,  no  longer  touch  it.     Shrieking  with  the  hun- 
ger that  devours  you,  you  wander  round  about  these 
walls  in  search  of  the  little  that  is  profane,  and  the 
circles  of  your  course  keep  growing  more  and  more  ex- 
tended.    Soon  that  church  will  embrace  the  whole 
world,  and  you  be  driven  out  to  the  extreme  edge; 
another  step,  and  the  world  of  the  sacred  has  con- 
quered: you  sink  into  the  abyss.     Therefore  take 
courage  while  it  is  yet  time,  wander  about  no  longer 
in  the  profane  where  now  it  is  dry  feeding,  dare  the 
leap,  and  rush  in  through  the  gates  into  the  sanctuary 
itself.      If  you  devour  the  sacred,  you  have  made  it 
your  own!     Digest  the  sacramental  wafer,  and  you 
are  rid  of  it  ! 


III.— THE  FREE 

The  ancients  and  the  moderns  having  been  pre- 
sented above  in  two  divisions,  it  may  seem  as  if  the 
free  were  here  to  be  described  in  a  third  division  as  in- 
dependent and  distinct.     This  is  not  so.     The  free  are 
only  the  more  modern  and  most  modern  among  the 
"  moderns,"  and  are  put  in  a  separate  division  merely 
because  they  belong  to  the  present,  and  what  is 
present,  above  all,  claims  our  attention  here.     I  give 
"  the  free  "  only  as  a  translation  of  "  the  liberals,"  but 
must  with  regard  to  the  concept  of  freedom  (as  in 
general  with  regard  to  so  many  other  things  whose 
anticipatory  introduction  cannot  be  avoided)  refer  to 
what  comes  later. 


128  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

§  1. — POLITICAL  LIBERALISM 

After  the  chalice  of  so-called  absolute  monarchy  had 
been  drained  down  to  the  dregs,  in  the  eighteenth 
century  people  became  aware  that  their  drink  did  not 
taste  human — too  clearly  aware  not  to  begin  to  crave 
a  different  cup.     Since  our  fathers  were  "human 
beings"  after  all,  they  at  last  desired  also  to  be 
regarded  as  such. 

Whoever  sees  in  us  something  else  than  human 
beings,  in  him  we  likewise  will  not  see  a  human  being, 
but  an  inhuman  being,  and  will  meet  him  as  an  un- 
human  being;  on  the  other  hand,  whoever  recognizes 
us  as  human  beings  and  protects  us  against  the  danger 
of  being  treated  inhumanly,  him  we  will  honor  as  our 
true  protector  and  guardian. 

Let  us  then  hold  together  and  protect  the  man  in 
each  other;  then  we  find  the  necessary  protection  in 
our  holding  together,  and  in  ourselves,  those  who  hold 
together,  a  fellowship  of  those  who  know  their  human 
dignity  and  hold  together  as  "  human  beings."     Our 
holding  together  is  the  State ;  we  who  hold  together 
are  the  nation. 

In  our  being  together  as  nation  or  State  we  are 
only  human  beings.     How  we  deport  ourselves  in 
other  respects  as  individuals,  and  what  self-seeking  im- 
pulses we  may  there  succumb  to,  belongs  solely 
to  our  private  life;  our  public  or  State  life  is  a  purely 
human  one.     Everything  un-human  or  "  egoistic  " 
that  clings  to  us  is  degraded  to  a  "  private  matter  " 
and  we  distinguish  the  State  definitely  from   "  civil 
society,"  which  is  the  sphere  of  "  egoism's  "  activity. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  129 

The  true  man  is  the  nation,  but  the  individual  is 
always  an  egoist.     Therefore  strip  off  your  individ- 
uality or  isolation  wherein  dwells  discord  and  egoistic 
inequality,  and  consecrate  yourselves  wholly  to  the 
true  man, — the  nation  or  the  State.     Then  you  will 
rank  as  men,  and  have  all  that  is  man's;  the  State, 
the  true  man,  will  entitle  you  to  what  belongs  to  it, 
and  give  you  the  "  rights  of  man  " ;   Man  gives  you 
his  rights  ! 

So  runs  the  speech  of  the  commonalty. 

The  commonalty*  is  nothing  else  than  the  thought 
that  the  State  is  all  in  all,  the  true  man,  and  that  the 
individual's  human  value  consists  in  being  a  citizen  of 
the  State.      In  being  a  good  citizen  he  seeks  his  high- 
est honor;   beyond  that  he  knows  nothing  higher 
than  at  most  the  antiquated — "being  a  good 
Christian." 

The  commonalty  developed  itself  in  the  struggle 
against  the  privileged  classes,  by  whom  it  was  cav- 
alierly treated  as  "  third  estate  "  and  confounded  with 
the  canaille.     In  other  words,  up  to  this  time  the  State 
had  recognized  caste.f     The  son  of  a  nobleman  was 
selected  for  posts  to  which  the  most  distinguished 
commoners  aspired  in  vain,  etc.     The  civic  feeling 
revolted  against  this.     No  more  distinction,  no  giving 
preference  to  persons,  no  difference  of  classes  !      Let 
all  be  alike  !     No  separate  interest  is  to  be  pursued 
longer,  but  the  general  interest  of  all.     The  State  is 

*  [Or  "citizenhood."    The  word  (das  Bwrgertum)  means  either  the  con- 
dition of  being  a  citizen,  or  citizen-like  principles,  or  the  body  of  citizens  or 
of  the  middle  or  business  class,  the  bourgeoisie.] 

t  [Man  hatte  im  Staate  "  die  ungleiche  Person  angesehen, "  there  had 
been  "  respect  of  unequal  persons  "  in  the  State.] 


130  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

to  be  a  fellowship  of  free  and  equal  men,  and  every 
one  is  to  devote  himself  to  the  "  welfare  of  the  whole," 
to  be  dissolved  in  the  State,  to  make  the  State  his  end 
and  ideal.     State!  State!  so  ran  the  general  cry, 
and  thenceforth  people  sought  for  the  "  right  form  of 
State,"  the  best  constitution,  and  so  the  State  in  its 
best  conception.     The  thought  of  the  State  passed 
into  all  hearts  and  awakened  enthusiasm;  to  serve  it, 
this  mundane  god,  became  the  new  divine  service  and 
worship.     The  properly  political  epoch  had  dawned. 
To  serve  the  State  or  the  nation  became  the  highest 
ideal,  the  State's  interest  the  highest  interest,  State 
service  (for  which  one  does  not  by  any  means  need  to 
be  an  official)  the  highest  honor. 

So  then  the  separate  interests  and  personalities  had 
been  scared  away,  and  sacrifice  for  the  State  had  be- 
come the  shibboleth.     One  must  give  up  himself,  and 
live  only  for  the  State.     One  must  act  "  disinterest- 
edly," not  want  to  benefit  himself,  but  the  State. 
Hereby  the  latter  has  become  the  true  person,  before 
whom  the  individual  personality  vanishes;  not  I  live, 
but  it  lives  in  me.     Therefore,  in  comparison  with  the 
former  self-seeking,  this  was  unselfishness  and  imper- 
sonality itself.     Before  this  god — State — all  egoism 
vanished,  and  before  it  all  were  equal;  they  were 
without  any  other  distinction — men,  nothing  but  men. 

The  Revolution  took  fire  from  the  inflammable  ma- 
terial of  property.     The  government  needed  money. 
Now  it  must  prove  the  proposition  that  it  is  absolute, 
and  so  master  of  all  property,  sole  proprietor;  it  must 
take  to  itself  its  money,  which  was  only  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  subjects,  not  their  property.     Instead  of 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  131 

this,  it  calls  States-general,  to  have  this  money 
granted  to  it.     The  shrinking  from  strictly  logical 
action  destroyed  the  illusion  of  an  absolute  govern- 
ment; he  who  must  have  something  "  granted  "  to  him 
cannot  be  regarded  as  absolute.     The  subjects  recog- 
nized that  they  were  real  proprietors,  and  that  it  was 
their  money  that  was  demanded.     Those  who  had 
hitherto  been  subjects  attained  the  consciousness  that 
they  were  proprietors.     Bailly  depicts  this  in  a  few 
words:    "  If  you  cannot  dispose  of  my  property  without 
my  assent,  how  much  less  can  you  of  my  person,  of  all 
that  concerns  my  mental  and  social  position?      All 
this  is  my  property,  like  the  piece  of  land  that  I  till; 
and  I  have  a  right,  an  interest,  to  make  the  laws  my- 
self."     Bailly's  words  sound,  certainly,  as  if  every  one 
was  a  proprietor  now.     However,  instead  of  the  gov- 
ernment, instead  of  the  prince,  the — nation  now  be- 
came proprietor  and  master.     From  this  time  on  the 
ideal  is  spoken  of  as — "  popular  liberty  " — "  a  free 
people,"  etc. 

As  early  as  July  8,  1789,  the  declaration  of  the 
bishop  of  Autun  and  Barrere  took  away  all  semblance 
of  the  importance  of  each  and  every  individual  in  leg- 
islation ;  it  showed  the  complete  powerlessness  of  the 
constituents;  the  majority  of  the  representatives  has 
become  matter.     When  on  July  9  the  plan  for  divi- 
sion cf  the  work  on  the  constitution  is  proposed,  Mira- 
beau  remarks  that  "  the  government  has  only  power, 
no  rights;  only  in  the  people  is  the  source  of  all  right 
to  be  found."     On  July  16  this  same  Mirabeau  ex- 
claims: "  Is  not  the  people  the  source  of  all  power?  " 
The  source,  therefore,  of  all  right,  and  the  source  of 


132  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

all — power  !  *     By  the  way,  here  the  substance  of 
"right"  becomes  visible;    it  is — power.     "  He  who 
has  power  has  right." 

The  commonalty  is  the  heir  of  the  privileged  classes. 
In  fact,  the  rights  of  the  barons,  which  were  taken 
from  them  as  "  usurpations,"  only  passed  over  to  the 
commonalty.     For  the  commonalty  was  now  called  the 
"  nation."     "  Into  the  hands  of  the  nation  "  all  pre- 
rogatives were  given  back.     Thereby  they  ceased  to 
be  "  prerogatives  " :  f  they  became  "  rights.  "J     From 
this  time  on  the  nation  demands  tithes,  compulsory 
services;  it  has  inherited  the  lord's  court,  the  rights 
of  vert  and  venison,  the — serfs.     The  night  of  August 
4  was  the  death-night  of  privileges  or  "  prerogatives  " 
(cities,  communes,  boards  of  magistrates,  were  also 
privileged,  furnished  with  prerogatives  and  seigniorial 
rights),  and  ended  with  the  new  morning  of  "  right," 
the  "  rights  of  the  State,"  the  "  fights  of  the  nation." 

The  monarch  in  the  person  of  the  "  royal  master  " 
had  been  a  paltry  monarch  compared  with  this  new 
monarch,  the  "  sovereign  nation."     This  monarchy 
was  a  thousand  times  severer,  stricter,  and  more  con- 
sistent.    Against  the  new  monarch  there  was  no 
longer  any  right,  any  privilege  at  all;  how  limited 
the  "  absolute  king  "  of  the  anden  regime  looks  in 
comparison!      The  Revolution  effected  the  transforma- 
tion of  limited  monarchy  into  absolute  monarchy. 
From  this  time  on  every  right  that  is  not  conferred  by 
this  monarch  is  an  "  assumption  ";  but  every  prerog- 

*  [Geicalt,  a  word  which  is  also  commonly  used  like  the  English  "  vio- 
lence," denoting  especially  unlawful  violence.] 

HVorrechte]  %[Rechte] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          133 

ative  that  he  bestows,  a  "  right."     The  times  de-  . 
manded  absolute  royalty,  absolute  monarchy;  there- 
fore down  fell  that  so-called  absolute  royalty  which 
had  so  little  understood  how  to  become  absolute  that 
it  remained  limited  by  a  thousand  little  lords. 

What  was  longed  for  and  striven  for  through  thou- 
sands of  years, — to  wit,  to  find  that  absolute  lord  be- 
side whom  no  other  lords  and  lordlings  any  longer  ex- 
ist to  clip  his  power. — the  bourgeoisie  has  brought  to 
pass.     It  has  revealed  the  Lord  who  alone  confers 
"  rightful  titles,"  and  without  whose  warrant  nothing 
is  justified.     "  So  now,  we  know  that  an  idol  is  noth- 
ing in  the  world,  and  that  there  is  no  other  god  save 
the  one."* 

Against  right  one  can  no  longer,  as  against  a  right, 
come  forward  with  the  assertion  that  it  is  "a  wrong." 
One  can  say  now  only  that  it  is  a  piece  of  nonsense,  an 
illusion.      If  one  called  it  wrong,  one  would  have  to 
set  up  another  right  in  opposition  to  it,  and  measure 
it  by  this.     If,  on  the  contrary,  one  rejects  right  as 
such,  right  in  and  of  itself,  altogether,  then  one  also 
rejects  the  concept  of  wrong,  and  dissolves  the  whole 
concept  of  right  (to  which  the  concept  of  wrong  be- 
longs). 

What  is  the  meaning  of  the  doctrine  that  we  all  en- 
joy "  equality  of  political  rights  "  ?      Only  this, — 
that  the  State  has  no  regard  for  my  person,  that  to  it 
I,  like  every  other,  am  only  a  man,  without  having 
another  significance  that  commands  its  deference. 
I  do  not  command  its  deference  as  an  aristocrat,  a 

*  1  Corinthians  8. 4. 


134  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

nobleman's  son,  or  even  as  heir  of  an  official  whose 
office  belongs  to  me  by  inheritance  (as  in  the  Middle 
Ages  countships,  etc.,  and  later  under  absolute  royalty, 
where  hereditary  offices  occur).     Now  the  State  has  an 
innumerable  multitude  of  rights  to  give  away,  e.  g. 
the  right  to  lead  a  battalion,  a  company,  etc.;  the 
right  to  lecture  at  a  university;  and  so  forth;  it  has 
them  to  give  away  because  they  are  its  own,  i.  e. 
State  rights  or  "  political "  rights.     Withal,  it  makes 
no  difference  to  it  to  whom  it  gives  them,  if  the  re- 
ceiver only  fulfils  the  duties  that  spring  from  the  dele- 
gated rights.     To  it  we  are  all  of  us  all  right,  and — 
equal, — one  worth  no  more  and  no  less  than  another. 
It  is  indifferent  to  me  who  receives  the  command  of  the 
army,  says  the  sovereign  State,  provided  the  grantee 
understands  the  matter  properly.      "  Equality  of  polit- 
ical rights  "  has,  consequently,  the  meaning  that  every 
one  may  acquire  every  right  that  the  State  has  to  give 
away,  if  only  he  fulfils  the  conditions  annexed  there- 
to,— conditions  which  are  to  be  sought  only  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  particular  right,  not  in  a  predilection  for 
the  person  (persona  grata) :  the  nature  of  the  right  to 
become  an  officer  brings  with  it,  e.  g-.,  the  necessity 
that  one  possess  sound  limbs  and  a  suitable  measure  of 
knowledge,  but  it  does  not  have  noble  birth  as  a  con- 
dition;   if,  on  the  other  hand,  even  the  most  deserving 
commoner  could  not  reach  that  station,  then  an  in- 
equality of  political  rights  would  exist.     Among  the 
States  of  to-day  one  has  carried  out  that  maxim  of 
equality  more,  another  less. 

The  monarchy  of  estates  (so  I  will  call  absolute  roy- 
alty, the  time  of  the  kings  before  the  revolution)  kept 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          135 

the  individual  in  dependence  on  a  lot  of  little  mon- 
archies.    These  were  fellowships  (societies)  like  the 
guilds,  the  nobility,  the  priesthood,  the  burgher  class, 
cities,  communes,  etc;     Everywhere  the  individual 
must  regard  himself  first  as  a  member  of  this  little  so- 
ciety, and  yield  unconditional  obedience  to  its  spirit, 
the  esprit  tie  corps,  as  his  monarch.     More,  e.  g., 
than  the  individual  nobleman  himself  must  his  family, 
the  honor  of  his  race,  be  to  him.     Only  by  means  of 
his  corporation,  his  estate,  did  the  individual  have  re- 
lation to  the  greater  corporation,  the  State, — as  in 
Catholicism  the  individual  deals  with  God  only 
through  the  priest.     To  this  the  third  estate  now, 
showing  courage  to  negate  itself  as  an  estate,  made  an 
end.      It  decided  no  longer  to  be  and  be  called  an  es- 
tate beside  other  estates,  but  to  glorify  and  generalize 
itself  into  the  "  nation."     Hereby  it  created  a  much 
more  complete  and  absolute  monarchy,  and  the  entire 
previously  ruling  principle  of  estates,  the  principle  of 
little  monarchies  inside  the  great,  went  down.     There- 
fore it  cannot  be  said  that  the  Revolution  was  a  revo- 
lution against  the  first  two  privileged  estates:  it  was 
against  the  little  monarchies  of  estates  in  general. 
But,  if  the  estates  and  their  despotism  were  broken  (the 
king  too,  we  know,  was  only  a  king  of  estates,  not  a 
citizen-king),  the  individuals  freed  from  the  inequality 
of  estate  were  left.     Were  they  now  really  to  be  with- 
out estate  and  "  out  of  gear,"  no  longer  bound  by  any 
estate,  without  a  general  bond  of  union  ?     No,  for 
the  third  estate  had  declared  itself  the  nation 
only  in  order  not  to  remain  an  estate  beside  other  es- 
tates, but  to  become  the  sole  estate.     This  sole  estate 


136  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

is  the  nation,  the  "State"     What  had  the  indi- 
vidual now  become  ?      A  political  Protestant,  for 
he  had  come  into  immediate  connection  with  his  God, 
the  State.     He  was  no  longer,  as  an  aristocrat,  in  the 
monarchy  of  the  nobility;  as  a  mechanic,  in  the  mon- 
archy of  the  guild ;  but  he,  like  all,  recognized  and 
acknowledged  only — one  lord,  the  State,  as  whose  ser- 
vants they  all  received  the  equal  title  of  honor, 
"  citizen." 

The  bourgeoisie  is  the  aristocracy  of  DESERT;  its 
motto,  "  Let  desert  wear  its  crowns."      It  fought 
against  the  "  lazy  "  aristocracy,  for  according  to  it 
(the  industrious  aristocracy  acquired  by  industry  and 
desert)  it  is  not  the  "  born  "  who  is  free,  nor  yet  I  who 
am  free  either,  but  the  "  deserving  "  man,  the  honest 
servant  (of  his  king;  of  the  State;  of  the  people  in 
constitutional  States).     Through  service  one  acquires 
freedom,  i.  e.  acquires  "  deserts,"  even  if  one  served — 
mammon.     One  must  deserve  well  of  the  State,  i.  e. 
of  the  principle  of  the  State,  of  its  moral  spirit.     He 
who  serves  this  spirit  of  the  State  is  a  good  citizen,  let 
him  live  to  whatever  honest  branch  of  industry  he 
will.     In  its  eyes  innovators  practise  a  "  breadless 
art."     Only  the  "shopkeeper"  is  "practical,"  and  the 
spirit  that  chases  after  public  offices  is  as  much  the 
shopkeeping  spirit  as  is  that  which  tries  in  trade  to 
feather  its  nest  or  otherwise  to  become  useful  to  itself 
and  anybody  else. 

But,  if  the  deserving  count  as  the  free  (for  what 
does  the  comfortable  commoner,  the  faithful  office- 
holder, lack  of  that  freedom  that  his  heart  desires  ?), 
then  the  "  servants  "  are  the — free.     The  obedient 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         137 

servant  is  the  free  man  !      What  glaring  nonsense  ! 
Yet  this  is  the  sense  of  the  bourgeoisie,  and  its  poet, 
Goethe,  as  well  as  its  philosopher,  Hegel,  succeeded  in 
glorifying  the  dependence  of  the  subject  on  the  object, 
obedience  to  the  objective  world,  etc.      He  who  only 
serves  the  cause,  "devotes  himself  entirely  to  it,"  has 
the  true  freedom.     And  among  thinkers  the  cause  was 
— reason,  that  which,  like  State  and  Church,  gives — 
general  laws,  and  puts  the  individual  man  in  irons  by 
the  thought  of  humanity.      It  determines  what  is 
"  true,"  according  to  which  one  must  then  act.     No 
more  "  rational "  people  than  the  honest  servants,  who 
primarily  are  called  good  citizens  as  servants  of  the 
State. 

Be  rich  as  Crcesus  or  poor  as  Job — the  State  of  the 
commonalty  leaves  that  to  your  option ;  but  only  have 
a  "  good  disposition."     This  it  demands  of  you,  and 
counts  it  its  most  urgent  task  to  establish  this  in  all. 
Therefore  it  will  keep  you  from  "  evil  promptings," 
holding  the  "ill-disposed  "  in  check  and  silencing 
their  inflammatory  discourses  under  censors'  cancel- 
ling-marks  or  press-penalties  and  behind  dungeon 
walls,  and  will,  on  the  other  hand,  appoint  people  of 
"  good  disposition  "  as  censors,  and  in  every  way  have 
a  moral  influence  exerted  on  you  by  "  well-disposed 
and  well-meaning"  people.      If  it  has  made  you  deaf 
to  evil  promptings,  then  it  opens  your  ears  again  all 
the  more  diligently  to  good  promptings.- 

With  the  time  of  the  bourgeoisie  begins  that  of  lib- 
eralism.    People  want  to  see  what  is  "rational," 
"  suited  to  the  times,"  etc.,  established  everywhere. 
The  following  definition  of  liberalism,  which  is  sup- 


139  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

posed  to  be  pronounced  in  its  honor,  characterizes  it 
completely:    "  Liberalism  is  nothing  else  than  the 
knowledge  of  reason,  applied  to  our  existing  rela- 
tions."*    Its  aim  is  a  "rational  order,"  a  "  moral  be- 
havior," a  "  limited  freedom,"  not  anarchy,  lawless- 
ness, selfhood.     But,  if  reason  rules,  then  the  person 
succumbs.     Art  has  for  a  long  time  not  only  acknowl- 
edged the  ugly,  but  considered  the  ugly  as  necessary 
to  its  existence,  and  taken  it  up  into  itself;    it  needs 
the  villain,  etc.     In  the  religious  domain,  too,  the  ex- 
tremest  liberals  go  so  far  that  they  want  to  see  the 
most  religious  man  regarded  as  a  citizen — i.  e.  the 
religious  villain ;  they  want  to  see  no  more  of  trials 
for  heresy.     But  against  the  "  rational  law  "  no  one  is 
to  rebel,  otherwise  he  is  threatened  with  the  severest — 
penalty.     What  is  wanted  is  not  free  movement  and    • 
realization  of  the  person  or  of  me,  but  of  reason, — L  e. 
a  dominion  of  reason,  a  dominion.     The  liberals  are 
zealots,  not  exactly  for  the  faith,  for  God,  etc.,  but 
certainly  for  reason,  their  master.     They  brook  no 
lack  of  breeding,  and  therefore  no  self-development 
and  self-determination ;  they  play  the  guardian  as 
effectively  as  the  most  absolute  rulers. 

"  Political  liberty,"  what  are  we  to  understand  by 
that?      Perhaps  the  individual's  independence  of  the 
State  and  its  laws?      No ;  on  the  contrary,  the  individ- 
ual's subjection  in  the  State  and  to  the  State's  laws. 
But  why  "  liberty  "?      Because  one  is  no  longer  sep- 
arated from  the  State  by  intermediaries,  but  stands  in 
direct  and  immediate  relation  to  it;  because  one  is 

*  "  Ein  und  zwanzig  Bogen,"  p.  12. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  139    . 

a — citizen,  not  the  subject  of  another,  not  even  of  the 
king  as  a  person,  but  only  in  his  quality  as  "  su- 
preme head  of  the  State."     Political  liberty,  this  fun- 
damental doctrine  of  liberalism,  is  nothing  but  a  sec- 
ond phase  of — Protestantism,  and  runs  quite  parallel 
with  "  religious  liberty."*     Or  would  it  perhaps  be 
right  to  understand  by  the  latter  an  independence  of 
religion?      Anything  but  that.     Independence  of 
intermediaries  is  all  that  it  is  intended  to  express,  in- 
dependence of  mediating  priests,  the  abolition  of  the 
"  laity,"  and  so  direct  and  immediate  relation  to  re- 
ligion or  to  God.     Only  on  the  supposition  that  one 
has  religion  can  he  enjoy  freedom  of  religion ;  free- 
dom of  religion  does  not  mean  being  without  religion, 
but  inwardness  of  faith,  unmediated  intercourse  with 
God.     To  him  who  is  "  religiously  free"  religion  is  an 
affair  of  the  heart,  it  is  to  him  his  own  affair,  it  is  to 
him  a  "sacredly  serious  matter."     So,  too,  to  the 
"  politically  free  "  man  the  State  is  a  sacredly  serious 
matter;  it  is  his  heart's  affair,  his  chief  affair,  his  own 
affair. 

Political  liberty  means  that  the  polls,  the  State,  is 
free;  freedom  of  religion  that  religion  is  free,  as  free- 
dom of  conscience  signifies  that  conscience  is  free ; 
not,  therefore,  that  I  am  free  from  the  State,  from  reli- 
gion, from  conscience,  or  that  I  am  rid  of  them.     It 
does  not  mean  my  liberty,  but  the  liberty  of  a  power 
that  rules  and  subjugates  me;    it  means  that  one  of  my 
despots,  like  State,  religion,  conscience,  is  free.     State, 
religion,  conscience,  these  despots,  make  me  a  slave, 

*  Louis  Blanc  says  ("Histoire  des  Dix  Ans,"  I,  p.  138)  of  the  time  of  the 
Restoration:  "  Le  protcstantismc  dvvint  !<•  fond  des  idees  ct  des  wceurs." 


140  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

and  their  liberty  is  my  slavery.     That  in  this  they 
necessarily  follow  the  principle,  "  the  end  hallows  the 
means,"  is  self-evident.     If  the  welfare  of  the  State  is 
the  end,  war  is  a  hallowed  means;  if  justice  is  the 
State's  end,  homicide  is  a  hallowed  means,  and  is 
called  by  its  sacred  name,  "  execution,"  etc. ;  the 
sacred  State  hallows  everything  that  is  serviceable 
to  it. 

"  Individual  liberty,"  over  which  civic  liberalism 
keeps  jealous  watch,  does  not  by  any  means  signify  a 
completely  free  self-determination,  by  which  actions  be- 
come altogether  mine,  but  only  independence  of  per- 
sons.     Individually  free  is  he  who  is  responsible  to  no 
man.     Taken  in  this  sense, — and  we  are  not  allowed 
to  understand  it  otherwise, — not  only  the  ruler  is  indi- 
vidually free,  i.  e.,  irresponsible  toward  men  ("  before 
God,"  we  know,  he  acknowledges  himself  responsible), 
but  all  who  are  "  responsible  only  to  the  law."     This 
kind  of  liberty  was  won  through  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  the  century, — to  wit,  independence  of 
arbitrary  will,  of  tel  est  notre  plaisir.     Hence  the  con- 
stitutional prince  must  himself  be  stripped  of  all  per- 
sonality, deprived  of  all  individual  decision,  that  he 
may  not  as  a  person,  as  an  individual  man,  violate 
the  "  individual  liberty  "  of  others.     The  personal  will 
of  the  ruler  has  disappeared  in  the  constitutional 
prince;  it  is  with  a  right  feeling,  therefore,  that  ab- 
solute princes  resist  this.     Nevertheless  these  very  ones 
profess  to  be  in  the  best  sense  "  Christian  princes." 
For  this,  however,  they  must  become  a  purely  spiritual 
power,  as  the  Christian  is  subject  only  to  spirit  ("  God 
is  spirit ").    The  purely  spiritual  power  is  consistently 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          141 

represented  only  by  the  constitutional  prince,  he  who, 
without  any  personal  significance,  stands  there  spirit- 
ualized to  the  degree  that  he  can  rank  as  a  sheer, 
uncanny  "  spirit,"  as  an  idea.    The  constitutional  king 
is  the  truly  Christian  king,  the  genuine,  consistent 
carrying-out  of  the  Christian  principle.     In  the  consti- 
tutional monarchy  individual  dominion, — i.  e.,  a  real 
ruler  that  wills — has  found  its  end;  here,  therefore, 
individual  liberty  prevails,  independence  of  every  in- 
dividual dictator,  of  every  one  who  could  dictate  to 
me  with  a  tel  est  notre  plaisir.     It  is  the  completed 
Christian  State-life,  a  spiritualized  life. 

The  behavior  of  the  commonalty  is  liberal  through 
and  through.     Every  personal  invasion  of  another's 
sphere  revolts  the  civic  sense;  if  the  citi/en  sees  that 
one  is  dependent  on  the  humor,  the  pleasure,  the  will 
of  a  man  as  individual  (i.  e.  as  not  authorized  by  a 
"  higher  power  "),  at  once  he  brings  his  liberalism  to 
the  front  and  shrieks  about  "  arbitrariness."      In  fine, 
the  citizen  asserts  his  freedom  from  what  is  called 
orders  (ordonnance) :    "  No  one  has  any  business  to 
give  me — orders  !  "      Orders  carries  the  idea  that  what 
I  am  to  do  is  another  man's  will,  while  law  does  not 
express  a  personal  authority  of  another.     The  liberty 
of  the  commonalty  is  liberty  or  independence  from  the 
will  of  another  person,  so-called  personal  or  individual 
liberty;  for  being  personally  free  means  being  only 
so  free  that  no  other  person  can  dispose  of  mine,  or 
that  what  I  may  or  may  not  do  does  not  depend  on 
the  personal  decree  of  another.     The  liberty  of  the 
press,  for  instance,  is  such  a  liberty  of  liberalism,  lib- 
eralism fighting  only  against  the  coercion  of  the  cen- 


142  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

sorship  as  that  of  personal  wilfulness,  but  otherwise 
showing  itself  extremely  inclined  and  willing  to  tyr- 
annize over  the  press  by  "  press  laws  ";    i.  e.,  the  civic 
liberals  want  liberty  of  writingjfor  themselves ;  for, 
as  they  are  law-abiding,  their  writings  will  not  bring 
them  under  the  law.     Only  liberal  matter,  i.  e.  only 
lawful  matter,  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  printed;  oth- 
erwise the  "  press  laws  "  threaten  "  press-penalties." 
If  one  sees  personal  liberty  assured,  one  does  not  no- 
tice at  all  how,  if  a  new  issue  happens  to  arise,  the 
most  glaring  unfreedom  becomes  dominant.     For  one 
is  rid  of  orders  indeed,  and  "  no  one  has  any  business 
to  give  us  orders,"  but  one  has  become  s6  much  the 
more  submissive  to  the — law.     One  is  enthralled  now 
in  due  legal  form. 

In  the  citizen-State  there  are  only  "  free  people," 
who  are  compelled  to  thousands  of  things  (e.  g.  to  de- 
ference, to  a  confession  of  faith,  and  the  like).      But 
what  does  that  amount  to?      Why,  it  is  only  the — 
State,  the  law,  not  any  man,  that  compels  them! 

What  does  the  commonalty  mean  by  inveighing 
against  every  personal  order,  i.  e.  every  order  not 
founded  on  the  "  cause,"  on  "  reason,"  etc.?      It  is 
simply  fighting  in  the  interest  of  the  "  cause  "* 
against  the  dominion  of  "  persons  "  !      But  the  mind's 
cause  is  the  rational,  good,  lawful,  etc. ;  that  is  the 
"good  cause."     The  commonalty  wants  an  impersonal 
ruler. 

Furthermore,  if  the  principle  is  this,  that  only  the 
cause  is  to  rule  man — to  wit,  the  cause  of  morality, 

*  iSache,  which  commonly  means  thing.} 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          143 

the  cause  of  legality,  etc., — then  no  personal  balking 
of  one  by  the  other  may  be  authorized  either  (as  for- 
merly, e.  g.,  the  commoner  was  balked  of  the  aristo- 
tocratic  offices,  the  aristocrat  of  common  mechanical 
trades,  etc.) ;    i.  e.free  competition  must  exist.     Only 
through  the  thing*  can  one  balk  another  (e.  g.  the 
rich  man  balking  the  impecunious  man  by  money,  a 
thing),  not  as  a  person.     Henceforth  only  one  lord- 
ship, the  lordship  of  the  State,  is  admitted ;  personally 
no  one  is  any  longer  lord  of  another.     Even  at  birth 
the  children  belong  to  the  State,  and  to  the  parents 
only  in  the  name  of  the  State,  which,  e.  g.,  does  not 
allow  infanticide,  demands  their  baptism,  etc. 

But  all  the  State's  children,  furthermore,  are  of 
quite  equal  account  in  its  eyes  ("  civic  or  political 
equality  "),  and  they  may  see  to  it  themselves  how 
they  get  along  with  each  other;  they  may  compete. 

Free  competition  means  nothing  else  than  that 
every  one  can  present  himself,  assert  himself,  fight, 
against  another.     Of  course  the  feudal  party  set  itself 
against  this,  as  its  existence  depended  on  an  absence 
of  competition.     The  contests  in  the  time  of  the  Res- 
toration in  France  had  no  other  substance  than  this, — 
that  the  bourgeoisie  was  struggling  for  free  competi- 
tion, and  the  feudalists  were  seeking  to  bring  back  the 
guild  system. 

Now,  free  competition  has  won,  and  against  the 
guild  system  it  had  to  win.      (See  below  for  the  further 
discussion.) 

If  the  Revolution  ended  in  a  reaction,  this  only 

*  [Sache] 


144  THE  EGO  AND   HIS  OWN 

showed  what  the  Revolution  really  was.     For  every 
effort  arrives  at  reaction  when  it  comes  to  discreet  re- 
flection, and  storms  forward  in  the  original  action  only 
so  long  as  it  is  an  intoxication,  an  "  indiscretion." 
"  Discretion  "  will  always  be  the  cue  of  the  reac- 
tion, because  discretion  sets  limits,  and  liberates  what 
was  really  wanted,  i.  e.  the  principle,  from  the  initial 
"  unbridledness  "  and  "  unrestrainedness."     Wild 
young  fellows,  bumptious  students,  who  set  aside  all 
considerations,  are  really  Philistines,  since  with  them, 
as  with  the  latter,  considerations  form  the  substance 
of  their  conduct;  only  that  as  swaggerers  they  are 
mutinous  against  considerations  and  in  negative  rela- 
tions to  them,  but  as  Philistines,  later,  they  give  them- 
selves up  to  considerations  and  have  positive  relations 
to  them.     In  both  cases  all  their  doing  and  thinking 
turns  upon  "  considerations,"  but  the  Philistine  is  re- 
actionary in  relation  to  the  student;  he  is  the  wild 
fellow  come  to  discreet  reflection,  as  the  latter  is  the 
unreflecting  Philistine.     Daily  experience  confirms 
the  truth  of  this  transformation,  and  shows  how  the 
swaggerers  turn  to  Philistines  in  turning  gray. 

So  too  the  so-called  reaction  in  Germany  gives 
proof  that  it  was  only  the  discreet  continuation  of  the 
warlike  jubilation  of  liberty. 

The  Revolution  was  not  directed  against  the  estab- 
lished, but  against  the  establishment  in  question, 
against  a  particular  establishment.      It  did  away  with 
this  ruler,  not  with  the  ruler — on  the  contrary,  the 
French  were  ruled  most  inexorably;  it  killed  the  old 
vicious  rulers,  but  wanted  to  confer  on  the  virtuous 
ones  a  securely  established  position,  i.  e.  it  simply  set 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          145 

virtue  in  the  place  of  vice.  (Vice  and  virtue,  again, 
are  on  their  part  distinguished  from  each  other  only 
as  a  wild  young  fellow  from  a  Philistine.)  Etc. 

To  this  day  the  revolutionary  principle  has  gone  no 
farther  than  to  assail  only  one  or  another  particular 
establishment,  i.  e.  be  reformatory.     Much  as  may 
be  improved,  strongly  as  "  discreet  progress  "  may 
be  adhered  to,  always  there  is  only  a  new  master 
set  in  the  old  one's  place,  and  the  overturning  is  a — 
building  up.     We  are  still  at  the  distinction  of  the 
young  Philistine  from  the  old  one.     The  Revolution 
began  in  bourgeois  fashion  with  the  uprising  of  the 
third  estate,  the  middle  class;  in  bourgeois  fashion  it 
dries  away.     It  was  not  the  individual  man — and  he 
alone  is  Man — that  became  free,  but  the  citizen,  the 
citoyen,  the  political  man,  who  for  that  very  reason  is 
not  Man  but  a  specimen  of  the  human  species,  and 
more  particularly  a  specimen  of  the  species  Citizen,  a 
free  citizen. 

In  the  Revolution  it  was  not  the  individual  who 
acted  so  as  to  affect  the  world's  history,  but  a  people ; 
the  nation,  the  sovereign  nation,  wanted  to  effect 
everything.     A  fancied  /,  an  idea,  such  as  the  nation 
is,  appears  acting  ;    i.  e.,  the  individuals  contribute 
themselves  as  tools  of  this  idea,  and  act  as  "  citizens." 

The  commonalty  has  its  power,  and  at  the  same 
time  its  limits,  in  the  fundamental  law  of  the  State, 
in  a  charter,  in  a  legitimate*  or  "just"f  prince  who 
himself  is  guided,  and  rules,  according  to  "  rational 
laws  " ;  in  short,  in  legality.     The  period  of  the 

*  [Or  "righteous."    German  rechtlich.]  t  [gerecht] 


146  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

bourgeoisie  is  ruled  by  the  British  spirit  of  legality. 
An  assembly  of  provincial  estates,  e.  g.,  is  ever  recall- 
ing that  its  authorization  goes  only  so  and  so  far,  and 
that  it  is  called  at  all  only  through  favor  and  can  be 
thrown  out  again  through  disfavor.     It  is  always  re- 
minding itself  of  its — vocation.     It  is  certainly  not 
to  be  denied  that  my  father  begot  me;    but,  now  that 
I  am  once  begotten,  surely  his  purposes  in  begetting 
do  not  concern  me  a  bit  and,  whatever  he  may  have 
called  me  to,  I  do  what  I  myself  will.     Therefore  even 
a  called  assembly  of  estates,  the  French  assembly  in 
the  beginning  of  the  Revolution,  recognized  quite 
rightly  that  it  was  independent  of  the  caller.     It  ex- 
isted, and  would  have  been  stupid  if  it  did  not  avail 
itself  of  the  right  of  existence,  but  fancied  itself  de- 
pendent as  on  a  father.     The  called  one  no  longer 
has  to  ask  "  what  did  the  caller  want  when  he  created 
me  ?"  but  "  what  do  I  want  after  I  have  once  fol- 
lowed the  call  ? "     Not  the  caller,  not  the  constituents, 
not  the  charter  according  to  which  their  meeting  was 
called  out,  nothing  will  be  to  him  a  sacred,  inviolable 
power.      He  is  authorized  for  everything  that  is  in  his 
power;    he  will  know  no  restrictive  "  authorization," 
will  not  want  to  be  loyal.     This,  if  any  such  thing 
could  be  expected  from  chambers  at  all,  would  give  a 
completely  egoistic  chamber,  severed  from  all  navel- 
string  and  without  consideration.     But  chambers  are 
always  devout,  and  therefore  one  cannot  be  surprised 
if  so  much  half-way  or  undecided,  i.  e.  hypocritical, 
"  egoism  "  parades  in  them. 

The  members  of  the  estates  are  to  remain  within  the 
limits  that  are  traced  for  them  by  the  charter,  by  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  147 

king's  will,  and  the  like.      If  they  will  not  or  can  not 
do  that,  then  they  are  to  "  step  out."     What  dutiful 
man  could  act  otherwise,  could  put  himself,  his  con- 
viction, and  his  will  as  the  first  thing?   who  could  be 
so  immoral  as  to  want  to  assert  himself,  even  if  the 
body  corporate  and  everything  should  go  to  ruin  over 
it?      People  keep  carefully  within  the  limits  of  their 
authorization ;  of  course  one  must  remain  within  the 
limits  of  his  power  anyhow,  because  no  one  can  do 
more  than  he  can.     "  My  power,  or,  if  it  be  so,  pow- 
erlessness,  be  my  sole  limit,  but  authorizations 
only  restraining — precepts  ?      Should  I  profess  this 
all-subversive  view  ?      No,  I  am  a — law-abiding 
citizen  ! " 

The  commonalty  professes  a  morality  which  is  most 
closely  connected  with  its  essence.     The  first  demand 
of  this  morality  is  to  the  effect  that  one  should  carry 
on  a  solid  business,  an  honorable  trade,  lead  a  moral 
life.     Immoral,  to  it,  is  the  sharper,  the  demirep,  the 
thief,  robber,  and  murderer,  the  gamester,  the  penni- 
less man  without  a  situation,  the  frivolous  man.     The 
doughty  commoner  designates  the  feeling  against  these 
"  immoral "  people  as  his  "  deepest  indignation." 
All  these  lack  settlement,  the  solid  quality  of  business, 
a  solid,  seemly  life,  a  fixed  income,  etc. ;   in  short,  they 
belong,  because  their  existence  does  not  rest  on  a" 
secure  basis,  to  the  dangerous  "  individuals  or  isolated 
persons,"  to  the  dangerous  proletariat ;  they  are  "  in- 
dividual bawlers  "  who  offer  no  "  guarantee  "  and 
have  "  nothing  to  lose,"  and  so  nothing  to  risk.     The 
forming  of  family  ties,  e.  g.,  Innds  a  man:  he  who  is 
bound  furnishes  security,  can  be  taken  hold  of;  not 


148  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

so  the  street-walker.     The  gamester  stakes  everything 
on  the  game,  ruins  himself  and  others; — no  guaran- 
tee.    All  who  appear  to  the  commoner  suspicious, 
hostile,  and  dangerous  might  be  comprised  under  the 
name  "vagabonds";  every  vagabondish  way  of  living 
displeases  him.      For  there  are  intellectual  vagabonds 
too,  to  whom  the  hereditary  dwelling-place  of  their 
fathers  seems  too  cramped  and  oppressive  for  them  to 
be  willing  to  satisfy  themselves  with  the  limited  space 
any  more :  instead  of  keeping  within  the  limits  of  a 
temperate  style  of  thinking,  and  taking  as  inviolable 
truth  what  furnishes  comfort  and  tranquillity  to  thou- 
sands, they  overleap  all  bounds  of  the  traditional  and 
run  wild  with  their  impudent  criticism  and  untamed 
mania  for  doubt,  these  extravagating  vagabonds. 
They  form  the  class  of  the  unstable,  restless,  change- 
able, i.  e.  of  the  proletariat,  and,  if  they  give  voice 
to  their  unsettled  nature,  are  called  "  unruly  fellows." 
Such  a  broad  sense  has  the  so-called  proletariat,  or 
pauperism.      How  much  one  would  err  if  one  believed 
the  commonalty  to  be  desirous  of  doing  away  with 
poverty  (pauperism)  to  the  best  of  its  ability !     On 
the  contrary,  the  good  citizen  helps  himself  with  the 
incomparably  comforting  conviction  that  "  the  fact  is 
that  the  good  things  of  fortune  are  unequally  divided 
and  will  always  remain  so — according  to  God's  wise 
decree."     The  poverty  which  surrounds  him  in  every 
alley  does  not  disturb  the  true  commoner  further  than 
that  at  most  he  clears  his  account  with  it  by  throwing 
an  alms,  or  finds  work  and  food  for  an  "  honest  and 
serviceable  "  fellow.     But  so  much  the  more  does  he 
feel  his  quiet  enjoyment  clouded  by  innovating  and 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW    149 

discontented  poverty,  by  those  poor  who  no  longer 
behave  quietly  and  endure,  but  begin  to  run  wild  and 
become  restless.     Lock  up  the  vagabond,  thrust  the 
breeder  of  unrest  into  the  darkest  dungeon !      He 
wants  to  "  arouse  dissatisfaction  and  incite  people 
against  existing  institutions  "  in  the  State — stone 
him,  stone  him! 

But  from  these  identical  discontented  ones  comes  a 
reasoning  somewhat  as  follows:  It  need  not  make 
any  difference  to  the  "  good  citizens  "  who  protects 
them  and  their  principles,  whether  an  absolute  king  or 
a  constitutional  one,  a  republic,  etc.,  if  only  they  are 
protected.     And  what  is  their  principle,  whose  pro- 
tector they  always  "  love  "?      Not  that  of  labor;  not 
that  of  birth  either.     But  that  of  mediocrity,  of  the 
golden  mean:  a  little  birth  and  a  little  labor,  i.  e.,  an 
interest-bearing-  possession.     Possession  is  here  the 
fixed,  the  given,  inherited  (birth) ;  interest-drawing 
is  the  exertion  about  it  (labor) ;  laboring-  capital, 
therefore.     Only  no  immoderation,  no  ultra,  no  rad- 
icalism !     Right  of  birth  certainly,  but  only  hereditary 
possessions;    labor  certainly,  yet  little  or  none  at  all  of 
one's  own,  but  labor  of  capital  and  of  the — subject 
laborers. 

If  an  age  is  imbued  with  an  error,  some  always  de- 
rive advantage  from  the  error,  while  the  rest  have  to 
suffer  from  it.     In  the  Middle  Ages  the  error  was 
general  among  Christians  that  the  church  must  have 
all  power,  or  the  supreme  lordship  on  earth;  the 
hierarchs  believed  in  this  "  truth  "  not  less  than  the 
laymen,  and  both  were  spellbound  in  the  like  error. 
But  by  it  the  hierarchs  had  the  advantage  of  power, 


150  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  laymen  had  to  suffer  subjection.     However,  as 
the  saying  goes,  "  one  learns  wisdom  by  suffering  " ; 
and  so  the  laymen  at  last  learned  wisdom  and  no 
longer  believed  in  the  mediaeval  "  truth." — A  like  re- 
lation exists  between  the  commonalty  and  the  laboring 
class.     Commoner  and  laborer  believe  in  the  "  truth  " 
of  money ;  they  who  do  not  possess  it  believe  in  it  no 
less  than  those  who  possess  it:  the  laymen,  therefore, 
as  well  as  the  priests. 

"  Money  governs  the  world  "  is  the  keynote  of  the 
civic  epoch.     A  destitute  aristocrat  and  a  destitute 
laborer,  as  "  starvelings,"  amount  to  nothing  so  far  as 
political  consideration  is  concerned;  birth  and  labor 
do  not  do  it,  but  money  brings  consideration.*     The 
possessors  rule,  but  the  State  trains  up  from  the  desti- 
tute its  "  servants,"  to  whom,  in  proportion  as  they 
are  to  rule  (govern)  in  its  name,  it  gives  money 
(a  salary). 

I  receive  everything  from  the  State.      Have  I  any- 
thing without  the  State's  assent  ?     What  I  have  with- 
out this  it  takes  from  me  as  soon  as  it  discovers  the 
lack  of  a  "  legal  title."     Do  I  not,  therefore,  have 
everything  through  its  grace,  its  assent  ? 

On  this  alone,  on  the  legal  title,  the  commonalty 
rests.     The  commoner  is  what  he  is  through  the  pro- 
tection of. the  State,  through  the  State's  grace.     He 
would  necessarily  be  afraid  of  losing  everything  if  the 
State's  power  were  broken. 

But  how  is  it  with  him  who  has  nothing  to  lose, 
how  with  the  proletarian?      As  he  has  nothing  to  lose, 

*  Idas  Geld  gibt  Geltiing.] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  151 

he  does  not  need  the  protection  of  the  State  for  his 
"  nothing."     He  may  gain,  on  the  contrary,  if  that 
protection  of  the  State  is  withdrawn  from  the  protege. 

Therefore  the  non-possessor  will  regard  the  State  as 
a  power  protecting  the  possessor,  which  privileges  the 
latter,  but  does  nothing  for  him,  the  non-possessor, 
but  to — suck  his  blood.     The  State  is  a — commoners' 
State,  is  the  estate  of  the  commonalty.     It  protects 
man  not  according  to  his  labor,  but  according  to  his 
tractableness  ("  loyalty  "), — to  wit,  according  to 
whether  the  rights  entrusted  to  him  by  the  State  are 
enjoyed  and  managed  in  accordance  with  the  will, 
i.  e.  laws,  of  the  State. 

Under  the  regime  of  the  commonalty  the  laborers 
always  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  possessors, — i.  e.  of 
those  who  have  at  their  disposal  some  bit  of  the  State 
domains  (and  everything  possessible  is  State  domain, 
belongs  to  the  State,  and  is  only  a  fief  of  the  indi- 
vidual), especially  money  and  land;  of  the  capitalists, 
therefore.     The  laborer  cannot  realize  on  his  labor  to 
the  extent  of  the  value  that  it  has  for  the  consumer. 
"  Labor  is  badly  paid !  "     The  capitalist  has  the 
greatest  profit  from  it. — Well  paid,  and  more  than 
well  paid,  are  only  the  labors  of  those  who  heighten 
the  splendor  and  dominion  of  the  State,  the  labors  of 
high  State  servants.     The  State  pays  well  that  its 
"  good  citizens,"  the  possessors,  may  be  able  to  pay 
badly  without  danger;  it  secures  to  itself  by  good 
payment  its  servants,  out  of  whom  it  forms  a  protect- 
ing power,  a  "  police  "  (to  the  police  belong  soldiers, 
officials  of  all  kinds,  e.  g.  those  of  justice,  education, 
etc., — in  short,  the  whole  "  machinery  of  the  State  ") 


152  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

for  the  "  good  citizens,"  and  the  "  good  citizens  " 
gladly  pay  high  tax-rates  to  it  in  order  to  pay  so 
much  lower  rates  to  their  laborers. 

But  the  class  of  laborers,  because  unprotected  in 
what  they  essentially  are  (for  they  do  not  enjoy  the 
protection  of  the  State  as  laborers,  but  as  its  subjects 
they  have  a  share  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  police,  a  so- 
called  protection  of  the  law),  remains  a  power  hostile 
to  this  State,  this  State  of  possessors,  this  "  citizen 
kingship."     Its  principle,  labor,  is  not  recognized  as 
to  its  value ;  it  is  exploited,*  a  spoil  f  of  the  possess- 
ors, the  enemy. 

The  laborers  have  the  most  enormous  power  in  their 
hands,  and,  if  they  once  became  thoroughly  conscious 
of  it  and  used  it,  nothing  would  withstand  them ;  they 
would  only  have  to  stop  labor,  regard  the  product 
of  labor  as  theirs,  and  enjoy  it.     This  is  the  sense  of 
the  labor  disturbances  which  show  themselves  here  and 
there. 

The  State  rests  on  the — slavery  of  labor.     If  labor 
becomesfree,  the  State  is  lost. 

§  2. — SOCIAL  LIBERALISM 

We  are  freeborn  men,  and  wherever  we  look  we  see 
ourselves  made  servants  of  egoists !      Are  we  therefore 
to  become  egoists  too?      Heaven  forbid!  we  want 
rather  to  make  egoists  impossible!      We  want  to 
make  them  all  "  ragamuffins  " ;  all  of  us  must  have 
nothing,  that  "  all  may  have." 

So  say  the  Socialists. 

*  [ausgebeutet]  t  [Kriegsbeute] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         153 

Who  is  this  person  that  you  call  "  All  "  ? — It  is 
"  society  "! — But  is  it  corporeal,  then? — We  are  its 
body! — You?     Why,  you  are  not  a  body  yourselves; 
— you,  sir,  are  corporeal  to  be  sure,  you  too,  and  you, 
but  you  all  together  are  only  bodies,  not  a  body. 
Accordingly  the  united  society  may  indeed  have  bodies 
at  its  service,  but  no  one  body  of  its  own.     Like  the 
"  nation  "  of  the  politicians,  it  will  turn  out  to  be 
nothing  but  a  "  spirit,"  its  body  only  semblance. 

The  freedom  of  man  is,  in  political  liberalism,  free- 
dom from  persons,  from  personal  dominion,  from  the 
master;  the  securing  of  each  individual  person  against 
other  persons,  personal  freedom. 

No  one  has  any  orders  to  give;  the  law  alone  gives 
orders. 

But,  even  if  the  persons  have  become  equal,  yet 
their  possessions  have  not.     And  yet  the  poor  man 
needs  the  rich,  the  rich  the  poor,  the  former  the  rich 
man's  money,  the  latter  the  poor  man's  labor.     So  no 
one  needs  another  as  a  person,  but  needs  him  as  a 
giver,  and  thus  as  one  who  has  something  to  give,  as 
holder  or  possessor.     So  what  he  has  makes  the  man. 
And  in  having,  or  in  "  possessions,"  people  are  un- 
equal. 

Consequently,  social  liberalism  concludes,  no  one 
must  have,  as  according  to  political  liberalism  no  one 
was  to  give  orders ;  i.  e.,  as  in  that  case  the  State 
alone  obtained  the  command,  so  now  society  alone 
obtains  the  possessions. 

For  the  State,  protecting  each  one's  person  and 
property  against  the  other,  separates  them  from  one 
another;  each  one  is  his  special  part  and  has  his 


154  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

special  part.      He  who  is  satisfied  with  what  he  is  and 
has  finds  this  state  of  things  profitable  ;  but  he  who 
would  like  to  be  and  have  more  looks  around  for  this 
"  more,"  and  finds  it  in  the  power  of  other  persons. 
Here  he  comes  upon  a  contradiction;  as  a  person  no 
one  is  inferior  to  another,  and  yet  one  person  has 
what  another  has  not  but  would  like  to  have.     So,  he 
concludes,  the  one  person  is  more  than  the  other,  after 
all,  for  the  former  has  what  he  needs,  the  latter  has 
not;  the  former  is  a  rich  man,  the  latter  a  poor  man. 
He  now  asks  himself  further,  are  we  to  let  what  we 
rightly  buried  come  to  life  again?  are  we  to  let  this 
circuitously  restored  inequality  of  persons  pass?      No; 
on  the  contrary,  we  must  bring  quite  to  an  end  what 
was  only  half  accomplished.     Our  freedom  from 
another's  person  still  lacks  the  freedom  from  what  the 
other's  person  can  command,  from  what  he  has  in  his 

Crsonal  power, — in  short,  from  "  personal  property." 
t  us  then  do  away  with  personal  property .     Let  no 
one  have  anything  any  longer,  let  every  one  be  a — 
ragamuffin.     Let  property  be  impersonal,  let  it  belong 
to — society. 

Before  the  supreme  ruler,  the  sole  commander,  we 
had  all  become  equal,  equal  persons,  i.  c.  nullities. 

Before  the  supreme  proprietor  we  all  become  equal 
— ragamuffins.     For  the  present,  one  is  still  in  an- 
other's estimation  a  "  ragamuffin,"  a  "  have-nothing  "  ; 
but  then  this  estimation  ceases.     We  are  all  ragamuf- 
fins together,  and  as  the  aggregate  of  Communistic 
society  we  might  call  burselves  a  "  ragamuffin  crew." 

When  the  proletarian  shall  really  have  founded  his 
purposed  "  society  "  in  which  the  interval  between  rich 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         155 

and  poor  is  to  be  removed,  then  he  will  be  a  raga- 
muffin, for  then  he  will  feel  that  it  amounts  to  some- 
thing to  be  a  ragamuffin,  and  might  lift  "Ragamuf-. 
fin  "  to  be  an  honorable  form  of  address,  just  as  the 
Revolution  did  with  the  word  "  Citizen."      Ragamuf- 
fin is  his  ideal;  we  are  all  to  become  ragamuffins. 

This  is  the  second  robbery  of  the  "  personal "  in 
the  interest  of  "  humanity."     Neither  command  nor 
property  is  left  to  the  individual;  the  State  took  the 
former,  society  the  latter. 

Because  in  society  the  most  oppressive  evils  make 
themselves  felt,  therefore  the  oppressed  especially,  and 
consequently  the  members  in  the  lower  regions  of 
society,  think  they  find  the  fault  in  society,  and  make 
it  their  task  to  discover  the  right  society.     This  is 
only  the  old  phenomenon, — that  one  looks  for  the 
fault  first  in  everything  but_iim&^  and  conse- 
quently in  the  State,  in  the  self-seeking  of  the  rich,     ^    - 
etc.,  which  yet  have  precisely  our  fault  to  thank  for 
their  existence. 

The  reflections  and  conclusions  of  Communism  look 
very  simple.     As  matters  lie  at  this  time, — in  the 
present  situation  with  regard  to  the  State,  therefore, — 
some,  and  they  the  majority,  are  at  a  disadvantage 
compared  to  others,  the  minority.     In  this  state  of 
things  the  former  are  in  a  state  of  prosperity,  the  lat- 
ter in  a  state  of  need.     Hence  the  present  state  of 
things,  i.  e.  the  State,  must  be  done  away  with.     And 
what  in. its  place?      Instead  of  the  isolated  state  of 
prosperity — a  general  state  of  prosperity,  a  prosperity 
of  all. 

Through  the  Revolution  the  bourgeoisie  became 


156  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

omnipotent,  and  all  inequality  was  abolished  by  every 
one's  being  raised  or  degraded  to  the  dignity  of  a 
citizen :  the  common  man — raised,  the  aristocrat — 
degraded;  the  third  estate  became  sole  estate, — viz., 
the  estate  of — citizens  of  the  State.     Now  Communism 
responds:    Our  dignity  and  our  essence  consist  not  in 
our  being  all — the  equal  children  of  our  mother,  the 
State,  all  born  with  equal  claim  to  her  love  and  her 
protection,  but  in  our  all  existing^br  each  other. 
This  is  our  equality,  or  herein  we  are  equal,  in  that 
we,  I  as  well  as  you  and  you  and  all  of  you,  are  active 
or  "labor"  each  one  for  the  rest;  in  that  each  of  us  is 
a  laborer,  then.     The  point  for  us  is  not  what  we  are 
for  the  State  (viz.,  citizens),  not  our  citizenship 
therefore,  but  what  we  are  for  each  other, — viz.,  that 
each  of  us  exists  only  through  the  other,  who,  caring 
for  my  wants,  at  the  same  time  sees  his  own  satisfied 
by  me.     He  labors,  e.  g.,  for  my  clothing  (tailor),  I 
for  his  need  of  amusement  (comedy-writer,  rope- 
dancer,  etc.),  he  for  my  food  (farmer,  etc.),  I  for  his 
instruction  (scientist,  etc.).     It  is  labor  that  consti- 
tutes our  dignity  and  our — equality. 

What  advantage  does  citizenship  bring  us  ?      Bur- 
dens !      And  how  high  is  our  labor  appraised  ?      As 
low  as  possible  !      But  labor  is  our  sole  value  all  the 
same;  that  we  are  laborers  is  the  best  thing  about  us, 
this  is  our  significance  in  the  world,  and  therefore  it 
must  be  our  consideration  too  and  must  come  to 
receive  consideration.     What  can  you  meet  us  with  ? 
Surely  nothing  but — labor  too.     Only  for  labor  or 
services  do  we  owe  you  a  recompense,  not  for  your 
bare  existence;  not  for  what  you  are  for  yourselves 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          157 

cither,  but  only  for  what  you  are  for  us.      By  what 
have  you  claims  on  us  ?      Perhaps  by  your  high  birth, 
etc.  ?      No,  only  by  what  you  do  for  us  that  is  desir- 
able or  useful.     Be  it  thus  then :  we  are  willing  to  be 
worth  to  you  only  so  much  as  we  do  for  you;  but  you 
are  to  be  held  likewise  by  us.     Services  determine 
value, — i.  e.  those  services  that  are  worth  something  to 
us,  and  consequently  labors  for  each  other,  labors  for 
the  common  good.     Let  each  one  be  in  the  other's  eyes 
a  laborer.     He  who  accomplishes  something  useful  is 
inferior  to  none,  or — all  laborers  (laborers,  of  course, 
in  the  sense  of  laborers  "for  the  common  good,"  i.  e. 
communistic  laborers)  are  equal.      But,  as  the  laborer 
is  worth  his  wages,*  let  the  wages  too  be  equal. 

As  long  as  faith  sufficed  for  man's  honor  and  dig- 
nity, no  labor,  however  harassing,  could  be  objected  to 
if  it  only  did  not  hinder  a  man  in  his  faith.     Now,  on 
the  contrary,  when  every  one  is  to  cultivate  himself 
into  man,  condemning  a  man  to  machine-like  labor 
amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  slavery.      If  a  factory- 
worker  must  tire  himself  to  death  twelve  hours  and 
more,  he  is  cut  off  from  becoming  man.     Every  labor 
is  to  have  the  intent  that  the  man  be  satisfied. 
Therefore  he  must  become  a  master  in  it  too,  i.  e.  be 
able  to  perform  it  as  a  totality.     He  who  in  a  pin-fac- 
tory only  puts  on  the  heads,  only  draws  the  wire,  etc., 
works,  as  it  were,  mechanically,  like  a  machine;  he 
remains  half-trained,  does  not  become  a  master:  his 
labor  cannot  satisfy  him,  it  can  only  fatigue  him. 
His  labor  is  nothing  taken  by  itself,  has  no  object  in 

*  [In  German  an  exact  quotation  of  Luke  10.7.] 


158  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

itself,  is  nothing  complete  in  itself;  he  labors  only  into 
another's  hands,  and  is  used  (exploited)  by  this  other. 
For  this  laborer  in  another's  service  there  is  no  enjoy- 
ment of  a  cultivated  mind,  at  most  crude  amusements: 
culture,  you  see,  is  barred  against  him.     To  be  a  good 
Christian  one  needs  only  to  believe,  and  that  can  be 
done  under  the  most  oppressive  circumstances.     Hence 
the  Christian-minded  take  care  only  of  the  oppressed 
laborers'  piety,  their  patience,  submission,  etc.     Only 
so  long  as  the  downtrodden  classes  were  Christians 
could  they  bear  all  their  misery:  for  Christianity  does 
not  let  their  murmurings  and  exasperation  rise.     Now 
the  hushing-  of  desires  is  no  longer  enough,  but  their 
sating-  is  demanded.     The  bourgeoisie  has  proclaimed 
the  gospel  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  world,  of  material 
enjoyment,  and  now  wonders  that  this  doctrine  finds 
adherents  among  us  poor:  it  has  shown  that  not  faith 
and  poverty,  but  culture  and  possessions,  make  a  man 
blessed;  we  proletarians  understand  that  too. 

The  commonalty  freed  us  from  the  orders  and  arbi- 
trariness of  individuals.     But  that  arbitrariness  was 
left  which  springs  from  the  conjuncture  of  situations, 
and  may  be  called  the  fortuity  of  circumstances ;  fa- 
voring  fortune,  and  those  "  favored  by  fortune,"  still 
remain. 

When  e.  g.  a  branch  of  industry  is  ruined  and 
thousands  of  laborers  become  breadless,  people  think 
reasonably  enough  to  acknowledge  that  it  is  not  the 
individual  who  must  bear  the  blame,  but  that  "  the 
evil  lies  in  the  situation." 

Let  us  change  the  situation  then,  but  let  us  change 
}t  thoroughly,  and  so  that  its  fortuity  becomes  power- 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          159 

less,  and  a  law !  Let  us  no  longer  be  slaves  of  chance ! 
Let  us  create  a  new  order  that  makes  an  end  oi  fluctu- 
ations. Let  this  order  then  be  sacred ! 

Formerly  one  had  to  suit  the  lords  to  come  to  any- 
thing;   after  the  Revolution  the  word  was  "  Grasp 
fortune ! "     Luck-hunting  or  hazard-playing,  civil 
life  was  absorbed  in  this.     Then,  alongside  this,  the 
demand  that  he  who  has  obtained  something  shall  not 
frivolously  stake  it  again. 

Strange  and  yet  supremely  natural  contradiction. 
Competition,  in  which  alone  civil  or  political  life  un- 
rolls itself,  is  a  game  of  luck  through  and  through, 
from  the  speculations  of  the  exchange  down  to  the  so- 
licitation of  offices,  the  hunt  for  customers,  looking  for 
work,  aspiring  to  promotion  and  decorations,  the 
second-hand  dealer's  petty  haggling,  etc.     If  one  suc- 
ceeds in  supplanting  and  outbidding  his  rivals,  then 
the  "  lucky  throw  "  is  made;  for  it  must  be  taken  as  a 
piece  of  luck  to  begin  with  that  the  victor  sees  himself 
equipped  with  an  ability  (even  though  it  has  been  de- 
veloped by  the  most  careful  industry)  against  which 
the  others  do  not  know  how  to  rise,  consequently  that 
— no  abler  ones  are  found.     And  now  those  who  ply 
their  daily  lives  in  the  midst  of  these  changes  of  for- 
tune without  seeing  any  harm  in  it  are  seized  with  the 
most  virtuous  indignation  when  their  own  principle 
appears  in  naked  form  and  "  breeds  misfortune  "  as 
— hazard-playing.     Hazard-playing,  you  see,  is  too 
clear,  too  barefaced  a  competition,  and,  like  every  de- 
cided nakedness,  offends  honorable  modesty. 

The  Socialists  want  to  put  a  stop  to  this  activity  of 
chance,  and  to  form  a  society  in  which  men  are  no 


160  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

longer  dependent  on  fortune,  but  free. 

In  the  most  natural  way  in  the  world  this  endeavor 
first  utters  itself  as  hatred  of  the  "  unfortunate  " 
against  the  "fortunate,"  i.  e.,  of  those  for  whom  for- 
tune has  done  little  or  nothing,  against  those  for 
whom  it  has  done  everything. 

But  properly  the  ill-feeling  is  not  directed  against 
the  fortunate,  but  againsifortune,  this  rotten  spot  of 
the  commonalty. 

As  the  Communists  first  declare  free  activity  to  be 
man's  essence,  they,  like  all  work-day  dispositions, 
need  a  Sunday;  like  all  material  endeavors,  they  need 
a  God,  an  uplifting  and  edification  alongside  their 
witless  "  labor." 

That  the  Communist  sees  in  you  the  man,  the  bro- 
ther, is  only  the  Sunday  side  of  Communism.     Accord- 
ing to  the  work-day  side  he  does  not  by  any  means 
take  you  as  man  simply,  but  as  human  laborer  or 
laboring  man.     The  first  view  has  in  it  the  liberal 
principle;  in  the  second,  illiberality  is  concealed.     If 
you  were  a  "  lazybones,"  he  would  not  indeed  fail  to 
recognize  the  man  in  you,  but  would  endeavor  to 
cleanse  him  as  a  "  lazy  man  "  from  laziness  and  to 
convert  you  to  ihe  faith  that  labor  is  man's  "  destiny 
and  calling." 

Therefore  he  shows  a  double  face :  with  the  one  he 
takes  heed  that  the  spiritual  man  be  satisfied,  with  the 
other  he  looks  about  him  for  means  for  the  material 
or  corporeal  man.     He  gives  man  a  twofold  post, — an 
office  of  material  acquisition  and  one  of  spiritual. 

The  commonalty  had  thrown  open  spiritual  and 
material  goods,  and  left  it  with  each  one  to  reach  out 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          161 

for  them  if  he  liked. 

Communism  really  procures  them  for  each  one, 
presses  them  upon  him,  and  compels  him  to  acquire 
them.     It  takes  seriously  the  idea  that,  because  only 
spiritual  and  material  goods  make  us  men,  we  must 
unquestionably  acquire  these  goods  in  order  to  be 
man.     The  commonalty  made  acquisition  free;  Com- 
munism compels  to  acquisition,  and  recognizes  only 
the  acquirer,  him  who  practises  a  trade.     It  is  not 
enough  that  the  trade  is  free,  but  you  must  take  it 
up. 

So  all  that  is  left  for  criticism  to  do  is  to  prove 
that  the  acquisition  of  these  goods  does  not  yet  by  any 
means  make  us  men. 

With  the  liberal  commandment  that  every  one  is  to 
make  a  man  of  himself,  or  every  one  to  make  himself 
man,  there  was  posited  the  necessity  that  every  one 
must  gain  time  for  this  labor  of  humanization,  i.  e. 
that  it  should  become  possible  for  every  one  to  labor 
on  himself. 

The  commonalty  thought  it  had  brought  this  about 
if  it  handed  over  everything  human  to  competition, 
but  gave  the  individual  a  right  to  every  human 
thing.     "  Each  may  strive  after  everything!  " 

Social  liberalism  finds  that  the  matter  is  not  settled 
with  the  "  may,"  because  may  means  only  "  it  is  for- 
bidden to  none  "  but  not  "  it  is  made  possible  to  every 
one."     Hence  it  affirms  that  the  commonalty  is  liberal 
only  with  the  mouth  and  in  words,  supremely  illiberal 
in  act.     It  on  its  part  wants  to  give  all  of  us  the 
means  to  be  able  to  labor  on  ourselves. 

By  the  principle  of  labor  that  of  fortune  or  compe- 


162  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

tition  is  certainly  outdone.     But  at  the  same  time  the 
laborer,  in  his  consciousness  that  the  essential  thing  in 
him  is  "  the  laborer,"  holds  himself  aloof  from  egoism 
and  subjects  himself  to  the  supremacy  of  a  society  of 
laborers,  as  the  commoner  clung  with  self-abandon- 
ment to  the  competition-State.     The  beautiful  dream 
of  a  "  social  duty  "  still  continues  to  be  dreamed. 
People  think  again  that  society  gives  what  we  need, 
and  we  are  under  obligations  to  it  on  that  account, 
owe  it  everything.*     They  are  still  at  the  point  of 
wanting  to  serve  a  "  supreme  giver  of  all  good."    That 
society  is  no  ego  at  all,  which  could  give,  bestow,  or 
grant,  but  an  instrument  or  means,  from  which  we 
may  derive  benefit;  that  we  have  no  social  duties,  but 
solely  interests  for  the  pursuance  of  which  society  must 
serve  us;  that  we  owe  society  no  sacrifice,  but,  if  we 
sacrifice  anything,  sacrifice  it  to  ourselves, — of  this  the 
Socialists  do  not  think,  because  they — as  liberals — are 
imprisoned  in  the  religious  principle,  and  zealously  as- 
pire after — a  sacred  society,  such  as  the  State  was 
hitherto. 

Society,  from  which  we  have  everything,  is  a  new 
master,  a  new  spook,  a  new  "  supreme  being,"  which 
"  takes  us  into  its  service  and  allegiance  " ! 

The  more  precise  appreciation  of  political  as  well  as 
social  liberalism  must  wait  to  find  its  place  further  on. 
For  the  present  we  pass  this  over,  in  order  first  to 
summon  them  before  the  tribunal  of  humane  or  crit- 
ical liberalism. 

*  Proudhon  ("  Creation  de  I'Ordre  ")  cries  out,  e.  g.,  p.  414,  "  In  industry, 
as  in  science,  the  publication  of  an  invention  is  the  first  and  most  sacred  of 
duties!" 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  163 

§  3. — HUMANE  LIBERALISM 

As  liberalism  is  completed  in  self-criticising,  "  criti- 
cal"* liberalism, — in  which  the  critic  remains  a  lib- 
eral and  does  not  go  beyond  the  principle  of  liberal- 
ism, Man, — this  may  distinctively  be  named  after 
Man  and  called  the  "  humane."   • 

The  laborer  is  counted  as  the  most  material  and 
egoistical  man.      He  does  nothing  at  alljftr  humanity, 
does  everything  for  himself,  for  his  welfare. 

The  commonalty,  because  it  proclaimed  the  freedom 
of  Man  only  as  to  his  birth,  had  to  leave  him  in  the 
claws  of  the  un-human  man  (the  egoist)  for  the  rest  of 
life.      Hence  under  the  regime  of  political  liberalism 
egoism  has  an  immense  field  for  free  utilization. 

The  laborer  will  utilize  society  for  his  egoistic 
ends  as  the  commoner  does  the  State.     You  have  only 
an  egoistic  end  after  all,  your  welfare!  is  the  humane 
liberal's  reproach  to  the  Socialist;  take  up  a  purely 
human  interest,  then  I  will  be  your  companion. 
"  But  to  this  there  belongs  a  consciousness  stronger, 
more  comprehensive,  than  a  laborer-consciousness" 
"  The  laborer  makes  nothing,  therefore  he  has  noth- 
ing; but  he  makes  nothing  because  his  labor  is  always 
a  labor  that  remains  individual,  calculated  strictly  for 

*  [In  his  strictures  on  "  criticism  "  Stirner  refers  to  a  special  movement 
known  by  that  name  in  the  early  forties  of  the  last  century,  of  which  Bruno 
Bauer  was  the  principal  exponent.    After  his  official  separation  from  the 
faculty  of  the  university  of  Bonn  on  account  of  his  views  in  regard  to  the 
Bible,  Bruno  Bauer  in  1843  settled  near  Berlin  and  founded  the  Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung,  in  which  he  and  his  friends,  at  war  with  their  surround- 
ings, championed  the  '"  absolute  emancipation  "  of  the  individual  within 
the  limits  of  "  pure  humanity  "  and  fought  as  their  foe  "  the  mass,"  com- 
prehending in  that  term  the  radical  aspirations  of  political  liberalism  and 
the  communistic  demands  of  the  rising  Socialist  movement  of  that  time. 
For  a  brief  account  of  Bruno  Bauer's  movement  of  criticism,  see  John 
Henry  Mackay,  "  Max  Stirner.    Sein  Leben  und  sein  Werk"] 


164  THE  EGO  AND   HIS  OWN 

his  own  want,  a  labor  day  by  day."*  In  opposition 
to  this  one  might,  for  instance,  consider  the  fact  that 
Gutenberg's  labor  did  not  remain  individual,  but  be- 
got innumerable  children,  and  still  lives  to-day;  it 
was  calculated  for  the  want  of  humanity,  and  was  an 
eternal,  imperishable  labor. 

The  humane  consciousness  despises  the  commoner- 
consciousness  as  well  as  the  laborer-consciousness:  for 
the  commoner  is  "  indignant "  only  at  vagabonds  (at 
all  who  have  "  no  definite  occupation  ")  and  their 
"immorality";  the  laborer  is  "disgusted"  by  the 
idler  ("  lazybones  ")  and  his  "  immoral,"  because  par- 
asitic and  unsocial,  principles.     To  this  the  humane 
liberal  retorts:  The  unsettledness  of  many  is  only 
your  product,  Philistine!      But  that  you,  proletarian, 
demand  the  grind  of  all,  and  want  to  make  drudgery 
general,  is  a  part,  still  clinging  to  you,  of  your  pack- 
mule  life  up  to  this  time.     Certainly  you  want  to 
lighten  drudgery  itself  by  all  having  to  drudge  equally 
hard,  yet  only  for  this  reason,  that  all  may  gain  lei- 
sure to  an  equal  extent.     But  what  are  they  to  do 
with  their  leisure?      What  does  your  "  society  "  do, 
that  this  leisure  may  be  passed  humanly  ?     It  must 
leave  the  gained  leisure  to  egoistic  preference  again, 
and  the  very  gain  that  your  society  furthers  falls  to 
the  egoist,  as  the  gain  of  the  commonalty,  the  master- 
lessness  of  man,  could  not  be  filled  with  a  human  ele- 
ment by  the  State,  and  therefore  was  left  to  arbitrary 
choice. 

It  is  assuredly  necessary  that  man  be  masterless:  but 

*  Br.  Bauer.  "  Lit.  Ztg."  V,  18. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         165 

therefore  the  egoist  is  not  to  become  master  over  man 
again  either,  but  man  over  the  egoist.     Man  must  as- 
suredly find  leisure:  but,  if  the  egoist  makes  use  of  it, 
it  will  be  lost  for  man;  therefore  you  ought  to  have 
given  leisure  a  human  significance.      But  you  laborers 
undertake  even  your  labor  from  an  egoistic  impulse, 
because  you  want  to  eat,  drink,  live;  how  should  you 
be  less  egoists  in  leisure?      You  labor  only  because 
having  your  time  to  yourselves  (idling)  goes  well  after 
work  done,  and  what  you  are  to  while  away  your  lei- 
sure time  with  is  left  to  chance. 

But,  if  every  door  is  to  be  bolted  against  egoism,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  strive  after  completely  "  disin- 
terested "  action,  total  disinterestedness.     This  alone 
is  human,  because  only  Man  is  disinterested,  the  egoist 
always  interested. 

If  we  let  disinterestedness  pass  unchallenged  for  a 
while,  then  we  ask,  do  you  mean  not  to  take  an  inter- 
est in  anything,  not  to  be  enthusiastic  for  anything, 
not  for  liberty,  humanity,  etc.?      "  Oh,  yes,  but  that 
is  not  an  egoistic  interest,  not  interestedness,  but  a  hu- 
man, i.  e.  a — theoretical  interest,  to  wit,  an  interest 
not  for  an  individual  or  individuals  ('  all '),  but  for 
the  idea,  for  Man! " 

And  you  do  not  notice  that  you  too  are  enthusiastic 
only  for  your  idea,  your  idea  of  liberty? 

And,  further,  do  you  not  notice  that  your  disinter- 
estedness is  again,  like  religious  disinterestedness,  a 
heavenly  interestedness?      Certainly  benefit  to  the  in- 
dividual leaves  you  cold,  and  abstractly  you  could 
cryjiat  libertas,  per  eat  mundus.     You  do  not  take 


166  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

thought  for  the  coming  day  either,  and  take  no  serious 
care  for  the  individual's  wants  anyhow,  not  for  your 
own  comfort  nor  for  that  of  the  rest;  but  you  make 
nothing  of  all  this,  because  you  are  a — dreamer. 

Do  you  suppose  the  humane  liberal  will  be  so  lib- 
eral as  to  aver  that  everything  possible  to  man  is  hu- 
man ?     On  the  contrary !      He  does  not,  indeed,  share 
the  Philistine's  moral  prejudice  about  the  strumpet, 
but  "  that  this  woman  turns  her  body  into  a  money- 
getting  machine  "*  makes  her  despicable  to  him  as 
"human  being."    His  judgment  is,  The  strumpet  is  not 
a  human  being;  or,  So  far  as  a  woman  is  a  strumpet, 
so  far  is  she  unhuman,  dehumanized.     Further:  The 
Jew,  the  Christian,  the  privileged  person,  the  theolo- 
gian, etc.,  is  not  a  human  being;  so  far  as  you  are  a 
Jew,  etc.,  you  are  not  a  human  being.     Again  the  im- 
perious postulate:  Cast  from  you  everything  peculiar, 
criticise  it  away!     Be  not  a  Jew,  not  a  Christian,  etc., 
but  be  a  human  being,  nothing  but  a  human  being. 
Assert  your  humanity  against  every  restrictive  specifi- 
cation; make  yourself,  by  means  of  it,  a  human  being, 
smdfree  from  those  limits;  make  yourself  a  "  free 
man,"  i.  e.  recognize  humanity  as  your  all-determining 
essence. 

I  say:  You  are  indeed  more  than  a  Jew,  more  than 
a  Christian,  etc.,  but  you  are  also  more  than  a  human 
being.    Those  are  all  ideas,  but  you  are  corporeal.    Do 
you  suppose,  then,  that  you  can  ever  become  "  a  hu- 
man being  as  such"?      Do  you  suppose  our  posterity 
will  find  no  prejudices  and  limits  to  clear  away,  for 

*  "Lit.Ztg."V,W. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          167 

which  our  powers  were  not  sufficient  ?      Or  do  you  per- 
haps think  that  in  your  fortieth  or  fiftieth  year  you 
have  come  so  far  that  the  following  days  have  nothing 
more  to  dissipate  in  you,  and  that  you  are  a  human 
being?     The  men  of  the  future  will  yet  fight  their 
way  to  many  a  liberty  that  we  do  not  even  miss. 
What  do  you  need  that  later  liberty  for?      If  you 
meant  to  esteem  yourself  as  nothing  before  you  had  be- 
come a  human  being,  you  would  have  to  wait  till  the 
"  last  judgment,"  till  the  day  when  man,  or  humanity, 
shall  have  attained  perfection.      But,  as  you  will  surely 
die  before  that,  what  becomes  of  your  prize  of  victory? 

Rather,  therefore,  invert  the  case,  and  say  to  your- 
self, /  am  a  hitman  being  !     I  do  not  need  to  begin  by 
producing  the  human  being  in  myself,  for  he  belongs 
to  me  already,  like  all  my  qualities. 

But,  asks  the  critic,  how  can  one  be  a  Jew  and  a 
man  at  once?      In  the  first  place,  I  answer,  one  cannot 
be  either  a  Jew  or  a  man  at  all,  if  "  one  "  and  Jew 
or  man  are  to  mean  the  same;  "one  "  always  reaches 
beyond  those  specifications,  and, — let  Isaacs  be  ever  so 
Jewish, — a  Jew,  nothing  but  a  Jew,  he  cannot  be,  just 
because  he  is  this  Jew.      In  the  second  place,  as  a  Jew 
one  assuredly  cannot  be  a  man,  if  being  a  man  means 
being  nothing  special.     But  in  the  third  place — and 
this  is  the  point — I  can,  as  a  Jew,  be  entirely  what  I 
— can  be.     From  Samuel  or  Moses,  and  others,  you 
hardly  expect  that  they  should  have  raised  themselves 
above  Judaism,  although  you  must  say  that  they  were 
not  yet  "  men."     They  simply  were  what  they  could 
be.      Is  it  otherwise  with  the  Jews  of  to-day?     Because 
you  have  discovered  the  idea  of  humanity,  does  it  fol- 


168  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

low  from  this  that  every  Jew  can  become  a  convert  to 
it?  If  he  can,  he  does  not  fail  to,  and,  if  he  fails  to, 
he — cannot.  What  does  your  demand  concern  him? 
what  the  call  to  be  a  man,  which  you  address  to  him? 

As  a  universal  principle,  in  the  "  human  society  " 
which  the  humane  liberal  promises,  nothing  "  special  " 
which  one  or  another  has  is  to  find  recognition,  noth- 
ing which  bears  the  character  of  "  private  "  is  to  have 
value.     In  this  way  the  circle  of  liberalism,  which  has 
its  good  principle  in  man  and  human  liberty,  its  bad 
in  the  egoist  and  everything  private,  its  God  in  the 
former,  its  devil  in  the  latter,  rounds  itself  off  com- 
pletely; and,  if  the  special  or  private  person  lost  his 
value  in  the  State  (no  personal  prerogative),  if  in  the 
"  laborers'  or  ragamuffins'  society  "  special  (private) 
property  is  no  longer  recognized,  so  in  "  human  so- 
ciety "  everything  special  or  private  will  be  left  out 
of  account;  and,  when  "pure  criticism"  shall  have 
accomplished  its  arduous  task,  then  it  will  be  known 
just  what  we  must  look  upon  as  private,  and  what, 
"  penetrated  with  a  sense  of  our  nothingness,"  we 
must — let  stand. 

Because  State  and  society  do  not  suffice  for  humane 
liberalism,  it  negates  both,  and  at  the  same  time  re- 
tains them.     So  at  one  time  the  cry  is  that  the  task  of 
the  day  is  "  not  a  political,  but  a  social,  one,"  and 
then  again  the  "  free  State"  is  promised  for  the  future. 
In  truth,  "  human  society  "  is  both, — the  most  general 
State  and  the  most  general  society.     Only  against  the 
limited  State  is  it  asserted  that  it  makes  too  much  stir 
about  spiritual  private  interests  (e.  g.  people's  religious 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  169 

belief),  and  against  limited  society  that  it  makes  too 
much  of  material  private  interests.      Both  are  to  leave 
private  interests  to  private  people,  and,  as  human  so- 
ciety, concern  themselves  solely  about  general  human 
interests. 

The  politicians,  thinking  to  abolish  personal  zvill, 
self-will  or  arbitrariness,  did  not  observe  that  through 
property  *  our  self-will  f  gained  a  secure  place  of 
refuge. 

The  Socialists,  taking  away  property  too,  do  not  no- 
tice that  this  secures  itself  a  continued  existence  in 
self-owner -ship.     Is  it  only  money  and  goods,  then, 
that  are  a  property,  or  is  every  opinion  something  of 
mine,  something  of  my  own? 

So  every  opinion  must  be  abolished  or  made  im- 
personal.    The  person  is  entitled  to  no  opinion,  but, 
as  self-will  was  transferred  to  the  State,  property  to  so- 
ciety, so  opinion  too  must  be  transferred  to  something 
general,  "  Man,"  and  thereby  become  a  general  hu- 
man opinion. 

If  opinion  persists,  then  I  have  my  God  (why,  God 
exists  only  as  "  my  God,"  he  is  an  opinion  or  my 
"faith"),  and  consequently  my  faith,  my  religion,  my 
thoughts,  my  ideals.    Therefore  a  general  human  faith 
must  come  into  existence,  the  "fanaticism  of  liberty" 
For  this  would  be  a  faith  that  agreed  with  the  "  es- 
sence of  man,"  and,  because  only  "  man  "  is  reason- 
able (you  and  I  might  be  very  unreasonable!),  a  rea- 
sonable faith. 

As  self-will  and  property  become  powerless,  so  must 

*  [Eigenttim,  "owndom,"]  t  [Eiyenirille,  "own-will."] 


170  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

self-ownership  or  egoism  in  general. 

In  this  supreme  development  of  "free  man  "  egoism, 
self-ownership,  is  combated  on  principle,  and  such  sub- 
ordinate ends  as  the  social  "  welfare"  of  the  Social- 
ists, etc.,  vanish  before  the  lofty  "idea  of  humanity.' 
Everything  that  is  not  a  "general  human"  entity  is 
something  separate,  satisfies  only  some  or  one;  or,  if  it 
satisfies  all,  it  does  this  to  them  only  as  individuals, 
not  as  men,  and  is  therefore  called  "  egoistic." 

To  the  Socialists  welfare  is  still  the  supreme  aim,  as 
free  rivalry  was  the  approved  thing  to  the  political 
liberals;  now  welfare  is  free  too,  and  we  are  free  to 
achieve  welfare,  just  as  he  who  wanted  to  enter  into 
rivalry  (competition)  was  free  to  do  so. 

But  to  take  part  in  the  rivalry  you  need  only  to  be 
commoners;  to  take  part  in  the  welfare,  only  to  be 
laborers.     Neither  reaches  the  point  of  being  synony- 
mous with  "man."     It  is  "truly  well"  with  man  only 
when  he  is  also  "  intellectually  free"!      For  man  is 
mind:  therefore  all  powers  that  are  alien  to  him,  the 
mind, — all  superhuman,  heavenly,  unhuman  powers, — 
must  be  overthrown,  and  the  name  "  man  "  must  be 
above  every  name. 

So  in  this  end  of  the  modern  age  (age  of  the  mod-    j 
ems)  there  returns  again,  as  the  main  point,  what  hadj 
been  the  main  point  at  its  beginning:  "  intellectual 
liberty." 

To  the  Communist  in  particular  the  humane  liberal 
says:    If  society  prescribes  to  you  your  activity,  then 
this  is  indeed  free  from  the  influence  of  the  individual, 
i.  e.  the  egoist,  but  it  still  does  not  on  that  account 
need  to  be  a  purely  human  activity,  nor  you  to  be  a 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         171 

complete  organ  of  humanity.     What  kind  of  activity 
society  demands  of  you  remains  accidental,  you  know; 
it  might  give  you  a  place  in  building  a  temple  or 
something  of  that  sort,  or,  even  if  not  that,  you  might 
yet  on  your  own  impulse  be  active  for  something  fool- 
ish, therefore  unhuman;  yes,  more  yet,  you  really 
labor  only  to  nourish  yourself,  in  general  to  live,  for 
dear  life's  sake,  not  for  the  glorification  of  humanity. 
Consequently  free  activity  is  not  attained  till  you 
make  yourself  free  from  all  stupidities,  from  every- 
thing non-human,  i.  e.  egoistic  (pertaining  only  to  the 
individual,  not  to  the  Man  in  the  individual),  dissi- 
pate all  untrue  thoughts  that  obscure  man  or  the  idea 
of  humanity:  in  short,  when  you  are  not  merely  un- 
hampered in  your  activity,  but  the  substance  too  of 
your  activity  is  only  what  is  human,  and  you  live  and 
work  only  for  humanity.     But  this  is  not  the  case  so 
long  as  the  aim  of  your  effort  is  only  your  welfare  and 
that  of  all ;  what  you  do  for  the  society  of  ragamuf- 
fins is  not  yet  anything  done  for  "human  society." 

Laboring  does  not  alone  make  you  a  man,  because 
it  is  something  formal  and  its  object  accidental;  the 
question  is  who  you  that  labor  are.     As  far  as  labor- 
ing goes,  you  might  do  it  from  an  egoistic  (material) 
impulse,  merely  to  procure  nourishment  and  the  like; 
it  must  be  a  labor  furthering  humanity,  calculated  for 
the  good  of  humanity,  serving  historical  (i.  e.  human) 
evolution, — in  short,  a  humane  labor.     This  implies 
two  things:  one,  that  it  be  useful  to  humanity;  next, 
that  it  be  the  work  of  a  "  man."     The  first  alone  may 
be  the  case  with  every  labor,  as  even  the  labors  of 
nature,  e.  g.  of  animals,  are  utilized  by  humanity  for 


172  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  furthering  of  science,  etc. ;  the  second  requires 
that  he  who  labors  should  know  the  human  object  of 
his  labor;  and,  as  he  can  have  this  consciousness  only 
when  he  knows  himself  as  man,  the  crucial  condition 
is — self-consciousness. 

Unquestionably  much  is  already  attained  when  you 
cease  to  be  a  "  fragment-laborer,"*  yet  therewith  you 
only  get  a  view  of  the  whole  of  your  labor,  and  ac- 
quire a  consciousness  about  it,  which  is  still  far  re- 
moved from  a  self-consciousness,  a  consciousness  about 
your  true  "self"  or  "essence,"  Man.     The  laborer  has 
still  remaining  the  desire  for  a  "higher  consciousness," 
which,  because  the  activity  of  labor  is  unable  to  quiet 
it,  he  satisfies  in  a  leisure  hour.      Hence  leisure  stands 
by  the  side  of  his  labor,  and  he  sees  himself  compelled 
to  proclaim  labor  and  idling  human  in  one  breath, 
yes,  to  attribute  the  true  elevation  to  the  idler,  the 
leisure-enjoy er.     He  labors  only  to  get  rid  of  labor; 
he  wants  to  make  labor  free,  only  that  he  may  be  free 
from  labor. 

In  fine,  his  work  has  no  satisfying  substance,  be- 
cause it  is  only  imposed  by  society,  only  a  stint,  a 
task,  a  calling;  and,  conversely,  his  society  does  not 
satisfy,  because  it  gives  only  work. 

His  labor  ought  to  satisfy  him  as  a  man;  instead 
of  that,  it  satisfies  society;  society  ought  to  treat  him 
as  a  man,  and  it  treats  him  as — a  rag-tag  laborer,  or 
a  laboring  ragamuffin. 

Labor  and  society  are  of  use  to  him  not  as  he  needs 
them  as  a  man,  but  only  as  he  needs  them  as  an 

*  [Referring  to  minute  subdivision  of  labor,  whereby  the  single  workman 
produces,  not  a  whole,  but  a  part.] 


MEN  OF   THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          173 

"egoist." 

Such  is  the  attitude  of  criticism  toward  labor.      It 
points  to  "  mind,"  wages  the  war  "  of  mind  with  the 
masses,"*  and  pronounces  communistic  labor  unintel- 
lectual  mass-labor.     Averse  to  labor  as  they  are,  the 
masses  love  to  make  labor  easy  for  themselves.     In 
literature,  which  is  to-day  furnished  in  mass,  this  aver- 
sion to  labor  begets  the  universally-known  superficial- 
ity, which  puts  from  it  "the  toil  of  research."! 

Therefore  humane  liberalism  says:  You  want  labor; 
all  right,  we  want  it  likewise,  but  we  want  it  in  the 
fullest  measure.     We  want  it,  not  that  we  may  gain 
spare  time,  but  that  we  may  find  all  satisfaction  in  it 
itself.     We  want  labor  because  it  is  our  self- 
development. 

But  then  the  labor  too  must  be  adapted  to  that 
end!      Man  is  honored  only  by  human,  self-conscious 
labor,  only  by  the  labor  that  has  for  its  end  no  "  ego- 
istic" purpose,  but  Man,  and  is  Man's  self-revelation  ; 
so  that  the  saying  should  be  laboro,  ergo  sum,  I  labor, 
therefore  I  am  a  man.     The  humane  liberal  wants 
that  labor  of  the  mind  which  works  up  all  material ; 
he  wants  the  mind,  that  leaves  no  thing  quiet  or  in  its 
existing  condition,  that  acquiesces  in  nothing,  analyzes 
everything,  criticises  anew  every  result  that  has  been 
gained.     This  restless  mind  is  the  true  laborer,  it  ob- 
literates prejudices,  shatters  limits  and  narrownesses, 
and  raises  man  above  everything  that  would  like  to 
dominate  over  him,  while  the  Communist  labors  only 
for  himself,  and  not  even  freely,  but  from  necessity, — 

*  "  Lit  Ztg."  V,  24.  t  "  Lit.  Ztg."  ibid. 


174  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

in  short,  represents  a  man  condemned  to  hard  labor. 

The  laborer  of  such  a  type  is  not  "  egoistic,"  be- 
cause he  does  not  labor  for  individuals,  neither  for 
himself  nor  for  other  individuals,  not  for  private  men 
therefore,  but  for  humanity  and  its  progress:    he  does 
not  ease  individual  pains,  does  not  care  for  individual 
wants,  but  removes  limits  within  which  humanity  is 
pressed,  dispels  prejudices  which  dominate  an  entire 
time,  vanquishes  hindrances  that  obstruct  the  path  of 
all,  clears  away  errors  in  which  men  entangle  them- 
selves, discovers  truths  which  are  found  through  him 
for  all  and  for  all  time;  in  short — he  lives  and  labors 
for  humanity. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  discoverer  of  a  great 
truth  doubtless  knows  that  it  can  be  useful  to  the  rest 
of  men,  and,  as  a  jealous  withholding  furnishes  him  no 
enjoyment,  he  communicates  it;  but,  even  though  he 
has  the  consciousness  that  his  communication  is  highly 
valuable  to  the  rest,  yet  he  has  in  no  wise  sought  and 
found  his  truth  for  the  sake  of  the  rest,  but  for  his 
own  sake,  because  he  himself  desired  it,  because  dark- 
ness and  fancies  left  him  no  rest  till  he  had  procured 
for  himself  light  and  enlightenment  to  the  best  of  his 
powers. 

(     He  labors,  therefore,  for  his  own  sake  and  for  the 
satisfaction  of  his  want.     That  along  with  this  he  was 
also  useful  to  others,  yes,  to  posterity,  does  not  take 
from  his  labor  the  egoistic  character. 

In  the  next  place,  if  he  did  labor  only  on  his  own 
account,  like  the  rest,  why  should  his  act  be  human, 
those  of  the  rest  unhuman,  i.  e.  egoistic?      Perhaps, 
because  this  book,  painting,  symphony,  etc.,  is  the 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          175 

labor  of  his  whole  being,  because  he  has  done  his  best 
in  it,  has  spread  himself  out  wholly  and  is  wholly  to 
be  known  from  it,  while  the  work  of  a  handicraftsman 
mirrors  only  the  handicraftsman,  i.  e.  the  skill  in 
handicraft,  not  "  the  man"?      In  his  poems  we  have 
the  whole  Schiller;  in  so  many  hundred  stoves,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  have  before  us  only  the  stove-maker, 
not  "  the  man." 

But  does  this  mean  more  than  "  in  the  one  work 
you  see  me  as  completely  as  possible,  in  the  other  only 
my  skill"?      Is  it  not  me  again  that  the  act  expresses? 
And  is  it  not  more  egoistic  to  offer  oneself  'to  the 
world  in  a  work,  to  work  out  and  shape  oneself,  than 
to  remain  concealed  behind  one's  labor?      You  say,  to 
be  sure,  that  you  are  revealing  Man.      But  the  Man 
that  you  reveal  is  you;  you  reveal  only  yourself,  yet 
with  this  distinction  from  the  handicraftsman, — that 
he  does  not  understand  how  to  compress  himself  into 
one  labor,  but,  in  order  to  be  known  as  himself,  must 
be  searched  out  in  his  other  relations  of  life,  and  that 
your  want,  through  whose  satisfaction  that  work  came 
into  being,  was  a — theoretical  want. 

But  you  will  reply  that  you  reveal  quite  another 
man,  a  worthier,  higher,  greater,  a  man  that  is  more 
man  than  that  other.      I  will  assume  that  you  accom- 
plish all  that  is  possible  to  man,  that  you  bring  to 
pass  what  no  other  succeeds  in.     Wherein,  then,  does 
your  greatness  consist?      Precisely  in  this,  that  you 
are  more  than  other  men  (the  "  masses"),  more  than 
men  ordinarily  are,  more  than  "ordinary  men";  pre- 
cisely in  your  elevation  above  men.     You  are  distin- 
guished beyond  other  men  not  by  being  man,  but  be- 


176  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

cause  you  are  a  "  unique  "*  man.    Doubtless  you  show 
what  a  man  can  do;  but  because  you,  a  man,  do  it, 
this  by  no  means  shows  that  others,  also  men,  are 
able  to  do  as  much;  you  have  executed  it  only  as  a 
unique  man,  and  are  unique  therein. 

It  is  not  man  that  makes  up  your  greatness,  but 
you  create  it,  because  you  are  more  than  man,  and 
mightier  than  other — men. 

It  is  believed  that  one  cannot  be  more  than  man. 
Rather,  one  cannot  be  less! 

It  is  believed  further  that  whatever  one  attains  is 
good  for  Man.     In  so  far  as  I  remain  at  all  times  a 
man — or,  like  Schiller,  a  Swabian ;  like  Kant,  a  Prus- 
sian; like  Gustavus  Adolphus,  a  near-sighted  person 
— I  certainly  become  by  my  superior  qualities  a  not- 
able man,  Swabian,  Prussian,  or  near-sighted  per- 
son.    But  the  case  is  not  much  better  with  that  than 
with  Frederick  the  Great's  cane,  which  became  famous 
for  Frederick's  sake. 

To  "  Give  God  the  glory  "  corresponds  the  modern 
"  Give  Man  the  glory."     But  I  mean  to  keep  it  for 
myself. 

Criticism,  issuing  the  summons  to  man  to  be  "  hu- 
man," enunciates  the  necessary  condition  of  sociabil- 
ity; for  only  as  a  man  among  men  is  one  companion- 
able. Herewith  it  makes  known  its  social  object,  the 
establishment  of  "  human  society." 

Among  social  theories  criticism  is  indisputably  the 
most  complete,  because  it  removes  and  deprives  of 
value  everything  that  separates  man  from  man :  all 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  177 

prerogatives,  down  to  the  prerogative  of  faith.     In  it 
the  love-principle  of  Christianity,  the  true  social  prin- 
ciple, comes  to  the  purest  fulfilment,  and  the  last  pos- 
sible experiment  is  tried  to  take  away  exclusiveness 
and  repulsion  from  men :  a  fight  against  egoism  in  its 
simplest  and  therefore  hardest  form,  in  the  form  of 
singleness,*  exclusiveness,  itself. 

"  How  can  you  live  a  truly  social  life  so  long  as 
even  one  exclusiveness  still  exists  between  you?" 

I  ask  conversely,  How  can  you  be  truly  single  so 
long  as  even  one  connection  still  exists  between  you? 
If  you  are  connected,  you  cannot  leave  each  other;  if 
a  "  tie  "  clasps  you,  you  are  something  only  with 
another,  and  twelve  of  you  make  a  dozen,  thousands 
of  you  a  people,  millions  of  you  humanity. 

"  Only  when  you  are  human  can  you  keep  company 
with  each  other  as  men,  just  as  you  can  understand 
each  other  as  patriots  only  when  you  are  patriotic ! " 

All  right;    then  I  answer,  Only  when  you  are  single 
can  you  have  intercourse  with  each  other  as  what  you 
are. 

It  is  precisely  the  keenest  critic  who  is  hit  hardest 
by  the  curse  of  his  principle.      Putting  from  him  one 
exclusive  thing  after  another,  shaking  off  churchliness, 
patriotism,  etc.,  he  undoes  one  tie  after  another  and 
separates  himself  from  the  churchly  man,  from  the 
patriot,  etc.,  till  at  last,  when  all  ties  are  undone,  he 
stands — alone.     He,  of  all  men,  must  exclude  all  that 
have  anything  exclusive  or  private;  and,  when  you 
get  to  the  bottom,  what  can  be  more  exclusive  than 

*  [Einzigkeit] 


178  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  exclusive,  single  person  himself ! 

Or  does  he  perhaps  think  that  the  situation  would 
be  better  if  all  became  "  men  "  and  gave  up  exclusive- 
ness?     Why,  for  the  very  reason  that  "all"  means 
"  every  individual "  the  most  glaring  contradiction  is 
still  maintained,  for  the  "individual"  is  exclusiveness 
itself.      If  the  humane  liberal  no  longer  concedes  to 
the  individual  anything  private  or  exclusive,  any  pri- 
vate thought,  any  private  folly;  if  he  criticises  every- 
thing away  from  him  before  his  face,  since  his  hatred 
of  the  private  is  an  absolute  and  fanatical  hatred;  if 
he  knows  no  tolerance  toward  what  is  private,  because 
everything  private  is  unhuman, — yet  he  cannot  criti- 
cise away  the  private  person  himself,  since  the  hard- 
ness of  the  individual  person  resists  his  criticism,  and 
he  must  be  satisfied  with  declaring  this  person  a  "  pri- 
vate person  "  and  really  leaving  everything  private  to 
him  again. 

What  will  the  society  that  no  longer  cares  about 
anything  private  do?      Make  the  private  impossible? 
No,  but  "  subordinate  it  to  the  interests  of  society, 
and,  e.  g-.,  leave  it  to  private  will  to  institute  holidays 
as  many  as  it  chooses,  if  only  it  does  not  come  in  col- 
lision with  the  general  interest."*     Everything  pri- 
vate is  left  free ;  i.  e.  it  has  no  interest  for  society. 

"  By  their  raising  of  barriers  against  science  the 
church  and  religiousness  have  declared  that  they  are 
what  they  always  were,  only  that  this  was  hidden 
under  another  semblance  when  they  were  proclaimed 
to  be  the  basis  and  necessary  foundation  of  the  State 

*  Bruno  Bauer,  " Judenfrage, "  p.  66. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  179 

a  matter  of  purely  private  concern.     Even  when 

they  were  connected  with  the  State  and  made  it  Chris- 
tian, they  were  only  the  proof  that  the  State  had  not 
yet  developed  its  general  political  idea,  that  it  was 

only  instituting  private  rights they  were  only  the 

highest  expression  for  the  fact  that  the  State  was  a 
private  affair  and  had  to  do  only  with  private  affairs. 
When  the  State  shall  at  last  have  the  courage  and 
strength  to  fulfil  its  general  destiny  and  to  be  free; 
when,  therefore,  it  is  also  able  to  give  separate  inter-, 
ests  and  private  concerns  their  true  position, — then 
religion  and  the  church  will  be  free  as  they  have  never 
been  hitherto.     As  a  matter  of  the  most  purely  pri- 
vate concern,  and  a  satisfaction  of  purely  personal 
want,  they  will  be  left  to  themselves;  and  every  indi- 
vidual, every  congregation  and  ecclesiastical  commun- 
ion, will  be  able  to  care  for  the  blessedness  of  their 
souls  as  they  choose  and  as  they  think  necessary. 
Every  one  will  care  for  his  souPs  blessedness  so  far 
as  it  is  to  him  a  personal  want,  and  will  accept  and 
pay  as  spiritual  caretaker  the  one  who  seems  to  him 
to  offer  the  best  guarantee  for  the  satisfaction  of  his 
want.     Science  is  at  last  left  entirely  out  of  the 
game."* 

What  is  to  happen,  though?  Is  social  life  to  have 
an  end,  and  all  companionableness,  all  fraternization, 
everything  that  is  created  by  the  love  or  society  prin- 
ciple, to  disappear? 

As  if  one  will  not  always  seek  the  other  because  he 
needs  him  ;  as  if  one  must  not  accommodate  himself  to 

*  Bruno  Bauer,  "Die  pute  Sache  der  Freiheit,"  pp.  62-63. 


180  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  other  when  he  needs  him.      But  the  difference  is 
this,  that  then  the  individual  really  unites  with  the  in- 
dividual, while  formerly  they  were  bound  tog-ether  by 
a  tie  ;  son  and  father  are  bound  together  before 
majority,  after  it  they  can  come  together  indepen- 
dently; before  it  they  belonged  together  as  members 
of  the  family,  after  it  they  unite  as  egoists ;  sonship 
and  fatherhood  remain,  but  son  and  father  no  longer 
pin  themselves  down  to  these. 

The  last  privilege,  in  truth,  is  "Man";  with  it  all 
are  privileged  or  invested.     For,  as  Bruno  Bauer  him- 
self says,  "  privilege  remains  even  when  it  is  extended 
to  all."* 

Thus  liberalism  runs  its  course  in  the  following 
transformations:    "First,  the  individual  is  not  man, 
therefore  his  individual  personality  is  of  no  account: 
no  personal  will,  no  arbitrariness,  no  orders  or 
mandates ! 

"  Second,  the  individual  has  nothing  human,  there- 
fore no  mine  and  thine,  or  property,  is  valid. 

"  Third,  as  the  individual  neither  is  man  nor  has 
anything  human,  he  shall  not  exist  at  all:  he  shall,  as 
an  egoist  with  his  egoistic  belongings,  be  annihilated 
by  criticism  to  make  room  for  Man,  '  Man,  just  dis- 
covered V 

But,  although  the  individual  is  not  Man,  Man  is 
yet  present  in  the  individual,  and,  like  every  spook 
and  everything  divine,  has  its  existence  in  him. 
Hence  political  liberalism  awards  to  the  individual 
everything  that  pertains  to  him  as  "  a  man  by  birth," 

*  Bruno  Bauer,  "Judenfrage,"  p.  60. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  181 

as  a  born  man,  among  which  there  are  counted  liberty 
of  conscience,  the  possession  of  goods,  etc., — in  short, 
the  "  rights  of  man  " ;    Socialism  grants  to  the  individ- 
ual what  pertains  to  him  as  an  active  man,  as  a 
"laboring"  man;    finally,  humane  liberalism  gives 
the  individual  what  he  has  as  "  a  man,"  i.  e.  every- 
thing that  belongs  to  humanity.      Accordingly  the 
single  one*  has  nothing  at  all,  humanity  everything  ; 
and  the  necessity  of  the  "  regeneration  "  preached  in 
Christianity  is  demanded  unambiguously  and  in  the 
completest  measure.      Become  a  new  creature,  become 
"man"! 

One  might  even  think  himself  reminded  of  the  close 
of  the  Lord's  Prayer.     To  Man  belongs  the  lordship 
(the  "  power  "  or  dynamis) ;   therefore  no  individual 
may  be  lord,  but  Man  is  the  lord  of  individuals  ; — 
Man's  is  the  kingdom,  i.  e.  the  world,  consequently 
the  individual  is  not  to  be  proprietor,  but  Man,  "  all," 
commands  the  world  as  property  ; — to  Man  is  due  re- 
nown, glorification  or  "  glory  "  (doxa)  from  all,  for 
Man  or  humanity  is  the  individual's  end,  for  which  he 
labors,  thinks,  lives,  and  for  whose  glorification  he 
must  become  "  man." 

Hitherto  men  have  always  striven  to  find  out  a  fel- 
lowship in  which  their  inequalities  in  other  respects 
should  become  "  non-essential " ;  they  strove  for  equali- 
zation, consequently  for  equality,  and  wanted  to  come 
all  under  one  hat,  which  means  nothing  less  than  that 
they  were  seeking  for  one  lord,  one  tie,  one  faith 
("  'Tis  in  one  God  we  all  believe").     There  cannot  be 


182  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

for  men  anything  more  fellowly  or  more  equal  than 
Man  himself,  and  in  this  fellowship  the  love-craving 
has  found  its  contentment:  it  did  not  rest  till  it  had 
brought  on  this  last  equalization,  leveled  all  inequality, 
laid  man  on  the  breast  of  man.     But  under  this  very 
fellowship  decay  and  ruin  become  most  glaring.     In 
a  more  limited  fellowship  the  Frenchman  still  stood 
against  the  German,  the  Christian  against  the  Moham- 
medan, etc.    Now,  on  the  contrary,  man  stands  against 
men,  or,  as  men  are  not  man,  man  stands  against  the 
un-man. 

The  sentence  "  God  has  become  man  "  is  now  fol- 
lowed by  the  other,  "  Man  has  become  I."     This  is 
the  human  I.     But  we  invert  it  and  say :  I  was  not 
able  to  find  myself  so  long  as  I  sought  myself  as 
Man.     But,  now  that  it  appears  that  Man  is  aspiring 
to  become  I  and  to  gain  a  corporeity  in  me,  I  note 
that,  after  all,  everything  depends  on  me,  and  Man  is 
lost  without  me.     But  I  do  not  care  to  give  myself  up 
•  to  be  the  shrine  of  this  most  holy  thing,  and  shall  not 
ask  henceforward  whether  I  am  man  or  un-man  in 
what  I  set  about;  let  this  spirit  keep  off  my  neck! 

Humane  liberalism  goes  to  work  radically.     If  you 
want  to  be  or  have  anything  especial  even  in  one 
point,  if  you  want  to  retain  for  yourself  even  one  pre- 
rogative above  others,  to  claim  even  one  right  that  is 
not  a  "general  right  of  man,"  you  are  an  egoist. 

Very  good!      I  do  not  want  to  have  or  be  anything 
especial  above  others,  I  do  not  want  to  claim  any  pre- 
rogative against  them,  but — I  do  not  measure  myself 
by  others  either,  and  do  not  want  to  have  any  right 
whatever.     I  want  to  be  all  and  have  all  that  I  can  be 


4 

MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          183 

and  have.     Whether  others  are  and  have  anything 
similar,  what  do  I  care?     The  equal,  the  same,  they 
can  neither  be  nor  have.      I  cause  no  detriment  to 
them,  as  I  cause  no  detriment  to  the  rock  by  being 

ahead  of  it"  in  having  motion.     If  they  could  have 
it,  they  would  have  it. 

To  cause  other  men  no  detriment  is  the  point  of  the 
demand  to  possess  no  prerogative;  to  renounce  all 
"  being  ahead,"  the  strictest  theory  of  renunciation. 
One  is  not  to  count  himself  as  "anything especial," 
such  as  e.  g.  a  Jew  or  a  Christian.     Well,  I  do  not 
count  myself  as  anything  especial,  but  as  unique* 
Doubtless  I  have  similarity  with  others;  yet  that  holds 
good  only  for  comparison  or  reflection;  in  fact  I  am 
incomparable,  unique.     My  flesh  is  not  their  flesh,  my 
mind  is  not  their  mind.      If  you  bring  them  under  the 
generalities  "  flesh,  mind,"  those  are  your  thoughts, 
which  have  nothing  to  do  with  my  flesh,  my  mind,  and 
can  least  of  all  issue  a  "  call"  to  mine. 

I  do  not  want  to  recognize  or  respect  in  you  any- 
thing, neither  the  proprietor  nor  the  ragamuffin,  nor 
even  the  man,  but  to  use  you.     In  salt  I  find  that  it 
makes  food  pala,table  to  me,  therefore  I  dissolve  it;  in 
the  fish  I  recognize  an  aliment,  therefore  I  eat  it;  in 
you  I  discover  the  gift  of  making  my  life  agreeable, 
therefore  I  choose  you  as  a  companion.     Or,  in  salt  I 
study  crystallization,  in  the  fish  animality,  in  you 
men,  etc.      But  to  me  you  are  only  what  you  are  for 
me, — to  wit,  my  object;  and,  because  my  object,  there- 
fore my  property. 

*  [etnzip] 


184  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

In  humane  liberalism  ragamuffinhood  is  completed. 
We  must  first  come  down  to  the  most  ragamuffin-like, 
most  poverty-stricken  condition  if  we  want  to  arrive 
at  ownness,  for  we  must  strip  off  everything  alien. 
But  nothing  seems  more  ragamuffin-like  than  naked 
— Man. 

It  is  more  than  ragamuffinhood,  however,  when 
I  throw  away  Man  too  because  I  feel  that  he  too  is 
alien  to  me  and  that  I  can  make  no  pretensions  on 
that  basis.     This  is  no  longer  mere  ragamuffinhood : 
because  even  the  last  rag  has  fallen  off,  here  stands 
real  nakedness,  denudation  of  everything  alien.     The 
ragamuffin  has  stripped  off  ragamuffinhood  itself,  and 
therewith  has  ceased  to  be  what  he  was,  a  ragamuffin. 

I  am  no  longer  a  ragamuffin,  but  have  been  one. 


Up  to  this  time  the  discord  could  not  come  to  an 
outbreak,  because  properly  there  is  current  only  a  con- 
tention of  modern  liberals  with  antiquated  liberals,  a 
contention  of  those  who  understand  "  freedom  "  in  a 
small  measure  and  those  who  want  the  "  full  measure  " 
of  freedom ;  of  the  moderate  and  measureless,  therefore. 
Everything  turns  on  the  question,  how  free  must  man 
be?     That  man  must  be  free,  in  this  all  believe;  there- 
fore all  are  liberal  too.     But  the  un-man  *  who  is 
somewhere  in  every  individual,  how  is  he  blocked? 
How  can  it  be  arranged  not  to  leave  the  un-man  free 
at  the  same  time  with  man  ? 


*  [It  should  be  remembered  that  to  be  an  Unmensch  ("  un-man  ")  one 
must  be  a  man.  The  word  means  an  inhuman  or  unhuman  man,  a  man 
who  is  not  man.  A  tiger,  an  avalanche,  a  drought,  a  cabbage,  is  not  an 
un-man.] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW     185 

Liberalism  as  a  whole  has  a  deadly  enemy,  an  in- 
vincible opposite,  as  God  has  the  devil:  by  the  side  of 
man  stands  always  the  un-man,  the  individual,  the 
egoist.     State,  society,  humanity,  do  not  master  this 
devil. 

Humane  liberalism  has  undertaken  the  task  of  show- 
ng  the  other  liberals  that  they  still  do  not  want 
'  freedom." 

If  the  other  liberals  had  before  their  eyes  only  iso- 
ated  egoism  and  were  for  the  most  part  blind,  radical 
iberalism  has  against  it  egoism  "  in  mass,"  throws 
among  the  masses  all  who  do  not  make  the  cause  of 
Teedom  their  own  as  it  does,  so  that  now  man  and 
un-man,  rigorously  separated,  stand  over  against  each 
other  as  enemies,  to  wit,  the  "  masses  "  and  "  criti- 
cism"; *  namely,  "free,  human  criticism,"  as  it  is 
called  ("  Judenfrage"  p.  114),  in  opposition  to  crude, 
?.  g.  religious,  criticism. 

Criticism  expresses  the  hope  that  it  will  be  victor- 
ious over  all  the  masses  and  "  give  them  a  general 
certificate  of  insolvency."!     So  it  means  finally  to 
make  itself  out  in  the  right,  and  to  represent  all  con- 
tention of  the  "  faint-hearted  and  timorous  "  as  an 
egoistic  stubbornness, $  as  pettiness,  paltriness.     All 
wrangling  loses  significance,  and  petty  dissensions  are 
given  up,  because  in  criticism  a  common  enemy  enters 
the  field.     "  You  are  egoists  altogether,  one  no  better 
than  another! "     Now  the  egoists  stand  together 
against  criticism. 

*  "  Lit.  Ztg."  V,  23  ;  as  comment,  V,  12  ff.  t  "  Lit.  Ztg."  V,  15. 

$  [Rechthaberei,  literally  the  character  of  always  insisting  on  making 
one's  self  out  to  be  in  the  right] 


186  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Really  the  egoists?      No,  they  fight  against  criti- 
cism precisely  because  it  accuses  them  of  egoism  ;  they 
do  not  plead  guilty  to  egoism.     Accordingly  criticism 
and  the  masses  stand  on  the  same  basis:  both  fight 
against  egoism,  both  repudiate  it  for  themselves  and 
charge  it  to  each  other. 

Criticism  and  the  masses  pursue  the  same  goal,  free- 
dom from  egoism,  and  wrangle  only  over  which  of 
them  approaches  nearest  to  the  goal  or  even  attains  it. 

The  Jews,  the  Christians,  the  absolutists,  the  men 
of  darkness  and  men  of  light,  politicians,  Commun- 
ists,— all,  in  short, — hold  the  reproach  of  egoism  far 
from  them  ;  and,  as  criticism  brings  against  them  this 
reproach  in  plain  terms  and  in  the  most  extendad 
sense,  all  justify  themselves  against  the  accusation 
of  egoism,  and  combat — egoism,  the  same  enemy  with 
whom  criticism  wages  war. 

Both,  criticism  and  masses,  are  enemies  of  egoists, 
and  both  seek  to  liberate  themselves  from  egoism,  as 
well  by  clearing  or  whitewashing  themselves  as  by  as- 
cribing it  to  the  opposite  party. 

The  critic  is  the  true  "spokesman  of  the  masses" 
who  gives  them  the  "simple  concept  and  the  phrase" 
of  egoism,  while  the  spokesmen  to  whom  the  triumph 
is  denied  in  "Lit.  Ztg"  V.  24  were  only  bunglers. 
He  is  their  prince  and  general  in  the  war  against  ego- 
ism for  freedom  ;  what  he  fights  against  they  fight 
against.      But  at  the  same  time  he  is  their  enemy  too, 
only  not  the  enemy  before  them,  but  the  friendly 
enemy  who  wields  the  knout  behind  the  timorous  to 
force  courage  into  them. 

Hereby  the  opposition  of  criticism  and  the  masses  is 


MEN  OF   THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          187 

reduced  to  the  following  contradiction :   "  You  are 
egoists"!      "No,  we  are  not"!      "I  will  prove  it  to 
you  " !      "  You  shall  have  our  justification  " ! 

Let  us  then  take  both  for  what  they  give  themselves 
out  for,  non-egoists,  and  what  they  take  each  other 
for,  egoists.     They  are  egoists  and  are  not. 

Properly  criticism  says:  You  must  liberate  your 
ego  from  all  limitedness  so  entirely  that  it  becomes  a 
human  ego.      I  say :    Liberate  yourself  as  far  as  you 
can,  and  you  have  done  your  part;  for  it  is  not  given 
to  every  one  to  break  through  all  limits,  or,  more  ex- 
pressively :  not  to  every  one  is  that  a  limit  which  is  a 
limit  for  the  rest.     Consequently,  do  not  tire  yourself 
with  toiling  at  the  limits  of  others  ;  enough  if  you 
tear  down  yours.     Who  has  ever  succeeded  in  tearing 
down  even  one  limitjfor  all  men  ?     Are  not  countless 
persons  to-day,  as  at  all  times,  running  about  with  all 
the  "limitations  of  humanity"?      He  who  overturns 
one  of  hh'  limits  may  have  shown  others  the  way  and 
the  means;  the  overturning  of  their  limits  remains 
their  affair.     Nobody  does  anything  else  either.     To 
demand  of  people  that  they  become  wholly  men  is  to 
call  on  them  to  cast  down  all  human  limits.     That  is 
impossible,  because  Man  has  no  limits.      I  have  some 
indeed,  but  then  it  is  only  mine  that  concern  me  any, 
and  only  they  can  be  overcome  by  me.     A  human 
ego  I  cannot  become,  just  because  I  am  I  and  not 
merely  man. 

Yet  let  us  still  see  whether  criticism  has  not  taught 
us  something  that  we  can  lay  to  heart!      I  am  not 
free  if  I  am  not  without  interests,  not  man  if  I  am  not 
disinterested?     Well,  even  if  it  makes  little  difference 


188  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

to  me  to  be  free  or  man,  yet  I  do  not  want  to  leave 
unused  any  occasion  to  realize  myself  or  make  myself 
count.     Criticism  offers  me  this  occasion  by  the  teach- 
ing that,  if  anything  plants  itself  firmly  in  me,  and 
becomes  indissoluble,  I  become  its  prisoner  and  ser- 
vant, i.  e.  a  possessed  man.     An  interest,  be  it  for 
what  it  may,  has  kidnapped  a  slave  in  me  if  I  cannot 
get  away  from  it,  and  is  no  longer  my  property,  but 
I  am  its.     Let  us  therefore  accept  criticism's  lesson  to 
let  no  part  of  our  property  become  stable,  and  to  feel 
comfortable  only  in — dissolving-  it. 

So,  if  criticism  says:  You  are  man  only  when  you 
are  restlessly  criticising  and  dissolving!    then  we  say: 
Man  I  am  without  that,  and  I  am  I  likewise;  there- 
fore I  want  only  to  be  careful  to  secure  my  property 
to  myself;  and,  in  order  to  secure  it,  I  continually 
take  it  back  into  myself,  annihilate  in  it  every  move- 
ment toward  independence,  and  swallow  it  before  it 
can  fix  itself  and  become  a  "  fixed  idea  "  or  a 
"  mania." 

But  I  do  that  not  for  the  sake  of  my  "  human 
calling,"  but  because  I  call  myself  to  it.     I  do  not 
strut  about  dissolving  everything  that  it  is  possible 
for  a  man  to  dissolve,  and,  e.  g.,  while  not  yet  ten 
years  old  I  do  not  criticise  the  nonsense  of  the  Com- 
mandments, but  I  am  man  all  the  same,  and  act 
humanly  in  just  this, — that  I  still  leave  them  uncriti- 
cised.     In  short,  I  have  no  calling,  and  follow  none, 
not  even  that  to  be  a  man. 

Do  I  now  reject  what  liberalism  has  won  in  its 
various  exertions?      Far  be  the  day  that  anything  won 
should  be  lost!      Only,  after  "Man "  has  become  free 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW          189 

:hrough  liberalism,  I  turn  my  gaze  back  upon  myself 
and  confess  to  myself  openly:  What  Man  seems  to 
lave  gained,  /  alone  have  gained. 

Man  is  free  when  "  Man  is  to  man  the  supreme 
jeing."     So  it  belongs  to  the  completion  of  liberalism 
;hat  every  other  supreme  being  be  annulled,  theology 
overturned  by  anthropology,  God  and  his  grace 
laughed  down,  "  atheism  "  universal. 

The  egoism  of  property  has  given  up  the  last  that  it 
had  to  give  when  even  the  "  My  God  "  has  become 
senseless;  for  God  exists  only  when  he  has  at  heart  the 
individual's  welfare,  as  the  latter  seeks  his  welfare  in 
lim. 

Political  liberalism  abolished  the  inequality  of 
masters  and  servants:  it  made  people  masterless, 
anarchic.     The  master  was  now  Removed  from  the 
ndividual,  the  "egoist,"  to  become  a  ghost, — the  law 
or  the  State.     Social  liberalism  abolishes  the  inequal- 
ty  of  possession,  of  the  poor  and  rich,  and  makes 
people  possessionkss  or  propertyless.     Property  is 
withdrawn  from  the  individual  and  surrendered  to 
ghostly  society.     Humane  liberalism  makes  people 
godless,  atheistic.     Therefore  the  individual's  God, 
'my  God,"  must  be  put  an  end  to.     Now  masterless- 
ness  is  indeed  at  the  same  time  freedom  from  service, 
posscssionlessness  at  the  same  time  freedom  from  care, 
ind  godlessness  at  the  same  time  freedom  from  preju- 
dice: for  with  the  master  the  servant  falls  away;  with 
possession,  the  care  about  it;  with  the  firmly-rooted 
God,  prejudice.     But,  since  the  master  rises  again  as 
State,  the  servant  appears  again  as  subject;  since 
possession  becomes  the  property  of  society,  care  is  be- 


190  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

gotten  anew  as  labor ;  and,  since  God  as  Man  becomes 
a  prejudice,  there  arises  a  new  faith,  faith  in  humanity 
or  liberty.     For  the  individual's  God  the  God  of  all, 
viz.,  "Man,"  is  now  exalted  ;  "for  it  is  the  highest 
thing  in  us  all  to  be  man."      But,  as  nobody  can  be- 
come entirely  what  the  idea  "man"  imports,  Man  re- 
mains to  the  individual  a  lofty  other  world,  an  unat- 
tained  supreme  being,  a  God.     But  at  the  same  time 
this  is  the  "  true  God,"  because  he  is  fully  adequate  to 
us, — to  wit,  our  own  "self";  we  ourselves,  but  sepa- 
rated from  us  and  lifted  above  us. 


POSTSCRIPT 

The  foregoing  review  of  "  free  human  criticism  " 
was  written  by  bits  immediately  after  the  appearance 
of  the  books  in  question,  as  was  also  that  which  else- 
where refers  to  writings  of  this  tendency,  and  I  did 
little  more  than  bring  together  the  fragments.     But 
criticism  is  restlessly  pressing  forward,  and  thereby 
makes  it  necessary  for  me  to  come  back  to  it  once 
more,  now  that  my  book  is  finished,  and  insert  this 
concluding  note. 

I  have  before  me  the  latest  (eighth)  number  of  the 
"  Allgemeine  Liter atur-Zeitung"  of  Bruno  Bauer. 

There  again  "  the  general  interests  of  society  " 
stand  at  the  top.     But  criticism  has  reflected,  and 
"  given  this  "  society  "  a  specification  by  which  it  is 
discriminated  from  a  form  which  previously  had  still 
been  confused  with  it:  the  "State,"  in  former  passages 
still  celebrated  as  "free  State,"  is  quite  given  up  be- 
cause it  can  in  no  wise  fulfil  the  task  of  "human 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         191 

society."     Criticism  only  "  saw  itself  compelled  to 
identify  for  a  moment  human  and  political  affairs"  in 
1842;  but  now  it  has  found  that  the  State,  even  as 
"free  State,"  is  not  human  society,  or,  as  it  could 
likewise  say,  that  the  people  is  not  "  man."     We  saw 
how  it  got  through  with  theology  and  showed  clearly 
that  God  sinks  into  dust  before  Man;  we  see  it  now 
come  to  a  clearance  with  politics  in  the  same  way, 
and  show  that  before  Man  peoples  and  nationalities 
fall :  so  we  see  how  it  has  its  explanation  with  Church 
and  State,  declaring  them  both  unhuman,  and  we  shall 
see — for  it  betrays  this  to  us  already — how  it  can  also 
give  proof  that  before  Man  the  "  masses,"  which  it 
even  calls  a  "  spiritual  being,"  appear  worthless.     And 
how  should  the  lesser  "  spiritual  beings  "  be  able  to 
maintain  themselves  before  the  supreme  spirit? 
"  Man  "  casts  down  the  false  idols. 

So  what  the  critic  has  in  view  for  the  present  is  the 
scrutiny  of  the  "  masses,"  which  he  will  place  before 
"  Man  "  in  order  to  combat  them  from  the  standpoint 
of  Man.     "  What  is  now  the  object  of  criticism  ?  " 
"The  masses,  a  spiritual  being! "     These  the  critic 
will  "learn  to  know,"  and  will  find  that  they  are  in 
contradiction  with  Man;  he  will  demonstrate  that 
they  are  unhuman,  and  will  succeed  just  as  well  in 
this  demonstration  as  in  the  former  ones,  that  the 
divine  and  the  national,  or  the  concerns  of  Church 
and  of  State,  were  the  unhuman. 

The  masses  are  defined  as  "the  most  significant 
product  of  the  Revolution,  as  the  deceived  multitude 
which  the  illusions  of  political  Illumination,  and  in 
general  the  entire  Illumination  movement  of  the 


192  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

eighteenth  century,  have  given  over  to  boundless  dis- 
gruntlement."     The  Revolution  satisfied  some  by  its 
result,  and  left  others  unsatisfied;  the  satisfied  part 
is  the  commonalty  (bourgeoisie,  etc.),  the  unsatisfied 
is  the — masses.     Does  not  the  critic,  so  placed,  himself 
belong  to  the  "masses"? 

But  the  unsatisfied  are  still  in  great  mistiness,  and 
their  discontent  utters  itself  only  in  a  "boundless  dis- 
gruntlement."    This  the  likewise  unsatisfied  critic  now 
wants  to  master:  he  cannot  want  and  attain  more 
than  to  bring  that  "spiritual  being,"  the  masses,  out 
of  its  disgruntlement,  and  to  "uplift"  those  who  were 
only  disgruntled,  i.  e.  to  give  them  the  right  attitude 
toward  those  results  of  the  Revolution  which  are  to  be 
overcome; — he  can  become  the  head  of  the  masses, 
their  decided  spokesman.     Therefore  he  wants  also  to 
"  abolish  the  deep  chasm  which  parts  him  from  the 
multitude."     From  those  who  want  to  "  uplift  the 
lower  classes  of  the  people  "  he  is  distinguished  by 
wanting  to  deliver  from  "  disgruntlement,"  not  merely 
these,  but  himself  too. 

But  assuredly  his  consciousness  does  not  deceive 
him  either,  when  he  takes  the  masses  to  be  the 
"  natural  opponents  of  theory,"  and  foresees  that,  "  the 
more  this  theory  shall  develop  itself,  so  much  the  more 
will  it  make  the  masses  compact."      For  the  critic  can- 
not enlighten  or  satisfy  the  masses  with  his  presupposi- 
tion, Man.     If  over  against  the  commonalty  they  are 
only  the  "  lower  classes  of  the  people,"  politically  in- 
significant masses,  over  against  "  Man  "  they  must 
still  more  be  mere  "  masses,"  humanly  insignificant — 
yes,  unhuman — masses,  or  a  multitude  of  un-men. 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  193 

The  critic  clears  away  everything  human;  and, 
starting  from  the  presupposition  that  the  human  is  the 
true,  he  works  against  himself,  denying  it  wherever  it 
had  been  hitherto  found.     He  proves  only  that  the 
human  is  to  be  found  nowhere  except  in  his  head,  but 
the  unhuman  everywhere.     The  unhuman  is  the  real, 
the  extant  on  all  hands,  and  by  the  proof  that  it  is 
"  not  human  "  the  critic  only  enunciates  plainly  the 
tautological  sentence  that  it  is  the  unhuman. 

But  what  if  the  unhuman,  turning  its  back  on  itself 
with  resolute  heart,  should  at  the  same  time  turn 
away  from  the  disturbing  critic  and  leave  him  stand- 
ing, untouched  and  unstung  by  his  remonstrance? 
"  You  call  me  the  unhuman,"  it  might  say  to  him, 
"  and  so  I  really  am — for  you;  but  I  am  so  only  be- 
cause you  bring  me  into  opposition  to  the  human,  and 
I  could  despise  myself  only  so  long  as  I  let  myself  be 
hypnotized  into  this  opposition.     I  was  contemptible 
because  I  sought  my  '  better  self n  outside  me ;  I  was  the 
unhuman  because  I  dreamed  of  the  '  human ' ;  I  re- 
sembled the  pious  who  hunger  for  their  'true  self  and 
always  remain  *  poor  sinners';   I  thought  of  myself 
only  in  comparison  to  another;  enough,  I  was  not  all 
in  all,  was  not — unique.*     But  now  I  cease  to  appear 
to  myself  as  the  unhuman,  cease  to  measure  myself 
and  let  myself  be  measured  by  man,  cease  to  recognize 
anything  above  me:  consequently — adieu,  humane 
critic!      I  only  have  been  the  unhuman,  am  it  now  no 
longer,  but  am  the  unique,  yes,  to  your  loathing,  the 
egoistic;  yet  not  the  egoistic  as  it -lets  itself  be  mea- 


194  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

sured  by  the  human,  humane,  and  unselfish,  but  the 
egoistic  as  the — unique." 

We  have  to  pay  attention  to  still  another  sentence 
of  the  same  number.  "  Criticism  sets  up  no  dogmas, 
and  wants  to  learn  to  know  nothing  but  things." 

The  critic  is  afraid  of  becoming  "  dogmatic  "  or 
setting  up  dogmas.     Of  course :    why,  thereby  he 
would  become  the  opposite  of  the  critic, — the  dogmat- 
ist; he  would  now  become  bad,  as  he  is  good  as  critic, 
or  would  become  from  an  unselfish  man  an  egoist,  etc. 
"  Of  all  things,  no  dogma!  "  this  is  his — dogma.     For 
the  critic  remains  on  one  and  the  same  ground  with 
the  dogmatist, — that  of  thoughts.     Like  the  latter  he 
always  starts  from  a  thought,  but  varies  in  this,  that 
he  never  ceases  to  keep  the  principle-thought  in  the 
process  of  thinking,  and  so  does  not  let  it  become 
stable.      He  only  asserts  the  thought-process  against 
the  thought-faith,  the  progress  of  thinking  against 
stationariness  in  it.     From  criticism  no  thought  is 
safe,  since  criticism  is  thought  or  the  thinking  mind 
itself. 

Therefore  I  repeat  that  the  religious  world — and 
this  is  the  world  of  thoughts — reaches  its  completion 
in  criticism,  where  thinking  extends  its  encroach- 
ments over  every  thought,  no  one  of  which  may 
"  egoistically  "  establish  itself.     Where  would  the 
"purity  of -criticism,"  the  purity  of  thinking,  be  left  if 
even  one  thought  escaped  the  process  of  thinking? 
This  explains  the  fact  that  the  critic  has  even  begun 
already  to  gibe  gently  here  and  there  at  the  thought 
of  Man,  of  humanity  and  humaneness,  because  he  sus- 
pects that  here  a  thought  is  approaching  dogmatic 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  195 

fixity.     But  yet  he  cannot  decompose  this  thought 
till  he  has  found  a — "  higher  "  in  which  it  dissolves ; 
for  he  moves  only — in  thoughts.     This  higher  thought 
might  be  enunciated  as  that  of  the  movement  or  pro- 
cess of  thinking  itself,  i.  e.  as  the  thought  of  thinking 
or  of  criticism. 

Freedom  of  thinking  has  in  fact  become  complete 
hereby,  freedom  of  mind  celebrates  its  triumph :  for 
the  individual,  "egoistic"  thoughts  have  lost  their 
dogmatic  truculence.     There  is  nothing  left  but  the — 
dogma  of  free  thinking  or  of  criticism. 

Against  everything  that  belongs  to  the  world  ol 
thought,  criticism  is  in  the  right,  i.  e.  in  might:  it  is 
the  victor.     Criticism,  and  criticism  alone,  is  "  up  to 
date."     From  the  standpoint  of  thought  there  is  no 
power  capable  of  being  an  overmatch  for  criticism's, 
and  it  is  a  pleasure  to  see  how  easily  and  sportively 
this  dragon  swallows  all  other  serpents  of  thought. 
Each  serpent  twists,  to  be  sure,  but  criticism  crushes  it 
in  all  its  "  turns." 

I  am  no  opponent  of  criticism,  i.  e.  I  am  no  dog- 
matist, and  do  not  feel  myself  touched  by  the  critic's 
tooth  with  which  he  tears  the  dogmatist  to  pieces.     If 
I  were  a  "  dogmatist,"  I  should  place  at  the  head  a 
dogma,  i.  e.  a  thought,  an  idea,  a  principle,  and 
should  complete  this  as  a  "  systematist,"  spinning  it 
out  to  a  system,  i.  e.  a.  structure  of  thought.     Con- 
versely, if  I  were  a  critic,  viz.,  an  opponent  of  the 
dogmatist,  I  should  carry  on  the  fight  of  free  thinking 
against  the  enthralling  thought,  I  should  defend 
thinking  against  what  was  thought.     But  I  am  neither 
the  champion  of  a  thought  nor  the  champion  of  think- 


196  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ing;  for  "  I,"  from  whom  I  start,  am  not  a  thought, 
nor  do  I  consist  in  thinking.     Against  me,  the  un- 
nameable,  the  realm  of  thoughts,  thinking,  and  mind 
is  shattered. 

Criticism  is  the  possessed  man's  fight  against  pos- 
session as  such,  against  all  possession:  a  fight  which  is 
founded  in  the  consciousness  that  everywhere  posses- 
sion, or,  as  the  critic  calls  it,  a  religious  and  theologi- 
cal attitude,  is  extant.      He  knows  that  people  stand 
in  a  religious  or  believing  attitude  not  only  toward 
God,  but  toward  other  ideas  as  well,  like  right,  the 
State,  law,  etc.;  i.  e.  he  recognizes  possession  in  all 
places.     So  he  wants  to  break  up  thoughts  by  think- 
ing; but  I  say,  only  thoughtlessness  really  saves  me 
from  thoughts.     It  it  not  thinking,  but  my  thought- 
lessness, or  I  the  unthinkable,  incomprehensible,  that 
frees  me  from  possession. 

A  jerk  does  me  the  service  of  the  most  anxious 
thinking,  a  stretching  of  the  limbs  shakes  off  the  tor- 
ment of  thoughts,  a  leap  upward  hurls  from  my  breast 
the  nightmare  of  the  religious  world,  a  jubilant  Hoop- 
la throws  off  year-long  burdens.      But  the  monstrous 
significance  of  unthinking  jubilation  could  not  be 
recognized  in  the  long  night  of  thinking  and 
believing. 

"  What  clumsiness  and  frivolity,  to  want  to  solve 
the  most  difficult  problems,  acquit  yourself  of  the 
most  comprehensive  tasks,  by  a  breaking  off!"" 

But  have  you  tasks  if  you  do  not  set  them  to  your- 
self ?     So  long  as  you  set  them,  you  will  not  give 
them  up,  and  I  certainly  do  not  care  if  you  think, 
and,  thinking,  create  a  thousand  thoughts.     But  you 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW  197 

who  have  set  the  tasks,  are  you  not  to  be  able  to  upset 
them  again?      Must  you  be  bound  to  these  tasks,  and 
must  they  become  absolute  tasks? 

To  cite  only  one  thing,  the  government  has  been 
disparaged  on  account  of  its  resorting  to  forcible 
means  against  thoughts,  interfering  against  the  press 
by  means  of  the  police  power  of  the  censorship,  and 
making  a  personal  fight  out  of  a  literary  one.     As  if 
it  were  solely  a  matter  of  thoughts,  and  as  if  one's 
attitude  toward  thoughts  must  be  unselfish,  self- 
denying,  and  self-sacrificing!      Do  not  those  thoughts 
attack  the  governing  parties  themselves,  and  so  call 
out  egoism  ?      And  do  the  thinkers  not  set  before  the 
attacked  ones  the  religious  demand  to  reverence  the 
power  of  thought,  of  ideas?     They  are  to  succumb 
voluntarily  and  resignedly,  because  the  divine  power 
of  thought,  Minerva,  fights  on  their  enemies'  side. 
Why,  that  would  be  an  act  of  possession,  a  religious 
sacrifice.     To  be  sure,  the  governing  parties  are  them- 
selves held  fast  in  a  religious  bias,  and  follow  the  lead- 
ing power  of  an  idea  or  a  faith;  but  they  are  at  the 
same  time  unconfessed  egoists,  and  right  here,  against 
the  enemy,  their  pent-up  egoism  breaks  loose:  pos- 
sessed in  their  faith,  they  are  at  the  same  time  unpos- 
sessed by  their  opponents'  faith,  i.  e.  they  are  egoists 
toward  this.     If  one  wants  to  make  them  a  reproach, 
it  could  only  be  the  converse, — to  wit,  that  they  are 
possessed  by  their  ideas. 

Against  thoughts  no  egoistic  power  is  to  appear,  no 
police  power  and  the  like.     So  the  believers  in  think- 
ing believe.      But  thinking  and  its  thoughts  are  not 
sacred  to  me,  and  I  defend  my  skin  against  them  as 


198  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

against  other  things.     That  may  be  an  unreasonable 
defence;  but,  if  I  am  in  duty  bound  to  reason,  then  I, 
like  Abraham,  must  sacrifice  my  dearest  to  it! 

In  the  kingdom  of  thought,  which,  like  that  of 
faith,  is  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  every  one  is  assuredly 
wrong  who  uses  unthinking  force,  just  as  every  one  is 
wrong  who  in  the  kingdom  of  love  behaves  unlov- 
ingly,  or,  although  he  is  a  Christian  and  therefore 
lives  in  the  kingdom  of  love,  yet  acts  unchristianly ; 
in  these  kingdoms,  to  which  he  supposes  himself  to  be- 
long though  he  nevertheless  throws  off  their  laws,  he 
is  a  "sinner"  or  "egoist."     But  it  is  only  when  he  be- 
comes a  criminal  against  these  kingdoms  that  he  can 
throw  off  their  dominion. 

Here  too  the  result  is  this,  that  the  fight  of  the 
thinkers  against  the  government  is  indeed  in  the  right, 
viz.,  in  might, — so  far  as  it  is  carried  on  against 
the  government's  thoughts  (the  government  is  dumb, 
and  does  not  succeed  in  making  any  literary  rejoinder 
to  speak  of),  but  is,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  wrong, 
viz.,  in  impotence,  so  far  as  it  does  not  succeed  in 
bringing  into  the  field  anything  but  thoughts  against 
a  personal  power  (the  egoistic  power  stops  the 
mouths  of  the  thinkers).     The  theoretical  fight  can- 
not complete  the  victory,  and  the  sacred  power  of 
thought  succumbs  to  the  might  of  egoism.     Only  the 
egoistic  fight,  the  fight  of  egoists  on  both  sides,  clears 
up  everything. 

This  last  now,  to  make  thinking  an  affair  of  egoistic 
option,  an  affair  of  the  single  person,*  a  mere  pas- 

*  [des  Einzigen] 


MEN  OF  THE  OLD  TIME  AND  THE  NEW         199 

time  or  hobby  as  it  were,  and  to  take  from  it  the  im- 
portance of  "  being  the  last  decisive  power"  ;  this 
degradation  and  desecration  of  thinking;  this  equali- 
zation of  the  unthinking  and  thoughtful  ego;  this 
clumsy  but  real  "equality," — criticism  is  not  able  to 
produce,  because  it  itself  is  only  the  priest  of  thinking, 
and  sees  nothing  beyond  thinking  but — the  deluge. 

Criticism  does  indeed  affirm,  e.  g.,  that  free  criti- 
cism may  overcome  the  State,  but  at  the  same  time  it 
defends  itself  against  the  reproach  which  is  laid  upon 
it  by  the  State  government,  that  it  is  "  self-will  and 
impudence  ";  it  thinks,  then,  that  "  self-will  and  im- 
pudence "  may  not  overcome,  it  alone  may.     The 
truth  is  rather  the  reverse:  the  State  can  be  really 
overcome  only  by  impudent  self-will. 

It  may  now,  to  conclude  with  this,  be  clear  that 
in  the  critic's  new  change  of  front  he  has  not  trans- 
formed himself,  but  only  "  made  good  an  oversight," 
"  disentangled  a  subject, "  and  is  saying  too  much 
when  he  speaks  of  "  criticism  criticising  itself":  it,  or 
rather  he,  has  only  criticised  its  "oversight"  and 
cleared  it  of  its  "  inconsistencies."      If  he  wanted  to 
criticise  criticism,  he  would  have  to  look  and  see  if 
there  was  anything  in  its  presupposition. 

I  on  my  part  start  from  a  presupposition  in  presup- 
posing my.telf;  but  my  presupposition  does  not 
struggle  for  its  perfection  like  "  Man  struggling  for 
his  perfection,"  but  only  serves  me  to  enjoy  it  and 
consume  it.     I  consume  my  presupposition,  and  noth- 
ing else,  and  exist  only  in  consuming  it.     But  that 
presupposition  is  therefore  not  a  presupposition  at  all: 
for.  as  I  am  the  Unique,  I  know  nothing  of  the  dual- 


200  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ity  of  a  presupposing  and  a  presupposed  ego  (an  "  in- 
complete "  and  a  'e  complete  "  ego  or  man) ;  but  this, 
that  I  consume  myself,  means  only  that  I  am.     I  do 
not  presuppose  myself,  because  I  am  every  moment 
just  positing  or  creating  myself,  and  am  I  only  by  be- 
ing not  presupposed  but  posited,  and,  again,  posited 
only  in  the  moment  when  I  posit  myself;  i.  e.,  I  am 
creator  and  creature  in  one. 

If  the  presuppositions  that  have  hitherto  been  cur- 
rent are  to  melt  away  in  a  full  dissolution,  they  must 
not  be  dissolved  into  a  higher  presupposition  again, — 
i.  e.  a  thought,  or  thinking  itself,  criticism.     For  that 
dissolution  is  to  be  for  my  good;  otherwise  it  would 
belong  only  in  the  series  of  the  innumerable  dissolu-    | 
tions  which,  in  favor  of  others,  (e.  g.  this  very  Man, 
God,  the  State,  pure  morality,  etc.),  declared  old 
truths  to  be  untruths  and  did  away  with  long- 
fostered  presuppositions. 


Part  Second 


At  the  entrance  of  the  modern  time  stands  the  "  God-man." 
At  its  exit  will  only  the  God  in  the  God-man  evaporate  ?  and  can 
the  God-man  really  die  if  only  the  God  in  him  dies  ?     They  did 
not  think  of  this  question,  and  thought  they  were  through  when 
in  our  days  they  brought  to  a  victorious  end  the  work  of  the 
Illumination,  the  vanquishing  of  God;  they  did  not  notice  that 
Man  has  killed  God  in  order  to  become  now — "  sole  God  on 
high."     The  other  world  outside  u$  is  indeed  brushed  away, 
and  the  great  undertaking  of  the  Illuminators  completed ;  but  the 
other  world  in  us  has  become  a  new  heaven  and  calls  us  forth  to 
renewed  heaven-storming :  God  has  had  to  give  place,  yet  not  to 
us,  but  to — Man.     How  can  you  believe  that  the  God-man  is 
dead  before  the  Man  in  him,  besides  the  God,  is  dead? 


I 
OWNNESS  * 

"  Does  not  the  spirit  thirst  for  freedom?" — Alas, 
not  my  spirit  alone,  my  body  too  thirsts  for  it  hourly ! 
When  before  the  odorous  castle-kitchen  my  nose  tells 
my  palate  of  the  savory  dishes  that  are  being  prepared 
therein,  it  feels  a  fearful  pining  at  its  dry  bread; 
when  my  eyes  tell  the  hardened  back  about  soft  down 
on  which  one  may  lie  more  delightfully  than  on  its 
compressed  straw,  a  suppressed  rage  seizes  it;   when 
— but  let  us  not  follow  the  pains  further. — And  you 
call  that  a  longing  for  freedom?      What  do  you  want 
to  become  free  from,  then?      From  your  hardtack  and 
your  straw  bed  ?     Then  throw  them  away !  — But 
that  seems  not  to  serve  you:  you  want  rather  to  have 
the  freedom  to  enjoy  delicious  foods  and  downy  beds. 
Are  men  to  give  you  this  "  freedom," — are  they  to 
permit  it  to  you?      You  do  not  hope  that  from 
their  philanthropy,  because  you  know  they  all  think 


*  [This  is  a  literal  translation  of  the  German  word  Eigenheit.  which,  with 
its  primitive  eigen,  "  own,"  is  used  in  this  chapter  in  a  way  that  the  Ger- 
man dictionaries  do  not  quite  recognize.    The  author's  conception  being 
new,  he  had  to  make  an  innovation  in  the  German  language  to  express  it. 
The  translator  is  under  the  like  necessity.    In  most  passages  "  self-owner- 
ship." or  else  "  personality,"  would  translate  the  word,  but  there  are  some 
where  the  thought  is  so  eigen,  that  is,  so  peculiar  or  so  thoroughly  the 
author's  otrti,  that  no  English  word  I  can  think  of  would  express  it.     It  will 
explain  itself  to  one  who  has  rend  Part  First  intelligently.] 


204  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

like — you:  each  is  the  nearest  to  himself  !      How, 
therefore,  do  you  mean  to  come  to  the  enjoyment  of 
those  foods  and  beds?      Evidently  not  otherwise  than 
in  making  them  your  property! 

If  you  think  it  over  rightly,  you  do  not  want  the 
freedom  to  have  all  these  fine  things,  for  with  this 
freedom  you  still  do  not  have  them ;  you  want  really 
to  have  them,  to  call  them  yours  and  possess  them  as 
your  property.     Of  what  use  is  a  freedom  to  you,  in- 
deed, if  it  brings  in  nothing?      And,  if  you  became 
free  from  everything,  you  would  no  longer  have  any- 
thing; for  freedom  is  empty  of  substance.     Whoso 
knows  not  how  to  make  use  of  it,  for  him  it  has  no 
value  this  useless  permission;  but  how  I  make  use  of 
it  depends  on  my  personality.* 

I  have  no  objection  to  freedom,  but  I  wish  more 
than  freedom  for  you:  you  should  not  merely  be  rid 
of  what  you  do  not  want,  you  should  also  have  what 
you  want;  you  should  not  only  be  a  "  freeman,"  you 
should  be  an  "  owner  "  too. 

Free — from  what?      Oh!  what  is  there  that  cannot 
be  shaken  off  ?     The  yoke  of  serfdom,  of  sovereignty, 
of  aristocracy  and  princes,  the  dominion  of  the  desires 
and  passions;  yes,  even  the  dominion  of  one's  own 
will,  of  self-will,  for  the  completest  self-denial  is 
nothing  but  freedom — freedom,  to  wit,  from  self- 
determination,  from  one's  own  self.     And  the  craving 
for  freedom  as  for  something  absolute,  worthy  of  every 
praise,  deprived  us  of  ownness:  it  created  self-denial. 
However,  the  freer  I  become,  the  more  compulsion 

*  [EigenkeU] 


OWNNESS  205 

piles  up  before  my  eyes;  and  the  more  impotent  I  feel 
myself.     The  unfree  son  of  the  wilderness  does  not  yet 
feel  anything  of  all  the  limits  that  crowd  a  civilized 
man :  he  seems  to  himself  freer  than  this  latter.      In 
the  measure  that  I  conquer  freedom  for  myself  I  create 
for  myself  new  bounds  and  new  tasks :  if  I  have  in- 
vented railroads,  I  feel  myself  weak  again  because  I 
cannot  yet  sail  through  the  skies  like  the  bird  ;  and,  if 
I  have  solved  a  problem  whose  obscurity  disturbed  my 
mind,  at  once  there  await  me  innumerable  others, 
whose  perplexities  impede  my  progress,  dim  my  free 
gaze,  make  the  limits  of  my  freedom  painfully  sensible 
to  me.      "  Now  that  you  have  become  free  from  sin, 
you  have  become  servants  of  righteousness."*     Repub- 
licans in  their  broad  freedom,  do  they  not  become 
servants  of  the  law?      How  true  Christian  hearts  at  all 
times  longed  to  "  become  free,"  how  they  pined  to  see 
themselves  delivered  from  the  "  bonds  of  this  earth- 
life"!  they  looked  out  toward  the  land  of  freedom. 
("The  Jerusalem  that  is  above  is  the  freewoman  ;  she 
is  the  mother  of  us  all."     Gal.  4.  26.) 

Being  free  from  anything — -means  only  being  clear 
or  rid.     "  He  is  free  from  headache"  is  equal  to  "he 
is  rid  of  it."     "  He  is  free  from  this  prejudice"  is 
equal  to  "  he  has  never  conceived  it"  or  "he  has  got 
rid  of  it."     In  "less"  we  complete  the  freedom  recom- 
mended by  Christianity,  in  sinless,  godless,  morality- 
less,  etc. 

Freedom  is  the  doctrine  of  Christianity.     "  Ye,  dear 
brethren,  are  called  to  freedom. "f     "So  speak  and  so 

*  Rom.  6.  18.  t  1  Pet.  2.  16. 


206  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

do,  as  those  who  are  to  be  judged  by  the  law  of 
freedom."* 

Must  we  then,  because  freedom  betrays  itself  as  a 
Christian  ideal,  give  it  up?      No,  nothing  is  to  be  lost, 
freedom  no  more  than  the  rest ;  but  it  is  to  become 
our  own,  and  in  the  form  of  freedom  it  cannot. 

What  a  difference  between  freedom  and  ownness  ! 
One  can  get  rid  of  a  great  many  things,  one  yet  does 
not  get  rid  of  all ;  one  becomes  free  from  much,  not 
from  everything.     Inwardly  one  may  be  free  in  spite 
of  the  condition  of  slavery,  although,  too,  it  is  again 
only  from  all  sorts  of  things,  not  from  everything  ; 
but  from  the  whip,  the  domineering  temper,  etc.,  of 
the  master,  one  does  not  as  slave  becomeyra'.     "  Free- 
dom lives  only  in  the  realm  of  dreams  !  "     Ownness, 
on  the  contrary,  is  my  whole  being  and  existence,  it  is 
I  myself.      I  am  free  from  what  I  am  rid  of,  owner  of 
what  I  have  in  my  power  or  what  I  control.     My  own 
I  am  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances,  if  I 
know  how  to  have  myself  and  do  not  throw  myself 
away  on  others.     To  be  free  is  something  that  I  can- 
not truly  will,  because  I  cannot  make  it,  cannot  create 
it:  I  can  only  wish  it  and — aspire  toward  it,  for  it  re- 
mains an  ideal,  a  spook.     The  fetters  of  reality  cut 
the  sharpest  welts  in  my  flesh  every  moment.      But  my 
own  I  remain.      Given  up  as  serf  to  a  master,  I  think 
only  of  myself  and  my  advantage  ;  his  blows  strike  me 
indeed,  I  am  not  free  from  them  ;  but  I  endure  them 
only  for  my  benefit,  perhaps  in  order  to  deceive  him 
and  make  him  secure  by  the  semblance  of  patience,  or, 


OWNNESS  207 

again,  not  to  draw  worse  upon  myself  by  contumacy. 
But,  as  I  keep  my  eye  on  myself  and  my  selfishness,  I 
take  by  the  forelock  the  first  good  opportunity  to 
trample  the  slaveholder  into  the  dust.     That  I  then 
facomefree  from  him  and  his  whip  is  only  the  conse- 
quence of  my  antecedent  egoism.      Here  one  perhaps 
says  I  was  "  free  "  even  in  the  condition  of  slavery, — 
to  wit,  "intrinsically"  or  "inwardly."      But  "intrinsi- 
cally free  "  is  not  "  really  free,"  and  "  inwardly  "  is 
not  "outwardly."     I  was  own,  on  the  other  hand,  my 
own,  altogether,  inwardly  and  outwardly.      Under  the 
dominion  of  a  cruel  master  my  body  is  not  "free" 
from  torments  and  lashes ;  but  it  is  my  bones  that 
moan  under  the  torture,  my  fibres  that  quiver  under 
the  blows,  and  /  moan  because  my  body  moans. 
That  /  sigh  and  shiver  proves  that  I  have  not  yet  lost 
myself ,  that  I  am  still  my  own.     My  leg- is  not  "free" 
from  the  master's  stick,  but  it  is  my  leg  and  is  insepa- 
rable.     Let  him  tear  it  off  me  and  look  and  see  if  he 
still  has  my  leg!      He  retains  in  his  hand  nothing  but 
the — corpse  of  my  leg,  which  is  as  little  my  leg  as  a 
dead  dog  is  still  a  dog:  a  dog  has  a  pulsating  heart,  a 
so-called  dead  dog  has  none  and  is  therefore  no  longer 
a  <!(><>;. 

If  one  opines  that  a  slave  may  yet  be  inwardly  free, 
he  says  in  fact  only  the  most  indisputable  and  trivial 
thing.     For  who  is  going  to  assert  that  any  man  is 
wholly  without  freedom?      If  I  am  an  eye-servant,  can 
I  therefore  not  be  free  from  innumerable  things,  e.  g. 
from  faith  in  Zeus,  from  the  desire  for  fame,  and  the 
like?      Why  then  should  not  a  whipped  slave  also  be 
able  to  be  inwardly  free  from  unchristian  sentiments, 


208  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

from  hatred  of  his  enemy,  etc.  ?      He  then  has  "  Chris- 
tian freedom,"  is  rid  of  the  unchristian  ;  but  has  he 
absolute  freedom,  freedom  from  everything,  e.  g.  from 
the  Christian  delusion,  or  from  bodily  pain,  etc.? 

In  the  meantime,  all  this  seems  to  be  said  more 
against  names  than  against  the  thing.      But  is  the 
name  indifferent,  and  has  not  a  word,  a  shibboleth, 
always  inspired  and — fooled  men?      Yet  between 
freedom  and  ownness  there  lies  still  a  deeper  chasm 
than  the  mere  difference  of  the  words. 

All  the  world  desires  freedom,  all  long  for  its  reign 
to  come.     O  enchantingly  beautiful  dream  of  a 
blooming  "  reign  of  freedom,"  a  "  free  human  race  "! 
— who  has  not  dreamed  it?      So  men  shall  become 
free,  entirely  free,  free  from  all  constraint!      From  all 
constraint,  really  from  all?      Are  they  never  to  put 
constraint  on  themselves  any  more?      "Oh  yes,  that, 
of  course;  don't  you  see,  that  is  no  constraint  at  all?" 
Well,  then  at  any  rate  they  are  to  become  free  from 
religious  faith,  from  the  strict  duties  of  morality, 
from  the  inexorability  of  the  law,  from — "  What  a 
fearful  misunderstanding!"     Well,  what  are  they 
to  be  free  from  then,  and  what  not? 

The  lovely  dream  is  dissipated;  awakened,  one  rubs 
his  half-opened  eyes  and  stares  at  the  prosaic  ques- 
tioner.    "  What  men  are  to  be  free  from?" — From 
blind  credulity,  cries  one.     What's  that?  exclaims  an- 
other, all  faith  is  blind  credulity;  they  must  become 
free  from  all  faith.     No,  no,  for  God's  sake, — inveighs 
the  first  again, — do  not  cast  all  faith  from  you,  else 
the  power  of  brutality  breaks  in.     We  must  have  the 
republic, — a  third  makes  himself  heard, — and  be- 


OWNNESS  209 

come — free  from  all  commanding  lords.    There  is  no 
help  in  that,  says  a  fourth:  we  only  get  a  new  lord 
then,  a  "  dominant  majority  " ;  let  us  rather  free  our- 
selves from  this  dreadful  inequality. — O  hapless 
equality,  already  I  hear  your  plebeian  roar  again! 
How  I  had  dreamed  so  beautifully  just  now  of  a  para- 
dise of 'freedom,  and  what — impudence  and  licentious- 
ness now  raises  its  wild  clamor!      Thus  the  first  la- 
ments, and  gets  on  his  feet  to  grasp  the  sword  against 
"  unmeasured  freedom."    Soon  we  no  longer  hear  any- 
thing but  the  clashing  of  the  swords  of  the  disagreeing 
dreamers  of  freedom. 

What  the  craving  for  freedom  has  always  come  to 
has  been  the  desire  for  a  particular  freedom,  e.  g. 
freedom  of  faith;  i.  e.,  the  believing  man  wanted  to  be 
free  and  independent;  of  what?  of  faith  perhaps?  no! 
but  of  the  inquisitors  of  faith.     So  now  "  political  or 
civil "  freedom.     The  citizen  wants  to  become  free  not 
from  citizenhood,  but  from  bureaucracy,  the  arbitrari- 
ness of  princes,  and  the  like.     Prince  Metternich  once 
said  he  had  "  found  a  way  that  was  adapted  to  guide 
men  in  the  path  of  genuine  freedom  for  all  the 
future."     The  Count  of  Provence  ran  away  from 
France  precisely  at  the  time  when  she  was  preparing 
the  "  reign  of  freedom,"  and  said:  "  My  imprison- 
ment had  become  intolerable  to  me;  I  had  only  one 
passion,  the  desire  for— freedom ;  I  thought  only  of  it." 

The  craving  for  a  particular  freedom  always  in- 
cludes the  purpose  of  a  new  dominion,  as  it  was  with 
the  Revolution,  which  indeed  "could  give  its  de- 
fenders the  uplifting  feeling  that  they  were  fighting 
for  freedom,"  but  in  truth  only  because  they  were 


910  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

after  a  particular  freedom,  therefore  a  new  domtmon, 
the  "  dominion  of  the  law." 

Freedom  you  all  want,  you  want  freedom.     Why 
then  do  you  higgle  over  a  more  or  less?     Freedom  can 
only  be  the  whole  of  freedom ;  a  piece  of  freedom  is 
notfreedom.     You  despair  of  the  possibility  of  ob- 
taining the  whole  of  freedom,  freedom  from  every- 
thing,— yes,  you  consider  it  insanity  even  to  wish 
this? — Well,  then  leave  off  chasing  after  the  phantom, 
and  spend  your  pains  on  something  better  than  the — 
unattainable. 

"  Ah,  but  there  is  nothing  better  than  freedom !  " 
What  have  you  then  when  you  have  freedom,  viz., 
— for  I  will  not  speak  here  of  your  piecemeal  bits  of 
freedom, — complete  freedom?     Then  you  are  rid  of 
everything  that  embarrasses  you,  everything,  and 
there  is  probably  nothing  that  does  not  once  in 
your  life  embarrass  you  and  cause  you  inconvenience. 
And  for  whose  sake,  then,  did  you  want  to  be  rid  of 
it?      Doubtlessybr  your  sake,  because  it  is  in  your 
way!      But,  if  something  were  not  inconvenient  to 
you;  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  were  quite  to  your  mind 
(e.  g.  the  gently  but  irresistibly  commanding  look  of 
your  loved  one), — then  you  would  not  want  to  be  rid 
of  it  and  free  from  it.     Why  not?     For  your  sake 
again !      So  you  take  yourselves  as  measure  and  judge 
over  all.     You  gladly  let  freedom  go  when  unfreedom, 
the  "  sweet  service  of  love, "  suits  you ;  and  you  take 
up  your  freedom  again  on  occasion  when  it  begins 
to  suit  you  better, — that  is,  supposing,  which  is  not 
the  point  here,  that  you  are  not  afraid  of  such  a  Re- 
peal of  the  Union  for  other  (perhaps  religious)  reasons. 


OWNNESS  211 

Why  will  you  not  take  courage  now  to  really  make 
yourselves  the  central  point  and  the  main  thing  alto- 
gether?     Why  grasp  in  the  air  at  freedom,  your 
dream?      Are  you  your  dream?      Do  not  begin  by  in- 
quiring of  your  dreams,  your  notions,  your  thoughts, 
for  that  is  all  "hollow  theory."     Ask  yourselves  and 
ask  after  yourselves — that  is  practical,  and  you  know 
you  want  very  much  to  be  "  practical."     But  there  the 
one  hearkens  what  his  God  (of  course  what  he  thinks 
of  at  the  name  God  is  his  God)  may  be  going  to  say 
to  it,  and  another  what  his  moral  feelings,  his  con- 
science, his  feeling  of  duty,  may  determine  about  it, 
and  a  third  calculates  what  folks  will  think  of  it, — 
and,  when  each  has  thus  asked  his  Lord  God  (folks 
are  a  Lord  God  just  as  good  as,  nay,  even  more  com- 
pact than,  the  other-worldly  and  imaginary  one: 
vox  populi,  vox  dei),  then  he  accommodates  himself  to 
his  Lord's  will  and  listens  no  more  at  all  for  what  he 
hhnwlf  would  like  to  say  and  decide. 

Therefore  turn  to  yourselves  rather  than  to  your 
gods  or  idols.     Bring  out  from  yourselves  what  is  in 
you,  bring  it  to  the  light,  bring  yourselves  to 
revelation. 

How  one  acts  only  from  himself,  and  asks  after  noth- 
ing further,  the  Christians  have  realized  in  the  notion 
"  God."      He  acts  "  as  it  pleases  him."      And  foolish 
man,  who  could  do  just  so,  is  to  act  as  it  "  pleases 
God"  instead. — If  it  is  said  that  even  God  proceeds 
according  to  eternal  laws,  that  too  fits  me,  since  I  too 
cannot  get  out  of  my  skin,  but  have  my  law  in  my 
whole  nature,  i.  e.  in  myself. 

But  one  needs  only  admonish  you  of  yourselves  to 


212  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

bring  you  to  despair  at  once.     "  What  am  I?"  each 
of  you  asks  himself.     An  abyss  of  lawless  and  unregu- 
lated impulses,  desires,  wishes,  passions,  a  chaos  with- 
out light  or  guiding  star!      How  am  I  to  obtain  a 
correct  answer,  if,  without  regard  to  God's  command- 
ments or  to  the  duties  which  morality  prescribes,  with- 
out regard  to  the  voice  of  reason,  which  in  the  course 
of  history,  after  bitter  experiences,  has  exalted  the 
best  and  most  reasonable  thing  into  law,  I  simply 
appeal  to  myself?      My  passion  would  advise  me  to  do 
the  most  senseless  thing  possible. — Thus  each  deems 
himself  the — devil;  for,  if,  so  far  as  he  is  unconcerned 
about  religion,  etc.,  he  only  deemed  himself  a  beast, 
he  would  easily  find  that  the  beast,  which  does  follow 
only  its  impulse  (as  it  were,  its  advice),  does  not  advise 
and  impel  itself  to  do  the  "  most  senseless  "  things,  but 
takes  very  correct  steps.     But  the  habit  of  the  re- 
ligious way  of  thinking  has  biased  our  mind  so  griev- 
ously that  we  are — terrified  at  ourselves  in  our  naked- 
ness and  naturalness;  it  has  degraded  us  so  that  we 
deem  ourselves  depraved  by  nature,  born  devils.     Of 
course  it  comes  into  your  head  at  once  that  your 
calling  requires  you  to  do  the  "  good,"  the  moral, 
the  right.     Now,  if  you  ask  yourselves  what  is  to  be 
done,  how  can  the  right  voice  sound  forth  from  you, 
the  voice  which  points  the  way  of  the  good,  the  right, 
the  true,  etc.?      What  concord  have  God  and  Belial? 
But  what  would  you  think  if  one  answered  you  by 
saying:  "That  one  is  to  listen  to  God,  conscience, 
duties,  laws,  etc.,  is  flim-flam  with  which  people  have 
stuffed  your  head  and  heart  and  made  you  crazy  "? 
And  if  he  asked  you  how  it  is  that  you  know  so  surely 


OWNNESS  213 

that  the  voice  of  nature  is  a  seducer?      And  if  he  even 
demanded  of  you  to  turn  the  thing  about  and  actually 
to  deem  the  voice  of  God  and  conscience  to  be  the 
devil's  work?     There  are  such  graceless  men  ;  how 
will  you  settle  them?      You  cannot  appeal  to  your 
parsons,  parents,  and  good  men,  for  precisely  these  are 
designated  by  them  as  your  seducers,  as  the  true  se- 
ducers and  corrupters  of  youth,  who  busily  sow  broad- 
cast the  tares  of  self-contempt  and  reverence  to  God, 
who  fill  young  hearts  with  mud  and  young  heads  with 
stupidity. 

But  now  those  people  go  on  and  ask:  For  whose 
sake  do  you  care  about  God's  and  the  other  command- 
ments?     You  surely  do  not  suppose  that  this  is  done 
merely  out  of  complaisance  toward  God  ?      No,  you 
are  doing  it— -for  your  sake  again. — Here  too,  there- 
fore, you  are  the  main  thing,  and  each  must  say  to 
himself,  /  am  everything  to  myself  and  I  do  every- 
thing on  my  account.     If  it  ever  became  clear  to  you 
that  God,  the  commandments,  etc.,  only  harm  you, 
that  they  reduce  and  ruin  you,  to  a  certainty  you 
would  throw  them  from  you  just  as  the  Christians  once 
condemned  Apollo  or  Minerva  or  heathen  morality. 
They  did  indeed  put  in  the  place  of  these  Christ  and 
afterward  Mary,  as  well  as  a  Christian  morality;  but 
they  did  this  for  the  sake  of  their  souls'  welfare  too, 
therefore  out  of  egoism  or  ownness. 

And  it  was  by  this  egoism,  this  ownness,  that  they 
got  rid  of  the  old  world  of  gods  and  became^m? 
from  it.     Ownness  created  a  new  freedom;  for  ownness 
is  the  creator  of  everything,  as  genius  (a  definite 
ownness),  which  is  always  originality,  has  for  a  long 


2U  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

time  already  been  looked  upon  as  the  creator  of  new 
productions  that  have  a  place  in  the  history  of  the 
world. 

If  your  efforts  are  ever  to  make  "  freedom  "  the 
issue,  then  exhaust  freedom's  demands.     Who  is  it 
that  is  to  become  free?     You,  I,  we.     Free  from  what? 
From  everything  that  is  not  you,  not  I,  not  we.     I, 
therefore,  am  the  kernel  that  is  to  be  delivered  from 
all  wrappings  and — freed  from  all  cramping  shells. 
What  is  left  when  I  have  been  freed  from  everything 
that  is  not  I?      Only  I;  nothing  but  I.      But  freedom 
has  nothing  to  offer  to  this  I  himself.     As  to  what  is 
now  to  happen  further  after  I  have  become  free,  free- 
dom is  silent, — as  our  governments,  when  the  pris- 
oner's time  is  up,  merely  let  him  go,  thrusting  him 
into  abandonment. 

Now  why,  if  freedom  is  striven  after  for  love  of  the 
.1  after  all, — why  not  choose  the  I  himself  as  beginning, 
middle,  and  end?      Am  I  not  worth  more  than  free- 
dom?     Is  it  not  I  that  make  myself  free,  am  not  I  the 
first?      Even  unfree,  even  laid  in  a  thousand  fetters,  I 
yet  am;  and  I  am  not,  like  freedom,  extant  only  in 
the  future  and  in  hopes,  but  even  as  the  most  abject  of 
slaves  I  am — present. 

Think  that  over  well,  and  decide  whether  you  will 
place  on  your  banner  the  dream  of  "  freedom"  or  the 
resolution  of  "  egoism,"  of  "  ownness."     "  Freedom  " 
awakens  your  rage  against  everything  that  is  not 
you;  "egoism"  calls  you  to  joy  over  yourselves,  to 
self-enjoyment;  "freedom  "  is  and  remains  a  longing, 
a  romantic  plaint,  a  Christian  hope  for  unearthliness 
and  futurity  ;  "  ownness  "  is  a  reality,  which  of  it. fe  If 


OWNNESS  915 

removes  just  so  much  unfreedom  as  by  barring  your 
own  way  hinders  you.     What  does  not  disturb  you, 
you  will  not  want  to  renounce  ;  and,  if  it  begins  to 
disturb  you,  why,  you  know  that  "  you  must  obey 
yourselves  rather  than  men!  " 

Freedom  teaches  only:  Get  yourselves  rid,  relieve 
yourselves,  of  everything  burdensome  ;  it  does  not 
teach  you  who  you  yourselves  are.     Rid,  rid!  so 
rings  its  rallying-cry,  and  you,  eagerly  following  its 
call,  get  rid  even  of  yourselves,  "  deny  yourselves." 
But  ownness  calls  you  back  to  yourselves,  it  says 
"  Come  to  yourself !  "     Under  the  aegis  of  freedom 
you  get  rid  of  many  kinds  of  things,  but  something 
new  pinches  you  again:    "you  are  rid  of  the  Evil  One; 
evil  is  left."*    As  own  you  are  really  rid  of  everything, 
and  what  clings  to  you  you  have  accepted ;  it  is  your 
choice  and  your  pleasure.     The  own  man  is  the  free- 
born,  the  man  free  to  begin  with  ;  the  free  man,  on 
the  contrary,  is  only  the  eleutheromaniac,  the  dreamer 
and  enthusiast. 

The  former  is  originally  free,  because  he  recognizes 
nothing  but  himself;  he  does  not  need  to  free  himself 
first,  because  at  the  start  he  rejects  everything  outside 
himself,  because  he  prizes  nothing  more  than  himself, 
rates  nothing  higher,  because,  in  short,  he  starts  from 
himself  and  "  comes  to  himself."      Constrained  by 
childish  respect,  he  is  nevertheless  already  working  at 
"  freeing  "  himself  from  this  constraint.     Ownness 
works  in  the  little  egoist,  and  procures  him  the  de- 
sired— freedom . 

*  [See  note,  p.  IK.] 


216  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Thousands  of  years  of  civilization  have  obscured  to 
you  what  you  are,  have  made  you  believe  you  are  not 
egoists  but  are  called  to  be  idealists  ("  good  men"). 
Shake  that  off!      Do  not  seek  for  freedom,  which  does 
precisely  deprive  you  of  yourselves,  in  "self-denial"; 
but  seek  for  yourselves,  become  egoists,  become  each  of 
you  an  almighty  ego.     Or,  more  clearly :  Just  recog- 
nize yourselves  again,  just  recognize  what  you  really 
are,  and  let  go  your  hypocritical  endeavors,  your 
foolish  mania  to  be  something  else  than  you  are. 
Hypocritical  I  call  them  because  you  have  yet  re- 
mained egoists  all  these  thousands  of  years,  but  sleep- 
ing, self-deceiving,  crazy  egoists,  you  Heautontimoru- 
menoses,  you  self-tormentors.    Never  yet  has  a  religion 
been  able  to  dispense  with  "  promises,"  whether  they 
referred  us  to  the  other  world  or  to  this  ("long  life," 
etc.) ;  for  man  is  mercenary  and  does  nothing 
"  gratis."     But  how  about  that  "  doing  the  good 
for  the  good's  sake"  without  prospect  of  reward? 
As  if  here  too  the  pay  was  not  contained  in  the  satis- 
faction that  it  is  to  afford.     Even  religion,  therefore, 
is  founded  on  our  egoism  and — exploits  it;  calculated 
for  our  desires,  it  stifles  many  others  for  the  sake 
of  one.     This  then  gives  the  phenomenon  of  cheated 
egoism,  where  I  satisfy,  not  myself,  but  one  of  my 
desires,  e.  g.  the  impulse  toward  blessedness.     Reli- 
gion promises  me  the — "supreme  good"  ;  to  gain  this 
I  no  longer  regard  any  other  of  my  desires,  and  do 
not  slake  them. — All  your  doings  are  unconfessed, 
secret,  covert,  and  concealed  egoism.     But  because 
they  are  egoism  that  you  are  unwilling  to  confess  to 
yourselves,  that  you  keep  secret  from  yourselves, 


OWNNESS  217 

hence  not  manifest  and  public  egoism,  consequently 
unconscious  egoism, — therefore  they  are  not  egoism, 
but  thraldom,  service,  self-renunciation  ;  you  are  ego- 
ists, and  you  are  not,  since  you  renounce  egoism. 
Where  you  seem  most  to  be  such,  you  have  drawn 
upon  the  word  "egoist" — loathing  and  contempt. 

I  secure  my  freedom  with  regard  to  the  world  in  the 
degree  that  I  make  the  world  my  own,  i.  e.  "  gain  it 
and  take  possession  of  it "  for  myself,  by  whatever 
might,  by  that  of  persuasion,  of  petition,  of  categori- 
cal demand,  yes,  even  by  hypocrisy,  cheating,  etc.; 
for  the  means  that  I  use  for  it  are  determined  by  what 
I  am.      If  I  am  weak,  I  have  only  weak  means,  like 
the  aforesaid,  which  yet  are  good  enough  for  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  world.      Besides,  cheating,  hypoc- 
risy, lying,  look  worse  than  they  are.     Who  has  not 
cheated  the  police,  the  law?  who  has  not  quickly  taken 
on  an  air  of  honorable  loyalty  before  the  sheriff's 
officer  who  meets  him,  in  order  to  conceal  an  illegality 
that  may  have  been  committed,  etc.?      He  who  has 
not  done  it  has  simply  let  violence  be  done  to  him  ; 
he  was  a  weakling  from — conscience.     I  know  that  my 
freedom  is  diminished  even  by  my  not  being  able  to 
carry  out  my  will  on  another  object,  be  this  other 
something  without  will,  like  a  rock,  or  something  with 
will,  like  a  government,  an  individual,  etc. ;   I  deny  my 
ownness  when — in  presence  of  another — I  give  myself 
up,  i.  e.  give  way,  desist,  submit ;  therefore  by 
loyalty,  submission.     For  it  is  one  thing  when  I  give 
up  my  previous  course  because  it  does  not  lead  to  the 
goal,  and  therefore  turn  out  of  a  wrong  road ;  it 
is  another  when  I  yield  myself  a  prisoner.     I  get 


218  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

around  a  rock  that  stands  in  my  way,  till  I  have 
powder  enough  to  blast  it;   I  get  around  the  laws  of  a 
people,  till  I  have  gathered  strength  to  overthrow 
them.      Because  I  cannot  grasp  the  moon,  is  it  there- 
fore to  be  "sacred"  to  me,  an  Astarte?      If  I  only 
could  grasp  you,  I  surely  would,  and,  if  I  only  find  a 
means  to  get  up  to  you,  you  shall  not  frighten  me! 
You  inapprehensible  one,  you  shall  remain  in- 
apprehensible to  me  only  till  I  have  acquired  the 
might  for  apprehension  and  call  you  my  own;  I  do 
not  give  myself  up  before  you,  but  only  bide  my  time. 
Even  if  for  the  present  I  put  up  with  my  inability  to 
touch  you,  I  yet  remember  it  against  you. 

Vigorous  men  have  always  done  so.     When  the 
"  loyal "  had  exalted  an  unsubdued  power  to  be  their 
master  and  had  adored  it,  when  they  had  demanded 
adoration  from  all,  then  there  came  some  such  son  of 
nature  who  would  not  loyally  submit,  and  drove  the 
adored  power  from  its  inaccessible  Olympus.     He 
cried  his  "  Stand  still "  to  the  rolling  sun,  and  made 
the  earth  go  round;  the  loyal  had  to  make  the  best  of 
it;  he  laid  his  axe  to  the  sacred  oaks,  and  the  "  loyal " 
were  astonished  that  no  heavenly  fire  consumed  him; 
he  threw  the  pope  off  Peter's  chair,  and  the  "  loyal " 
had  no  way  to  hinder  it;  he  is  tearing  down  the 
divine-right  business,  and  the  "loyal"  croak  in  vain, 
and  at  last  are  silent. 

My  freedom  becomes  complete  only  when  it  is  my — 
might ;  but  by  this  I  cease  to  be  a  merely  free  man, 
and  become  an  own  man.     Why  is  the  freedom  of  the 
peoples  a  "hollow  word  "?      Because  the  peoples 
have  no  might!      With  a  breath  of  the  living  ego  I 


OWNNESS  219 

blow  peoples  over,  be  it  the  breath  of  a  Nero,  a 
Chinese  emperor,  or  a  poor  writer.     Why  is  it  that 

the  G *  legislatures  pine  in  vain  for  freedom, 

and  are  lectured  for  it  by  the  cabinet  ministers?      Be- 
cause they  are  not  of  the  "  mighty  " !      Might  is  a  fine 
thing,  and  useful  for  many  purposes;  for  "one  goes 
further  with  a  handful  of  might  than  with  a  bagful  o  f 
right."     You  long  for  freedom?      You  fools!      If  you 
took  might,  freedom  would  come  of  itself.     See,  he 
who  has  might  "stands  above  the  law."     How  does 
this  prospect  taste  to  you,  you  "law-abiding"  people? 
But  you  have  no  taste! 

The  cry  for  "  freedom  "  rings  loudly  all  around. 
But  is  it  felt  and  known  what  a  donated  or  chartered 
freedom  must  mean?      It  is  not  recognized  in  the  full 
amplitude  of  the  word  that  all  freedom  is  essentially — 
self-liberation, — i.  e.,  that  I  can  have  only  so  much 
freedom  as  I  procure  for  myself  by  my  ownness.     Of 
what  use  is  it  to  sheep  that  no  one  abridges  their  free- 
dom of  speech?     They  stick  to  bleating.     Give  one 
who  is  inwardly  a  Mohammedan,  a  Jew,  or  a  Chris- 
tian, permission  to  speak  what  he  likes:  he  will  yet 
utter  only  narrow-minded  stuff.     If,  on  the  contrary, 
certain  others  rob  you  of  the  freedom  of  speaking  and 
hearing,  they  know  quite  rightly  wherein  lies  their 
temporary  advantage,  as  you  would  perhaps  be  able 
to  say  and  hear  something  whereby  those  "  certain  " 
persons  would  lose  their  credit. 

If  they  nevertheless  give  you  freedom,  they  are 
simply  knaves  who  give  more  than  they  have.     For 

*  [Meaning  "  German."     Written  in  this  form  because  of  the  censorship.] 


F 

: 


220  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

then  they  give  you  nothing  of  their  own,  but  stolen 
wares:  they  give  you  your  own  freedom,  the  freedom 
that  you  must  take  for  yourselves;  and  they  give  it  to 
you  only  that  you  may  not  take  it  and  call  the  thieves 
and  cheats  to  an  account  to  boot.     In  their  slyness 
they  know  well  that  given  (chartered)  freedom  is  no 
freedom,  since  only  the  freedom  one  takes  for  him- 
self, therefore  the  egoist's  freedom,  rides  with  full  sai 
Donated  freedom  strikes  its  sails  as  soon  as  there 
comes  a  storm — or  calm;  it  requires  always  a — gent 
and  moderate  breeze. 

Here  lies  the  difference  between  self-liberation  and 
emancipation  (manumission,  setting  free).     Those  who 
to-day  "  stand  in  the  opposition  "  are  thirsting  and 
screaming  to  be  "  set  free."     The  princes  are  to  "  de- 
clare their  peoples  of  age,"  i.  e.  emancipate  them ! 
Behave  as  if  you  were  of  age,  and  you  are  so  without 
any  declaration  of  majority;  if  you  do  not  behave  ac- 
cordingly, you  are  not  worthy  of  it,  and  would  never 
be  of  age  even  by  a  declaration  of  majority.     When 
the  Greeks  were  of  age,  they  drove  out  their  tyrants, 
and,  when  the  son  is  of  age,  he  makes  himself  inde- 
pendent of  his  father.     If  the  Greeks  had  waited  till 
their  tyrants  graciously  allowed  them  their  majority, 
they  might  have  waited  long.     A  sensible  father 
throws  out  a  son  who  will  not  come  of  age,  and  keeps 
the  house  to  himself;  it  serves  the  noodle  right. 

The  man  who  is  set  free  is  nothing  but  a  freedman, 
a  libertinus,  a  dog  dragging  a  piece  of  chain  with  him : 
he  is  an  unfree  man  in  the  garment  of  freedom,  like 
the  ass  in  the  lion's  skin.     Emancipated  Jews  are 
nothing  bettered  in  themselves,  but  only  relieved  as 


OWNNESS  221 

Jews,  although  he  who  relieves  their  condition  is  cer- 
;ainly  more  than  a  churchly  Christian,  as  the  latter 
cannot  do  this  without  inconsistency.     But,  emanci- 
pated or  not  emancipated,  Jew  remains  Jew;  he  who 

not  self-freed  is  merely  an — emancipated  man.     The 
Protestant  State  can  certainly  set  free  (emancipate) 
he  Catholics;  but,  because  they  do  not  make  them- 
selves free,  they  remain  simply — Catholics. 

Selfishness  and  unselfishness  have  already  been 
spoken  of.     The  friends  of  freedom  are  exasperated 
against  selfishness  because  in  their  religious  striving 
after  freedom  they  cannot — free  themselves  from  that 
sublime  thing,  "  self-renunciation."     The  liberal's 
anger  is  directed  against  egoism,  for  the  egoist,  you 
know,  never  takes  trouble  about  a  thing  for  the  sake 
of  the  thing,  but  for  his  sake :  the  thing  must  serve 
him.     It  is  egoistic  to  ascribe  to  no  thing  a  value  of 
its  own,  an  "  absolute  "  value,  but  to  seek  its  value 
in  me.     One  often  hears  that  pot-boiling  study  which 
is  so  common  counted  among  the  most  repulsive  traits 
of  egoistic  behavior,  because  it  manifests  the  most 
shameful  desecration  of  science;  but  what  is  science 
for  but  to  be  consumed?      If  one  does  not  know  how 
to  use  it  for  anything  better  than  to  keep  the  pot  boil- 
ing, then  his  egoism  is  a  petty  one  indeed,  because 
this  egoist's  power  is  a  limited  power;  but  the  egoistic 
element  in  it,  and  the  desecration  of  science,  only  a 
possessed  man  can  blame. 

Because  Christianity,  incapable  of  letting  the  indi- 
vidual count  as  an  ego,  *  thought  of  him  only  as  a 


222  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

dependent,  and  was  properly  nothing  but  a  social 
theory, — a  doctrine  of  living  together,  and  that  of 
man  with  God  as  well  as  of  man  with  man, — therefore 
in  it  everything  "own"  must  fall  into  most  woful  dis- 
repute: selfishness,  self-will,  ownness,  self-love,  etc. 
The  Christian  way  of  looking  at  things  has  on  all 
sides  gradually  re-stamped  honorable  words  into  dis- 
honorable; why  should  they  not  be  brought  into 
honor  again?      So  Schimjof  (contumely)  is  in  its  old 
sense  equivalent  to  jest,  but  for  Christian  seriousness 
pastime  became  a  dishonor,*  for  that  seriousness  can- 
not take  a  joke;  f reck  (impudent)  formerly  meant 
only  bold,  brave;  Frevel  (wanton  outrage)  was  only 
daring.     It  is  well  known  how  askance  the  word 
"  reason  "  was  looked  at  for  a  long  time. 

Our  language  has  settled  itself  pretty  well  to  the 
Christian  standpoint,  and  the  general  consciousness  is 
still  too  Christian  not  to  shrink  in  terror  from  every- 
thing unchristian  as  from  something  incomplete  or 
evil.     Therefore  "  selfishness  "  is  in  a  bad  way  too. 

Selfishness,!  in  the  Christian  sense,  means  some- 
thing like  this:   I  look  only  to  see  whether  anything 
is  of  use  to  me  as  a  sensual  man.      But  is  sensuality 
then  the  whole  of  my  ownness?      Am  I  in  my  own 
senses  when  I  am  given  up  to  sensuality?      Do  I  fol- 
low myself,  my  own  determination,  when  I  follow 
that?      I  am  my  own  only  when  I  am  master  of  my- 
self, instead  of  being  mastered  either  by  sensuality  or 
by  anything  else  (God,  man,  authority,  law,  State, 


*  [I  take  Entbe.hnmg,  "  destitution,"  to  be  a  misprint  for  Entehrung.] 
t  [Eigennutz,  literally  "  own-use."! 


OWNNESS  223 

Ihurch,  etc.) ;  what  is  of  use  to  me,  this  self-owned  or 
self-appertaining  one,  my  selfishness  pursues. 

Besides,  one  sees  himself  every  moment  compelled  to 
jelieve  in  that  constantly-blasphemed  selfishness  as  an 
,11-controlling  power.     In  the  session  of  February  10, 
1844,  Welcker  argues  a  motion  on  the  dependence  of 
,he  judges,  and  sets  forth  in  a  detailed  speech  that 
removable,  dismissable,  transferable,  and  pensionable 
udges — in  short,  such  members  of  a  court  of  justice  as 
:an  by  mere  administrative  process  be  damaged  and 
endangered, — are  wholly  without  reliability,  yes,  lose 
all  respect  and  all  confidence  among  the  people.     The 
'hole  bench,  Welcker  cries,  is  demoralized  by  this  de- 
>endence!      In  blunt  words  this  means  nothing  else 
;han  that  the  judges  find  it  more  to  their  advantage  to 
rive  judgment  as  the  ministers  would  have  them  than 
jo  give  it  as  the  law  would  have  them.      How  is  that 
o  be  helped?      Perhaps  by  bringing  home  to  the 
udges'  hearts  the  ignominiousness  of  their  venality, 
and  then  cherishing  the  confidence  that  they  will  re- 
>ent  and  henceforth  prize  justice  more  highly  than 
heir  selfishness?     No,  the  people  does  not  soar  to- this 
romantic  confidence,  for  it  feels  that  selfishness  is 
mightier  than  any  other  motive.     Therefore  the  same 
arsons  who  have  been  judges  hitherto  may  remain  so, 
however  thoroughly  one  has  convinced  himself  that 
they  behaved  as  egoists;  only  they  must  not  any 
longer  find  their  selfishness  favored  by  the  venality  of 
justice,  but  must  stand  so  independent  of  the  govern- 
ment that  by  a  judgment  in  conformity  with  the  facts 
they  do  not  throw  into  the  shade  their  own  cause,  their 
'*  well-understood  interest,"  but  rather  secure  a  com- 


224  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

fortable  combination  of  a  good  salary  with  respect 
among  the  citizens. 

So  Welcker  and  the  commoners  of  Baden  consider 
themselves  secured  only  when  they  can  count  on  self- 
ishness.    What  is  one  to  think,  then,  of  the  countless 
phrases  of  unselfishness  with  which  their  mouths  over- 
flow at  other  times?  i  ' 

To  a  cause  which  I  am  pushing  selfishly  I  have  an- 
other relation  than  to  one  which  I  am  serving  unself- 
ishly.    The  following  criterion  might  be  cited  for  it: 
against  the  one  I  can  sin  or  commit  a  sin,  the  other  I 
can  only  trifle  away,  push  from  me,  deprive  myself  of. 
— i.  e.  commit  an  imprudence.     Free  trade  is  looked 
at  in  both  ways,  being  regarded  partly  as  a  freedom 
which  may  under  certain  circumstances  be  granted  or 
withdrawn,  partly  as  one  which  is  to  be  held  sacred 
under  all  circumstances. 

If  I  am  not  concerned  about  a  thing  in  and  for  it- 
self, and  do  not  desire  it  for  its  own  sake,  then  I  de- 
sire it  solely  as  a  means  to  an  end,  for  its  usefulness; 
for  the  sake  of  another  end;  e.  g.,  oysters  for  a  pleas- 
ant  flavor.     Now  will  not  every  thing  whose  final  end 
he  himself  is  serve  the  egoist  as  means?  and  is  he  to 
protect  a  thing  that  serves  him  for  nothing, — e.  g.,  the 
proletarian  to  protect  the  State? 

Ownness  includes  in  itself  everything  own,  and 
brings  to  honor  again  what  Christian  language  dis- 
honored.    But  ownness  has  not  any  alien  standard 
either,  as  it  is  not  in  any  sense  an  idea  like  freedom, 
morality,  humanity,  and  the  like:  it  is  only  a  descrip- 
tion of  the — owner. 


THE  OWNElt  225 


II 

THE  OWNER 

I — do  I  come  to  myself  and  mine  through 
liberalism  ? 

Whom  does  the  liberal  look  upon  as  his  equal? 
Man!      Be  only  man, — and  that  you  are  anyway, — 
and  the  liberal  calls  you  his  brother.      He  asks  very 
ittle  about  your  private  opinions  and  private  follies, 
if  only  he  can  espy,"  Man  "  in  you.  « 

But,  as  he  takes  little  heed  of  what  you  are  priva- 
tim, — nay,  in  a  strict  following  out  of  his  principle 
sets  no  value  at  all  on  it, — he  sees  in  you  only  what 
are  generatim.     In  other  words,  he  sees  in  you, 
not  you,  but  the  species ;  not  Tom  or  Jim,  but  Man; 
lot  the  real  or  unique  one,*  but  your  essence  or  your 
concept;  not  the  bodily  man,  but  the  spirit. 

As  Tom  you  would  not  be  his  equal,  because  he  is 
Jim,  therefore  not  Tom  ;  as  man  you  are  the  same 
;hat  he  is.     And,  since  as  Tom  you  virtually  do  not 
exist  at  all  for  him  (so  far,  to  wit,  as  he  is  a  liberal 
and  not  unconsciously  an  egoist),  he  has  really  made 
'  brother-love  "  very  easy  for  himself:  he  loves  in  you 
not  Tom,  of  whom  he  knows  nothing  and  wants  to 
know  nothing,  but  Man. 

*  [Einzigen] 


226  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

To  see  in  you  and  me  nothing  further  than  "  men,'« 
that  is  running  the  Christian  way  of  looking  at  things! 
according  to  which  one  is  for  the  other  nothing  but  a  j 
concept  (e.  g.  a  man  called  to  salvation,  etc.),  into 
the  ground. 

Christianity  properly  so  called  gathers  us  under  a    ] 
less  utterly  general  concept:  there  we  are  "  sons  of 
God  "  and  "  led  by  the  Spirit  of  God."  '      Yet  not  all 
can  boast  of  being  God's  sons,  but  "  the  same  Spirit 
which  witnesses  to  our  spirit  that  we  are  sons  of  God 
reveals  also  who  are  the  sons  of  the  devil."  f     Con- 
sequently, to  be  a  son  of  God  one  must  not  be  a  son 
of  the  devil;  the  sonship  of  God  excluded  certain  men. 
To  be  sons  of  men, — i.  e.  men, —  on  the  contrary,  we 
need  nothing  but  to  belong  to  the  human  species,  need  j 
only  to  be  specimens  of  the  same  species.     What  I 
am  as  this  I  is  no  concern  of  yours  as  a  good  liberal, 
but  is  my  private  affair  alone ;  enough  that  we  are 
both  sons  of  one  and  the  same  mother,  to  wit,  the  hu- 
man species :  as  "  a  son  of  man  "  I  am  your  equal. 

What  am  I  now  to  you?      Perhaps  this  bodily  I  as  I 
walk  and  stand?      Anything  but  that.     This  bodily 
I,  with  its  thoughts,  decisions,  and  passions,  is  in  your 
eyes  a  "  private  affair"  which  is  no  concern  of  yours: 
it  is  an  "  affair  by  itself."     As  an  "  affair  for  you  " 
there  exists  only  my  concept,  my  generic  concept,  only 
the  Man,  who,  as  he  is  called  Tom,  could  just  as  well 
be  Joe  or  Dick.     You  see  in  me  not  me,  the  bodily 
man,  but  an  unreal  thing,  the  spook,  i.  e.  a  Man. 

In  the  course  of  the  Christian  centuries  we  declared 

*  Rom.  8.  14.  t  Cf.  1  John  3.  10  with  Rom.  8.  16. 


THE  OWNER  297 

the  most  various  persons  to  be  "our  equals,"  but  each 
time  in  the  measure  of  that  spirit  which  we  expected 
from  them, — e.  g.  each  one  in  whom  the  spirit  of  the 
need  of  redemption  may  be  assumed,  then  later  each 
one  who  has  the  spirit  of  integrity,  finally  each  one 
who  shows  a  human  spirit  and  a  human  face.     Thus 
the  fundamental  principle  of  "  equality  "  varied. 

Equality  being  now  conceived  as  equality  of  the 
human  spirit,  there  has  certainly  been  discovered  an 
equality  that  includes  all  men ;  for  who  could  deny 
that  we  men  have  a  human  spirit,  i.  e.  no  other  than  a 
human ! 

But  are  we  on  that  account  further  on  now  than  in 
the  beginning  of  Christianity?     Then  we  were  to  have 
a  dirine  spirit,  now  a  human;  but,  if  the  divine  did 
not  exhaust  us,  how  should  the  human  wholly  express 
what  we  are?      Feuerbach,  e.  g.,  thinks  that,  if  he  hu- 
manizes the  divine,  he  has  found  the  truth.     No,  if 
God  has  given  us  pain,  "  Man  "  is  capable  of  pinching 
us  still  more  torturingly.    The  long  and  the  short  of  it 
is  this :  that  we  are  men  is  the  slightest  thing  about  us, 
and  has  significance  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  one  of  our 
qualities,*  i.  e.  our  property.!     I  am  indeed  among 
other  things  a  man,  as  I  am,  e.  g.,  a  living  being, 
therefore  an  animal,  or  a  European,  a  Berliner,  and 
the  like;  but  he  who  chose  to  have  regard  for  me  only 
as  a  man,  or  as  a  Berliner,  would  pay  me  a  regard 
that  would  be  very  unimportant  to  me.     And  where- 
fore?     Because  he  would  have  regard  only  for  one  of 
my  qualities,  not  for  me. 

*  (Eigenxchaften\ 


228  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

It  is  just  so  with  the  spirit  too.     A  Christian  spirit, 
an  upright  spirit,  and  the  like  may  well  be  my  ac- 
quired quality,  i.  e.  my  property,  but  I  am  not  this 
spirit:  it  is  mine,  not  I  its. 

Hence  we  have  in  liberalism  only  the  continuation 
of  the  old  Christian  depreciation  of  the  I,  the  bodily 
Tom.     Instead  of  taking  me  as  I  am,  one  looks 
solely  at  my  property,  my  qualities,  and  enters  into 
marriage  bonds  with  me  only  for  the  sake  of  my — pos- 
sessions; one  marries,  as  it  were,  what  I  have,  not 
what  I  am.     The  Christian  takes  hold  of  my  spirit, 
the  liberal  of  my  humanity. 

But,  if  the  spirit,  which  is  not  regarded  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  bodily  ego  but  as  the  proper  ego  itself,  is  a 
ghost,  then  the  Man  too,  who  is  not  recognized  as  my 
quality  but  as  the  proper  I,  is  nothing  but  a  spook,  a 
thought,  a  concept. 

Therefore  the  liberal  too  revolves  in  the  same  circle 
as  the  Christian.      Because  the  spirit  of  mankind,  i.  e. 
Man,  dwells  in  you,  you  are  a  man,  as  when  the  spirit 
of  Christ  dwells  in  you  you  are  a  Christian ;  but,  be- 
cause it  dwells  in  you  only  as  a  second  ego,  even 
though  it  be  as  your  proper  or  "  better  "  ego,  it  re- 
mains otherworldly  to  you,  and  you  have  to  strive  to 
become  wholly  man.     A  striving  just  as  fruitless  as 
the  Christian's  to  become  wholly  a  blessed  spirit! 

One  can  now,  after  liberalism  has  proclaimed  Man, 
declare  openly  that  herewith  was  only  completed  the 
consistent  carrying  out  of  Christianity,  and  that  in 
truth  Christianity  set  itself  no  other  task  from  the  start 
than  to  realize  "  man,"  the  "true  man."     Hence,  then, 
the  illusion  that  Christianity  ascribes  an  infinite  value 


THE  OWNER  229 

to  the  ego  (as  e.  g.  in  the  doctrine  of  immortality,  in 
the  cure  of  souls,  etc.)  comes  to  light.     No,  it  assigns 
this  value  to  Man  alone.     Only  Man  is  immortal,  and 
only  because  I  am  man  am  I  too  immortal.     In  fact, 
Christianity  had  to  teach  that  no  one  is  lost,  just  as 
liberalism  too  puts  all  on  an  equality  as  men ;  but  that 
eternity,  like  this  equality,  applied  only  to  the  Man  in 
me,  not  to  me.     Only  as  the  bearer  and  harborer  of 
Man  do  I  not  die,  as  notoriously  "  the  king  never 
dies."     Louis  dies,  but  the  king  remains;  I  die,  but 
my  spirit,  Man,  remains.     To  identify  me  now  en- 
tirely with  Man  the  demand  has  been  invented,  and 
stated,  that  I  must  become  a  "  real  generic  being."  * 
The  HUMAN  religion  is  only  the  last  metamorphosis 
of  the  Christian  religion.     For  liberalism  is  a  religion 
because  it  separates  my  essence  from  me  and  sets  it 
above  me,  because  it  exalts  "  Man  "  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  any  other  religion  does  its  God  or  idol,  because 
it  makes  what  is  mine  into  something  otherworldly, 
because  in  general  it  makes  out  of  what  is  mine,  out 
of  my  qualities  and  my  property,  something  alien, — to 
wit,  an  "  essence  ";  in  short,  because  it  sets  me  be- 
neath Man,  and  thereby  creates  for  me  a  "vocation." 
But  liberalism  declares  itself  a  religion  in  form  too 
when  it  demands  for  this  supreme  being,  Man,  a  zeal 
of  faith,  "  a  faith  that  some  day  will  at  last  prove  its 
fiery  zeal  too,  a  zeal  that  will  be  invincible."  f     But, 
as  liberalism  is  a  human  religion,  its  professor  takes 
a  tolerant  attitude  toward  the  professor  of  any  other 


*  E.  a.  Marx  in  the  "  Deutsch-franzoesische  Jahrbuecter,"  p.  197. 
t  Br.  Bauer,  "  Judenfrape,"  p.  61. 


230  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

(Catholic,  Jewish,  etc.),  as  Frederick  the  Great  did  to- 
ward every  one  who  performed  his  duties  as  a  subject, 
whatever  fashion  of  becoming  blest  he  might  be  in- 
clined toward.     This  religion  is  now  to  be  raised  to 
the  rank  of  the  generally  customary  one,  and  separated 
from  the  others  as  mere  "  private  follies,"  toward 
which,  besides,  one  takes  a  highly  liberal  attitude  on 
account  of  their  unessentialness. 

One  may  call  it  the  State-religion,  the  religion  of 
the  "free  State,"  not  in  the  sense  hitherto  current  that 
it  is  the  one  favored  or  privileged  by  the  State,  but  as 
that  religion  which  the  "  free  State  "  not  only  has  the 
right,  but  is  compelled,  to  demand  from  each  of  those 
who  belong  to  it,  let  him  be  privatim  a  Jew,  a  Chris- 
tian, or  anything  else.     For  it  does  the  same  service 
to  the  State  as  filial  piety  to  the  family.     If  the  fam- 
ily is  to  be  recognized  and  maintained,  in  its  existing 
condition,  by  each  one  of  those  who  belong  to  it,  then 
to  him  the  tie  of  blood  must  be  sacred,  and  his  feeling 
for  it  must  be  that  of  piety,  of  respect  for  the  ties  of 
blood,  by  which  every  bloodTrelation  becomes  to  him  a 
consecrated  person.     So  also  to  every  member  of  the 
State-community  this  community  must  be  sacred,  and 
the  concept  which  is  the  highest  to  the  State  must  like- 
wise be  the  highest  to  him. 

But  what  concept  is  the  highest  to  the  State? 
Doubtless  that  of  being  a  really  human  society,  a  so- 
ciety in  which  every  one  who  is  really  a  man,  i.  e. 
not  an  un-man,  can  obtain  admission  as  a  member. 
Let  a  State's  tolerance  go  ever  so  far,  toward  an  un- 
man and  toward  what  is  inhuman  it  ceases.     And  yet 
this  "  un-man  "  is  a  man,  yet  the  "  inhuman  "  itself  is 


THE  OWNER  231 

something  human,  yes,  possible  only  to  a  man,  not  to 
any  beast;  it  is,  in  fact,  something  "  possible  to  man." 
But,  although  every  un-man  is  a  man,  yet  the  State 
excludes  him;  i.  e.,  it  locks  him  up,  or  transforms  him 
from  a  fellow  of  the  State  into  a  fellow  of  the  prison 
(fellow  of  the  lunatic  asylum  or  hospital,  according  to 
Communism). 

To  say  in  blunt  words  what  an  un-man  is  is  not 
particularly  hard:  it  is  a  man  who  does  not  corre- 
spond to  the  concept  man,  as  the  inhuman  is  something 
human  which  is  not  conformed  to  the  concept  of  the 
human.      Logic  calls  this  a  "  self-contradictory  judg- 
ment."    Would  it  be  permissible  for  one  to  pronounce 
this  judgment,  that  one  can  be  a  man  without  being  a 
man,  if  he  did  not  admit  the  hypothesis  that  the  con- 
cept of  man  can  be  separated  from  the  existence,  the 
essence  from  the  appearance?     They  say,  he  appears 
indeed  as  a  man,  but  is  not  a  man. 

Men  have  passed  this  "  self-contradictory  judgment" 
through  a  long  line  of  centuries!      Nay,  what  is  still 
more,  in  this  long  time  there  were  only — un-men. 
What  individual  can  have  corresponded  to  his  con- 
cept?     Christianity  knows  only  one  Man,  and  this 
one — Christ — is  at  once  an  un-man  again  in  the  re- 
verse sense,  to  wit,  a  superhuman  man,  a  "  God." 
Only  the — un-man  is  a  real  man. 

Men  that  are  not  men,  what  should  they  be  but 
ghosts  ?     Every  real  man,  because  he  does  not  cor- 
respond to  the  concept  "  man,"  or  because  he  is  not 
a  "  generic  man,"  is  a  spook.      But  do  I  still  remain 
an  un-man  even  if  I  bring  Man  (who  towered  above 
me  and  remained  otherworldly  to  me  only  as  my 


232  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ideal,  my  task,  my  essence  or  concept)  down  to  be  my 
quality,  my  own  and  inherent  in  me;  so  that  Man  is 
nothing  else  than  my  humanity,  my  human  existence, 
and  everything  that  I  do  is  human  precisely  because 
/  do  it,  but  not  because  it  corresponds  to  the  concept 
"  man  "?     /  am  really  Man  and  the  un-man  in  one; 
for  I  am  a  man  and  at  the  same  time  more  than  a 
man;  i.  e.,  I  am  the  ego  of  this  my  mere  quality. 

It  had  to  come  to  this  at  last,  that  it  was  no  longer 
merely  demanded  of  us  to  be  Christians,  but  to  become 
men;  for,  though  we  could  never  really  become  even 
Christians,  but  always  remained  "  poor  sinners  "  (for 
the  Christian  was  an  unattainable  ideal  too),  yet  in 
this  the  contradictoriness  did  not  come  before  our 
consciousness  so,  and  the  illusion  was  easier  than  now 
when  of  us,  who  are  men  and  act  humanly  (yes,  cannot 
do  otherwise  than  be  such  and  act  so),  the  demand  is 
made  that  we  are  to  be  men,  "  real  men." 

Our  States  of  to-day,  because  they  still  have  all  sorts 
of  things  sticking  to  them,  left  from  their  churchly 
mother,  do  indeed  load  those  who  belong  to  them 
with  various  obligations  (e.  g.  churchly  religiousness) 
which  properly  do  not  a  bit  concern  them,  the  States; 
yet  on  the  whole  they  do  not  deny  their  significance, 
since  they  want  to  be  looked  upon  as  human  societies, 
in  which  man  as  man  can  be  a  member,  even  if  he  is 
less  privileged  than  other  members;  most  of  them  ad- 
mit adherents  of  every  religious  sect,  and  receive  peo- 
ple without  distinction  of  race  or  nation :  Jews,  Turks, 
Moors,  etc.,  can  become  French  citizens.      In  the  act 
of  reception,  therefore,  the  State  looks  only  to  see 
whether  one  is  a  man.     The  Church,  as  a  society  of 


THE  OWNER  233 

believers,  could  not  receive  every  man  into  her  bosom; 
the  State,  as  a  society  of  men,  can.     But,  when  the 
State  has  carried  its  principle  clear  through,  of  presup- 
posing in  its  constituents  nothing  but  that  they  are       „ 
men  (even  the  North  Americans  still  presuppose  in 
theirs  that  they  have  religion,  at  least  the  religion  of 
integrity,  of  respectability),  then  it  has  dug  its  grave. 
While  it  will  fancy  that  those  whom  it  possesses  are 
without  exception  men,  these  have  meanwhile  become 
without  exception  egoists,  each  of  whom  utilizes  it  ac- 
cording to  his  egoistic  powers  and  ends.     Against  the 
egoists  "  human  society  "  is  wrecked;  for  they  no 
longer  have  to  do  with  each  other  as  men,  but  appear 
egoistically  as  an  /  against  a  You  altogether  different 
from  me  and  in  opposition  to  me. 

If  the  State  must  count  on  our  humanity,  it  is  the 
same  if  one  says  it  must  count  on  our  morality.     See-    ' 
ing  Man  in  each  other,  and  acting  as  men  toward  each 
other,  is  called  moral  behavior.    This  is  every  whit  the 
"  spiritual  love  "  of  Christianity.     For,  if  I  see  Man  in 
you,  as  in  myself  I  see  Man  and  nothing  but  Man, 
then  I  care  for  you  as  I  would  care  for  myself;  for  we 
represent,  you  see,  nothing  but  the  mathematical  prop- 
osition: A=C  and  B=C,  consequently  A=B, —          ., 
i.  e.,  I  nothing  but  man  and  you  nothing  but  man, 
consequently  I  and  you  the  same.     Morality  is  incom- 
patible with  egoism,  because  the  former  does  not  allow 
validity  to  me,  but  only  to  the  Man  in  me.     But,  if 
the  State  is  a  society  of  men,  not  a  union  of  egos  each 
of  whom  has  only  himself  before  his  eyes,  then  it  can- 
not last  without  morality,  and  must  insist  on  morality. 

Therefore  we  two,  the  State  and  I,  are  enemies.     I, 


234  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  egoist,  have  not  at  heart  the  welfare  of  this  "  hu- 
man society,"  I  sacrifice  nothing  to-  it,  I  only  utilize 
it;  but  to  be  able  to  utilize  it  completely  I  transform 
it  rather  into  my  property  and  my  creature, — i.  e.  I 
annihilate  it,  and  form  in  its  place  the  Union  of 
Egoists. 

So  the  State  betrays  its  enmity  to  me  by  demanding 
that  I  be  a  man,  which  presupposes  that  I  may  also 
not  be  a  man,  but  rank  for  it  as  an  "  un-man  ";  it 
imposes  being  a  man  upon  me  as  a  duty.     Further, 
it  desires  me  to  do  nothing  along  with  which  it  cannot 
last;  so  its  permanence  is  to  be  sacred  for  me.     Then 
I  am  not  to  be  an  egoist,  but  a  "  respectable,  up- 
right," i.  e.  moral,  man.     Enough,  before  it  and  its 
permanence  I  am  to  be  impotent  and  respectful, — etc. 

This  State,  not  a  present  one  indeed,  but  still  in 
need  of  being  first  created,  is  the  ideal  of  advancing 
liberalism.     There  is  to  come  into  existence  a  true 
"  society  of  men,"  in  which  every  "  man  "  finds  room. 
Liberalism  means  to  realize  "  Man,"  i.  e.  create  a 
world  for  him;  and  this  should  be  the  human  world  or 
the  general  (Communistic)  society  of  men.    It  was  said, 
"  The  Church  could  regard  only  the  spirit,  the  State  is 
to  regard  the  whole  man."  *      But  is  not  "  Man  " 
"  spirit "?      The  kernel  of  the  State  is  simply  "  Man," 
this  unreality,  and  it  itself  is  only  a  "  society  of  men." 
The  world  which  the  believer  (believing  spirit)  creates 
is  called  Church,  the  world  which  the  man  (human  or 
humane  spirit)  creates  is  called  State.     But  that  is  not 
my  world.      I  never  execute  anything  human  in  the 

*  Hess,  "  Triarchie,"  p.  76. 


THE  OWNER  235 

abstract,  but  always  my  own  things;  i.  e.,  my  human 
act  is  diverse  from  every  other  human  act,  and  only  by 
this  diversity  is  it  a  real  act  belonging  to  me.     The 
human  in  it  is  an  abstraction,  and,  as  such,  spirit, 
i.  e.  abstracted  essence. 

Br.  Bauer  states  (e.  g.  "  Judenfrage,"  p.  84)  that 
the  truth  of  criticism  is  the  final  truth,  and  in  fact  the 
truth  sought  for  by  Christianity  itself, — to  wit, 
"Man."    He  says,  "  The  history  of  the  Christian  world 
is  the  history  of  the  supreme  fight  for  truth,  for  in  it 
— and  in  it  only !  — the  thing  at  issue  is  the  discovery 
of  the  final  or  the  primal  truth — man  and  freedom." 

All  right,  let  us  accept  this  gain,  and  let  us  take 
wan  as  the  ultimately  found  result  of  Christian 
history  and  of  the  religious  or  ideal  efforts  of  man  in 
general.     Now,  who  is  Man?      /am!      Man,  the  end 
and  outcome  of  Christianity,  is,  as  7,  the  beginning 
and  raw  material  of  the  new  history,  a  history  of  en- 
joyment after  the  history  of  sacrifices,  a  history  not  of 
man  or  humanity,  but  of — me.     Man  ranks  as  the 
general.     Now  then,  I  «nd  the  egoistic  are  the  really 
general,  since  every  one  is  an  egoist  and  of  paramount 
importance  to  himself.     The  Jewish  is  not  the  purely 
egoistic,  because  the  Jew  still  devotes  himself  to 
Jehovah;  the  Christian  is  not,  because  the  Christian 
lives  on  the  grace  of  God  and  subjects  himself  to  him. 
As  Jew  and  as  Christian  alike  a  man  satisfies  only 
certain  of  his  wants,  only  a  certain  need,  not  himself: 
a  Afl^egoism,  because  the  egoism  of  a  half-man,  who 
is  half  he,  half  Jew,  or  half  his  own  proprietor,  half  a 
slave.     Therefore,  too,  Jew  and  Christian  always  half- 
way exclude  each  other;  i.  e.,  as  men  they  recognize 


236  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

each  other,  as  slaves  they  exclude  each  other,  because 
they  are  servants  of  two  different  masters.     If  they 
could  be  complete  egoists,  they  would  exclude  each 
other  wholly  and  hold  together  so  much  the  more 
firmly.     Their  ignominy  is  not  that  they  exclude  each 
other,  but  that  this  is  done  only  half-way.     Br.  Bauer, 
on  the  contrary,  thinks  Jews  and  Christians  cannot  re- 
gard and  treat  each  other  as  "  men  "  till  they  give  up 
the  separate  essence  which  parts  them  and  obligates 
them  to  eternal  separation,  recognize  the  general 
essence  of  "  Man,"  and  regard  this  as  their  "  true 
essence." 

According  to  his  representation  the  defect  of  the 
Jews  and  the  Christians  alike  lies  in  their  wanting  to 
be  and  have  something  "  particular  "  instead  of  only 
being  men  and  endeavoring  after  what  is  human, — to 
wit,  the  "  general  rights  of  man."     He  thinks  their 
fundamental  error  consists  in  the  belief  that  they  are 
"privileged,"  possess  "  prerogatives";  in  general,  in 
the  belief  in  prerogative.*     In  opposition  to  this  he 
holds  up  to  them  the  general  rights  of  man.     The 
rights  of  man !  — 

Man  is  man  in  general,  and  in  so  far  every  one  who 
is  a  man.     Now  every  one  is  to  have  the  eternal  rights 
of  man,  and,  according  to  the  opinion  of  Communism, 
enjoy  them  in  the  complete  "  democracy,"  or,  as  it 
ought  more  correctly  to  be  called, — anthropocracy. 
But  it  is  I  alone  who  have  everything  that  I — procure 
for  myself;  as  man  I  have  nothing.      People  would 
like  to  give  every  man  an  affluence  of  all  good,  merely 

*  [Vorrecht,  literally  "  precedent  right,"] 


THE  OWNER  23? 

because  he  has  the  title  "  man."     But  I  put  the  accent 
on  me,  not  on  my  being  man. 

Man  is  something  only  as  my  quality*  (property!), 
like  masculinity  or  femininity.     The  ancients  found 
the  ideal  in  one's  being  male  in  the  full  sense;  their 
virtue  is  virtus  and  arete, — i.  e.  manliness.     What  is 
one  to  think  of  a  woman  who  should  want  only  to  be 
perfectly  "  woman  "?     That  is  not  given  to  all,  and 
many  a  one  would  therein  be  fixing  for  herself  an 
unattainable  goal.     Feminine,  on  the  other  hand,  she 
is  anyhow,  by  nature;  femininity  is  her  quality,  and 
she  does  not  need  "  true  femininity."     I  am  a  man 
just  as  the  earth  is  a  star.     As  ridiculous  as  it  would 
be  to  set  the  earth  the  task  of  being  a  "  thorough 
star,"  so  ridiculous  it  is  to  burden  me  with  the  call  to 
be  a  "  thorough  man." 

When  Fichte  says,  "  The  ego  is  all,"  this  seems  to 
harmonize  perfectly  with  my  theses.     But  it  is  not  that 
the  ego  is  all,  but  the  ego  destroys  all,  and  only  the 
self-dissolving  ego,  the  never-being  ego,  the — -finite  ego 
is  really  I.     Fichte  speaks  of  the  "  absolute  "  ego,  but 
I  speak  of  me,  the  transitory  ego. 

How  natural  is  the  supposition  that  man  and  ego 
mean  the  same!  and  yet  one  sees,  e.  g.,  by  Feuerbach, 
that  the  expression  "  man  "  is  to  designate  the  abso- 
lute ego,  the  species,  not  the  transitory,  individual  ego. 
Egoism  and  humanity  (humaneness)  ought  to  mean 
the  same,  but  according  to  Feuerbach  the  individual 
can  "  only  lift  himself  above  the  limits  of  his  individu- 
ality, but  not  above  the  laws,  the  positive  ordinances, 

*  [Eigrnschaft]  t  [Eigentum] 


238  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

of  his  species."  *     But  the  species  is  nothing,  and,  if 
the  individual  lifts  himself  above  the  limits  of  his  in- 
dividuality, this  is  rather  his  very  self  as  an  individ- 
ual; he  exists  only  in  raising  himself,  he  exists  only  in 
not  remaining  what  he  is;  otherwise  he  would  be 
done,  dead.     Man  with  the  great  M  is  only  an  ideal, 
the  species  only  something  thought  of.     To  be  a  man 
is  not  to  realize  the  ideal  of  Man,  but  to  present  one- 
self, the  individual.     It  is  not  how  I  realize  the  gen- 
erally human  that  needs  to  be  my  task,  but  how  I 
satisfy  myself.     /  am  my  species,  am  without  norm, 
without  law,  without  model,  and  the  like.     It  is  pos- 
sible that  I  can  make  very  little  out  of  myself;  but 
this  little  is  everything,  and  is  better  than  what  I  al- 
low to  be  made  out  of  me  by  the  might  of  others,  by 
the  training  of  custom,  religion,  the  laws,  the  State, 
etc.     Better — if  the  talk  is  to  be  of  better  at  all — 
better  an  unmannerly  child  than  an  old  head  on 
young  shoulders,  better  a  mulish  man  than  a  man  com- 
pliant in  everything.     The  unmannerly  and  mulish 
fellow  is  still  on  the  way  to  form  himself  according  to 
his  own  will;  the  prematurely  knowing  and  compliant 
one  is  determined  by  the  "  species,"  the  general  de- 
mands, etc., — the  species  is  law  to  him.     He  is  deter- 
mined f  by  it;  for  what  else  is  the  species  to  him  but 
his  "  destiny,"  $  his  "  calling"?     Whether  I  look  to 
"  humanity,"  the  species,  in  order  to  strive  toward  this, 
ideal,  or  to  God  and  Christ  with  like  endeavor,  where 
is  the  essential  dissimilarity?      At  most  the  former  is 


"  Essence  of  Christianity,"  2de<J.,  p.  401. 

'  J  [Bestimrmmg\ 


THE  OWNER  239 

more  washed-out  than  the  latter.     As  the  individual  is 
the  whole  of  nature,  so  he  is  the  whole  of  the  species 
too. 

Everything  that  I  do,  think,  etc., — in  short,  my  ex- 
pression or  manifestation — is  indeed  conditioned  by 
what  I  am.    The  Jew,  e.  g.,  can  will  only  thus  or  thus, 
can  "  present  himself"  only  thus;  the  Christian  can 
present  and  manifest  himself  only  christianly,  etc.     If 
it  were  possible  that  you  could  be  a  Jew  or  Christian, 
you  would  indeed  bring  out  only  what  was  Jewish  or 
Christian;  but  it  is  not  possible;  in  the  most  rigorous 
conduct  you  yet  remain  an  egoist,  a  sinner  against 
that  concept — i.  e.,  you  are  not  the  precise  equivalent 
of  Jew.     Now,  because  the  egoistic  always  keeps 
peeping  through,  people  have  inquired  for  a  more  per- 
fect concept  which  should  really  wholly  express  what 
you  are,  and  which,  because  it  is  your  true  nature, 
should  contain  all  the  laws  of  your  activity.    The  most 
perfect  thing  of  the  kind  has  been  attained  in  "  Man." 
As  a  Jew  you  are  too  little,  and  the  Jewish  is  not 
your  task;  to  be  a  Greek,  a  German,  does  not  suffice. 
But  lie  a — man,  then  you  have  everything;  look  upon 
the  human  as  your  calling. 

Now  I  know  what  is  expected  of  me,  and  the  new 
catechism  can  be  written.     The  subject  is  again  sub- 
jected to  the  predicate,  the  individual  to  something 
general;  the  dominion  is  again  secured  to  an  idea,  and 
the  foundation  laid  for  a  new  religion.     This  is  a  xtcp 
forward  in  .the  domain  of  religion,  and  in  particular 
of  Christianity ;  not  a  step  out  beyond  it. 

The  step  out  beyond  it  leads  into  the  unspeakable, 
For  me  paltry  language  has.  no  word,  and  "  the 


240  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Word,"  the  Logos,  is  to  me  a  "  mere  word." 

My  essence  is  sought  for.  If  not  the  Jew,  the  Ger- 
man, etc.,  then  at  any  rate  it  is — the  man.  "  Man  is 
my  essence." 

I  am  repulsive  or  repugnant  to  myself;  I  have  a 
horror  and  loathing  of  myself,  I  am  a  horror  to  my- 
self, or,  I  am  never  enough  for  myself  and  never  do 
enough  to  satisfy  myself.     From  such  feelings  springs 
self-dissolution  or  self-criticism.     Religiousness  begins 
with  self-renunciation,  ends  with  completed  criticism. 

I  am  .possessed,  and  want  to  get  rid  of  the  "  evil 
spirit."     How  do  I  set  about  it?      I  fearlessly  commit 
the  sin  that  seems  to  the  Christian  the  direst,  the  sin 
and  blasphemy  against  the  Holy  Spirit.     "  He  who 
blasphemes  the  Holy  Spirit  has  no  forgiveness  forever, 
but  is  liable  to  the  eternal  judgment !  "  '       I  want  no 
forgiveness,  and  am  not  afraid  of  the  judgment. 

Man  is  the  last  evil  spirit  or  spook,  the  most  decep- 
tive or  most  intimate,  the  craftiest  liar  with  honest 
mien,  the  father  of  lies. 

The  egoist,  turning  against  the  demands  and  con- 
cepts of  the  present,  executes  pitilessly  the  most  mea- 
sureless— desecration.  Nothing  is  holy  to  him ! 

It  would  be  foolish  to  assert  that  there  is  no  power 
above  mine.  Only  the  attitude  that  I  take  toward  it 
will  be  quite  another  than  that  of  the  religious  age :  I 
shall  be  the  enemy  of  every  higher  power,  while  re- 
ligion teaches  us  to  make  it  our  friend  and  be  humble 
toward  it. 

The  desecrator  puts  forth  his  strength  against  every 

*  Mark  3.  29. 


THE  OWNER  241 

fear  of  God,  for  fear  of  God  would  determine  him  in 
everything  that  he  left  standing  as  sacred.     Whether 
it  is  the  God  or  the  Man  that  exercises  the  hallowing 
power  in  the  God-man, — whether,  therefore,  anything 
is  held  sacred  for  God's  sake  or  for  Man's  (Human- 
ity's),— this  does  not  change  the  fear  of  God,  since 
Man  is  revered  as  "  supreme  essence,"  as  much  as  on 
the  specifically  religious  standpoint  God  as  "  supreme 
essence"  calls  for  our  fear  and  reverence;  both  over- 
awe us. 

The  fear  of  God  in  the  proper  sense  was  shaken 
long  ago,  and  a  more  or  less  conscious  "  atheism,"  ex- 
ternally recognizable  by  a  wide-spread  "  unchurchli- 
ness,"  has  involuntarily  become  the  mode.     But  what 
was  taken  from  God  has  been  superadded  to  Man,  and 
the  power  of  humanity  grew  greater  in  just  the  degree 
that  that  of  piety  lost  weight:  "  Man  "  is  the  God  of 
to-day,  and  fear  of  Man  has  taken  the  place  of  the  old 
fear  of  God. 

But,  because  Man  represents  only  another  Supreme 
Being,  nothing  has  in  fact  taken  place  but  a  metamor- 
phosis in  the  Supreme  Being,  and  the  fear  of  Man  is 
merely  an  altered  form  of  the  fear  of  God. 

Our  atheists  are  pious  people. 

If  in  the  so-called  feudal  times  we  held  everything 
as  a  fief  from  God,  in  the  liberal  period  the  same 
feudal  relation  exists  with  Man.     God  was  the  Lord, 
now  Man  is  the  Lord;  God  was  the  Mediator,  now 
Man  is;  God  was  the  Spirit,  now  Man  is.     In  this 
threefold  regard  the  feudal  relation  has  experienced  a 
transformation.     For  now,  firstly,  we  hold  as  a  fief 
from  all-powerful  Man  our  power,  which,  because  it 


242  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

comes  from  a  higher,  is  not  called  power  or  might,  but 
"  right," — the  "  rights  of  man  ";  we  further  hold  as  a 
fief  from  him  our  position  in  the  world,  for  he,  the 
mediator,  mediates  our  intercourse  with  others,  which 
therefore  may  not  be  otherwise  than  "  human";  fin- 
ally, we  hold  as  a  fief  from  him  ourselves, — to  wit,  our 
own  value,  or  all  that  we  are  worth, — inasmuch  as  we 
are  worth  nothing  when  he  does  not  dwell  in  us,  and 
when  or  where  we  are  not  "  human."     The  power  is 
Man's,  the  world  is  Man's,  I  am  Man's. 

But  am  I  not  still  unrestrained  from  declaring  my- 
self'the  entitler,  the  mediator,  and  the  own  self? 
Then  it  runs  thus : 

My  power  is  my  property. 

My  power  gives  me  property. 

My  power  am  I  myself,  and  through  it  am  I  my 
property. 

I.— MY  POWER 

Right*  is  the  spirit  of  society.     If  society  has  a 
•mil,  this  will  is  simply  right:  society  exists  only 
through  right.     But,  as  it  endures  only  by  exercising 
a  sovereignty  over  individuals,  right  is  its  SOVEREIGN 
WILL.     Aristotle  says  justice  is  the  advantage  of  society. 

All  existing  right  is— -foreign  law ;  some  one  makes 
me  out  to  be  in  the  right,  "  does  right  by  me."     But 
should  I  therefore  be  in  the  right  if  all  the  world 
made  me  out  so?      And  yet  what  else  is  the  right  that 
I  obtain  in  the  State,  in  society,  but  a  right  of  those 


*  [This  word  has  also,  in  German,  the  meaning  of  "  common  law,"  and 
will  sometimes  be  translated  "  law  "  in  the  following  paragraphs.] 


THE  OWNER  243 

foreign  to  me?      When  a  blockhead  makes  me  out  in 
the  right,  I  grow  distrustful  of  my  Tightness;  I  don't 
like  to  receive  it  from  him.     But,  even  when  a  wise 
man  makes  me  out  in  the  right,  I  nevertheless  am  not 
in  the  right  on  that  account.     Whether  7  am  in  the 
right  is  completely  independent  of  the  fool's  making 
out  and  of  the  wise  man's. 

All  the  same,  we  have  coveted  this  right  till  now. 
We  seek  for  right,  and  turn  to  the  court  for  that  pur- 
pose.    To  what?     To  a  royal,  a  papal,  a  popular 
court,  etc.     Can  a  sultanic  court  declare  another 
right  than  that  which  the  sultan  has  ordained  to  be 
right?      Can  it  make  me  out  in  the  right  if  I  seek  for 
a  right  that  does  not  agree  with  the  sultan's  law? 
Can  it,  e.  g,,  concede  to  me  high  treason  as  a  right, 
since  it  is  assuredly  not  a  right  according  to  the 
sultan's  mind?      Can  it  as  a  court  of  censorship  allow 
me  the  free  utterance  of  opinion  as  a  right,  since  the 
sultan  will  hear  nothing  of  this  my  right?      What  am 
I  seeking  for  in  this  court,  then?      I  am  seeking  for 
sultanic  right,  not  my  right;  I  am  seeking  for — 
foreign  right.     As  long  as  this  foreign  right  harmon- 
izes with  mine,  to  be  sure,  I  shall  find  in  it  the  latter 
too. 

The  State  does  not  permit  pitching  into  each  other 
man  to  man;  it  opposes  the  duel.     Even  every  ordin- 
ary appeal  to  blows,  notwithstanding  that  neither  of 
the  fighters  calls  the  police  to  it,  is  punished;  except 
when  it  is  not  an  I  whacking  away  at  a  you,  but,  say, 
the  head  of  a  family  at  the  child.     The  family  is  en- 
titled to  this,  and  in  its  name  the  father;  I  as  Ego 
am  not. 


244  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

The  "  Vossische  Zeitung"  presents  to  us  the  "  com- 
monwealth of  right."     There  everything  is  to  be  de- 
cided by  the  judge  and  a  court.     It  ranks  the  supreme 
court  of  censorship  as  a  "  court  "  where  "  right  is  de- 
clared."    What  sort  of  a  right?     The  right  of  the 
censorship.     To  recognize  the  sentences  of  that  court 
as  right  one  must  regard  the  censorship  as  right. 
But  it  is  thought  nevertheless  that  this  court  offers  a 
protection.     Yes,  protection  against  an  individual 
censor's  error:  it  protects  only  the  censorship-legislator 
against  false  interpretation  of  his  will,  at  the  same 
time  making  his  statute,  by  the  "  sacred  power  of 
right,"  all  the  firmer  against  writers. 

Whether  I  am  in  the  right  or  not  there  is  no  judge 
but  myself.     Others  can  judge  only  whether  they  en- 
dorse my  right,  and  whether  it  exists  as  right  for 
them  too. 

In  the  meantime  let  us  take  the  matter  yet  another 
way.     I  am  to  reverence  sultanic  law  in  the  sultanate, 
popular  law  in  republics,  canon  law  in  Catholic  com- 
munities, etc.     To  these  laws  I  am  to  subordinate  my- 
self; I  am  to  regard  them  as  sacred.     A  "  sense  of 
right "  and  "  law-abiding  mind  "  of  such  a  sort  is  so 
firmly  planted  in  people's  heads  that  the  most  revolu- 
tionary persons  of  our  days  want  to  subject  us  to  a 
new  "  sacred  law,"  the  "  law  of  society,"  the  law  of 
mankind,  the  "  right  of  all,"  and  the  like.     The 
right  of  "  all  "  is  to  go  before  my  right.     As  a  right 
of  all  it  would  indeed  be  my  right  among  the  rest, 
since  I,  with  the  rest,  am  included  in  all;  but  that  it 
is  at  the  same  time  a  right  of  others,  or  even  of  all 
others,  does  not  move  me  to  its  upholding.     Not  as  a 


THE  OWNER  246 

right  of  ill  will  I  defend  it,  but  as  my  right;  and 
then  every  other  may  see  to  it  how  he  shall  likewise 
maintain  it  for  himself.     The  right  of  all  (e.  g.  to 
eat)  is  a  right  of  every  individual.      Let  each  keep 
this  right  unabridged  for  himself,  then  all  exercise  it 
spontaneously;  let  him  not  take  care  for  all  though, — 
let  him  not  grow  zealous  for  it  as  for  a  right  of  all. 

But  the  social  reformers  preach  to  us  a  "  law  ofso- 
dety."     There  the  individual  becomes  society's  slave, 
and  is  in  the  right  only  when  society  makes  him  out  in 
the  right,  i.  e.  when  he  lives  according  to  society's 
statutes  and  so  is — loyal.     Whether  I  am  loyal  under 
a  despotism  or  in  a  "  society  "  a  la  Weitling,  it  is  the 
same  absence  of  right  in  so  far  as  in  both  cases  I  have 
not  my  right  butforeign  right. 

In  considerations  of  right  the  question  is  always 
asked,  "  What  or  who  gives  me  the  right  to  it?"     An- 
swer: God,  love,  reason,  nature,  humanity,  etc.     No, 
only  your  might,  your  power  gives  you  the  right 
(your  reason,  e.  g..  may  give  it  to  you). 

Communism,  which  assumes  that  men  "  have  equal 
rights  by  nature,"  contradicts  its  own  proposition  till 
it  comes  to  this,  that  men  have  no  right  at  all  by  na- 
ture.    For  it  is  not  willing  to  recognize,  e.  g.,  that 
parents  have  "  by  nature  "  rights  as  against  their 
children,  or  the  children  as  against  the  parents:  it 
abolishes  the  family.     Nature  gives  parents,  brothers, 
etc.,  no  right  at  all.     Altogether,  this  entire  revolu- 
tionary or  Babouvist  principle  *  rests  on  a  religious, 
i.  e.  false,  view  of  things.     Who  can  ask  after  "right" 

*Cf.  "/>!>  Komitiitiiisti -ii  hi  tin- Nchin-iz,"  committee  report,  p.  3. 


246  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

if  he  does  not  occupy  the  religious  standpoint  himself  ? 
Is  not  "right"  a  religious  concept,  i.  e.  something 
sacred?      Why,  "equality  of  rights,"  as  the  Revolu- 
tion propounded  it,  is  only  another  name  for  "  Chris- 
tian equality,"  the  "  equality  of  the  brethren,"  "  of 
God's  children,"  " of  Christians,"  etc.:  in  short, 
fraternite.      Each  and  every  inquiry  after  right 
deserves  to  be  lashed  with  Schiller's  words: 

Many  a  year  I've  used  my  nose 
To  smell  the  onion  and  the  rose ; 
Is  there  any  proof  which  shows 
That  I've  a  right  to  that  same  nose? 

When  the  Revolution  stamped  equality  as  a 
"right,"  it  took  flight  into  the  religious  domain, 
into  the  region  of  the  sacred,  of  the  ideal.     Hence, 
since  then,  the  fight  for  the  "  sacred,  inalienable 
rights  of  man."      Against  the  "  eternal  rights  of  man  " 
the  "  well-earned  rights  of  the  established  order  "  are 
quite  naturally,  and  with  equal  right,  brought  to 
bear:  right  against  right,  where  of  course  one  is  de- 
cried by  the  other  as  "  wrong."     This  has  been  the 
contest  of  rights*  since  the  Revolution. 

You  want  to  be  "  in  the  right "  as  against  the  rest. 
That  you  cannot;  as  against  them  you  remain  forever 
"  in  the  wrong  " ;  for  they  surely  would  not  be  your 
opponents  if  they  were  not  in  "their  right"  too; 
they  will  always  make  you  out  "  in  the  wrong."      But, 
as  against  the  right  of  the  rest,  yours  is  a  higher, 
greater,  more  powerful  right,  is  it  not?      No  such 
thing!      Your  right  is  not  more  powerful  if  you  are 

*  [Rechtsstreit,  a  word  which  usually  means  "lawsuit."] 


THE  OWNER  24? 

not  more  powerful.      Have  Chinese  subjects  a  right  to 
freedom?     Just  bestow  it  on  them,  and  then  look  how 
far  you  have  gone  wrong  in  your  attempt:  because 
they  do  not  know  how  to  use  freedom  they  have  no 
right  to  it,  or,  in  clearer  terms,  because  they  have 
not  freedom  they  have  not  the  right  to  it.     Children 
have  no  right  to  the  condition  of  majority  because 
they  are  not  of  age,  i.  e.  because  they  are  children. 
Peoples  that  let  themselves  be  kept  in  nonage  have  no 
right  to  the  condition  of  majority;  if  they  ceased  to  be 
in  nonage,  then  only  would  they  have  the  right  to  be 
of  age.     This  means  nothing  else  than  "  What  you 
have  the  power  to  be  you  have  the  right  to."     I  derive 
all  right  and  all  warrant  from  me;  I  am  entitled  to 
everything  that  I  have  in  my  power.     I  am  entitled  to 
overthrow  Zeus,  Jehovah,  God,  etc.,  if  I  can ;  if  I  can- 
not, then  these  gods  will  always  remain  in  the  right 
and  in  power  as  against  me,  and  what  I  do  will  be  to 
fear  their  right  and  their  power  in  impotent  "god-fear- 
ingness,"  to  keep  their  commandments  and  believe  that 
I  do  right  in  everything  that  I  do  according  to  their 
right,  about  as  the  Russian  boundary-sentinels  think 
themselves  rightfully  entitled  to  shoot  dead  the  suspic- 
ious persons  who  are  escaping,  since  they  murder  "  by 
superior  authority,"  i.  e.  "  with  right."     But  I  am  en- 
titled by  myself  to  murder  if  I  myself  do  not  forbid 
it  to  myself,  if  I  myself  do  not  fear  murder  as  a 
"  wrong."     This  view  of  things  lies  at  the  foundation 
of  Chamisso's  poem,  "  The  Valley  of  Murder,"  where 
the  gray-haired  Indian  murderer  compels  reverence 
from  the  white  man  whose  brethren  he  has  murdered. 
The  only  thing  I  am  not  entitled  to  is  what  I  do  not 


•248  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

do  with  a  free  cheer,  i.  e.  what  /  do  not  entitle  myself 
to. 

/  decide  whether  it  is  the  right  thing-  in  me  ,•  there 
is  no  right  outside  me.     If  it  is  right  for  me,*  it  is 
right.     Possibly  this  may  not  suffice  to  make  it  right 
for  the  rest;  that  is  their  care,  not  mine:  let  them  de- 
fend themselves.     And  if  for  the  whole  world  some- 
thing were  not  right,  but  it  were  right  for  me,  i.  e.  I 
wanted  it,  then  I  would  ask  nothing  about  the  whole 
world.     So  every  one  does  who  knows  how  to  value 
himself,  every  one  in  the  degree  that  he  is  an  egoist; 
for  might  goes  before  right,,  and  that — with  perfect 
right. 

Because  I  am  "  by  nature  "  a  man  I  have  an  equal 
right  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  goods,  says  Babeuf. 
Must  he  not  also  say:  because  I  am  "  by  nature  "  a 
first-born  prince  I  have  a  right  to  the  throne?     The 
rights  of  man  and  the  "  well-earned  rights  "  come  to 
the  same  thing  in  the  end,  to  wit,  to  nature,  which 
gives  me  a  right,  i.  e.  to  birth  (and,  further,  inheri- 
tance, etc.).    "  I  am  born  as  a  man  "  is  equal  to  "  I  am 
born  as  a  king's  son."     The  natural  man  has  only  a 
natural  right  (because  he  has  only  a  natural  power) 
and  natural  claims:  he  has  right  of  birth  and  claims 
of  birth.     But  nature  cannot  entitle  me,  i.  e.  give  me 
capacity  or  might,  to  that  to  which  only  my  act 
entitles  me.     That  the  king's  child  sets  himself  above 
other  children,  even  this  is  his  act,  which  secures  to 
him  the  precedence;  and  that  the  other  children  ap- 
prove and  recognize  this  act  is  their  act,  which  makes 

*  [A  common  German  phrase  for  "  it  suits  me."] 


THE  OWNER  249 

them  worthy  to  be — subjects. 

Whether  nature  gives  me  a  right,  or  whether  God, 
the  people's  choice,  etc.,  does  so,  all  of  that  is  the  same 
foreign  right,  a  right  that  /  do  not  give  or  take  to 
myself. 

Thus  the  Communists  say,  equal  labor  entitles  man 
to  equal  enjoyment.     Formerly  the  question  was 
raised  whether  the  "  virtuous  "  man  must  not  be 
"  happy  "  on  earth.     The  Jews  actually  drew  this  in- 
ference: "That  it  may  go  well  with  thee  on  earth." 
No,  equal  labor  does  not  entitle  you  to  it,  but  equal 
enjoyment  alone  entitles  you  to  equal  enjoyment. 
Enjoy,  then  you  are  entitled  to  enjoyment.      But,  it 
you  have  labored  and  let  the  enjoyment  be  taken  from 
you,  then — "  it  serves  you  right." 

If  you  take  the  enjoyment,  it  is  your  right;  if,  on 
the  contrary,  you  only  pine  for  it  without  laying  hands 
on  it,  it  remains  as  before,  a  "  well-earned  right"  of 
those  who  are  privileged  for  enjoyment.     It  is  their 
right,  as  by  laying  hands  on  it  it  would  become  you r 
right. 

The  conflict  over  the  "  right  of  property  "  wavers  in 
vehement  commotion.     The  Communists  affirm  *  that 
"  the  earth  belongs  rightfully  to  him  who  tills  it,  and 
its  products  to  those  who  bring  them  out."      I  think  it 
belongs  to  him  who  knows  how  to  take  it,  or  who  does 
not  let  it  be  taken  from  him,  does  not  let  himself  be 
deprived  of  it.     If  he  appropriates  it,  then  not  only  the 
earth,  but  the  right  to  it  too,  belongs  to  him.     This 
is  egoistic  right :  i.  e.,  it  is  right  for  me,  therefore 


*  A.  Becker,  "  Volksphilosophie,"  p.  22  f. 


250  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

it  is  right. 

Aside  from  this,  right  does  have  "a  wax  nose." 
The  tiger  that  assails  me  is  in  the  right,  and  I  who 
strike  him  down  am  also  in  the  right.     I  defend 
against  him  not  my  right,  but  myself. 

As  human  right  is  always  something  given,  it 
always  in  reality  reduces  to  the  right  which  men 
give.  i.  e.  "  concede,"  to  each  other.     If  the  right 
to  existence  is  conceded  to  new-born  children,  then 
they  have  the  right;  if  it  is  not  conceded  to  them,  as 
was  the  case  among  the  Spartans  and  ancient  Romans, 
then  they  do  not  have  it.     For  only  society  can  give 
or  concede  it  to  them ;  they  themselves  cannot  take  it, 
or  give  it  to  themselves.     It  will  be  objected,  the 
children  had  nevertheless  "  by  nature  "  the  right  to 
exist;  only  the  Spartans  refused  recognition  to  this 
right.     But  then  they  simply  had  no  right  to  this 
recognition, — no  more  than  they  had  to  recognition 
of  their  life  by  the  wild  beasts  to  which  they  were 
thrown. 

People  talk  so  much  about  birthright,  and  com- 
plain : 

There  is — alas ! — no  mention  of  the  rights 
That  were  born  with  us .  * 

What  sort  of  right,  then,  is  there  that  was  born  with 
me?     The  right  to  receive  an  entailed  estate,  to 
inherit  a  throne,  to  enjoy  a  princely  or  noble  edu- 
cation; or,  again,  because  poor  parents  begot  me,  to — 
get  free  schooling,  be  clothed  out  of  contributions  of 
alms,  and  at  last  earn  my  bread  and  my  herring  in 

*  [  Mephistopheles  in  "  Faust,"] 


THE  OWNER  251 

the  coal-mines  or  at  the  loom?      Are  these  not  birth-     • 
rights,  rights  that  have  come  down  to  me  from  my 
parents  through  birth?     You  think —  no;  you  think 
these  are  only  rights  improperly  so  called,  it  is  just 
these  rights  that  you  aim  to  abolish  through  the  real 
birthright.     To  give  a  basis  for  this  you  go  back  to 
the  simplest  thing  and  affirm  that  every  one  is  by 
birth  equal  to  another, — to  wit,  a  man.     I  will  grant 
you  that  every  one  is  born  as  man,  hence  the  new-born 
are  therein  equal  to  each  other.     Why  are  they? 
Only  because  they  do  not  yet  show  and  exert  them- 
selves as  anything  but  bare — children  of  men,  naked 
little  human  beings.     But  thereby  they  are  at  once  dif- 
ferent from  those  who  have  already  made  something 
out  of  themselves,  who  thus  are  no  longer  bare  "  chil- 
dren of  men,"  but — children  of  their  own  creation. 
The  latter  possess  more  than  bare  birthrights:  they 
have  earned  rights.     What  an  antithesis,  what  a  field 
of  combat!     The  old  combat  of  the  birthrights  of  man 
and  well-earned  rights.     Go  right  on  appealing  to 
your  birthrights;  people  will  not  fail  to  oppose  to  you 
the  well-earned.      Both  stand  on  the  "  ground  of 
right  ";  for  each  of  the  two  has  a  "  right"  against 
the  other,  the  one  the  birthright  or  natural  right,  the 
other  the  earned  or  "  well-earned  "  right. 

If  you  remain  on  the  ground  of  right,  you  remain 
in — Rechthaberei.*     The  other  cannot  give  you  your 
right;  he  cannot  "  mete  out  right"  to  you.      He  who 
has  might  has — right;  if  you  have  not  the  former, 

*  "  I  Ix-e  you.  spare  my  lungs  !    He  who  insists  on  proving  himself 
right,  if  lie  hut  has  one  of  these  things  called  tongues,  can  hold  his  own  in 
all  the  world's  despite  !  "     [Faust's  words  to  Mephistopheles,  slightly  mis- 
quoted.—For  Rcchthabtrti  see  note  on  p.  185.] 


259  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

neither  have  you  the  latter.     Is  this  wisdom  so  hard  to 
attain  ?  %  Just  look  at  the  mighty  and  their  doings ! 
We  are  talking  here  only  of  China  and  Japan,  of 
course.    Just  try  it  once,  you  Chinese  and  Japanese,  to 
make  them  out  in  the  wrong,  and  learn  by  experience 
how  they  throw  you  into  jail.      (Only  do  not  confuse 
with  this  the  "  well-meaning  counsels  "  which — in 
China  and  Japan — are  permitted,  because  they  do  not 
hinder  the  mighty  one,  but  possibly  help  him  ort.) 
For  him  who  should  want  to  make  them  out  in  the 
wrong  there  would  stand  open  only  one  way  thereto, 
that  of  might.     If  he  deprives  them  of  their  might, 
then  he  has  really  made  them  out  in  the  wrong,  de- 
prived them  of  their  right;  in  any  other  case  he  can  do 
nothing  but  clench  his  little  fist  in  his  pocket,  or  fall  a 
victim  as  an  obtrusive  fool. 

In  short,  if  you  Chinese  and  Japanese  did  not  ask 
after  right,  and  in  particular  if  you  did  not  ask  after 
the  rights  "  that  were  born  with  you,"  then  you  would 
not  need  to  ask  at  all  after  the  well-earned  rights 
either. 

You  start  back  in  fright  before  others,  because  you 
think  you  see  beside  them  the  ghost  of  right,  which, 
as  in  the  Homeric  combats,  seems  to  fight  as  a 
goddess  at  their  side,  helping  them.     What  do  you 
do?      Do  you  throw  the  spear?      No,  you  creep 
around  to  gain  the  spook  over  to  yourselves,  that  it 
may  fight  on  your  side:  you  woo  for  the  ghost's  favor 
Another  would  simply  ask  thus:   Do  I  will  what  my 
opponent  wills?      "No!"     Now  then,  there  may 
fight  for  him  a  thousand  devils  or  gods,  I  go  at  him 
all  the  same! 


THE  OWNER  953 

The  "commonwealth  of  right,"  as  the  "Vossische 
Zcitung"  among  others  stands  for  it,  asks  that  office- 
holders be  removable  only  by  the  judge,  not  by  the 
(Hhnini.vf  ration.     Vain  illusion!      If  it  were  settled  by 
law  that  an  office-holder  who  is  once  seen  drunken 
shall  lose  his  office,  then  the  judges  would  have  to 
condemn  him  on  the  word  of  the  witnesses,  etc.      In 
short,  the  lawgiver  would  only  have  to  state  precisely 
all  the  possible  grounds  which  entail  the  loss  of  office, 
however  laughable  they  might  be  (e.  g.  he  who  laughs 
in  his  superiors'  faces,  who  does  not  go  to  church 
every  Sunday,  who  does  not  take  the  communion  every 
four  weeks,  who  runs  in  debt,  who  has  disreputable 
associates,  who  shows  no  determination,  etc.,  shall  be 
removed.     These  things  the  lawgiver  might  take  it 
into  his  head  to  prescribe,  e.  g.,  for  a  court  of  honor) ; 
then  the  judge  would  solely  have  to  investigate 
whether  the  accused  had  "become  guilty  "  of  those 
"  offences,"  and,  on  presentation  of  the  proof,  pro-- 
nounce  sentence  of  removal  against  him  "  in  the  name 
of  the  law." 

The  judge  is  lost  when  he  ceases  to  be  mechanical, 
when  he  "  is  forsaken  by  the  rules  of  evidence."    Then 
he  no  longer  has  anything  but  an  opinion  like  every- 
body else;  and,  if  he  decides  according  to  this  opinion, 
his  action  is  no  longer  an  official  action.      As  judge  he 
must  decide  only  according  to  the  law.     Commend 
me  rather  to  the  old  French  parliaments,  which 
wanted  to  examine  for  themselves  what  was  to  be 
matter  of  right,  and  to  register  it  only  after  their  own 
approval.     They  at  least  judged  according  to  a  right 
of  their  own,  and  were  not  willing  to  give  themselves 


254  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

up  to  be  machines  of  the  lawgiver,  although  as  judges 
they  must,  to  be  sure,  become  their  own  machines. 

It  is  said  that  punishment  is  the  criminal's  right. 
But  impunity  is  just  as  much  his  right.     If  his  under- 
taking succeeds,  it  serves  him  right,  and,  if  it  does 
not  succeed,  it  likewise  serves  him  right.     You  make 
your  bed  and  lie  in  it.     If  some  one  goes  foolhardily 
into  dangers  and  perishes  in  them,  we  are  apt  to  say, 
"  It  serves  him  right;  he  would  have  it  so."      But,  if 
he  conquered  the  dangers,  i.  e.  if  his  might  was  victor- 
ious, then  he  would  be  in  the  right  too.      If  a  child 
plays  with  the  knife  and  gets  cut,  it  is  served  right; 
but,  if  it  doesn't  get  cut,  it  is  served  right  too. 
Hence  right  befalls  the  criminal,  doubtless,  when  he 
suffers  what  he  risked ;  why,  what  did  he  risk  it  for, 
since  he  knew  the  possible  consequences?      But  the 
punishment  that  we  decree  against  him  is  only  our 
right,  not  his.     Our  right  reacts  against  his,  and  he  is 
"  in  the  wrong  at  last "  because — we  get  the  upper 
hand. 

But  what  is  right,  what  is  matter  of  right  in  a  so- 
ciety, is  voiced  too — in  the  law.* 

Whatever  the  law  may  be,  it  must  be  respected  by 
the — loyal  citizen.     Thus  the  law-abiding  mind  of 
Old  England  is  eulogized.     To  this  that  Euripidean 
sentiment  (Orestes,  418)  entirely  corresponds:   "  We 
serve  the  gods,  whatever  the  gods  are."     Law  as  such. 
God  as  such,  thus  far  we  are  to-day. 

People  are  at  pains  to  distinguish  law  from  arbi- 

*  [Gesetz,  statute  ;  no  longer  the  same  German  word  as  "  right."] 


THE  OWNER  255 

trary  orders,  from  an  ordinance:  the  former  comes 
from  a  duly  entitled  authority.     But  a  law  over  hu- 
man action  (ethical  law,  State  law,  etc.)  is  always  a 
declaration  afwiU,  and  so  an  order.     Yes,  even  if  I 
myself  gave  myself  the  law,  it  would  yet  be  only  my 
order,  to  which  in  the  next  moment  I  can  refuse  obedi- 
ence.    One  may  well  enough  declare  what  he  will  put 
up  with,  and  so  deprecate  the  opposite  by  a  law,  mak- 
ing known  that  in  the  contrary  case  he  will  treat  the 
transgressor  as  his  enemy;  but  no  one  has  any  busi- 
ness to  command  my  actions,  to  say  what  course  I 
shall  pursue  and  set  up  a  code  to  govern  it.      I  must 
put  up  with  it  that  he  treats  me  as  his  enemy,  but 
never  that  he  makes  free  with  me  as  his  creature,  and 
that  he  makes  his  reason,  or  even  unreason,  my 
plumb-line. 

States  last  only  so  long  as  there  is  a  ruling  will  and 
this  ruling  will  is  looked  upon  as  tantamount  to  the 
own  will.     The  lord's  will  is — law.     What  do  your 
laws  amount  to  if  no  one  obeys  them?  what  your 
orders,  if  nobody  lets  himself  be  ordered?     The  State 
cannot  forbear  the  claim  to  determine  the  individual's 
will,  to  speculate  and  count  on  this.     For  the  State 
it  is  indispensable  that  nobody  have  an  own  will;  if 
one  had,  the  State  would  have  to  exclude  (lock  up, 
banish,  etc.)  this  one;  if  all  had,  they  would  do  away 
with  the  State.     The  State  is  not  thinkable  without 
lordship  and  servitude  (subjection);  for  the  State 
must  will  to  be  the  lord  of  all  that  it  embraces,  and 
this  will  is  called  the  "  will  of  the  State." 

He  who,  to  hold  his  own,  must  count  on  the  absence 
of  will  in  others  is  a  thing  made  by  these  others,  as 


256  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  master  is  a  thing  made  by  the  servant.     If  submis- 
siveness  ceased,  it  would  be  all  over  with  lordship. 

The  own  will  of  Me  is  the  State's  destroyer;  it  is 
therefore  branded  by  the  State  as  "self-will."     Own 
will  and  the  State  are  powers  in  deadly  hostility,  be- 
tween which  no  "  eternal  peace  "  is  possible.     As  long 
as  the  State  asserts  itself,  it  represents  own  will,  its 
ever-hostile  opponent,  as  unreasonable,  evil,  etc. ;  and 
the  latter  lets  itself  be  talked  into  believing  this, — nay, 
it  really  is  such,  for  no  more  reason  than  this,  that  it 
still^  lets  itself  be  talked  into  such  belief:   it  has  not 
yet  co ire  to  itself  and  to  the  consciousness  of  its  dig- 
nity; hence  it  is  still  incomplete,  still  amenable  to  fine 
words,  etc. 

Every  State  is  a  despotism,  be  the  despot  one  or 
many,  or  (as  one  is  likely  to  imagine  about  a  republic 
if  all  be  lords,  i.  e.  despotize  one  over  another.      For 
this  is  the  case  when  the  law  given  at  any  time,  the  ex 
pressed  volition  of  (it  may  be)  a  popular  assembly,  is 
thenceforth  to  be  law  for  the  individual,  to  which 
obedience  is  due  from  him,  or  toward  which  he  has  the 
duty  of  obedience.      If  one  were  even  to  conceive  the 
case  that  every  individual  in  the  people  had  expressed 
the  same  will,  and  hereby  a  complete  "  collective  will ' 
had  come  into  being,  the  matter  would  still  remain 
the  same.     Would  I  not  be  bound  to-day  and  hence- 
forth to  my  will  of  yesterday?      My  will  would  in  this 
case  be  frozen.     Wretched  stability!     My  creature — 
to  wit,  a  particular  expression  of  will— would  have 
become  my  commander.      But  I  in  my  will,  I  the 
creator,  should  be  hindered  in  my  flow  and  my  disso- 
lution,    Because  I  was  a  fool  yesterday  I  must  remain 


THE  OWNER  257 


258  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

individual,  "crime."     Crime,*  then, — so  the  individ- 
ual's violence  is  called;  and  only  by  crime  does  he 
overcome  f  the  State's  violence  when  he  thinks  that 
the  State  is  not  above  him,  but  he  above  the  State. 

Now,  if  I  wanted  to  act  ridiculously,  I  might,  as  a 
well-meaning  person,  admonish  you  not  to  make  laws 
which  impair  my  self-development,  self- activity,  self- 
creation.     I  do  not  give  this  advice.     For,  if  you 
should  follow  it,  you  would  be  unwise,  and  I  should 
have  been  cheated  of  my  entire  profit.      I  request 
nothing  at  all  from  you;  for,  whatever  I  might  de- 
mand, you  would  still  be  dictatorial  lawgivers,  and 
must  be  so,  because  a  raven  cannot  sing,  nor  a  robber 
live  without  robbery.     Rather  do  I  ask  those  who 
would  be  egoists  what  they  think  the  more  egoistic, — 
to  let  laws  be  given  them  by  you,  and  to  respect  those 
that  are  given,  or  to  practise  refractoriness,  yes,  com- 
plete disobedience.     Good-hearted  people  think  the 
laws  ought  to  prescribe  only  what  is  accepted  in  the 
people's  feeling  as  right  and  proper.     But  what  con- 
cern is  it  of  mine  what  is  accepted  in  the  nation  and 
by  the  nation?     The  nation  will  perhaps  be  against 
the  blasphemer;  therefore  a  law  against  blasphemy. 
Am  I  not  to  blaspheme  on  that  account?      Is  this  law 
to  be  more  than  an  "order"  to  me?      I  put  the 
question. 

Solely  from  the  principle  that  all  right  and  all 
authority  belong  to  the  collectivity  of  tlie  people  do 
all  forms  of  government  arise.     For  none  of  them 
lacks  this  appeal  to  the  collectivity,  and  the  despot,  as 

*  [Verbrechen]  t  [bnchen} 


THE  OWNER  259 

well  as  the  president  or  any  aristocracy,  etc.,  acts  and 
commands  "  in  the  name  of  the  State."     They  are  in 
possession  of  the  "  authority  of  the  State,"  and  it  is 
perfectly  indifferent  whether,  were  this  possible,  the 
people  as  a  collectivity  (all  individuals)  exercise  this 
state-authority,  or  whether  it  is  only  the  representa- 
tives of  this  collectivity,  be  there  many  of  them  as  in 
aristocracies  or  one  as  in  monarchies.     Always  the  col- 
lectivity is  above  the  individual,  and  has  a  power 
which  is  called  legitimate,  i.  e.  which  is  law. 

Over  against  the  sacredness  of  the  State,  the  indi- 
vidual is  only  a  vessel  of  dishonor,  in  which  "exuber- 
ance, malevolence,  mania  for  ridicule  and  slander, 
frivolity,"  etc.,  are  left  as  soon  as  he  does  not  deem 
that  object  of  veneration,  the  State,  to  be  worthy  of 
recognition.     The  spiritual  haughtiness  of  the  servants 
and  subjects  of  the  State  has  fine  penalties  against 
unspiritual  "  exuberance." 

When  the  government  designates  as  punishable  all 
play  of  mind  against  the  State,  the  moderate  liberals 
come  and  opine  that  fun,  satire,  wit,  humor,  etc..  must 
have  free  play  anyhow,  and  genius  must  enjoy  free- 
dom.    So  not  the  individual  man  indeed,  but  still 
genius,  is  to  be  free.      Here  the  State,  or  in  its  name 
the  government,  says  with  perfect  right:  He  who  is  not 
for  me  is  against  me.     Fun,  wit,  etc., — in  short,  the 
turning  of  State  affairs  into  a  comedy, — have  under- 
mined States  from  of  old:  they  are  not  "innocent." 
And,  further,  what  boundaries  are  to  be  drawn  between 
guilty  and  innocent  wit,  etc.?      At  this  question  the 
moderates  fall  into  great  perplexity,  and  everything 
reduces  itself  to  the  prayer  that  the  State  (govern- 


260  tHE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

merit)  would  please  not  be  so  sensitive,  so  ticklish ; 
that  it  would  not  immediately  scent  malevolence  in 
"  harmless  "  things,  and  would  in  general  be  a  little 
"  more  tolerant."      Exaggerated  sensitiveness  is  cer- 
tainly a  weakness,  its  avoidance  may  be  a  praiseworthy 
virtue;  but  in  time  of  war  one  cannot  be  sparing,  and 
what  may  be  allowed  under  peaceable  circumstances 
ceases  to  be  permitted  as  soon  as  a  state  of  siege  is  de- 
clared.     Because  the  well-meaning  liberals  feel  this 
plainly,  they  hasten  to  declare  that,  considering  "  the 
devotion  of  the  people,"  there  is  assuredly  no  danger 
to  be  feared.     But  the  government  will  be  wiser,  and 
not  let  itself  be  talked  into  believing  anything  of  that 
sort.      It  knows  too  well  how  people  stuff  one  with  fine 
words,  and  will  not  let  itself  be  satisfied  with  this 
Barmecide  dish. 

But  they  are  bound  to  have  their  play-ground,  for 
they  are  children,  you  know,  and  cannot  be  so  staid  as 
old  folks;  boys  will  be  boys. 

Only  for  this  play-ground,  only  for  a  few  hours  of 
jolly  running  about,  they  bargain.     They  ask  only 
that  the  State  should  not,  like  a  splenetic  papa,  be  too 
cross.      It  should  permit  some  Processions  of  the  Ass 
and  plays  of  fools,  as  the  church  allowed  them  in  the 
Middle  Ages.     But  the  times  when  it  could  grant  this 
without  danger  are  past.      Children  that  now  once 
come  into  the  open,  and  live  through  an  hour  without 
the  rod  of  discipline,  are  no  longer  willing  to  go  into 
the  cell.      For  the  open  is  now  no  longer  a  supplement 
to  the  cell,  no  longer  a  refreshing  recreation,  but  its 
opposite,  an  aut — aut.     In  short,  the  State  must 
either  no  longer  put  up  with  anything,  or  put  up  with 


THE  OWNER  261 

everything  and  perish;  it  must  be  either  sensitive 
through  and  through,  or,  like  a  dead  man,  insensitive. 
Tolerance  is  done  with.     If  the  State  but  gives  a 
finger,  they  take  the  whole  hand  at  once.     There  can 
be  no  more  "jesting,"  and  all  jest,  such  as  fun,  wit, 
humor,  etc.,  becomes  bitter  earnest. 

The  clamor  of  the  Liberals  for  freedom  of  the  press 
runs  counter  to  their  own  principle,  their  proper 
will.     They  will  what  they  do  not  will,  i.  e.  they  wish, 
they  would  like.      Hence  it  is  too  that  they  fall  away 
so  easily  when  once  so-called  freedom  of  the  press 
appears;  then  they  would  like  censorship.     Quite 
naturally.     The  State  is  sacred  even  to  them;  likewise 
morals,  etc.     They  behave  toward  it  only  as  ill-bred 
brats,  as  tricky  children  who  seek  to  utilize  the  weak- 
nesses of  their  parents.      Papa  State  is  to  permit  them 
to  say  many  things  that  do  not  please  him,  but  papa 
has  the  right,  by  a  stern  look,  to  blue-pencil  their 
impertinent  gabble.     If  they  recognize  in  him  their 
papa,  they  must  in  his  presence  put  up  with  the  cen- 
sorship of  speech,  like  every  child. 


If  you  let  yourself  be  made  out  in  the  right  by  an- 
other, you  must  no  less  let  yourself  be  made  out  in 
the  wrong  by  him;  if  justification  and  reward  come  to 
you  from  him,  expect  also  his  arraignment  and  punish- 
ment.    Alongside  right  goes  wrong,  alongside  legality 
crime.     What  are  you  ? — You  are  a — criminal! 

"  The  criminal  is  in  the  utmost  degree  the  State's 
own  crime! "  says  Bettina.*     One  may  let  this  senti- 

*  "This  Book  Belongs  to  the  King,"  p.  878. 


262  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ment  pass,  even  if  Bettina  herself  does  not  understand 
it  exactly  so.      For  in  the  State  the  unbridled  I — 
I,  as  I  belong  to  myself  alone — cannot  come  to  my  ful- 
filment and  realization.     Every  ego  is  from  birth  a 
criminal  to  begin  with  against  the  people,  the  State. 
Hence  it  is  that  it  does  really  keep  watch  over  all;  it 
sees  in  each  one  an — egoist,  and  it  is  afraid  of  the 
egoist.     It  presumes  the  worst  about  each  one,  and 
takes  care,  police-care,  that  "  no  harm  happens  to  the 
State,"  ne  quid  respublica  detrimenti  capiat.     The 
unbridled  ego — and  this  we  originally  are,  and  in 
our  secret  inward  parts  we  remain  so  always — is  the 
never-ceasing  criminal  in  the  State.     The  man  whom 
his  boldness,  his  will,  his  inconsiderateness  and  fear- 
lessness lead  is  surrounded  with  spies  by  the  State,  by 
the  people.     I  say,  by  the  people!      The  people  (think 
it  something  wonderful,  you  good-hearted  folks,  what 
you  have  in  the  people) — the  people  is  full  of  police 
sentiments  through  and  through. — Only  he  who  re- 
nounces his  ego,  who  practises  "  self-renunciation,"  is 
acceptable  to  the  people. 

In  the  book  cited  Bettina  is  throughout  good- 
natured  enough  to  regard  the  State  as  only  sick,  and 
to  hope  for  its  recovery,  a  recovery  which  she  would 
bring  about  through  the  "demagogues";  *  but  it  is 
not  sick;  rather  is  it  in  its  full  strength,  when  it  puts 
from  it  the  demagogues  who  want  to  acquire  some- 
thing for  the  individuals,  for  "  all."     In  its  believers  it 
is  provided  with  the  best  demagogues  (leaders  of  the 
people).     According  to  Bettina,  the  State  is  to  f 

*  P.  376.  t  P.  374, 


THE  OWNER  263 

"develop  mankind's  germ  of  freedom;  otherwise  it  is  a 
raven-mother*  and  caring  for  raven-fodder!"     It 
cannot  do  otherwise,  for  in  its  very  caring  for  "  man- 
kind "  (which,  besides,  would  have  to  be  the  "  hu- 
mane "  or  "  free  "  State  to  begin  with)  the  "  indi- 
vidual "  is  raven-fodder  for  it.     How  rightly  speaks 
the  burgomaster,  on  the  other  hand:  f  "  What?  the 
State  has  no  other  duty  than  to  be  merely  the  attend- 
ant of  incurable  invalids? — That  isn't  to  the  point. 
From  of  old  the  healthy  State  has  relieved  itself  of  the 
diseased  matter,  and  not  mixed  itself  with  it.      It  does 
not  need  to  be  so  economical  with  its  juices.     Cut  off 
the  robber-branches  without  hesitation,  that  the  others 
may  bloom. — Do  not  shiver  at  the  State's  harshness; 
its  morality,  its  policy  and  religion,  point  it  to  that. 
Accuse  it  of  no  want  of  feeling;  its  sympathy  revolts 
against  this,  but  its  experience  finds  safety  only  in  this 
severity!      There  are  diseases  in  which  only  drastic 
remedies  will  help.     The  physician  who  recognizes  the 
disease  as  such,  but  timidly  turns  to  palliatives,  will 
never  remove  the  disease,  but  may  well  cause  the 
patient  to  succumb  after  a  shorter  or  longer  sickness!  " 
Frau  Rat's  question,  "  If  you  apply  death  as  a 
drastic  remedy,  how  is  the  cure  to  be  wrought  then?" 
isn't  to  the  point.     Why,  the  State  does  not  apply 
death  against  itself,  but  against  an  offensive  member; 
it  tears  out  an  eye  that  offends  it,  etc. 

"  For  the  invalid  State  the  only  way  of  salvation  is 
to  make  man  flourish  in  it."J     If  one  here,  like 
Bettina,  understands  by  man  the  concept  "  Man,"  she 

*  [An  unnatural  mother]  t  P.  »«1.  $  P.  885. 


264  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

is  right;  the  "  invalid  "  State  will  recover  by  the 
flourishing  of  "  Man,"  for,  the  more  infatuated  the 
individuals  are  with  "  Man,"  the  better  it  serves  the 
State's  turn.     But,  if  one  referred  it  to  the  individ- 
uals, to  "  all  "  (and  the  authoress  half  does  this  too, 
because  about  "  Man  "  she  is  still  involved  in  vague- 
ness), then  it  would  sound  somewhat  like  the  follow- 
ing: For  an  invalid  band  of  robbers  the  only  way  of 
salvation  is  to  make  the  loyal  citizen  flourish  in  it! 
Why,  thereby  the  band  of  robbers  would  simply  go  to 
ruin  as  a  band  of  robbers;  and,  because  it  perceives  . 
this,  it  prefers  to  shoot  every  one  who  has  a  leaning 
toward  becoming  a  "  steady  man." 

In  this  book  Bettina  is  a  patriot,  or,  what  is  little 
more,  a  philanthropist,  a  worker  for  human  happiness. 
She  is  discontented  with  the  existing  order  in  quite  the 
same  way  as  is  the  title-ghost  of  her  book,  along  with 
all  who  would  like  to  bring  back  the  good  old  faith 
and  what  goes  with  it.     Only  she  thinks,  contrariwise, 
that  the  politicians,  place-holders,  and  diplomats 
ruined  the  State,  while  those  lay  it  at  the  door  of  the 
malevolent,  the  "  seducers  of  the  people." 

What  is  the  ordinary  criminal  but  one  who  has 
committed  the  fatal  mistake  of  endeavoring  after  what 
is  the  people's  instead  of  seeking  for  what  is  his?      He 
has  sought  despicable  alien  goods,  has  done  what 
believers  do  who  seek  after  what  is  God's.     What  does 
the  priest  who  admonishes  the  criminal  do?      He  sets 
before  him  the  great  wrong  of  having  desecrated  by 
his  act  what  was  hallowed  by  the  State,  its  property 
(in  which,  of  course,  must  be  included  even  the  life 
of  those  who  belong  to  the  State) ;  instead  of  this, 


THE  OWNER  965 

he  might  rather  hold  up  to  him  the  fact  that  he  has 
befouled  himself  in  not  despising-  the  alien  thing,  but 
thinking  it  worth  stealing;  he  could,  if  he  were  not  a 
parson.     Talk  with  the  so-called  criminal  as  with  an 
egoist,  and  he  will  be  ashamed,  not  that  he  trans- 
gressed against  your  laws  and  goods,  but  that  he  con- 
sidered your  laws  worth  evading,  your  goods  worth 
desiring;  he  will  be  ashamed  that  he  did  not — despise 
you  and  yours  together,  that  he  was  too  little  an 
egoist.      But  you  cannot  talk  egoistically  with  him, 
for  you  are  not  so  great  as  a  criminal,  you — commit 
no  crime!      You  do  not  know  that  an  ego  who  is  his 
own  cannot  desist  from  being  a  criminal,  that  crime 
is  his  life.     And  yet  you  should  know  it,  since  you 
believe  that  "  we  are  all  miserable  sinners  " ;  but  you 
think  surreptitiously  to  get  beyond  sin,  you  do  not 
comprehend — for  you  are  devil-fearing — that  guilt  is 
the  value  of  a  man.     Oh,  if  you  were  guilty!      But 
now  you  are  "righteous."*     Well, — just  put  every 
thing  nicely  to  rights  f  for  your  master! 

When  the  Christian  consciousness,  or  the  Christian 
man,  draws  up  a  criminal  code,  what  can  the  concept 
of  crime  be  there  but  simply — heartlessness  ?     Each 
severing  and  wounding  of  a  heart  relation,  each  heart- 
less behavior  toward  a  sacred  being,  is  crime.     The 
more  heartfelt  the  relation  is  supposed  to  be,  the  more 
scandalous  is  the  deriding  of  it,  and  the  more  worthy 
of  punishment  the  crime.      Every  one  who  is  subject  to 
the  lord  should  love  him ;  to  deny  this  love  is  a  high 
treason  worthy  of  death.     Adultery  is  a  heartlessness 

*  [GerecMe]  t  [niacht  Alles  huebsch  gerechf] 


266  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

worthy  of  punishment;  one  has  no  heart,  no  enthusi- 
asm, no  pathetic  feeling  for  the  sacredness  of  marriage. 
So  long  as  the  heart  or  soul  dictates  laws,  only  the 
heartful  or  soulful  man  enjoys  the  protection  of  the 
laws.     That  the  man  of  soul  makes  laws  means  prop- 
erly only  that  the  moral  man  makes  them :  what  con- 
tradicts these  men's  "  moral  feeling,"  this  they  penal- 
ize.    How,  e.  g.,  should  disloyalty,  secession,  breach  of 
oaths, — in  short,  all  radical  breaking-  off,  all  tearing 
asunder  of  venerable  ties, — not  be  flagitious  and  crimi- 
nal in  their  eyes?      He  who  breaks  with  these  demands 
of  the  soul  has  for  enemies  all  the  moral,  all  the  men 
of  soul.      Only  Krummacher  and  his  mates  are  the 
right  people  to  set  up  consistently  a  penal  code  of  the 
heart,  as  a  certain  bill  sufficiently  proves.     The  con- 
sistent legislation  of  the  Christian  State  must  be  placed 
wholly  in  the  hands  of  the — parsons,  and  will  not 
become  pure  and  coherent  so  long  as  it  is  worked  out 
only  by — the  parson-ridden,  who  are  always  only  half- 
parsons.     Only  then  will  every  lack  of  soulfulness, 
every  heartlessness,  be  certified  as  an  unpardonable 
crime,  only  then  will  every  agitation  of  the  soul  be- 
come condemnable,  every  objection  of  criticism  and 
doubt  be  anathematized;  only  then  is  the  own  man, 
before  the  Christian  consciousness,  a  convicted — 
criminal  to  begin  with. 

The  men  of  the  Revolution  often  talked  of  the 
people's  "just  revenge  "  as  its  "  right."      Revenge  and 
right  coincide  here.     Is  this  an  attitude  of  an  ego  to 
an  ego?     The  people  cries  that  the  opposite  party  has 
committed  "  crimes  "  against  it.     Can  I  assume  that 
one  commits  a  crime  against  me,  without  assuming 


THE  OWNER  267 

that  he  lias  to  act  as  I  see  fit?      And  this  action  I  call 
the  right,  the  good,  etc.;  the  divergent  action,  a 
crime.     So  I  think  that  the  others  must  aim  at  the 
same  goal  with  me;  i.  e.,  I  do  not  treat  them  as 
unique  beings  *  who  bear  their  law  in  themselves  and 
live  according  to  it,  but  as  beings  who  are  to  obey 
some  "  rational  "  law.      I  set  up  what  "  Man  "  is  and 
what  acting  in  a  "  truly  human  "  way  is,  and  I  de- 
mand of  every  one  that  this  law  become  norm  and 
ideal  to  him ;  otherwise  he  will  expose  himself  as  a 
"  sinner  and  criminal."      But  upon  the  "  guilty  "  falls 
the  "  penalty  of  the  law  " ! 

One  sees  here  how  it  is  "  Man  "  again  who  sets  on 
foot  even  the  concept  of  crime,  of  sin,  and  therewith 
that  of  right.     A  man  in  whom  I  do  not  recognize 
"  Man  "  is  "  a  sinner,  a  guilty  one." 

Only  against  a  sacred  thing  are  there  criminals; 
you  against  me  can  never  be  a  criminal,  but  only  an 
opponent.      But  not  to  hate  him  who  injures  a  sa- 
cred thing  is  in  itself  a  crime,  as  St.  Just  cries  out 
against  Danton:  "Are  you  not  a  criminal  and  re- 
sponsible for  not  having  hated  the  enemies  of  the 
fatherland?"— 

If,  as  in  the  Revolution,  what  "  Man  "  is  is  appre- 
hended as  "  good  citizen,"  then  from  this  concept  of 
"  Man  "  we  have  the  well-known  "  political  offences 
and  crimes." 

In  all  this  the  individual,  the  individual  man,  is 
regarded  as  refuse,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  general 
man,  "  Man,"  is  honored.     Now,  according  to  how 


268  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

this  ghost  is  named, — as  Christian,  Jew,  Mussulman, 
good  citizen,  loyal  subject,  freeman,  patriot,  etc., — 
just  so  do  those  who  would  like  to  carry  through  a  di- 
vergent concept^ of  man,  as  well  as  those  who  want  to 
put  themselves  through,  fall  before  victorious  "  Man." 

And  with  what  unction  the  butchery  goes  on  here 
in  the  name  of  the  law,  of  the  sovereign  people,  of 
God,  etc. ! 

Now,  if  the  persecuted  trickily  conceal  and  protect 
themselves  from  the  stern  parsonical  judges,  people 
stigmatize  them  as  "  hypocrites,"  as  St.  Just,  e.  g., 
does  those  whom  he  accuses  in  the  speech  against 
Danton.*     One  is  to  be  a  fool,  and  deliver  himself  up 
to  their  Moloch. 

Crimes  spring  fromJLved  ideas.     The  sacredness  of 
marriage  is  a  fixed  idea.      From  the  sacredness  it 
follows  that  infidelity  is  a  crime,  and  therefore  a  cer- 
tain marriage  law  imposes  upon  it  a  shorter  or  longer 
penalty.     But  by  those  who  proclaim  "  freedom  as 
sacred  "  this  penalty  must  be  regarded  as  a  crime 
against  freedom,  and  only  in  this  sense  has  public 
opinion  in  fact  branded  the  marriage  law. 

Society  would  have  every  one  come  to  his  right 
indeed,  but  yet  only  to  that  which  is  sanctioned  by 
society,  to  the  society-right,  not  really  to  his  right. 
But  7  give  or  take  to  myself  the  right  out  of  my  own 
plenitude  of  power,  and  against  every  superior  power  I 
am  the  most  impenitent  criminal.     Owner  and  creator 
of  my  right,  I  recognize  no  other  source  of  right  than 
— me,  neither  God  nor  the  State  nor  nature  nor  even 

*See  "Political  Speeches,"  10.  p.  153. 


THE  OWNER  269 

man  himself  with  his  "  eternal  rights  of  man,"  neither 
divine  nor  human  right. 

Right  "  in  and  for  itself."     Without  relation  to 
me,  therefore!      "  Absolute  right."     Separated  from 
me,  therefore!      A  thing  that  exists  in  and  for  itself! 
An  absolute!     An  eternal  right,  like  an  eternal  truth! 

According  to  the  liberal  way  of  thinking,  right  is  to 
be  obligatory  for  me  because  it  is  thus  established 
by  human  reason,  against  which  my  reason  is  "  un- 
reason."    Formerly  people  inveighed  in  the  name  of 
divine  reason  against  weak  human  reason  ;  now,  in  the 
name  of  strong  human  reason,  against  egoistic  reason, 
which  is  rejected  as  "  unreason."     And  yet  none  is  real 
but  this  very  "  unreason."     Neither  divine  nor  human 
reason,  but  only  your  and  my  reason  existing  at  any 
given  time,  is  real,  as  and  because  you  and  I  are  real. 

The  thought  of  right  is  originally  my  thought;  or, 
it  has  its  origin  in  me.      But,  when  it  has  sprung  from 
me,  when  the  "  Word  "  is  out,  then  it  has  "  become 
flesh,"  it  is  ajlred  idea.     Now^  I  no  longer  get  rid  of 
the  thought;  however  I  turn,  it  stands  before  me. 
Thus  men  have  not  become  masters  again  of  the 
thought  "right,"  which  they  themselves  created;  their 
creature  is  running  away  with  them.     This  is  absolute 
right,  that  which  is  absolved  or  unfastened  from  me. 
We,  revering  it  as  absolute,  cannot  devour  it  again, 
and  it  takes  from  us  the  creative  power;  the  creature 
is  more  than  the  creator,  it  is  "  in  a"nd  for  itself." 

•  Once  you  no  longer  let  right  run  around  free, 
once  you  draw  it  back  into  its  origin,  into  you,  it  is 
your  right;  and  that  is  right  which  suits  you. 


270  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Right  has  had  to  suffer  an  attack  within  itself,  L  e. 
from  the  standpoint  of  right;  war  being  declared  on 
the  part  of  liberalism  against  "privilege."* 

Privileged  and  endowed  with  equal  rights — on 
these  two  concepts  turns  a  stubborn  fight.     Excluded 
or  admitted — would  mean  the  same.      But  where 
should  there  be  a  power — be  it  an  imaginary  one  like 
God,  law,  or  a  real  one  like  I,  you — of  which  it  should 
not  be  true  that  before  it  all  are  "  endowed  with  equal 
rights,"  i.  e.  no  respect  of  persons  holds?      Every  one 
is  equally  dear  to  God  if  he  adores  him,  equally  agree- 
able to  the  law  if  only  he  is  a  law-abiding  person ; 
whether  the  lover  of  God  and  the  law  is  humpbacked 
and  lame,  whether  poor  or  rich,  and  the  like,  that 
amounts  to  nothing  for  God  and  the  law;  just  so,  when 
you  are  at  the  point  of  drowning,  you  like  a  negro  as 
rescuer  as  well  as  the  most  excellent  Caucasian, — yes, 
in  this  situation  you  esteem  a  dog  not  less  than  a  man. 
But  to  whom  will  not  every  one  be  also,  contrariwise, 
a  preferred  or  disregarded  person?      God  punishes  the 
wicked  with  his  wrath,  the  law  chastises  the  lawless, 
you  let  one  visit  you  every  moment  and  show  the  other 
the  door. 

The  "  equality  of  right "  is  a  phantom  just  because 
right  is  nothing  more  and  nothing  less  than  admission, 
i,  e.  a  matter  of  grace,  which,  be  it  said,  one  may  also 
acquire  by  his  desert;  for  desert  and  grace  are  not 
contradictory,  since  even  grace  wishes  to  be  "  de- 
served "  and  our  gracious  smile  falls  only  to  him  who 
knows  how  to  force  it  from  us. 

*  [Literally,  "  precedent  right."] 


THE  OWNER  271 

So  people  dream  of  "  all  citizens  of  the  State  having 
to  stand  side  by  side,  with  equal  rights."     As  citizens 
of  the  State  they  are  certainly  all  equal  for  the  State. 
But  it  will  divide  them,  and  advance  them  or  put  them 
in  the  rear,  according  to  its  special  ends,  if  on  no  other 
account;  and  still  more  must  it  distinguish  them  from 
one  another  as  good  and  bad  citizens. 

Bruno  Bauer  disposes  of  the  Jew  question  from  the 
standpoint  that  "  privilege  "  is  not  justified.      Because 
Jew  and  Christian  have  each  some  point  of  advantage 
over  the  other,  and  in  having  this  point  of  advantage 
are  exclusive,  therefore  before  the  critic's  gaze  they 
crumble  into  nothingness.     With  them  the  State  lies 
under  the  like  blame,  since  it  justifies  their  having  ad- 
vantages and  stamps  it  as  a  "  privilege  "  or  preroga- 
tive, but  thereby  derogates  from  its  calling  to  become 
a  "  free  State." 

But  now  every  one  has  something  of  advantage  over 
another, — viz.,  himself  or  his  individuality;  in  this 
everybody  remains  exclusive. 

And,  again,  before  a  third  party  every  one  makes 
his  peculiarity  count  for  as  much  as  possible,  and  (if 
he  wants  to  win  him  at  all)  tries  to  make  it  appear 
attractive  before  him. 

Now,  is  the  third  party  to  be  insensible  to  the  dif- 
ference of  the  one  from  the  other?      Do  they  ask  that 
of  the  free  State  or  of  humanity?     Then  these  would 
have  to  be  absolutely  without  self-interest,  and  in- 
capable of  taking  an  interest  in  any  one  whatever. 
Neither  God  (who  divides  his  own  from  the  wicked) 
nor  the  State  (which  knows  how  to  separate  good 
citizens  from  bad)  was  thought  of  as  so  indifferent. 


279  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

But  they  are  looking  for  this  very  third  party  that 
bestows  no  more  "  privilege."     Then  it  is  called 
perhaps  the  free  State,  or  humanity,  or  whatever  else 
it  may  be. 

As  Christian  and  Jew  are  ranked  low  by  Br. 
Bauer  on  account  of  their  asserting  privileges,  it  musl 
be  that  they  could  and  should  free  themselves  from 
their  narrow  standpoint  by  self-renunciation  or  unself 
ishness.      If  they  threw  off  their  "egoism,"  the 
mutual  wrong  would  cease,  and  with  it  Christian  and 
Jewish  religiousness  in  general;  it  would  be  necessary 
only  that  neither  of  them  should  any  longer  want  to 
be  anything  peculiar. 

But,  if  they  gave  up  this  exclusiveness,  with  that  th( 
ground  on  which  their  hostilities  were  waged  would  in 
truth  not  yet  be  forsaken.      In  case  of  need  they  woulc 
indeed  find  a  third  thing  on  which  they  could  unite,  a 
"  general  religion,"  a  "  religion  of  humanity,"  and 
the  like;  in  short,  an  equalization,  which  need  not 
be  better  than  that  which  would  result  if  all  Jews 
became  Christians,  by  which  likewise  the  "  privilege  " 
of  one  over  the  other  would  have  an  end.     The 
tension  *  would  indeed  be  done  away,  but  in  this  con- 
sisted not  the  essence  of  the  two,  but  only  their  neigh- 
borhood.    As  being  distinguished  from  each  other 
they  must  necessarily  be  mutually  resistant,!  and  the 
disparity  will  always  remain.     Truly  it  is  not  a  fail- 
ing in  you  that  you  stiffen  $  yourself  against  me  and 
assert  your  distinctness  or  peculiarity:  you  need  not 
give  way  or  renounce  yourself. 

*  [Spannung]  t  [gespannt]  t  [spannen] 


THE  OWNER  273 

People  conceive  the  significance  of  the  opposition 
loo  formally  and  weakly  when  they  want  only  to  "  dis- 
solve "  it  in  order  to  make  room  for  a  third  thing  that 
shall  "  unite."     The  opposition  deserves  rather  to  be 
sharpened.     As  Jew  and  Christian  you  are  in  too 
slight  an  opposition,  and  are  contending  only  about 
religion,  as  it  were  about  the  emperor's  beard,  about 
a  fiddlestick's  end.     Enemies  in  religion  indeed,  in  the 
rest  you  still  remain  good  friends,  and  equal  to  each 
other,  e.  g.,  as  men.     Nevertheless  the  rest  too  is  un- 
ike  in  each ;  and  the  time  when  you  no  longer  merely 
dissemble  your  opposition  will  be  only  when  you  en- 
irely  recognize  it,  and  everybody  asserts  himself  from 
»p  to  toe  as  unique.*     Then  the  former  opposition 
will  assuredly  be  dissolved,  but  only  because  a  stronger 
las  taken  it  up  into  itself. 

Our  weakness  consists  not  in  this,  that  we  are  in 
opposition  to  others,  but  in  this,  that  we  are  not  com- 
pletely so;  i.  e.  that  we  are  not  entirely  severed  from 
;hem,  or  that  we  seek  a  "  communion,"  a  "  bond," 
that  in  communion  we  have  an  ideal.     One  faith,  one 
jod,  one  idea,  one  hat,  for  all!      If  all  were  brought 
under  one  hat,  certainly  no  one  would  any  longer 
need  to  take  off  his  hat  before  another. 

The  last  and  most  decided  opposition,  that  of 
unique  against  unique,  is  at  bottom  beyond  what  is 
called  opposition,  but  without  having  sunk*  back  into 
'unity  "  and  unison.     As  unique  you  have  nothing 
in  common  with  the  other  any  longer,  and  therefore 
nothing  divisive  or  hostile  either;  you  are  not  seeking 


g74  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

to  be  in  the  right  against  him  before  a  third  party, 
and  are  standing  with  him  neither  "  on  the  ground  of 
right"  nor  on  any  other  common  ground.     The  oppo 
sition  vanishes  in  complete — severance  or  singleness.* 
This  might  indeed  be  regarded  as  the  new  point  in 
common  or  a  new  parity,  but  here  the  parity  consists 
precisely  in  the  disparity,  and  is  itself  nothing  but  dis- 
parity, a  par  of  disparity,  and  that  only  for  him  who 
institutes  a  "  comparison." 

The  polemic  against  privilege  forms  a  characteristic 
feature  of  liberalism,  which  fumes  against  "  privilege  ' 
because  it  itself  appeals  to  "  right."     Further  than 
to  fuming  it  cannot  carry  this;  for  privileges  do  not 
fall  before  right  falls,  as  they  are  only  forms  of  right. 
But  right  falls  apart  into  its  nothingness  when  it  is 
swallowed  up  by  might,  i.  e.  when  one  understands 
what  is  meant  by  "  Might  goes  before  right."     All 
right  explains  itself  then  as  privilege,  and  privilege 
itself  as  power,  as —  superior  power. 

But  must  not  the  mighty  combat  against  superior 
power  show  quite  another  face  than  the  modest  combai 
against  privilege,  which  is  to  be  fought  out  before  a 
first  judge,  "  Right,"  according  to  the  judge's  mind? 

Now,  in  conclusion,  I  have  still  to  take  back  the 
half-way  form  of  expression  of  which  I  was  willing  to 
make  use  only  so  long  as  I  was  still  rooting  among 
the  entrails  of  right,  and  letting  the  word  at  least 
stand.      But,  in  fact,  with  the  concept  the  word  too 
loses  its  meaning.     What  I  called  "  my  right  *'  is 

*  [EinzigTteit] 


THE  OWNER  275 

no  longer  "  right "  at  all,  because  right  can  be  be- 
stowed only'by  a  spirit,  be  it  the  spirit  of  nature  or 
that  of  the  species,  of  mankind,  the  Spirit  of  God  or 
that  of  His  Holiness  or  His  Highness,  etc.     What  I 
have  without  an  entitling  spirit  I  have  without  right; 
I  have  it  solely  and  alone  through  my  power. 

I  do  not  demand  any  right,  therefore  I  need  not 
recognize  any  either.     What  I  can  get  by  force  I  get 
by  force,  and  what  I  do  not  get  by  force  I  have  no 
right  to,  nor  do  I  give  myself  airs,  or  consolation, 
with  my  imprescriptible  right. 

With  absolute  right,  right  itself  passes  away;  the 
dominion  of  the  "  concept  of  right "  is  canceled  at  the 
same  time.     For  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  hitherto 
concepts,  ideas,  or  principles  ruled  us,  and  that  among 
these  rulers  the  concept  of  right,  or  of  justice,  played 
one  of  the  most  important  parts. 

Entitled  or  unentitled — that  does  not  concern  me ; 
if  I  am  only  powerful,  I  am  of  myself  empowered,  and 
need  no  other  empowering  or  entitling. 

Right — is  a  wheel  in  the  head,  put  there  by  a 
spook ;  power — that  am  I  myself,  I  am  the  powerful 
one  and  owner  of  power.     Right  is  above  me,  is 
absolute,  and  exists  in  one  higher,  as  whose  grace  it 
flows  to  me:  right  is  a  gift  of  grace  from  the  judge; 
power  and  might  exist  only  in  me  the  powerful  and 
mighty. 


II,— MY  INTERCOURSE 

In  society  the  human  demand  at  most  can  be 
satisfied,  while  the  egoistic  must  always  come  short. 


276  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Because  it  can  hardly  escape  anybody  that  the 
present  shows  no  such  living  interest  in  any  question 
as  in  the  "  social,"  one  has  to  direct  his  gaze  especially 
to  society.     Nay,  if  the  interest  felt  in  it  were  less  pas- 
sionate and  dazzled,  people  would  not  so  much,  in 
looking  at  society,  lose  sight  of  the  individuals  in  it, 
and  would  recognize  that  a  society  cannot  become  new 
so  long  as  those  who  form  and  constitute  it  remain  the 
old  ones.     If,  e.  g.,  there  was  to  arise  in  the  Jewish 
people  a  society  which  should  spread  a  new  faith  over 
the  earth,  these  apostles  could  in  no  case  remain 
Pharisees. 

As  you  are,  so  you  present  yourself,  so  you  behave 
toward  men :  a  hypocrite  as-  a  hypocrite,  a  Christian 
as  a  Christian.     Therefore  the  character  of  a  society 
is  determined  by  the  character  of  its  members :  they 
are  its  creators.     So  much  at  least  one  must  perceive 
even  if  one  were  not  willing  to  put  to  the  test  the  con- 
cept "  society  "  itself. 

Ever  far  from  letting  themselves  come  to  their  full 
development  and  consequence,  men  have  hitherto  not 
been  able  to  found  their  societies  on  themselves ;  or 
rather,  they  have  been  able  only  to  found  "  societies  " 
and  to  live  in  societies.     The  societies  were  always 
persons,  powerful  persons,  so-called  "  moral  persons," 
i.  e.  ghosts,  before  which  the  individual  had  the 
appropriate  wheel  in  his  head,  the  fear  of  ghosts.      As 
such  ghosts  they  may  most  suitably  be  designated  by 
the  respective  names  "  people"  and  "  peoplet":  the 
people  of  the  patriarchs,  the  people  of  the  Hellenes, 
etc.,  at  last  the — people  of  men,  Mankind  (Anacharsis 
Clootz  was  enthusiastic  for  the  "  nation  "  of  man- 


THE  OWNER  277 

kind);  then  every  subdivision  of  this  "people,"  which 
could  and  must  have  its  special  societies,  the  Spanish, 
French  people,  etc. ;  within  it  again  classes,  cities,  in 
short  all  kinds  of  corporations;  lastly,  tapering  to  the 
finest  point,  the  little  peoplet  of  the — -family.     Hence, 
instead  of  saying  that  the  person  that  walked  as  ghost 
in  all  societies  hitherto  has  been  the  people,  there 
might  also  have  been  named  the  two  extremes, — to  wit, 
either  "  mankind  "  or  the  "  family,"  both  the  most 
"natural-born  units."     We  choose  the  word  "peo- 
ple "  *  because  its  derivation  has  been  brought  into 
connection  with  the  Greek  polloi,  the  "many"  or  "the 
masses,"  but  still  more  because  "  national  efforts"  are 
at  present  the  order  of  the  day,  and  because  even  the 
newest  mutineers  have  not  yet  shaken  off  this  deceptive 
person,  although  on  the  other  hand  the  latter  consider- 
ation must  give  the  preference  to  the  expression  "  man- 
kind," since  on  all  sides  they  are  going  in  for  enthusi- 
asm over  "  mankind." 

The  people,  then, — mankind  or  the  family, — have 
hitherto,  as  it  seems,  played  history :  no  egcnstic  in- 
terest was  to  come  up  in  th'ese  societies,  but  solely 
general  ones,  national  or  popular  interests,  class  inter- 
ests, family  interests,  and  "general  human  interests." 
But  who  has  brought  to  their  fall  the  peoples  whose   . 
decline  history  relates?      Who  but  the  egoist,  who  was 
seeking  hix  satisfaction!      If  once  an  egoistic  interest 
crept  in,  the  society  was  "  corrupted  "  and  moved 
toward  its  dissolution,  as  Rome,  e.  g-.,  proves  with  its 


[  r,,lk  :  hut  the  etymological  remark  following  applies  equally  to  the 
English  word  "  people.."    See  Liddell  &  Scott's  Greek  lexicon,  under 
pimp/em  i.] 


278  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

highly  developed  system  of  private  rights,  or  Christi- 
anity with  the  incessantly-breaking-in  "  rational  self- 
determination,  "self-consciousness,"  the  "autonomy 
of  the  spirit,"  etc. 

The  Christian  people  has  produced  two  societies 
whose  duration  will  keep  equal  measure  with  the 
permanence  of  that  people:  these  are  the  societies 
State  and  Church.     Can  they  be  called  a  union  of 
egoists?      Do  we  in  them  pursue  an  egoistic,  personal, 
own  interest,  or  do  we  pursue  a  popular  (i.  e.  an  inter- 
est of  the  Christian  people),  to  wit,  a  State  and 
Church  interest?      Can  I  and  may  I  be  myself  in 
them?      May  I  think  and  act  as  I  will,  may  I  reveal 
myself,  live  myself  out,  busy  myself  ?      Must  I  not 
leave  untouched  the  majesty  of  the  State,  the  sanctity 
of  the  Church? 

Well,  I  may  not  do  as  I  will.      But  shall  I  find  in 
any  society  such  an  unmeasured  freedom  of  maying? 
Certainly  no!      Accordingly  we  might  be  content? 
Not  a  bit!      It  is  a  different  thing  whether  I  rebound 
from  an  ego  or  from  a  people,  a  generalization. 
There  I  am  my  opponent's  opponent,  born  his  equal; 
here  I  am  a  despised  opponent,  bound  and  under 
a  guardian :  there  I  stand  man  to  man  ;  here  I  am 
a  schoolboy  who  can  accomplish  nothing  against  his     j 
comrade  because  the  latter  has  called  father  and 
mother  to  aid  and  has  crept  under  the  apron,  while  I 
am  well  scolded  as  an  ill-bred  brat,  and  I  must  not 
"  argue  " :  there  I  fight  against  a  bodily  enemy  ;  here 
against  mankind,  against  a  generalization,  against  a 
"majesty,"  against  a  spook.      But  to  me  no  majesty, 
nothing  sacred,  is  a  limit ;  nothing  that  I  know  how 


THE  OWNER  279 

to  overpower.     Only  that  which  I  cannot  overpower 
still  limits  my  might ;  and  I  of  limited  might  am  tem- 
porarily a  limited  I,  not  limited  by  the  might  out- 
side me,  but  limited  by  my  own  still  deficient  might, 
by  my  own  impotence.     However,  "  the  Guard  dies, 
but  does  not  surrender! "     Above  all,  only  a  bodily 
opponent! 

I  dare  meet  every  foeman 
Whom  I  can  see  and  measure  with  my  eye, 
Whose  mettle  fires  my  mettle  for  the  fight, — etc. 

Many  privileges  have  indeed  been  cancelled  with 
time,  but  solely  for  the  sake  of  the  common  weal,  of 
the  State  and  the  State's  weal,  by  no  means  for  the 
strengthening  of  me.     Vassalage,  e.  g.,  was  abrogated 
only  that  a  single  liege  lord,  the  lord  of  the  people, 
the  monarchical  power,  might  be  strengthened :  vassal- 
age under  the  one  became  yet  more  rigorous  thereby. 
Only  in  favor  of  the  monarch,  be  he  called  "  prince  " 
or  "  law,"  have  privileges  fallen.      In  France  the 
citizens  are  not,  indeed,  vassals  of  the  king,  but  are 
instead  vassals  of  the  "  law  "  (the  Charter).     Subordi- 
nation was  retained,  only  the  Christian  State  recog- 
nized that  man  cannot  serve  two  masters  (the  lord  of 
the  manor  and  the  prince,  etc.) ;  therefore  one  obtained 
all  the  prerogatives;  now  he  can  again  place  one 
above  another,  he  can  make  "men  in  high  place." 

But  of  what  concern  to  me  is  the  common  weal? 
The  common  weal  as  such  is  not  my  weal,  but  only 
the  furthest  extremity  of  self-renundation.     The  com- 
mon weal  may  cheer  aloud  while  I  must  "  down  " ;  * 

*  [kusclit'ii,  a  word  whoso  only  use  is  in  ordering  dogs  to  keep  quiet.] 


280  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  State  may  shine  while  I  starve.     In  what  lies  the 
folly  of  the  political  liberals  but  in  their  opposing 
the  people  to  the  government  and  talking  of  people's 
rights?     So  there  is  the  people  going  to  be  of  age, 
etc.     As  if  one  who  has  no  mouth  could  be  muendigl* 
Only  the  individual  is  able  to  be  muendlg.     Thus 
the  whole  question  of  the  liberty  of  the  press  is  turned 
upside  down  when  it  is  laid  claim  to  as  a  "right  of 
the  people."     It  is  only  a  right,  or  better  the  might, 
of  the  individual.     If  a  people  has  liberty  of  the  press, 
then  /,  although  in  the  midst  of  this  people,  have  it 
not;  a  liberty  of  the  people  is  not  my  liberty,  and  the 
liberty  of  the  press  as  a  liberty  of  the  people  must 
have  at  its  side  a  press  law  directed  against  me. 

This  must  be  insisted  on  all  around  against  the 
present-day  efforts  for  liberty: 

Liberty  of  the  people  is  not  my  liberty ! 

Let  us  admit  these  categories,  liberty  of  the  people 
and  right  of  the  people:  e.  g.  the  right  of  the  people 
that  everybody  may  bear  arms.     Does  one  not  forfeit 
such  a  right?      One  cannot  forfeit  his  own  right,  but 
may  well  forfeit  a  right  that  belongs  not  to  me  but  to 
the  people.     I  may  be  locked  up  for  the  sake  of  the 
liberty  of  the  people ;  I  may,  under  sentence,  incur  the 
loss  of  the  right  to  bear  arms. 

Liberalism  appears  as  the  last  attempt  at  a  creation 
of  the  liberty  of  the  people,  a  liberty  of  the  commune, 
of  "  society,"  of  the  general,  of  mankind;  the  dream 
of  a  humanity,  a  people,  a  commune,  a  "  society," 


*  [This  is  the  word  for  "  of  age  "  ;  but  it  is  derived  from  Mund,  "  mouth," 
and  refers  properly  to  the  right  of  speaking  through  one's  own  -mouih,  not 
by  a  guardian.] 


THE  OWNER  281 

that  shall  be  of  age. 

A  people  cannot  be  free  otherwise  than  at  the  indi- 
vidual's expense;  for  it  is  not  the  individual  that  is 
the  main  point  in  this  liberty,  but  the  people.     The 
freer  ihe  people,  the  more -bound  the  individual;  the 
Athenian  people,  precisely  at  its  freest  time,  created 
ostracism,  banished  the  atheists,  poisoned  the  most 
honest  thinker. 

How  they  do  praise  Socrates  for  his  conscientious- 
ness, which  makes  him  resist  the  advice  to  get  away 
from  the  dungeon !      He  is  a  fool  that  he  concedes  to 
the  Athenians  a  right  to  condemn  him.     Therefore  it 
certainly  serves  him  right;  why  then  does -he  remain 
standing  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  Athenians? 
Why  does  he  not  break  with  them?      Had  he  known, 
and  been  able  to  know,  what  he  was,  he  would  have 
conceded  to  such  judges  no  claim,  no  right.     That  he 
did  not  escape  was  just  his  weakness,  his  delusion  of 
still  having  something  in  common  with  the  Athenians, 
or  the  opinion  that  he  was  a  member,  a  mere  member 
of  this  people.       But  he  was  rather  this  people  itself  in 
pe.rson,  and  could  only  be  his  own  judge.     There  was 
no  judge  orcr  him,  as  he  himself  had  really  pro- 
nounced a  public  sentence  on  himself  and  rated  him- 
self worthy  of  the  Prytaneum.      He  should  have  stuck 
to  that,  and,  as  he  had  uttered  no  sentence  of  death 
against  himself,  should  have  despised  that  of  the 
Athenians  too  and  escaped.     But  he  subordinated 
himself  and  recognized  in  the  people  \\isjudge ;  he 
seemed  little  to  himself  before  the  majesty  of  the 
people.     That  he  subjected  himself  to  intglil  (to 
which  alone  he  could  succumb)  as  to  a  "  right "  was 


282  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

treason  against  himself:  it  was  virtue.     To  Christ, 
who,  it  is  alleged,  refrained  from  using  the  power  over 
his  heavenly  legions,  the  same  scrupulousness  is  there- 
by ascribed  by  the  narrators.     Luther  did  very  well 
and  wisely  to  have  the  safety  of  his  journey  to  Worms 
warranted  to  him  in  black  and  white,  and  Socrates 
should  have  known  that  the  Athenians  were  his 
enemies,  he  alone  his  judge.     The  self-deception  of 
a  "  reign  of  law,"  etc.,  should  have  given  way  to  the 
perception  that  the  relation  was  a  relation  of  might. 
It  was  with  pettifoggery  and  intrigues  that  Greek 
liberty  ended.     Why?      Because  the  ordinary  Greeks 
could  still  less  attain  that  logical  conclusion  which  not 
even  their  hero  of  thought,  Socrates,  was  able  to  draw. 
What  then  is  pettifoggery  but  a  way  of  utilizing 
something  established  without  doing  away  with  it? 
I  might  add  "  for  one's  own  advantage,"  but,  you  see, 
that  lies  in  "  utilizing."     Such  pettifoggers  are  the 
theologians  who  "wrest"  and  "force"  God's  word; 
what  would  they  have  to  wrest  if  it  were  not  for  the 
"  established  "  Word  of  God?      So  those  liberals  who 
only  shake  and  wrest  the  "established  order."     They 
are  all  perverters,  like  those  perverters  of  the  law. 
Socrates  recognized  law,  right;  the  Greeks  constantly 
retained  the  authority  of  right  and  law.     If  with  this 
recognition  they  wanted  nevertheless  to  assert  their 
advantage,  every  one  his  own,  then  they  had  to  seek 
it  in  perversion  of  the  law,  or  intrigue.      Alcibiades, 
an  intriguer  of  genius,  introduces  the  period  of  Athen- 
ian "  decay  ";  the  Spartan  Lysander  and  others  show 
that  intrigue  had  become  universally  Greek.     Greek 
law,  on  which  the  Greek  States  rested,  had  to  be  per- 


THE  OWNER  283 

erted  and  undermined  by  the  egoists  within  these 
States,  and  the  States  went  down  that  the  individuals 
night  become  free,  the  Greek  people  fell  because  the 
ndividuals  cared  less  for  this  people  than  for  them- 
selves.    In  general,  all  States,  constitutions,  churches, 
?tc.,  have  sunk  by  the  secession  of  individuals;  for  the 
ndividual  is  the  irreconcilable  enemy  of  every  gener- 
dity,  every  tie,  i.  e.  every  fetter.     Yet  people  fancy  to 
;his  day  that  man  needs  "  sacred  ties":    he,  the  deadly 
memy  of  every  "  tie."     The  history  of  the  world 
>hows  that  no  tie  has  yet  remained  unrent,  shows  that 
Tian  tirelessly  defends  himself  against  ties  of  every 
;ort;  and  yet,  blinded,  people  think  up  new  ties 
igain  and  again,  and  think,  e.  g.,  that  they  have 
irrived  at  the  right  one  if  one  puts  upon  them  the  tie 
rf  a  so-called  free  constitution,  a  beautiful,  constitu- 
:ional  tie  ;  decoration  ribbons,  the  ties  of  confidence 
>etween  "  —         — ,"  do  seem  gradually  to  have  be- 
come somewhat  infirm,  but  people  have  made  no 
urther  progress  than  from  apron-strings  to  garters 
ind  collars. 

Everything  sacred  is  a  tie,  a  fetter. 
Everything  sacred  is  and  must  be  perverted  by  per- 
verters  of  the  law  ;  therefore  our  present  time  has 

.  multitudes  of  such  perverters  in  all  spheres.     They 
ire  preparing  the  way  for  the  break-up  of  law,  for 
awlessness. 
Poor  Athenians  who  are  accused  of  pettifoggery  and 

i>  sophistry !  poor  Alcibiades,  of  intrigue !      Why,  that 
•v as  just  your  best  point,  your  first  step  in  freedom. 
iiVour  jEschylus,  Herodotus,  etc.,  only  wanted  to  have 

.  x  free  Greek  people ;  you  were  the  first  to  surmise 


284  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

something  of  your  freedom. 

A  people  represses  those  who  tower  above  its 
majesty,  by  ostracism  against  too-powerful  citizens', 
by  the  Inquisition  against  the  heretics  of  the  Church, 
by  the — Inquisition  against  traitors  in  the  State,  etc. 

For  the  people  is  concerned  only  with  its  self-asser- 
tion ;  it  demands  '*  patriotic  self-sacrifice  "  from  every- 
body.    To  it,  accordingly,  every  one  in  himself 'is 
indifferent,  a  nothing,  and  it  cannot  do,  not  even 
suffer,  what  the  individual  and  he  alone  must  do,— to 
wit,  turn  him  to  account.     Every  people,  every  State, 
is  unjust  toward  the  egoist. 

As  long  as  there  still  exists  even  one  institution 
which  the  individual  may  not  dissolve,  the  ownness 
and  self-appurtenance  of  Me  is  still  very  remote.     How 
can  I,  e.  g.,  be  free  when  I  must  bind  myself  by  oath 
to  a  constitution,  a  charter,  a  law,  "  vow  body  and 
soul "  to  my  people?      How  can  I  be  my  own  when 
my  faculties  may  develop  only  so  far  as  they  "  do  not 
disturb  the  harmony  of  society"  (Weitling)? 

The  fall  of  peoples  and  mankind  will  invite  me  to 
my  rise. 

Listen,  even  as  I  am  writing  this,  the  bells  begin  to 
sound,  that  they  may  jingle  in  for  to-morrow  the 
festival  of  the  thousand  years'  existence  of  our  dear 
Germany.     Sound,  sound  its  knell!      You  do  sound 
solemn  enough,  as  if  your  tongue  was  moved  by  the 
presentiment  that  it  is  giving  convoy  to  a  corpse.    The 
German  people  and  German  peoples  have  behind  them 
a  history  of  a  thousand  years:  what  a  long  life!      O, 
go  to  rest,  never  to  rise  again, — that  all  may  become 
free  whom  you  so  long  have  held  in  fetters. — The 


THE  OWNER  285 

people  is  dead. — Up  with  me! 

O  thou  my  much-tormented  German  people — what 
was  thy  torment?      It  was  the  torment  of  a  thought 
that  cannot  create  itself  a  body,  the  torment  of  a 
walking  spirit  that  dissolves  into  nothing  at  every 
cock-crow  and  yet  pines  for  deliverance  and  fulfilment. 
In  me  too  thou  hast  lived  long,  thou  dear — thought, 
thou  dear — spook.      Already  I  almost  fancied  I  had 
found  the  word  of  thy  deliverance,  discovered  flesh  and 
bones  for  the  wandering  spirit;  then  I  hear  them 
sound,  the  bells  that  usher  thee  into  eternal  rest;  then 
the  last  hope  fades  out,  then  the  notes  of  the  last  love 
die  away,  then  I  depart  from  the  desolate  house  of 
those  who  now  are  dead  and  enter  at  the  door  of  the — 
living  one: 

For  only  he  who  is  alive  is  in  the  right. 

Farewell,  thou  dream  of  so  many  millions  ;  farewell, 
thou  who  hast  tyrannized  over  thy  children  for  a 
thousand  years! 

To-morrow  they  carry  thee  to  the  grave  ;  soon  thy 
sisters,  the  peoples,  will  follow  thee.      But,  when  they 

have  all  followed,  then mankind  is  buried,  and 

I  am  my  own,  I  am  the  laughing  heir! 


The  word  Gesellschqft  (society)  has  its  origin  in  the 
word  Sal  (hall).     If  one  hall  encloses  many  persons, 
then  the  hall  causes  these  persons  to  be  in  society. 
They  are  in  society,  and  at  most  constitute  a  parlor- 
society  by  talking  in  the  traditional  forms  of  parlor 
speech.     When  it  comes  to  real  intercourse,  this  is  to 
be  regarded  as  independent  of  society  :  it  may  occur 


286  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

or  be  lacking,  without  altering  the  nature  of  what  is 
named  society.     Those  who  are  in  the  hall  are  a 
society  even  as  mute  persons,  or  when  they  put  each 
other  off  solely  with  empty  phrases  of  courtesy.     In- 
tercourse is  mutuality,  it  is  the  action,  the  commer- 
cium,  of  individuals;  society  is  only  community  of  the 
hall,  and  even  the  statues  of  a  museum-hall  are  in 
society,  they  are  "  grouped."      People  are  accustomed 
to  say  "  they  haben  inne  *  this  hall  in  common,"  but 
the  case  is  rather  that  the  hall  has  us  inne  or  in  it. 
So  far  the  natural  signification  of  the  word  society. 
In  this  it  comes  out  that  society  is  not  generated  by 
me  and  you,  but  by  a  third  factor  which  makes  associ- 
ates out  of  us  two,  and  that  it  is  just  this  third  factor 
that  is  the  creative  one,  that  which  creates  society. 

Just  so  a  prison  society  or  prison  companionship 
(those  who  enjoy  f  the  same  prison).     Here  we  already 
hit  upon  a  third  factor  fuller  of  significance  than  was 
that  merely  local  one,  the  hall.      Prison  no  longer 
means  a  space  only,  but  a  space  with  express  refer- 
ence to  its  inhabitants:  for  it  is  a  prison  only  through 
being  destined  for  prisoners,  without  whom  it  would 
be  a  mere  building.     What  gives  a  common  stamp  to 
those  who  are  gathered  in  it?      Evidently  the  prison, 
since  it  is  only  by  means  of  the  prison  that  they  are 
prisoners.     What,  then,  determines  the  manner  of  life 
of  the  prison  society?     The  prison!      What  deter- 
mines their  intercourse?     The  prison  too,  perhaps? 
Certainly  they  can  enter  upon  intercourse  only  as 

"["occupy";  literally,  " have  within"] 

+  [The  word  Genosse,  "  companion,"  signifies  originally  a  companion  in 
enjoymetvt.] 


THE  OWNER  287 

prisoners,  i.  e.  only  so  far  as  the  prison  laws  allow  it; 
but  that  they  themselves  hold  intercourse,  I  with  you, 
this  the  prison  cannot  bring  to  pass;  on  the  contrary, 
it  must  have  an  eye  to  guarding  against  such  egoistic, 
purely  personal  intercourse  (and  only  as  such  is  it 
really  intercourse  between  me  and  you).     That  we 
jointly  execute  a  job,  run  a  machine,  effectuate  any- 
thing in  general, — for  this  a  prison  will  indeed  pro- 
vide ;  but  that  I  forget  that  I  am  a  prisoner,  and 
engage  in  intercourse  with  you  who  likewise  disregard 
it,  brings  danger  to  the  prison,  and  not  only  cannot 
be  caused  by  it,  but  must  not  even  be  permitted.     For 
this  reason  the  saintly  and  moral-minded  French 
chamber  decides  to  introduce  solitary  confinement, 
and  other  saints  will  do  the  like  in  order  to  cut  off 
"  demoralizing  intercourse."      Imprisonment  is  the 
established  and — sacred  condition,  to  injure  which  no 
attempt  must  be  made.     The  slightest  push  of  that  . 
kind  is  punishable,  as  is  every  uprising  against  a 
sacred  thing  by  which  man  is  to  be  charmed  and 
chained. 

Like  the  hall,  the  prison  does  form  a  society,  a 
companionship,  a  communion  (e.  g.  communion  of 
labor),  but  no  intercourse,  no  reciprocity,  no  union. 
On  the  contrary,  every  union  in  the  prison  bears 
within  it  the  dangerous  seed  of  a  "  plot,"  which  under 
favorable  circumstances  might  spring  up  and  bear 
fruit. 

Yet  one  does  not  usually  enter  the  prison  volun- 
tarily, and  seldom  remains  in  it  voluntarily  either,  but 
cherishes  the  egoistic  desire  for  liberty.     Here,  there- 
fore, it  sooner  becomes  manifest  that  personal  inter- 


288  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

course  is  in  hostile  relations  to  the  prison  society  and 
tends  to  the  dissolution  of  this  very  society,  this  joint 
incarceration. 

Let  us  therefore  look  about  for  such  communions 
as,  it  seems,  we  remain  in  gladly  and  voluntarily,  with- 
out wanting  to  endanger  them  by  our  egoistic 
impulses. 

As  a  communion  of  the  required  sort  ihefamily 
offers  itself  in  the  first  place.      Parents,  husband  and 
wife,  children,  brothers  and  sisters,  represent  a  whole 
or  form  a  family,  for  the  further  widening  of  which  the 
collateral  relatives  also  may  be  made  to  serve  if  taken 
into  account.     The  family  is  a  true  communion  only 
when  the  law  of  the  family,  piety  *  or  family  love,  is 
observed  by  its  members.     A  son  to  whom  parents, 
brothers,  and  sisters  have  become  indifferent  has  been 
a  son;  for,  as  the  sonship  no  longer  shows  itself  effica- 
cious, it  has  no  greater  significance  than  the  long-past 
connection  of  mother  and  child  by  the  navel-string. 
That  one  has  once  lived  in  this  bodily  juncture  cannot 
as  a  fact  be* undone  ;  and  so  far  one  remains  irrevoc- 
ably this  mother's  son  and  the  brother  of  the  rest  of 
her  children;  but  it  would  come  to  a  lasting  connec- 
tion only  by  lasting  piety,  this  spirit  of  the  family. 
Individuals  are  members  of  a  family  in  the  full  sense 
only  when  they  make  the  persistence  of  the  family 
their  task  ;  only  as  conservative  do  they  keep  aloof 
from  doubting  their  basis,  the  family.     To  every 
member  of  the  family  one  thing  must  be  fixed  and 

*  [This  word  in  German  does  not  mean  religion,  but,  as  in  Latin,  faithful 
ness  to  family  ties— as  we  speak  of  "  filial  piety."  But  the.  word  elsewhere 
translated  "pious"  (fromni)  means  "  religious,"  as  usually  in  F.nclish.l 


THE  OWNER  28< 

sacred, — z>iz.,  the  family  itself,  or,  more  expressively, 
piety.     That  the  family  is  to  persist  remains  to  its 
member,  so  long  as  he  keeps  himself  free  from  that 
egoism  which  is  hostile  to  the  family,  an  unassailable 
truth.     In  a  word: — If  the  family  is  sacred,  then  no- 
body who  belongs  to  it  may  secede  from  it ;  else  he 
becomes  a  "  criminal  "  against  the  family:    he  may 
never  pursue  an  interest  hostile  to  the  family,  e.  g. 
form  a  misalliance.     He  who  does  this  has  "  dis- 
honored the  family,"  "  put  it  to  shame,"  etc. 

Now,  if  in  an  individual  the  egoistic  impulse  has 
not  force  enough,  he  complies  and  makes  a  marriage 
which  suits  the  claims  of  the  family,  takes  a  rank 
which  harmonizes  with  its  position,  and  the  like ;  in 
short,  he  "  does  honor  to  the  family." 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  egoistic  blood  flows  fierily 
enough  in  his  veins,  he  prefers  to  become  a  "  criminal " 
against  the  family  and  to  throw  off  its  laws. 

Which  of  the  two  lies  nearer  my  heart,  the  good  of 
the  family  or  my  good?      In  innumerable  cases  both 
go  peacefully  together;  the  advantage  of  the  family 
is  at  the  same  time  mine,  and  vice  versa.     Then 
it  is  hard  to  decide  whether  I  am  thinking  fidfahly 
or  /or  the  common  benefit,  and  perhaps  I  complacently 
Hatter  myself  with  my  unselfishness.      But  there 
comes  the  day  when  a  necessity  of  choice  makes 
me  tremble,  when  I  have  it  in  mind  to  dishonor  my 
family  tree,  to  affront  parents,  brothers,  and  kindred. 
What  then?      Now  it  will  appear  how  I  am  disposed 
at  the  bottom  of  my  heart ;  now  it  will  be  revealed 
whether  piety  ever  stood  above  egoism  for  me,  now 
the  selfish  one  can  no  longer  skulk  behind  the  sem- 


290  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

blance  of  unselfishness.     A  wish  rises  in  my  soul, 
and,  growing  from  hour  to  hour,  becomes  a  pas- 
sion.    To  whom  does  it  occur  at  first  blush  that  the 
slightest  thought  which  may  result  adversely  to  the 
spirit  of  the  family  (piety)  bears  within  it  a  transgres- 
sion against  this?  nay,  who  at  once,  in  the  first 
moment,  becomes  completely  conscious  of  the  matter? 
It  happens  so  with  Juliet  in  "  Romeo  and  Juliet." 
The  unruly  passion  can  at  last  no  longer  be  tamed, 
and  undermines  the  building  of  piety.     You  will  say, 
indeed,  it  is  from  self-will  that  the  family  casts  out  of 
its  bosom  those  wilful  ones  that  grant  more  of  a  hear- 
ing to  their  passion  than  to  piety;  the  good  Protest- 
ants used  the  same  excuse  with  much  success  against 
the  Catholics,  and  believed  in  it  themselves.     But  it  is 
just  a  subterfuge  to  roll  the  fault  off  oneself,  nothing 
more.     The  Catholics  had  regard  for  the  common 
bond  of  the  church,  and  thrust  those  heretics  from 
them  only  because  these  did  not  have  so  much  regard 
for  the  bond  of  the  church  as  to  sacrifice  their  convic- 
tions to  it ;  the  former,  therefore,  held  the  bond  fast, 
because  the  bond,  the  Catholic  (i.  e.  common  and 
united)  church,  was  sacred  to  them;  the  latter,  on  the 
contrary,  disregarded  the  bond.     Just  so  those  who 
lack  piety.     They  are  not  thrust  out,  but  thrust  them- 
selves out,  prizing  their  passion,  their  wilfulness, 
higher  than  the  bond  of  the  family. 

But  now  sometimes  a  wish  glimmers  in  a  less  pas- 
sionate and  wilful  heart  than  Juliet's.     The  pliable 
girl  brings  herself  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  peace  of  the 
family.     One  might  say  that  here  too  selfishness  pre- 
vailed, for  the  decision  came  from  the  feeling  that  the 


THE  OWNER  291 

pliable  girl  felt  herself  more  satisfied  by  the  unity  of 
the  family  than  by  the  fulfilment  of  her  wish.     That 
might  be;  but  what  if  there  remained  a  sure  sign  that 
egoism  had  been  sacrificed  to  piety?      What  if,  even 
after  the  wish  that  had  been  directed  against  the 
peace  of  the  family  was  sacrificed,  it  remained  at  least 
as  a  recollection  of  a  "  sacrifice  "  brought  to  a  sacred 
tie?      What  if  the  pliable  girl  were  conscious  of  hav- 
ing left  her  self-will  unsatisfied  and  humbly  subjected 
herself  to  a  higher  power?      Subjected  and  sacrificed, 
because  the  superstition  of  piety  exercised  its  dominion 
over  her! 

There  egoism  won,  here  piety  wins  and  the  egoistic 
heart  bleeds;  there  egoism  was  strong,  here  it  was — 
weak.     But  the  weak,  as  we  have  long  known,  are  the 
— unselfish.      For  them,  for  these  its  weak  members, 
the  family  cares,  because  they  belong  to  the  family, 
do  not  belong  to  themselves  and  care  for  themselves. 
This  weakness  Hegel,  e.  g.,  praises  when  he  wants  to 
have  match-making  left  to  the  choice  of  the  parents. 

As  a  sacred  communion  to  which,  among  the  rest, 
the  individual  owes  obedience,  the  family  has  the 
judicial  function  too  vested  in  it ;  such  a  "  family 
court "  is  described  e .  g.  in  the  "  Cabanis  "  of  Wili- 
bald  Alexis.     There  the  father,  in  the  name  of  the 
"  family  council,"  puts  the  intractable  son  among  the 
soldiers  and  thrusts  him  out  of  the  family,  in  order 
to  cleanse  the  smirched  family  again  by  means  of  this 
act  of  punishment. — The  most  consistent  development 
of  family  responsibility  is  contained  in  Chinese  law, 
according  to  which  the  whole  family  has  to  expiate 
the  individual's  fault. 


292  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

To-day,  however,  the  arm  of  family  power  seldom 
reaches  far  enough  to  take  seriously  in  hand  the 
punishment  of  apostates  (in  most  cases  the  State  pro- 
tects even  against  disinheritance).     The  criminal 
against  the  family  (family-criminal)  flees  into  the 
domain  of  the  State  and  is  free,  as  the  State-criminal 
who  gets  away  to  America  is  no  longer  reached  by  the 
punishments  of  his  State.     He  who  has  shamed  his 
family,  the  graceless  son,  is  protected  against  the 
family's  punishment  because  the  State,  this  protecting 
lord,  takes  away  from  family  punishment  its  "  sacred- 
ness  "  and  profanes  it,  decreeing  that  it  is  only—  "  re- 
venge " :  it  restrains  punishment,  this  sacred  family 
right,  because  before  its,  the  State's,  "  sacredness  " 
the  subordinate  sacredness  of  the  family  always  pales 
and  loses  its  sanctity  as  soon  as  it  comes  in  conflict 
with  this  higher  sacredness.     Without  the  conflict, 
the  State  lets  pass  the  lesser  sacredness  of  the  family; 
but  in  the  opposite  case  it  even  commands  crime 
against  the  family,  charging,  e.  g.,  the  son  to  refuse 
obedience  to  his  parents  as  soon  as  they  want  to  be- 
guile him  to  a  crime  against  the  State. 

Well,  the  egoist  has  broken  the  ties  of  the  family 
and  found  in  the  State  a  lord  to  shelter  him  against 
the  grievously  affronted  spirit  of  the  family.     But 
where  has  he  run  now?     Straight  into  a  new  society, 
in  which  his  egoism  is  awaited  by  the  same  snares  and 
nets  that  it  has  just  escaped.     For  the  State  is  likewise 
a  society,  not  a  union;  it  is  the  broadenedym/w/^ 
("  Father  of  the  Country — Mother  of  the  Country — 
children  of  the  country  "). 


THE  OWNER       ,  993 

What  is  called  a  State  is  a  tissue  and  plexus  of 
dependence  and  adherence;  it  is  a  belonging  together, 
a  holding  together,  in  which  those  who  are  placed 
together  fit  themselves  to  each  other,  or,  in  short, 
mutually  depend  on  each  other:  it  is  the  order  of  this 
dependence.     Suppose  the  king,  whose  authority  lends 
authority  to  all  down  to  the  beadle,  should  vanish: 
still  all  in  whom  the  will  for  order  was  awake  would 
keep  order  erect  against  the  disorders  of  bestiality. 
If  disorder  were  victorious,  the  State  would  be  at  an 
end. 

But  is  this  thought  of  love,  to  fit  ourselves  to  each 
other,  to  adhere  to  each  other  and  depend  on  each 
other,  really  capable  of  winning  us?      According  to 
this  the  State  would  be  love  realized,  the  being  for 
each  other  and  living  for  each  other  of  all.      Is  not 
self-will  being  lost  while  we  attend  to  the  will  for 
order?      Will  people  not  be  satisfied  when  order  is 
cared  for  by  authority,  i.  c.  when  authority  sees  to  it 
that  no  one  "  gets  in  the  way  of"  another;  when, 
then,  the  herd  is  judiciously  distributed  or  ordered? 
Why,  then  everything  is  in  "  the  best  order,"  and  it  is 
this  best  order  that  is  called — State! 

Our  societies  and  States  are  without  our  making 
them,  are  united  without  our  uniting,  are  predestined 
and  established,  or  have  an  independent  standing  *  of 
their  own,  are  the  indissolubly  established  against  us 
egoists.     The  fight  of  the  world  to-day  is,  as  it  is  said, 
directed  against  the  "  established."     Yet  people  are 
wont  to  misunderstand  this  as  if  it  were  only  that 

*  [It  should  be  remembered  that  the  words  "  establish  "  and  "  State  "  are 
both  derived  from  the  root  "stand."] 


294  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

what  is  now  established  was  to  be  exchanged  for  an- 
other, a  better,  established  system.      But  war  might 
rather  be  declared  against  establishment  itself,  i.  e. 
the  State,  not  a  particular  State,  not  any  such  thing 
as  the  mere  condition  of  the  State  at  the  time ;  it  is 
not  -another  State  (such  as  a  "  people's  State  ")  that 
men  aim  at,  but  their  union,  uniting,  this  ever-fluid 
uniting  of  everything  standing. — A  State  exists 
even  without  my  co-operation:   I  am  born  in  it, 
brought  up  in  it,  under  obligations  to  it,  and  must 
"  do  it  homage."*     It  takes  me  up  into  its  "  favor,"f 
and  I  live  by  its  "grace."  Thus  the  independent  estab- 
lishment of  the  State  founds  my  lack  of  independence  ; 
its  condition  as  a  "  natural  growth,"  its  organism,  de- 
mands that  my  nature  do  not  grow  freely,  but  be  cut 
to  fit  it.     That  it  may  be  able  to  unfold  in  natural 
growth,  it  applies  to  me  the  shears  of  "civilization"; 
it  gives  me  an  education  and  culture  adapted  to  it, 
not  to  me,  and  teaches  me  e.  g.  to  respect  the  laws,  to 
refrain  from  injury  to  State  property  (i.  e.  private 
property),  to  reverence  divine  and  earthly  highness, 
etc.;  in  short,  it  teaches  me  to  be — unpunishable, 
"sacrificing"  my  ownness  to  "sacredness"  (everything 
possible  is  sacred,  e.  g.  property,  others'  life,  etc.). 
In  this  consists  the  sort  of  civilization  and  culture  that 
the  State  is  able  to  give  me:  it  brings  me  up  to  be  a 
"  serviceable  instrument,"  a  "  serviceable  member  of 
society." 

This  every  State  must  do,  the  people's  State  as  well 
as  the  absolute  or  constitutional  one.     It  must  do  so 

*[huldigen] 


THE  OWNER  295 

as  long  as  we  rest  in  the  error  that  it  is  an  /,  as  which 
it  then  applies  to  itself  the  name  of  a  "  moral,  mysti- 
cal, or  political  person."     I,  who  really  am  I,  must 
pull  off  this  lion-skin  of  the  I  from  the  stalking 
thistle-eater.      What  manifold  robbery  have  I  not  put 
up  with  in  the  history  of  the  world!      There  I  let  sun, 
moon,  and  stars,  cats  and  crocodiles,  receive  the  honor 
of  ranking  as  I ;  there  Jehovah,  Allah,  and  Our 
Father  came  and  were  invested  with  the  I ;  there 
families,  tribes,  peoples,  and  at  last  actually  mankind, 
came  and  were  honored  as  I's;  there  the  Church,  the 
State,  came  with  the  pretension  to  be  I, — and  I 
gazed  calmly  on  all.     What  wonder  if  then  there  was 
always  a  real  I  too  that  joined  the  company  and 
affirmed  in  my  face  that  it  was  not  my  you  but  my 
real  /.     Why,  the  Son  of  Man  par  excellence  had 
done  the  like  ;  why  should  not  a  son  of  man  do  it 
too?      So  I  saw  my  I  always  above  me  and  outside 
me,  and  could  never  really  come  to  myself. 

I  never  believed  in  myself;   I  never  believed  in  my 
present,  I  saw  myself  only  in  the  future.     The  boy 
aelieves  he  will  be  a  proper  I,  a  proper  fellow,  only 
when  lie  has  become  a  man ;  the  man  thinks,  only  in 
the  other  world  will  he  be  something  proper.     And,  to 
enter  more  closely  upon  reality  at  once,  even  the  best 
are  to-day  still  persuading  each  other  that  one  must 
lave  received  into  himself  the  State,  his  people,  man- 
kind, and  what  not,  in  order  to  be  a  real  I,  a  "  free 
burgher,"  a  "  citizen,"  a  "  free  or  true  man  ";  they 
too  see  the  truth  and  reality  of  me  in  the  reception  of 
an  alien  I  and  devotion  to  it.     And  what  sort  of  an 
I?      An  I  that  is  neither  an  I  nor  a  you,  A  fancied  I, 


296  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

a  spook. 

While  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  church  could  well 
brook  many  States  living  united  in  it,  the  States 
learned  after  the  Reformation,  especially  after  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  to  tolerate  many  churches  (con- 
fessions) gathering  under  one  crown.     But  all  States 
are  religious  and,  as  the  case  may  be,  "  Christian 
States,"  and  make  it  their  task  to  force  the  intract- 
able, the  "  egoists,"  under  the  bond  of  the  unnatural, 
i.  e.  Christianize  them.     All  arrangements  of  the  Chris- 
tian State  have*  the  object  of  Christianizing-  the  people. 
Thus  the  court  has  the  object  of  forcing  people  to 
justice,  the  school  that  of  forcing  them  to  mental  cul- 
ture,— in  short,  the  object  of  protecting  those  who  act 
Christianly  against  those  who  act  unchristianly,  of 
bringing  Christian  action  to  dominion,  of  making  it 
powerful.     Among  these  means  of  force  the  State 
counted  the  Church  too,  it  demanded  a — particular 
religion  from  everybody.     Dupin  said  lately  against 
the  clergy,  "  Instruction  and  education  belong  to  the 
State." 

Certainly  everything  that  regards  the  principle  of 
morality  is  a  State  affair.      Hence  it  is  that  the 
Chinese  State  meddles  so  much  in  family  concerns, 
and  one  is  nothing  there  if  one  is  not  first  of  all 
a  good  child  to  his  parents.     Family  concerns  are 
altogether  State  concerns  with  us  too,  only  that  our 
State — puts  confidence  in  the  families  without  painful 
oversight;  it  holds  the  family  bound  by  the  marriage 
tie,  and  this  tie  cannot  be  broken  without  it. 

But  that  the  State  makes  me  responsible  for  my 
principles,  and  demands  certain  ones  from  me,  might 


THE  OWNER  297 

make  me  ask,  what  concern  has  it  with  the  "  wheel  in 
my  head  "  (principle)?      Very  much,  for  the  State 
is  the — ruling-  prinriple.     It  is  supposed  that  in 
divorce  matters,  in  marriage  law  in  general,  the  ques- 
tion is  of  the  proportion  of  rights  between  Church 
and  State.     Rather,  the  question  is  of  whether  any- 
thing sacred  is  to  rule  over  man,  be  it  called  faith  or 
ethical  law  (morality).     The  State  behaves  as  the 
same  ruler  that  the  Church  was.     The  latter  rests  on 
godliness,  the  former  on  morality. 

People  talk  of  the  tolerance,  the  leaving  opposite 
tendencies  free,  and  the  like,  by  which  civilized  States 
are  distinguished.     Certainly  some  are  strong  enough 
to  look  with  complacency  on  even  the  most  unre- 
strained meetings,  while  others  charge  their  catchpolls 
to  go  hunting  for  tobacco-pipes.     Yet  for  one  State 
as  for  another  the  play  of  individuals  among  them- 
selves, their  buzzing  to  and  fro,  their  daily  life,  is  an 
incident  which  it  must  be  content  to  leave  to  them- 
selves because  it  can  do  nothing  with  this.     Many, 
indeed,  still  strain  out  gnats  and  swallow  camels,  while 
others  are  shrewder.      Individuals  are  "  freer  "  in  the 
latter,  because  less  pestered.      But  /  am  free  in  ho 
State.     The  lauded  tolerance  of  States  is  simply  a 
tolerating  of  the  "harmless,"  the  "  not  dangerous"; 
it  is  only  elevation  above  pettymindedness,  only  a 
more  estimable,  grander,  prouder — despotism.     A 
certain  State  seemed  for  a  while  to  mean  to  be  pretty 

ell  elevated  above  literary  combats,  which  might 
be  carried  on  with  all  heat ;  England  is  elevated 
above  popular  tuniunl  and — tobacco-smoking.      But 
\\o<-  to  the  literature  that  deals  blows  at  the  State 


298  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

itself,  woe  to  the  mobs  that  "  endanger  "  the  State. 
In  that  certain  State  they  dream  of  a  "  free  science," 
in  England  of  a  "  free  popular  life." 

The  State  does  let  individuals  play  as  freely  as  pos- 
sible, only  they  must  not  be  in  earnest,  must  not  for- 
get it.     Man  must  not  carry  on  intercourse  with  man 
unconcernedly,  not  without  "  superior  oversight  and 
mediation."     I  must  not  execute  all  that  I  am  able 
to,  but  only  so  much  as  the  State  allows;  I  must  not 
turn  to  account  my  thoughts,  nor  my  work,  nor,  in 
general,  anything  of  mine. 

The  State  always  has  the  sole  purpose  to  limit, 
tame,  subordinate,  the  individual — to  make  him  sub- 
ject to  some  generality  or  other;  it  lasts  only  so  long 
as  the  individual  is  not  all  in  all,  and  it  is  only  the 
clearly-marked  restriction  of  me,  my  limitation,  my 
slavery.      Never  does  a  State  aim  to  bring  in  the  free 
activity  of  individuals,  but  always  that  which  is  bound 
to  the  purpose  of  the  State.     Through  the  State  noth- 
ing in  common  comes  to  pass  either,  as  little  as  one 
can  call  a  piece  of  cloth  the  common  work  of  all  the 
individual  parts  of  a  machine;  it  is  rather  the  work  of 
the  whole  machine  as  a  unit,  machine  work.     In  the 
same  style  everything  is  done  by  the  State  machine 
too;  for  it  moves  the  clockwork  of  the  individual 
minds,  none  of  which  follow  their  own  impulse.     The 
State  seeks  to  hinder  every  free  activity  by  its  censor- 
ship, its  supervision,  its  police,  and  holds  this  hinder- 
ing to  be  its  duty,  because  it  is  in  truth  a  duty  of 
self-preservation.     The  State  wants  to  make  something 
out  of  man,  therefore  there  live  in  it  only  made  men; 
every  one  who  wants  to  be  his  own  self  is  its  opponent 


THE  OWNER  299 

and  is  nothing.     "  He  is  nothing"  means  as  much  as, 
The  State  does  not  make  use  of  him,  grants  him  no 
position,  no  office,  no  trade,  and  the  like. 

E.  Bauer,*  in  the  "Liberate  Bestrebungen,"  II,  50, 
is  still  dreaming  of  a  "  government  which,  proceeding 
out  of  the  people,  can  never  stand  in  opposition  to 
it."      He  does  indeed  (p.  69)  himself  take  back  the 
word  "  government " :   "  In  the  republic  no  govern- 
ment at  all  obtains,  but  only  an  executive  authority. 
An  authority  which  proceeds  purely  and  alone  out  of 
the  people;  which  has  not  an  independent  power,  in- 
dependent principles,  independent  officers,  over  against 
the  people;  but  which  has  its  foundation,  the  fountain 
of  its  power  and  of  its  principles,  in  the  sole,  supreme 
authority  of  the  State,  in  the  people.     The  concept 
government,  therefore,  is  not  at  all  suitable  in  the 
people's  State."     But  the  thing  remains  the  same. 
That  which  has  "  proceeded,  been  founded,  sprung 
from  the  fountain  "  becomes  something  "  independent" 
and,  like  a  child  delivered  from  the  womb,  enters 
upon  opposition  at  once.     The  government,  if  it  were 
nothing  independent  and  opposing,  would  be  nothing 
at  all. 

"  In  the  free  State  there  is  no  government,"  etc. 
(p.  94).     This  surely  means  that  the  people,  when  it 
is  the  Mn.'crcig'n,  does  not  let  itself  be  conducted  by  a 
sujK-rior  authority.     Is  it  perchance  different  in  abso- 
lute monarchy?      Is  there  there  for  the  sovereign,  per- 
chance, a  government  standing  over  him?      Over  the 


*  Wliat  was  said  in  the  concluding  remarks  after  Humane  Liberalism 
holds  good  of  the  following,    t<>  wit.  that  it  was  likewise  written  immedi- 
ately after  the  appearance  of  the  book  cited. 


300  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

sovereign,  be  he  called  prince  or  people,  there  never 
stands  a  government:  that  is  understood  of  itself. 
But  over  me  there  will  stand  a  government  in  every 
"  State,"  in  the  absolute  as  well  as  in  the  republican 
or  "  free."     /  am  as  badly  off  in  one  as  in  the  other. 

The  republic  is  nothing  whatever  but — absolute 
monarchy;  for  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the 
monarch  is  called  prince  or  people,  both  being  a 
"  majesty."     Constitutionalism  itself  proves  that  no- 
body is  able  and  willing  to  be  only  an  instrument. 
The  ministers  domineer  over  their  master  the  prince, 
the  deputies  over  their  master  the  people.     Here, 
then,  the  parties  at  least  are  already  free, — videlicet, 
the  office-holders'  party  (so-called  people's  party). 
The  prince  must  conform  to  the  will  of  the  ministers, 
the  people  dance  to  the  pipe  of  the  chambers.     Con- 
stitutionalism is  further  than  the  republic,  because  it 
is  the  State  in  incipient  dissolution. 

E.  Bauer  denies  (p.  56)  that  the  people  is  a  "  per- 
sonality" in  the  constitutional  State;  per  contra,  then, 
in  the  republic?      Well,  in  the  constitutional  State 
people  is — a, party,  and  a  party  is  surely  a  "person- 
ality "  if  one  is  once  resolved  to  talk  of  a  "  political 
(p.  76)  moral  person  anyhow.     The  fact  is  that  a 
moral  person,  be  it  called  people's  party  or  people 
even  "  the  Lord,"  is  in  no  wise  a  person,  but  a  spook. 

Further,  E.  Bauer  goes  on  (p.  69) :   "  guardianship 
is  the  characteristic  of  a  government."     Truly,  still 
more  that  of  a  people  and  "  people's  State  ";  it  is 
the  characteristic  of  all  dominion.     A  people's  State, 
which  "  unites  in  itself  all  completeness  of  power,"  the 
"  absolute  master,"  cannot  let  me  become  powerful. 


THE  OWNER  301 

And  what  a  chimera,  to  be  no  longer  willing  to  call 
the  "  people's  officials  "  "  servants,  instruments,"  be- 
cause they  "  execute  the  free,  rational  law-will  of  the 
people!  "  (p.  73).      He  thinks  (p.  74) :  "  Only  by  all 
official  circles  subordinating  themselves  to  the  govern- 
ment's views  can  unity  be  brought  into  the  State  " ; 
but  his  "  people's  State"  is  to  have  "  unity  "  too; 
how  will  a  lack  of  subordination  be  allowable  there? 
subordination  to  the — people's  will. 

"  In  the  constitutional  State  it  is  the  regent  and  his 
disposition  that  the  whole  structure  of  government 
rests  on  in  the  end."     (Ibid.,  p.  130.)      How  would 
that  be  otherwise  in  the  "people's  State "?    Shall  /  not 
there  be  governed  by  the  people's  disposition  too,  and 
does  it  make  a  differences/or  me  whether  I  see  myself 
kept  in  dependence  by  the  prince's  disposition  or  by 
the  people's  disposition,  so-called  "public  opinion"? 
If  dependence  means  as  much  as  "  religious  relation," 
as  E.  Bauer  rightly  alleges,  then  in  the  people's  State 
the  people  remains^r  me  the  superior  power,  the 
majesty  "  (for  God  and  prince  have  their  proper 
essence  in  "  majesty  ")  to  which  I  stand  in  religious 
relations. — Like  the  sovereign  regent,  the  sovereign 
people  too  would  be  reached  by  no  laiv.      E.  Bauer's 
whole  attempt  comes  to  a  change  of  masters.      Instead 
of  wanting  to  make  the  people  free,  he  should  have 
had  his  mind  on  the  sole  realizable  freedom,  his  own. 
In  the  constitutional  State  absolutism  itself  has  at 
last  come  in  conflict  with  itself,  as  it  has  been  shat- 
tered into  a  duality;  the  government  wants  to  be 
absolute,  and  the  people  wants  to  be  absolute.     These 
two  absolutes  will  wear  out  against  each  other. 


302  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

E.  Bauer  inveighs  against  the  determination  of  the 
regent  by  birth,  by  chance.      But,  when  "  the  people  " 
have  become  "  the  sole  power  in  the  State"  (p.  132), 
have  we  not  then  in  it  a  master  from  chance  ?     Why, 
what  is  the  people?      The  people  has  always  been  only 
the  body  of  the  government:  it  is  many  under  one  hat 
(a  prince's  hat)  or  many  under  one  constitution.     Ai 
the  constitution  is  the — prince.     Princes  and  peoples 
will  persist  so  long  as  both  do  not  eo/lapse,  i.  e.  fall 
together.     If  under  one  constitution  there  are  many 
"  peoples," — e.  g.  in  the  ancient  Persian  monarchy 
and  to-day, — then  these  "  peoples  "  rank  only  as 
"  provinces."      For  me  the  people  is  in  any  case  an — 
accidental  power,  a  force  of  nature,  an  enemy  that  I 
must  overcome. 

What  is  one  to  think  of  under  the  name  of  an 
"  organized  "  people  (ibid.,  p.  132)?      A  people  "  that 
no  longer  has  a  government,"  that  governs  itself.      In 
which,  therefore,  no  ego  stands  out  prominently;  a 
people  organized  by  ostracism.     The  banishment  of 
egos,  ostracism,  makes  the  people  autocrat. 

If  you  speak  of  the  people,  you  must  speak  of  the 
prince ;  for  the  people,  if  it  is  to  be  a  subject*  and 
make  history,  must,  like  everything  that  acts,  have  a 
head,  its  "  supreme  head."     Weitling  sets  this  forth  in 
the  "Trio,"  and  Proudhon  declares,  "une  societe,  poui 
ainsi  dire  acephak,  ne  pent  vivre"^ 

The  vox  populi  is  now  always  held  up  to  us,  and 
"  public  opinion  "  is  to  rule  our  princes.     Certainly 

*  [In  the  philosophical  sense  (a  thinking  and  acting  hcinfr),  not  in  the 
political  sense,] 

t  ["  Creation  de  I'Ordre,"  p.  485.] 


THE  OWNER  303 

the  vo.r  popidi  is  at  the  same  time  t>o.r  del ;  but  is 
either  of  any  use,  and  is  not  the  vox  principis  also 
vox  del? 

At  this  point  the  "  Nationals  "  may  be  brought  to 
mind.     To  demand  of  the  thirty-eight  States  of 
Germany  that  they  shall  act  as  one  nation  can  only  be 
put  alongside  the  senseless  desire  that  thirty-eight 
swarms  of  bees,  led  by  thirty-eight  queen-bees,  shall 
unite  themselves  into  one  swarm.     Bees  they  all  re- 
main; but  it  is  not  the  bees  as  bees  that  belong  to- 
gether and  can  join  themselves  together,  it  is  only  that 
the  subject  bees  are  connected  with  the  riding  queens. 
Hees  and  ]>eoples  are  destitute  of  will,  and  the  instinct 
of  their  queens  leads  them. 

If  one  were  to  point  the  bees  to  their  beehood,  in 
which  at  any  rate  they  are  all  equal  to  each  other,  one 
would  be  doing  the  same  thing  that  they  are  now  do- 
ing so  stormily  in  pointing  the  Germans  to  their 
Germanhood.     Why,  Germanhood  is  just  like  bee- 
hood  in  this  very  thing,  that  it  bears  in  itself  the 
necessity  of  cleavages  and  separations,  yet  without 
pushing  on  to  the  last  separation,  where,  with  the 
complete  carrying  through  of  the  process  of  separating, 
its  end  appears:   I  mean,  to  the  separation  of  man 
from  man.     Germanhood  does  indeed  divide  itself  into 
different  peoples  and  tribes,  i.  e.  beehives;  but  the 
individual  who  has  the  quality  of  being  a  German  is 
still  as  powerless  as  the  isolated  bee.     And  yet  only 
individuals  can  enter  into  union  with  each  other,  and 
all  alliances  and  leagues  of  peoples  are  and  remain 
mechanical  compoundings,  because  those  who  come 
together,  at  least  so  far  as  the  "  peoples  "  are  regarded 


304  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

as  the  ones  that  have  come  together,  are  destitute  of 
will.  Only  with  the  last  separation  does  separation 
itself  end  and  change  to  unification. 

Now  the  Nationals  are  exerting  themselves  to  set  up 
the  abstract,  lifeless  unity  of  beehood ;  but  the  self- 
owned  are  going  to  fight  for  the  unity  willed  by  their 
own  will,  for  union.     This  is  the  token  of  all  reaction- 
ary wishes,  that  they  want  to  set  up  something 
general,  abstract,  an  empty,  lifeless  concept,  in  dis- 
tinction from  which  the  self-owned  aspire  to  relieve 
the  robust,  lively  particular  from  the  trashy  burden  of 
generalities.     The  reactionaries  would  be  glad  to 
smite  &  people,  a  nation,  forth  from  the  earth;  the 
self-owned  have  before  their  eyes  only  themselves.      In 
essentials  the  two  efforts  that  are  just  now  the  order 
of  the  day — to  wit,  the  restoration  of  provincial 
rights  and  of  the  old  tribal  divisions  (Franks,  Bavari- 
ans, etc.,  Lusatia,  etc.),  and  the  restoration  of  the 
entire  nationality — coincide  in  one.      But  the  Germans 
will  come  into  unison,  i.  e.  unite  themselves,  only  when 
they  knock  over  their  beehood  as  well  as  all  the  bee- 
hives; in  other  words,  when  they  are  more  than — 
Germans:  only  then  can  they  form  a  "  German 
Union."     They  must  not  want  to  turn  back  into 
their  nationality,  into  the  womb,  in  order  to  be  born 
again,  but  let  every  one  turn  in  to  himself.     How 
ridiculously  sentimental  when  one  German  grasps 
another's  hand  and  presses  it  with  sacred  awe 
because  "  he  too  is  a  German  "!      With  that  he  is 
something  great!      But  this  will  certainly  still  be 
thought  touching  as  long  as  people  are  enthusiastic 
for  "  brotherliness,"  i.  e.  as  long  as  they  have  a 


THE  OWNER  3Q5 

"family  disposition.'1'1     From  the  superstition  of 
"  piety,"  from  "  brotherliness  "  or  "  childlikeness  "  or 
however  else  the  soft-hearted  piety-phrases  run, — from 
the  family  spirit, — the  Nationals,  who  want  to  have 
a  great  family  of  Germans,  cannot  liberate  themselves. 

Aside  from  this,  the  so-called  Nationals  would  only 
have  to  understand  themselves  rightly  in  order  to  lift 
themselves  out  of  their  juncture  with  the  good-natured 
Teutomaniacs.     For  the  uniting  for  material  ends  and 
interests,  which  they  demand  of  the  Germans,  comes 
to  nothing  else  than  a  voluntary  union.     Carriere,  in- 
spired, cries  out,*  "  Railroads  are  to  the  more  penetrat- 
ing eye  the  way  to  a  life  of  the  people  such  as  has  not 
yet  anywhere  appeared  in  such  significance."     Quite 
right,  it  will  be  a  life  of  the  people  that  has  nowhere 
appeared,  because  it  is  not  a — life  of  the  people. — So 
Carriere  then  combats  himself  (p.  10):  "  Pure  hu- 
manity or  manhood  cannot  be  better  represented  than 
by  a  people  fulfilling  its  mission."     Why,  by  this 
nationality  only  is  represented.     "  Washed-out  gener- 
ality is  lower  than  the  form  complete  in  itself,  which 
is  itself  a  whole,  and  lives  as  a  living  member  of  the 
truly  general,  the  organized."     Why,  the  people  is 
this  very  "  washed-out  generality,"  and  it  is  only  a 
man  that  is  the  "  form  complete  in  itself." 

The  impersonality  of  what  they  call  "  people,  na- 
tion," is  clear  also  from  this:  that  a  people  which 
wants  to  bring  its  I  into  view  to  the  best  of  its  power 
puts  at  its  head  the  ruler  without  will.      It  finds  itself 
in  the  alternative  either  to  be  subjected  to  a  prince 

*  ["Koelner  Dom,"  p.  4.] 


306  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

who  realizes  only  himself,  his  individual  pleasure — thei 
it  does  not  recognize  in  the  "  absolute  master  "  its  owi 
will,  the  so-called  will  of  the  people — ,  or  to  seat  on 
the  throne  a  prince  who  gives  effect  to  no  will  of  his 
own — then  it  has  a  prince  without  will,  whose  place 
some  ingenious  clockwork  would  perhaps  fill  just  as 
well. — Therefore  insight  need  go  only  a  step  farther; 
then  it  becomes  clear  of  itself  that  the  I  of  the  people 
is  an  impersonal,  "spiritual"  power,  the — law.     The 
people's  I,  therefore,  is  a — spook,  not  an  I.     I  am  I 
only  by  this,  that  I  make  myself;  i.  e.  that  it  is  not 
another  who  makes  me,  but  I  must  be  my  own  work. 
But  how  is  it  with  this  I  of  the  people?      Chance  plays 
it  into  the  people's  hand,  chance  gives  it  this  or  that 
born  lord,  accidents  procure  it  the  chosen  one;  he  is 
not  its  (the  "sovereign'1''  people's)  product,  as  I  am  my 
product.     Conceive  of  one  wanting  to  talk  you  into 
believing  that  you  were  not  your  I,  but  Tom  or  Jack 
was  your  I !      But  so  it  is  with  the  people,  and  rightly. 
For  the  people  has  an  I  as  little  as  the  eleven  planets 
counted  together  have  an  /,  though  they  revolve 
around  a  common  centre. 

Bailly's  utterance  is  representative  of  the  slave- 
disposition  that  folks  manifest  before  the  sovereign 
people,  as  before  the  prince.     "  I  have,"  says  he,  "  no 
longer  any  extra  reason  when  the  general  reason  has 
pronounced  itself.     My  first  law  was  the  nation's  will; 
as  soon  as  it  had  assembled  I  knew  nothing  beyond  its 
sovereign  will."     He  would  have  no  "  extra  reason," 
and  yet  this  extra  reason  alone  accomplishes  every- 
thing.    Just  so  Mirabeau  inveighs  in  the  words,  "  No 
power  on  earth  has  the  right  to  say  to  the  nation's 


THE  OWNER  307 

representatives,  It  is  my  will !  " 

As  with  the  Greeks,  there  is  now  a  wish  to  make 
man  a  zoon  politicon,  a  citizen  of  the  State  or  political 
man.     So  he  ranked  for  a  long  time  as  a  "  citizen  of 
heaven."     But  the  Greek  fell  into  ignominy  along 
with  his  State,  the  citizen  of  heaven  likewise  falls  with 
heaven ;  we,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  willing  to  go 
down  along  with  the  people,  the  nation  and  national- 
ity, not  willing  to  be  merely  political  men  or  politi- 
cians.    Since  the  Revolution  they  have  striven  to 
"  make  the  people  happy,"  and  in  making  the  people 
bappy,  great,  and  the  like,  they  make  Us  unhappy: 
the  people's  good  hap  is — my  mishap. 

What  empty  talk  the  political  liberals  utter  with 
emphatic  decorum  is  well  seen  again  in  Nauwerk's 
"  On  Taking  Part  in  the  State."     There  complaint  is 
made  of  those  who  are  indifferent  and  do  not  take 
part,  who- are  not  in  the  full  sense  citizens,  and  the 
author  speaks  as  if  one  could  not  be  man  at  all  if  one 
did  not  take  a  lively  part  in  State  affairs,  i.  e.  if  one 
were  not  a  politician.      In  this  he  is  right;  for,  if  the 
State  ranks  as  the  warder  of  everything  "  human,"  we 
can  have  nothing  human  without  taking  part  in  it. 
But  what  does  this  make  out  against  the  egoist? 
Nothing  at  all,  because  the  egoist  is  to  himself  the 
warder  of  the  human,  and  has  nothing  to  say  to  the 
State  except  "  Get  out  of  my  sunshine."     Only  when 
the  State  comes  in  contact  with  his  ownness  does  the 
egoist  take  an  active  interest  in  it.     If  the  condition 
of  the  State  does  not  bear  hard  on  the  closet-philo- 
sopher, is  he  to  occupy  himself  with  it  because  it  is  his 
"  most  sacred  duty  "?      So  long  as  the  State  does 


308  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

according  to  his  wish,  what  need  has  he  to  look  up 
from  his  studies?      Let  those  who  from  an  interest  of 
their  own  want  to  have  conditions  otherwise  busy 
themselves  with  them.     Not  now,  nor  evermore,  will 
"sacred  duty"  bring  folks  to  reflect  about  the  State, — 
as  little  as  they  become  disciples  of  science,  artists, 
etc.,  from  "  sacred  duty."      Egoism  alone  can  impel 
them  to  it,  and  will  as  soon  as  things  have  become 
much  worse.     If  you  showed  folks  that  their  egoism 
demanded  that  they  busy  themselves  with  State  affairs, 
you  would  not  have  to  call  on  them  long;  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  you  appeal  to  their  love  of  fatherland  and 
the  like,  you  will  long  preach  to  deaf  hearts  in  behalf 
of  this  "  service  of  love."     Certainly,  in  your  sense 
the  egoists  will  not  participate  in  State  affairs  at  all. 

Nauwerk  utters  a  genuine  liberal  phrase  on  p.  16: 
"  Man  completely  fulfils  his  calling  only  in  feeling  and 
knowing  himself  as  a  member  of  humanity,  and  being 
active  as  such.     The  individual  cannot  realize  the  idea 
of  manhood  if  he  does  not  stay  himself  upon  all  hu- 
manity, if  he  does  not  draw  his  powers  from  it  like 
Antaeus." 

In  the  same  place  it  is  said:  "Man's  relation  to  the 
res  pubtica  is  degraded  to  a  purely  private  matter  by 
the  theological  view;  is,  accordingly,  made  away  with 
by  denial."     As  if  the  political  view  did  otherwise 
with  religion!      There  religion  is  a  "  private  matter." 

If,  instead  of  "  sacred  duty,"  "  man's  destiny,"  the 
"  calling  to  full  manhood,"  and  similar  command- 
ments, it  were  held  up  to  people  that  their  self-interest 
was  infringed  on  when  they  let  everything  in  the  State 
go  as  it  goes,  then,  without  declamations,  they  would 


THE  OWNER  309 

be  addressed  as  one  will  have  to  address  them  at  the 
decisive  moment  if  he  wants  to  attain  his  end.     In- 
stead of  this,  the  theology-hating  author  says,  "  If 
there  has  ever  been  a  time  when  the  State  laid  claim 
to  all  that  are  hers,  such  a  time  is  ours. — The  think- 
ing man  sees  in  participation  in  the  theory  and  prac- 
tice of  the  State  a  duty,  one  of  the  most  sacred  duties 
that  rest  upon  him  " — and  then  takes  under  closer 
consideration  the  "  unconditional  necessity  that  every- 
body participate  in  the  State." 

He  in  whose  head  or  heart  or  both  the  State  is 
seated,  he  who  is  possessed  by  the  State,  or  the  believer 
in  the  State,  is  a  politician,  and  remains  such  to  all 
eternity. 

"The  State  is  the  most  necessary  means  for  the  com- 
plete development  of  mankind."      It  assuredly  has 
been  so  as  long  as  we  wanted  to  develop  mankind; 
but,  if  we  want  to  develop  ourselves,  it  can  be  to  us 
only  a  means  of  hindrance. 

Can  State  and  people  still  be  reformed  and  bettered 
now?      As  little  as  the  nobility,  the  clergy,  the  church, 
etc.:  they  can  be  abrogated,  annihilated,  done  away 
with,  not  reformed.     Can  I  change  a  piece  of  nonsense 
into  sense  by  reforming  it,  or  must  I  drop  it  outright? 

Henceforth  what  is  to  be  done  is  no  longer  about 
the  State  (the  form  of  the  State,  etc.),  but  about  me. 
With  this  all  questions  about  the  prince's  power,  the 
constitution,  etc.,  sink  into  their  true  abyss  and  their 
true  nothingness.     I,  this  nothing,  shall  put  forth  my 
creations  from  myself. 


310  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

To  the  chapter  of  society  belongs  also  "  the  party," 
whose  praise  has  of  late  been  sung. 

In  the  State  the  party  is  current.     "  Party,  party, 
who  should  not  join  one!  "     But  the  individual  is 
unique,*  not  a  member  of  the  party.     He  unites 
freely,  and  separates  freely  again.     The  party  is  noth- 
ing but  a  State  in  the  State,  and  in  this  smaller  bee- 
State  "  peace  "  is  also  to  rule  just  as  in  the  greater. 
The  very  people  who  cry  loudest  that  there  must  be  an 
opposition  in  the  State  inveigh  against  every  discord 
in  the  party.     A  proof  that  they  too  want  only  a — 
State.     All  parties  are  shattered  not  against  the  State, 
but  against  the  ego.f 

One  hears  nothing  oftener  now  than  the  admonition 
to  remain  true  to  his  party;  party  men  despise  noth- 
ing so  much  as  a  mugwump.      One  must  run  with  his 
party  through  thick  and  thin,  and  unconditionally  ap- 
prove and  represent  its  chief  principles.      It  does  not 
indeed  go  quite  so  badly  here  as  with  closed  societies, 
because  these  bind  their  members  to  fixed  laws  or 
statutes  (tf.  g.  the  orders,  the  Society  of  Jesus,  etc.) . 
But  yet  the  party  ceases  to  be  a  union  at  the  same 
moment  at  which  it  makes  certain  principles  binding 
and  wants  to  have  them  assured  against  attacks;  but 
this  moment  is  the  very  birth-act  of  the  party.     As 
party  it  is  already  a  born  society,  a  dead  union,  an 
idea  that  has  become  fixed.     As  party  of  absolutism  it 
cannot  will  that  its  members  should  doubt  the  irre- 
fragable truth  of  this  principle;  they  could  cherish  this 
doubt  only  if  they  were  egoistic  enough  to  want  still 

*  [einzip]  t  [am  Einzigen] 


THE  OWNER  311 

to  be  something  outside  their  party,  /.  c.  non-partis- 
ans.    Non-partisan  they  cannot  be  as  party-men,  but 
only  as  egoists.     If  you  are  a  Protestant  and  belong 
to  that  party,  you  must  only  justify  Protestantism,  at 
most  "purge"  it,  not  reject  it;  if  you  are  a  Christian 
and  belong  among  men  to  the  Christian  party,  you 
cannot  go  beyond  this  as  a  member  of  this  party,  but 
only  when  your  egoism,  i.  e.  non-partisanship,  impels 
you  to  it.     What  exertions  the  Christians,  down  to 
Hegel  and  the  Communists,  have  put  forth  to  make 
their  party  strong!  they  stuck  to  it  that  Christianity 
must  contain  the  eternal  truth,  and  that  one  needs 
only  to  get  at  it,  make  sure  of  it,  and  justify  it. 

In  short,  the  party  cannot  bear  non-partisanship, 
and  it  is  in  this  that  egoism  appears.     What  matters 
the  party  to  me?      I  shall  find  enough  anyhow  who 
unite  with  me  without  swearing  allegiance  to  my  flag. 

He  who  passes  over  from  one  party  to  another  is  at 
once  abused  as  a  "  turncoat."     Certainly  morality  de- 
mands that  one  stand  by  his  party,  and  to  become 
apostate  from  it  is  to  spot  oneself  with  the  stain  of 
"faithlessness";  but  ownness  knows  no  commandment 
of  "  faithfulness,  adhesion,  etc.,"  ownness  permits 
everything,  even  apostasy,  defection.     Unconsciously 
even  the  moral  themselves  let  themselves  be  led  by  this 
principle  when  they  have  to  judge  one  who  passes  over 
to  their  party, — nay,  they  are  likely  to  be  making 
proselytes;  they  should  only  at  the  same  time  acquire 
a  consciousness  of  the  fact  that  one  must  commit  im- 
moral actions  in  order  to  commit  his  own, — i.  e.  here, 
that  one  must  break  faith,  yes,  even  his  oath,  in  order 
to  determine  himself  instead  of  being  determined  by 


312  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

moral  considerations.      In  the  eyes  of  people  of  strict 
moral  judgment  an  apostate  always  shimmers  in  equi- 
vocal colors,  and  will  not  easily  obtain  their  con- 
fidence; for  there  sticks  to  him  the  taint  of  "faithless- 
ness," i.  e.  of  an  immorality.     In  the  lower  man  this 
view  is  found  almost  generally;  advanced  thinkers  fall 
here  too,  as  always,  into  an  uncertainty  and  bewilder- 
ment, and  the  contradiction  necessarily  founded  in  the 
principle  of  morality  does  not,  on  account  of  the  con- 
fusion of  their  concepts,  come  clearly  to  their  con- 
sciousness.    They  do  not  venture  to  call  the  apostate 
immoral  downright,  because  they  themselves  entice  to 
apostasy,  to  defection  from  one  religion  to  another, 
etc.;  still,  they  cannot  give  up  the  standpoint  of 
morality  either.     And  yet  here  the  occasion  was  to  be 
seized  to  step  outside  of  morality. 

Are  the  Own  or  Unique*  perchance  a  party?      How 
could  they  be  own  if  they  were  such  as  belonged  to  a 
party? 

Or  is  one  to  hold  with  no  party?      In  the  very  act 
of  joining  them  and  entering  their  circle  one  forms  a 
union  with  them  that  lasts  as  long  as  party  and  I 
pursue  one  and  the  same  goal.     But  to-day  I  still 
share  the  party's  tendency,  and  by  to-morrow  I  can  d( 
so  no  longer  and  I  become  "  untrue  "  to  it.     The 
party  has  nothing  binding  (obligatory)  for  me,  and  I 
do  not  have  respect  for  it;  if  it  no  longer  pleases  me, 
I  become  its  foe. 

In  every  party  that  cares  for  itself  and  its  persist- 
ence, the  members  are  unfree  (or  better,  unown)  in 

*  [Einzigen] 


THE  OWNER  313 

that  degree,  they  lack  egoism  in  that  degree,  in  which 
they  serve  this  desire  of  the  party.  The  independence 
of  the  party  conditions  the  lack  of  independence  in  the 
party-members. 

A  party,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be,  can  never 
do  without  a  confession  of  faith.      For  those  who  be- 
long to  the  party  must  believe  in  its  principle,  it  must 
not  be  brought  in  doubt  or  put  in  question  by  them, 
it  must  be  the  certain,  indubitable  thing  for  the  party- 
member.     That  is:  One  must  belong  to  a  party  body 
and  soul,  else  one  is  not  truly  a  party-man,  but  more 
or  less — an  egoist.     Harbor  a  doubt  of  Christianity, 
and  you  are  already  no  longer  a  true  Christian,  you 
have  lifted  yourself  to  the  "  effrontery"  of  putting  a 
question  beyond  it  and  haling  Christianity  before  your 
egoistic  judgment-seat.     You  have — sinned  against 
Christianity,  this  party  cause  (for  it  is  surely  not  e.  g. 
a  cause  for  the  Jews,  another  party).      But  well  for 
you  if  you  do  not  let  yourself  be  affrighted :  your  ef- 
frontery helps  you  to  ownness. 

So  then  an  egoist*  could  never  embrace  a  party  or 
take  up  with  a  party?      Oh,  yes,  only  he  cannot  let 
himself  be  embraced  and  taken  up  by  the  party.      For 
him  the  party  remains  all  the  time  nothing  but  a 
gathering :  he  is  one  of  the  party,  he  takes  part. 

The  best  State  will  clearly  be  that  which  has  the 
most  loyal  citizens,  and  the  more  the  devoted  mind  for 
legality  is  lost,  so  much  the  more  will  the  State,  this 
system  of  morality,  this  moral  life  itself,  be  diminished 
in  force  and  quality.     With  the  "  good  citizens  "  the 
good  State  too  perishes  and  dissolves  into  anarchy  and 


314  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


lawlessness.     "  Respect  for  the  law! "     By  this  cement 
the  total  of  the  State  is  held  together.     "  The  law  is 
sacred,  and  he  who  affronts  it  a  criminal.'''1     Without 
crime  no  State:  the  moral  world — and  this  the  State 
— is  crammed  full  of  scamps,  cheats,  liars,  thieves,  etc. 
Since  the  State  is  the  "  lordship  of  law,"  its  hierarchy, 
it  follows  that  the  egoist,  in  all  cases  where  his  ad- 
vantage runs  against  the  State's,  can  satisfy  himself 
only  by  crime. 

The  State  cannot  give  up  the  claim  that  its  laics  and 
ordinances  are  sacred.*     At  this  the  individual  ranks 
as  the  unholy^  (barbarian,  natural  man,  "egoist") 
over  against  the  State,  exactly  as  he  was  once  regarded 
by  the  Church;  before  the  individual  the  State  takes 
on  the  nimbus  of  a  saint.  \     Thus  it  issues  a  law 
against  dueling.     Two  men  who  are  both  at  one  in 
this,  that  they  are  willing  to  stake  their  life  for  a 
cause  (no  matter  what),  are  not  to  be  allowed  this,  be- 
cause the  State  will  not  have  it:  it  imposes  a  penalty 
on  it.     Where  is  the  liberty  of  self-determination  then? 
It  is  at  once  quite  another  situation  if,  as  e.  g.  in 
North  America,  society  determines  to  let  the  duelists 
bear  certain  evil  consequences  of  their  act,  e.  g.  with- 
drawal of  the  credit  hitherto  enjoyed.     To  refuse 
credit  is  everybody's  affair,  and,  if  a  society  wants  to 
withdraw  it  for  this  or  that  reason,  the  man  who  is  hit 
cannot  therefore  complain  of  encroachment  on  his  lib- 
erty: the  society  is  simply  availing  itself  of  its  own 
liberty.     That  is  no  penalty  for  sin,  no  penalty  for  a 
crime.     The  duel  is  no  crime  there,  but  only  an  act 

*  [heilig]  t  [unheilig]  }  [Heiliger] 


THE  OWNER  315 

against  which  the  society  adopts  counter-measures,  re- 
solves on  a  defence.     The  State,  on  the  contrary, 
stamps  the  duel  as  a  crime,  i.  e.  as  an  injury  to  its 
sacred  law:  it  makes  it  a  criminal  case.     The  society 
leaves  it  to  the  individual's  decision  whether  he  will 
draw  upon  himself  evil  consequences  and  inconveni- 
ences by  his  mode  of  action,  and  hereby  recognizes  his 
free  decision;  the  State  behaves  in  exactly  the  reverse 
way,  denying  all  right  to  the  individual's  decision 
and,  instead,  ascribing  the  sole  right  to  its  own  de- 
cision, the  law  of  the  State,  so  that  he  who  trans- 
gresses the  State's  commandment  is  looked  upon  as  if 
he  were  acting  against  God's  commandment, — a  view 
which  likewise  was  once  maintained  by  the  Church. 
Here  God  is  the  Holy  in  and  of  himself,  and  the  com- 
mandments of  the  Church,  as  of  the  State,  are  the 
commandments  of  this  Holy  One,  which  he  transmits  to 
the  world  through  his  anointed  and  Lords-by-the- 
Grace-of-God.      If  the  Church  had  deadly  sins,  the  State 
has  capital  crimes ;  if  the  one  had  heretics,  the  other 
has  traitors;  the  one  ecclesiastical  penalties,  the  other 
criminal  penalties ;  the  one  inquisitorial  processes,  the 
other  fiscal;  in  short,  there  sins,  here  crimes,  there 
sinners,  here  criminals,  there  inquisition  and  here — 
inquisition.     Will  the  sanctity  of  the  State  not  fall 
like  the  Church's?     The  awe  of  its  laws,  the  reverence 
for  its  highness,  the  humility  of  its  "  subjects,"  will 
this  remain?      Will  the  "  saint's  "  face  not  be  stripped 
of  its  adornment? 

What  a  folly,  to  ask  of  the  State's  authority  that  it 
should  enter  into  an  honorable  fight  with  the  indi- 
vidual, and,  as  they  express  themselves  in  the  matter 


316  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

of  freedom  of  the  press,  share  sun  and  wind  equally ! 
If  the  State,  this  thought,  is  to  be  a  de  facto  power,  it 
simply  must  be  a  superior  power  against  the  individ- 
ual.    The  State  is  "  sacred  "  and  must  not  expose 
itself  to  the  "  impudent  attacks  "  of  individuals.     If 
the  State  is  sacred,  there  must  be  censorship.     The 
political  liberals  admit  the  former  and  dispute  the 
inference.     But  in  any  case  they  concede  repressive 
measures  to  it,  for — they  stick  to  this,  that  State  is 
more  than  the  individual  and  exercises  a  justified 
revenge,  called  punishment. 

Punishment  has  a  meaning  only  when  it  is  to  afford 
expiation  for  the  injuring  of  a  sacred  thing.     If  some- 
thing is  sacred  to  any  one,  he  certainly  deserves 
punishment  when  he  acts  as  its  enemy.     A  man  who 
lets  a  man's  life  continue  in  existence  because  to  him 
it  is  sacred  and  he  has  a  dread  of  touching  it  is  simply 
a — religious  man. 

Weitling  lays  crime  at  the  door  of  "  social  dis- 
order," and  lives  in  the  expectation  that  under  Com- 
munistic arrangements  crimes  will  become  impossible, 
because  the  temptations  to  them,  e.  g.  money,  fall 
away.     As,  however,  his  organized  society  is  also  ex- 
alted into  a  sacred  and  inviolable  one,  he  miscalcu- 
lates in  that  good-hearted  opinion.     Such  as  with 
their  mouth  professed  allegiance  to  the  Communistic 
society,  but  worked  underhand  for  its  ruin,  would  not 
be  lacking.     Besides,  Weitling  has  to  keep  on  with 
"  curative  means  against  the  natural  remainder  of  hu- 
man diseases  and  weaknesses,"  and  "  curative  means  " 
always  announce  to  begin  with  that  individuals  will  be 
looked  upon  as  "called  "  to  a  particular  "salvation" 


THE  OWNER  317 

and  hence  treated  according  to  the  requirements  of 
this  "  human  calling."      Curative  means  or  healing  is 
only  the  reverse  side  of  punishment,  the  theory  of  cure 
runs  parallel  with  the  theory  of  punishment ;  if  the 
latter  sees  in  an  action  a  sin  against  right,  the  former 
takes  it  for  a  sin  of  the  man  against  himself,  as  a  de- 
cadence from  his  health.      But  the  correct  thing  is 
that  I  re^a  d  it  either  as  an  action  that  suits  me  or  as 
one  that  does  not  suit  me,  as  hostile  or  friendly  to  me, 
i.  e.  that  I  treat  it  as  my  property,  which  I  cherish  or 
demolish.     "  Crime  "  or  "  disease  "  are  not  either  of 
them  an  cg'oi.stic  view  of  the  matter,  i.  e.  a  judgment 
starting  from  me,  but  starting  from  another, — to 
wit,  whether  it  injures  right,  general  right,  or  the 
health  partly  of  the  individual  (the  sick  one),  partly 
of  the  generality  (society).     "  Crime"  is  treated  inex- 
orably, "  disease  "  with  "  loving  gentleness,  compas- 
sion," and  the  like. 

Punishment  follows  crime.      If  crime  falls  because 
the  sacred  vanishes,  punishment  must  not  less  be 
drawn  into  its  fall;  for  it  too  has  significance  only 
over  against  something  sacred.      Ecclesiastical  punish- 
ments have  been  abolished.     Why?      Because  how 
one  behaves  toward  the  "holy  God  "  is  his  own  affair. 
But,  as  this  one  punishment,  ecclesiastical  punishment, 
has  fallen,  so  all  punishments  must  fall.     As  sin 
against  the  so-called  God  is  a  man's  own  affair,  so 
that  against  every  kind  of  the  so-called  sacred.     Ac- 
cording to  our  theories  of  penal  law,  with  whose  "  im- 
provement in  conformity  to  the  times  "  people  are 
tormenting  themselves  in  vain,  they  want  to  punish 
men  for  this  or  that  "  inhumanity  ";  and  therein  they 


318  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

make  the  silliness  of  these  theories  especially  plain  by 
their  consistency,  hanging  the  little  thieves  and  letting 
the  big  ones  run.     For  injury  to  property  they  have 
the  house  of  correction,  and  for  "  violence  to  thought," 
suppression  of  "  natural  rights  of  man,"  only — repre- 
sentations and  petitions. 

The  criminal  code  has  continued  existence  only 
through  the  sacred,  and  perishes  of  itself  if  punish- 
ment is  given  up.     Now  they  want  to  create  every- 
where a  new  penal  law,  without  indulging  in  a  mis- 
giving about  punishment  itself.      But  it  is  exactly 
punishment  that  must  make  room  for  satisfaction, 
which,  again,  cannot  aim  at  satisfying  right  or  justice, 
but  at  procuring  us  a  satisfactory  outcome.     If  one 
does  to  us  what  we  will  not  put  up  with,  we  break  his 
power  and  bring  our  own  to  bear:  we  satisfy  ourselves 
on  him,  and  do  not  fall  into  the  folly  of  wanting  to 
satisfy  right  (the  spook).      It  is  not  the  sacred  that 
is  to  defend  itself  against  man,  but  man  against  man; 
as  God  too,  you  know,  no  longer  defends  himself 
against  man,  God  to  whom  formerly  (and  in  part,  in- 
deed, even  now)  all  the  "  servants  of  God  "  offered 
their  hands  to  punish  the  blasphemer,  as  they  still  at 
this  very  day  lend  their  hands  to  the  sacred.     This 
devotion  to  the  sacred  brings  it  to  pass  also  that,  wit! 
out  lively  participation  of  one's  own,  one  only  deliver 
misdoers  into  the  hands  of  the  police  and  courts :  a 
non-participating  making  over  to  the  authorities, 
"  who,  of  course,  will  best  administer  sacred  matters. 
The  people  is  quite  crazy  for  hounding  the  police  on 
against  everything  that  seems  to  it  to  be  immoral, 
often  only  unseemly,  and  this  popular  rage  for  the 


THE  OWNER  319 

moral  protects  the  police  institution,  more  than  the 
government  could  in  any  way  protect  it. 

In  crime  the  egoist  has  hitherto  asserted  himself 
and  mocked  at  the  sacred;  the  break  with  the  sacred, 
or  rather  of  the  sacred,  may  become  general.     A 
i  revolution  never  returns,  but  a  mighty,  reckless, 
shameless,  conscienceless,  proud — crime,  does  it  not 
rumble  in  distant  thunders,  and  do  you  not  see  how 
the  sky  grows  presciently  silent  and  gloomy? 

He  who  refuses  to  spend  his  powers  for  such  limited 
societies  as  family,  party,  nation,  is  still  always  long- 
ing for  a  worthier  society,  and  thinks  he  has  found  the 
true  object  of  love,  perhaps,  in  "  human  society  "  or 
"  mankind,"  to  sacrifice  himself  to  which  constitutes 
his  honor;   from  now  on  he  "lives  for  and  serves 
mankind.'1'1 

People  is  the  name  of  the  body,  State  of  the  spirit, 
of  that  riding  person  that  has  hitherto  suppressed  me. 
Some  have  wanted  to  transfigure  peoples  and  States  by 
broadening  them  out  to  "  mankind  "  and  "  general 
reason  ";   but  servitude  would  only  become  still  more 
intense  with  this  widening,  and  philanthropists  and 
humanitarians  are  as  absolute  masters  as  politicians 
and  diplomats. 

Modern  critics  inveigh  against  religion  because  it 
sets  God,  the  divine,  moral,  etc.,  outside  of  man,  or 
makes  them  something  objective,  in  opposition  to 
which  the  critics  rather  transfer  these  very  subjects 
into  man.      But  those  critics  none  the  less  fall  into 
the  proper  error  of  religion,  to  give  man  a  "  destiny," 
in  that  they  too  want  to  have  him  divine,  human,  and 


320  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  like:  morality,  freedom  and  humanity,  etc.,  are 
his  essence.     And,  like  religion,  politics  too  wanted 
to  "  educate  "  man,  to  bring  him  to  the  realization  of 
his  "  essence,"  his  "  destiny,"  to  make  something  out 
of  him, — to  wit,  a  "  true  man,"  the  one  in  the  form  of 
the  "  true  believer,"  the  other  in  that  of  the  "  true 
citizen  or  subject."     In  fact,  it  comes  to  the  same 
whether  one  calls  the  destiny  the  divine  or  human. 

Under  religion  and  politics  man  finds  himself  at  the 
standpoint  of  should:  he  should  become  this  and  that, 
should  be  so  and  so.     With  this  postulate,  this  com- 
mandment, every  one  steps  not  only  in  front  of  an- 
other but  also  in  front  of  himself.     Those  critics  say : 
You  should  be  a  whole,  free  man.     Thus  they  too 
stand  in  the  temptation  to  proclaim  a  new  religion,  to 
set  up  a  new  absolute,  an  ideal, — to  wit,  freedom.' 
Men  should  be  free.    Then  there  might  even  arise  mis- 
sionaries of  freedom,  as  Christianity,  in  the  conviction 
that  all  were  properly  destined  to  become  Christians, 
sent  out  missionaries  of  the  faith.      Freedom  would 
then  (as  have  hitherto  faith  as  Church,  morality  as 
State)  constitute  itself  as  a  new  community  and  carry 
on  a  like  "  propaganda  "  therefrom.      Certainly  no 
objection  can  be  raised  against  a  getting  together; 
but  so  much  the  more  must  one  oppose  every  renewal 
of  the  old  care  for  us,  of  culture  directed  toward  an 
end, — in  short,  the  principle  of  making  something  out 
of  us,  no  matter  whether  Christians,  subjects,  or  free- 
men and  men. 

One  may  well  say  with  Feuerbach  and  others  that 
religion  has  displaced  the  human  from  man,  and  has 
transferred  it  so  into  another  world  that,,  unattainab 


ut 

. 


THE  OWNER  321 

it  went  on  with  its  own  existence  there  as  something 
personal  in  itself,  as  a  "  God  ":  but  the  error  of  reli- 
gion is  by  no  means  exhausted  with  this.     One  might 
very  well  let  fall  the  personality  of  the  displaced  hu- 
man, might  transform  God  into  the  divine,  and  still 
remain  religious.     For  the  religious  consists  in  discon- 
tent with  the  present  man,  i.  e.  in  the  setting  up  of  a 
"perfection  "  to  be  striven  for,  in  "  man  wrestling  for 
his  completion."*     ("  Ye  therefore  should  be  perfect 
as  your  father  in  heaven  is  perfect."     Matt.  5.  48) : 
it  consists  in  the  fixation  of  an  ideal,  an  absolute. 
Perfection  is  the  "  supreme  good,"  thejinis  bonorum ; 
every  one's  ideal  is  the  perfect  man,  the  true,  the  free 
man,  etc. 

The  efforts  of  modern  times  aim  to  set  up  the  ideal 
of  the  "  free  man."     If  one  could  find  it,  there  would 
be  a  new — religion,  because  a  new  ideal;  there  would 
be  a  new  longing,  a  new  torment,  a  new  devotion,  a 
new  deity,  a  new  contrition. 

With  the  ideal  of  "  absolute  liberty,"  the  same  tur- 
moil is  made  as  with  everything  absolute,  and  accord- 
ing to  Hess,  e.  g.,  it  is  said  to  "  be  realizable  in  abso- 
lute human  society."!     Nay,  this  realization  is 
immediately  afterward  styled  a  "  vocation  " ;  just  so  he 
then  defines  liberty  as  "  morality  " :  the  kingdom  of 
"justice"  (i.  e.  equality)  and  "morality"  (i.  e. 
liberty)  is  to  begin,  etc. 

Ridiculous  is  he  who,  while  fellows  of  his  tribe, 
family,  nation,  etc.,  rank  high,  is — nothing  but 
"  puffed  up  "  over  the  merit  of  his  fellows;  but 

*  B.  Bauer.  "  Lit.  Ztg."  8.  22,  t  "  E.  w.  Z.  B.,"  p.  89  ff. 


322  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

blinded  too  is  he  who 'wants  only  to  be  "  man." 
Neither  of  them  puts  his  worth  in  exclusiveness,  but 
in  connectedness,  or  in  the  "  tie  "  that  conjoins  him 
with  others,  in  the  ties  of  blood,  of  nationality,  of 
humanity. 

Through  the  "  Nationals  "  of  to-day  the  conflict  has 
again  been  stirred  up  between  those  who  think  them- 
selves to  have  merely  human  blood  and  human  ties  of 
blood,  and  the  others  who  brag  of  their  special  blood 
and  the  special  ties  of  blood. 

If  we  disregard  the  fact  that  pride  may  mean  con- 
ceit, and  take  it  for  consciousness  alone,  there  is  found 
to  be  a  vast  difference  between  pride  in  "  belonging 
to  "  a  nation  and  therefore  being  its  property,  and 
that  in  calling  a  nationality  one's  property.     Nation- 
ality is  my  quality,  but  the  nation  my  owner  and 
mistress.     If  you  have  bodily  strength,  you  can  apply 
it  at  a  suitable  place  and  have  a  self-consciousness  or 
pride  of  it;  if,  on  the  contrary,  your  strong  body  has 
you,  then  it  pricks  you  everywhere,  and  at  the  most 
unsuitable  place,  to  show  its  strength:  you  can  give 
nobody  your  hand  without  squeezing  his. 

The  perception  that  one  is  more  than  a  member  of 
the  family,  more  than  a  fellow  of  the  tribe,  more  than 
an  individual  of  the  people,  etc.,  has  finally  led  to  say 
ing,  one  is  more  than  all  this  because  one  is  man,  or, 
the  man  is  more  than  the  Jew,  German,  etc.  "  There 
fore  be  every  one  wholly  and  solely  — man !  "  Could 
one  not  rather  say :  Because  we  are  more  than  what 
has  been  stated,  therefore  we  will  be  this,  as  well  as 
that  "  more  "  also?  Man  and  German,  then,  man 
and  Guelph,  etc.?  The  Nationals  are  in  the  right; 


THE  OWNER  323 

one  cannot  deny  his  nationality:  and  the  humanitar- 
ians are  in  the  right;  one  must  not  remain  in  the 
narrowness  of  the  national.      In  uniqueness  *  the  con- 
tradiction is  solved;  the  national  is  my  quality.      But 
I  am  not  swallowed  up  in  my  quality, — as  the  human 
too  is  my  quality,  but  I  give  to  man  his  existence  first 
through  my  uniqueness. 

History  seeks  for  Man :  but  he  is  I,  you,  we. 
Sought  as  a  mysterious  essence,  as  the  divine,  first  as 
God,  then  as  Man  (humanity,  humaneness,  and 
mankind),  he  is  found  as  the 'individual,  the  finite,  the 
unique  one. 

I  am  owner  of  humanity,  am  humanity,  and  do 
nothing  for  the  good  of  another  humanity.     Fool,  you 
who  are  a  unique  humanity,  that  you  make  a  merit 
of  wanting  to  live  for  another  than  you  are. 

The  hitherto-considered  relation  of  me  to  the  world 
of  men  offers  such  a  wealth  of  phenomena  that  it  will 
have  to  be  taken  up  again  and  again  on  other  occa- 
sions, but  here,  where  it  was  only  to  have  its  chief 
outlines  made  clear  to  the  eye,  it  must  be  broken  off 
to  make  place  for  an  apprehension  of  two  other  sides 
toward  which  it  radiates.     For,  as  I  find  myself  in 
relation  not  merely  to  men  so  far  as  they  present  in 
themselves  the  concept  "  man  "  or  are  children  of  men 
(children  of  Man,  as  children  of  God  are  spoken  of), 
but  also  to  that  which  they  have  of  man  and  call  their 
own,  and  as  therefore  I  relate  myself  not  only  to  that 
which  they  are  through  man,  but  also  to  their  human 
possessions :  so,  besides  the  world  of  men,  the  world  of 

*[Einzigkeit] 


324  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  senses  and  of  ideas  will  have  to  be  included  in  our 
survey,  and  somewhat  said  of  what  men  call  their  own 
of  sensuous  goods,  and  of  spiritual  as  well. 

According  as  one  had  developed  and  clearly 
grasped  the  concept  of  man,  he  gave  it  to  us  to  respect 
as  this  or  th&t  person  of  respect,  and  from  the  broad- 
est understanding  of  this  concept  there  proceeded  at 
last  the  command  "  to  respect  Man  in  every  one." 
But,  if  I  respect  Man,  my  respect  must  likewise  ex- 
tend to  the  human,  or  what  is  Man's. 

Men  have  somewhat  of  their  own,  and  /  am  to 
recognize  this  own  and  hold  it  sacred.     Their  own 
consists  partly  in  outward,  partly  in  inward  posses- 
sions.    The  former  are  things,  the  latter  spiritualities, 
thoughts,  convictions,  noble  feelings,  etc.     But  I  am 
always  to  respect  only  rightful  or  human  possessions; 
the  wrongful  and  unhuman  I  need  not  spare,  for  only 
Man's  own  is  men's  real  own.     An  inward  possession 
of  this  sort  is,  e.  g.,  religion;  because  religion  is  free, 
i.  e.  is  Man's,  /  must  not  strike  at  it.     Just  so  honor 
is  an  inward  possession;  it  is  free  and  must  not  be 
struck  at  by  me.     (Action  for  insult,  caricatures,  etc/ 
Religion  and  honor  are  "spiritual  property."     In 
tangible  property  the  person  stands  foremost:  my 
person  is  my  first  property.     Hence  freedom  of  the 
person;  but  only  the  rightful  or  human  person  is 
free,  the  other  is  locked  up.     Your  life  is  your  prop- 
erty ;  but  it  is  sacred  for  men  only  if  it  is  not  that  of 
an  inhuman  monster. 

What  a  man  as  such  cannot  defend  of  bodily 
goods,  we  may  take  from  him :  this  is  the  meaning 
of  competition,  of  freedom  of  occupation.     What  he 


THE  OWNER  325 

cannot  defend  of  spiritual  goods  falls  a  prey  to  us 
likewise:  so  far  goes  the  liberty  of  discussion,  of 
science,  of  criticism. 

But  consecrated  goods  are  inviolable.     Consecrated 
and  guaranteed  by  whom?      Proximately  by  the 
State,  society,  but  properly  by  man  or  the  "concept," 
the  "  concept  of  the  thing  " :  for  the  concept  of  con- 
secrated goods  is  this,  that  they  are  truly  human,  or 
rather  that  the  holder  possesses  them  as  man  and  not 
as  un-man.* 

On  the  spiritual  side  man's  faith  is  such  goods,  his 
honor,  his  moral  feeling, — yes,  his  feeling  of  decency, 
modesty,  etc.     Actions  (speeches,  writings)  that 
touch  honor  are  punishable ;  attacks  on  "  the  founda- 
tion of  all  religion";  attacks  on  political  faith;  in 
short,  attacks  on  everything  that  a  man  "  rightly  " 
has. 

How  far  critical  liberalism  would  extend  the  sanc- 
tity of  goods, — on  this  point  it  has  not  yet  made  any 
pronouncement,  and  doubtless  fancies  itself  to  be 
ill-disposed  toward  all  sanctity;  but,  as  it  combats 
egoism,  it  must  set  limits  to  it,  and  must  not  let  the 
un-man  pounce  on  the  human.     To  its  theoretical 
contempt  for  the  "  masses  "  there  must  correspond  a 
practical  snub  if  it  should  get  into  power. 

What  extension  the  concept  "  man  "  receives,  and 
what  comes  to  the  individual  man  through  it, — what, 
therefore,  man  and  the  human  are, — on  this  point  the 
various  grades  of  liberalism  differ,  and  the  political, 
the  social,  the  humane  man  are  each  always  claiming 

*  [See  note  on  p.  184.] 


326  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

more  than  the  other  for  "  man."     He  who  has  best 
grasped  this  concept  knows  best  what  is  "  man's." 
The  State  still  grasps  this  concept  in  political  re- 
striction, society  in  social;  mankind,  so  it  is  said,  is 
the  first  to  comprehend  it  entirely,  or  "  the  history  of 
mankind  develops  it."     But,  if  "  man  is  discovered," 
then  we  know  also  what  pertains  to  man  as  his  own, 
man's  property,  the  human. 

But  let  the  individual  man  lay  claim  to  ever  so 
many  rights  because  Man  or  the  concept  man  "  en- 
titles "  him  to  them,  i.  e.  because  his  being  man  does 
it:  what  do  /  care  for  his  right  and  his  claim?      If 
he  has  his  right  only  from  Man  and  does  not  have  it 
from  me,  then  for  me  he  has  no  right.     His  life,  e.  g., 
counts  to  me  only  for  what  it  is  worth  to  me.     I  re- 
spect neither  a  so-called  right  of  property  (or  his 
claim  to  tangible  goods)  nor  yet  his  right  to  the 
"  sanctuary  of  his  inner  nature"  (or  his  right  to  have 
the  spiritual  goods  and  divinities,  his  gods,  remain 
unaggrieved).     His  goods,  the  sensuous  as  well  as  the 
spiritual,  are  mine,  and  I  dispose  of  them  as  propri- 
etor, in  the  measure  of  my — might. 

In  the  property  question  lies  a  broader  meaning 
than  the  limited  statement  of  the  question  allows  to 
be  brought  out.     Referred  solely  to  what  men  call  our 
possessions,  it  is  capable  of  no  solution ;  the  decision 
is  to  be  found  only  in  him  "  from  whom  we  have 
everything."     Property  depends  on  the  owner. 

The  Revolution  directed  its  weapons  against  every- 
thing which  came  "  from  the  grace  of  God,"  e .  g.t 
against  divine  right,  in  whose  place  the  human  was 
confirmed.     To  that  which  is  granted  by  the  grace  of 


THE  OWNER  327 

God,  there  is  opposed  that  which  is  derived  "  from  the 
essence  of  man." 

Now,  as  men's  relation  to  each  other,  in  opposition 
to  the  religious  dogma  which  commands  a  "  Love  one 
another  for  God's  sake,"  had  to  receive  its  human 
position  by  a  "  Love  each  other  for  man's  sake,"  so 
the  revolutionary  teaching  could  not  do  otherwise 
than,  first  as  to  what  concerns  the  relation  of  men 
to  the  things  of  this  world,  settle  it  that  the  world, 
which  hitherto  was  arranged  according  to  God's  ordi- 
nance, henceforth  belongs  to  "  Man." 

The  world  belongs  to  "  Man,"  and  is  to  be  re- 
spected by  me  as  his  property. 

Property  is  what  is  mine! 

Property  in  the  civic  sense  means  sacred  property, 
such  that  I  must  respect  your  property.     "  Respect 
for  property !  "      Hence  the  politicians  would  like  to 
have  every  one  possess  his  little  bit  of  property,  and 
they  have  in  part  brought  about  an  incredible  par- 
cellation  by  this  effort.     Each  must  have  his  bone  on 
which  he  may  find  something  to  bite. 

The  position  of  affairs  is  different  in  the  egoistic 
sense.     I  do  not  step  shyly  back  from  your  property, 
but  look  upon  it  always  as  my  property,  in  which  I 
need  to  "  respect "  nothing.      Pray  do  the  like  with 
what  you  call  my  property! 

With  this  view  we  shall  most  easily  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  each  other. 

The  political  liberals  are  anxious  that,  if  possible, 
all  servitudes  be  dissolved,  and  every  one  be  free  lord 
on  his  ground,  even  if  this  ground  has  only  so  much 
area  as  can  have  its  requirements  adequately  filled  by 


328  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  manure  of  one  person.      (The  farmer  in  the  story 
married  even  in  his  old  age  "  that  he  might  profit  by 
his  wife's  dung.")      Be  it  ever  so  little,  if  one  only 
has  somewhat  of  his  own, — to  wit,  a  respected  prop- 
erty!     The  more  such  owners,  such  cotters,*  the  more 
"  free  people  and  good  patriots  "  has  the  State. 

Political  liberalism,  like  everything  religious,  counts 
on  respect,  humaneness,  the  virtues  of  love.     There- 
fore does  it  live  in  incessant  vexation.     For  in  practice 
people  respect  nothing,  and  every  day  the  small 
possessions  are  bought  up  again  by  greater  propri- 
etors, and  the  "  free  people  "  change  into  day-laborers. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  "  small  proprietors  "  had 
reflected  that  the  great  property  was  also  theirs,  they 
would  not  have  respectfully  shut  themselves  out  from 
it,  and  would  not  have  been  shut  out. 

Property  as  the  civic  liberals  understand  it  de- 
serves the  attacks  of  the  Communists  and  Proudhon : 
it  is  untenable,  because  the  civic  proprietor  is  in  truth 
nothing  but  a  propertyless  man,  one  who  is  every- 
where shut  out.      Instead  of  owning  the  world,  as  he 
might,  he  does  not  own  even  the  paltry  point  on 
which  he  turns  around. 

Proudhon  wants  not  the  proprietaire  but  the  pos- 
sesseur  or  usufruitier.^     What  does  that  mean?      He 
wants  no  one  to  own  the  land;  but  the  benefit  of  it — 
even  though  one  were  allowed  only  the  hundredth  part 
of  this  benefit,  this  fruit — is  at  any  rate  one's  prop- 
erty, which  he  can  dispose  of  at  will.     He  who  has 

*  [The  words  ''cot  "  and  "  dung^are  alike  in  German.] 
t  E.  g.,  "  Qu'est-ce  que  la  Proprlete  ?    p.  83. 


THE  OWNER  329 

only  the  benefit  of  a  field  is  assuredly  not  the  proprie- 
tor of  it;  still  less  he  who,  as  Proudhon  would  have  it, 
must  give  up  so  much  of  this  benefit  as  is  not  required 
for  his  wants;  but  he  is  the  proprietor  of  the  share 
that  is  left  him.     Proudhon,  therefore,  denies  only 
such  and  such  property,  not  property  itself.     If  we 
want  no  longer  to  leave  the  land  to  the  landed  propri- 
etors, but  to  appropriate  it  to  ourselves,  we  unite  our- 
selves to  this  end,  form  a  union,  a  societe,  that  makes 
itself  proprietor;  if  we  have  good  luck  in  this,  then 
those  persons  cease  to  be  landed  proprietors.     And,  as 
from  the  land,  so  we  can  drive  them  out  of  many 
another  property  yet,  in  order  to  make  it  our  property, 
the  property  of  the — conquerors.     The  conquerors 
form  a  society  which  one  may  imagine  so  great  that  it 
by  degrees  embraces  all  humanity;  but  so-called  hu- 
manity too  is  as  such  only  a  thought  (spook) ;  the  indi- 
viduals are  its  -reality.     And  these  individuals  as  a  col- 
lective mass  will  treat  land  and  earth  not  less  arbitra- 
rily than  an  isolated  individual  or  so-called  propri- 
etairc.     Even  so,  therefore,  property  remains  stand- 
ing, and  that  as  "  exclusive  "  too,  in  that  humanity, 
this  great  society,  excludes  the  individual  from  its 
property  (perhaps  only  leases  to  him,  gives  him  as  a 
fief,  a  piece  of  it)  as  it  besides  excludes  everything  that 
is  not  humanity,  e.  g.  does  not  allow  animals  to  have 
property. — So  too  it  will  remain,  and  will  grow  to  be. 
That  in  which  all  want  to  have  a  share  will  be  with- 
drawn from  that  individual  who  wants  to  have  it  for 
himself  alone:  it  is  made  a  common  estate.     As  a 
common  estate  every  one  has  his  share  in  it,  and  this 
share  is  his  property.     Why,  so  in  our  old  relations  a 


330  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

house  which  belongs  to  five  heirs  is  their  common  es- 
tate; but  the  fifth  part  of  the  revenue  .is  each  one's 
property.     Proudhon  might  spare  his  prolix  pathos  if 
he  said:  "There  are  some  things  that  belong  only  to 
a  few,  and  to  which  we  others  will  from  now  on  lay 
claim  or — siege.     Let  us  take  them,  because  one 
comes  to  property  by  taking,  and  the  property  of 
which  for  the  present  we  are  still  deprived  came  to  the 
proprietors  likewise  only  by  taking.     It  can  be  uti- 
lized better  if  it  is  in  the  hands  of  us  all  than  .if  the 
few  control  it.     Let  us  therefore  associate  ourselves 
for  the  purpose  of  this  robbery  (voT)" — Instead  of 
this,  he  tries  to  get  us  to  believe  that  society  is  the 
original  possessor  and  the  sole  proprietor,  of  impre- 
scriptible right;  against  it  the  so-called  proprietors 
have  become  thieves  (La  propriete  c'est  le  vol) ;  if  it 
now  deprives  of  his  property  the  present  proprietor,  it 
robs  him  of  nothing,  as  it  is  only  availing  itself  of  its 
imprescriptible  right. — So  far  one  comes  with  the 
spook  of  society  as  a  moral  person.     On  the  contrary, 
what  man  can  obtain  belongs  to  him :  the  world  be- 
longs to  me.     Do  you  say  anything  else  by  your  oppo- 
site proposition,  "  The  world  belongs  to  all "  ?     All 
are  I  and  again  I,  etc.     But  you  make  out  of  the 
" all"  a  spook,  and  make  it  sacred,  so  that  then  the 
"  all "  become  the  individual's  fearful  master.     Then 
the  ghost  of  "  right "  places  itself  on  their  side. 

Proudhon,  like  the  Communists,  fights  against 
egoism.     Therefore  they  are  continuations  and  consis- 
tent carryings-out  of  the  Christian  principle,  the  prin- 
ciple of  love,  of  sacrifice  for  something  general,  some- 
thing alien.     They  complete  in  property,  e.  g.,  only 


THE  OWNER  331 

what  has  long  been  extant  as  a  matter  of  fact, — viz., 
the  property lessness  of  the  individual.     When  the  law 
says,  Ad  reges  potestas  omnium  pertinet,  ad  singulos 
proprietas ;  omnia  rex  imperio  possidet,  singuli  do- 
minio,  this  means:  The  king  is  proprietor,  for  he  alone 
can  control  and  dispose  of  "everything,"  he  has potes- 
tas  and  imperium  over  it.     The  Communists  make  this 
clearer,  transferring  that  imperium  to  the  "  society  of 
all."     Therefore:  Because  enemies  of  egoism,  they  are 
on  that  account — Christians,  or,  more  generally  speak- 
ing, religious  men,  believers  in  ghosts,  dependents,  ser- 
vants of  some  generality  (God,  society,  etc.).      In  this 
too  Proudhon  is  like  the  Christians,  that  he  ascribes  to 
God  that  which  he  denies  to  men.      He  names  him 
(e.g.,  page  90)  the  Proprietaire  of  the  earth.     Here- 
with he  proves  that  he  cannot  think  away  the  pro- 
prietor as  such ;  he  comes  to  a  proprietor  at  last,  but 
removes  him  to  the  other  world. 

Neither  God  nor  Man  ("  human  society  ")  is  pro- 
prietor, but  the  individual. 

Proudhon  (Weitling  too)  thinks  he  is  telling  the 
worst  about  property  when  he  calls  it  theft  (vol^). 
Passing  quite  over  the  embarrassing  question,  what 
well-founded  objection  could  be  made  against  theft, 
we  only  ask:   Is  the  concept  "theft"  at  all  possible 
unless  one  allows  validity  to  the  concept  "  property"? 
How  can  one  steal  if  property  is  not  already  extant? 
What  belongs  to  no  one  cannot  be  stolen ;  the  water 
that  one  draws  out  of  the  sea  he  does  not  steal.     Ac- 
cordingly property  is  not  theft,  but  a  theft  becomes 
possible  only  through  property.     Weitling  has  to 


332  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

come  to  this  too,  as  he  does  regard  everything  as  the 
property  of  all:  if  something  is  "the  property  of  all," 
then  indeed  the  individual  who  appropriates  it  to 
himself  steals. 

Private  property  lives  by  grace  of  the  law.     Only 
in  the  law  has  it  its  warrant — for  possession  is  not  yet 

Eroperty,  it  becomes  "  mine  "  only  by  assent  of  the 
iw — ;  it  is  not  a  fact,  not  unfait  as  Proudhon 
thinks,  but  a  fiction,  a  thought.     This  is  legal  prop- 
erty, legitimate  property,  guaranteed  property.     It  is 
mine  not  through  me  but  through  the — law. 

Nevertheless,  property  is  the  expression  for  unlimited 
dominion  over  somewhat  (thing,  beast,  man)  which  "  I 
can  judge  and  dispose  of  as  seems  good  to  me."     Ac- 
cording to  Roman  law,  indeed,^*  utcndi  el  aim  tend) 
re  sua,  quatenus  juris  ratio  patitur,  an  exclusive  and 
unlimited  right ;  but  property  is  conditioned  by 
might.     What  I  have  in  my  power,  that  is  my  own. 
So  long  as  I  assert  myself  as  holder,  I  am  the  propri- 
etor of  the  thing;  if  it  gets  away  from  me  again,  no 
matter  by  what  power,  e.  g.  through  my  recognition 
of  a  title  of  others  to  the  thing, — then  the  property 
is  extinct.     Thus  property  and  possession  coincide. 
It  is  not  a  right  lying  outside  my  might  that  legiti- 
mizes me,  but  solely  my  might:  if  I  no  longer  have 
this,  the  thing  vanishes  away  from  me.     When  the 
Romans  no  longer  had  any  might  against  the  Ger- 
mans, the  world-empire  of  Rome  belonged  to  the 
latter,  and  it  would  sound  ridiculous  to  insist  that 
the  Romans  had  nevertheless  remained  properly  the 
proprietors.     Whoever  knows  how  to  take  and  to  de- 
fend the  thing,  to  him  it  belongs  till  it  is  again  taken 


THE  OWNER  333 

from  him,  as  liberty  belongs  to  him  who  takes  it. — 

Only  might  decides  about  property,  and,  as  the 
State  (no  matter  whether  State  of  well-to-do  citizens  or 
of  ragamuffins  or  of  men  in  the  absolute)  is  the  sole 
mighty  one,  it  alone  is  proprietor;  I,  the  unique,* 
have  nothing,  and  am  only  enfeoffed,  am  vassal  and, 
as  such,  servitor.     Under  the  dominion  of  the  State 
there  is  no  property  of  mine. 

I  want  to  raise  the  value  of  myself,  the  value  of 
ownness,  and  should  I  cheapen  property?      No,  as  I 
was  not  respected  hitherto  because  people,  mankind, 
and  a  thousand  other  generalities  were  put  higher,  so 
property  too  has  to  this  day  not  yet  been  recognized 
in  its  full  value.      Property  too  was  only  the  property 
of  a  ghost,  e.  g.  the  people's  property;  my  whole  ex- 
istence "  belonged  to  the  fatherland  ":  /  belonged  to 
the  fatherland,  the  people,  the  State,  and  therefore 
also  everything  that  I  called  my  own.      It  is  demanded 
of  States  that  they  make  away  with  pauperism.     It 
seems  to  me  this  is  asking  that  the  State  should  cut 
off  its  own  head  and  lay  it  at  its  feet;  for  so  long  as 
the  State  is  the  ego  the  individual  ego  must  remain  a 
poor  devil,  a  non-ego.     The  State  has  an  interest 
only  in  being  itself  rich  ;  whether  Michael  is  rich  and 
Peter  poor  is  alike  to  it;   Peter  might  also  be  rich  and 
Michael  poor.      It  looks  on  indifferently  as  one  grows 
poor  and  the  other  rich,  unruffled  by  this  alternation. 
As  individuals  they  are  really  equal  before  its  face; 
in  this  it  is  just :  before  it  both  of  them  are — nothing, 
as  we  "  are  altogether  sinners  before  God  " ;  on  the 

*  [Einzige] 


334  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

other  hand,  it  has  a  very  great  interest  in  this,  that 
those  individuals  who  make  it  their  ego  should  have 
a  part  in  its  wealth;  it  makes  them  partakers  in  its 
property.     Through  property,  with  which  it  rewards 
the  individuals,  it  tames  them  ;  but  this  remains  its 
property,  and  every  one  has  the  usufruct  of  it  only  so 
long  as  he  bears  in  himself  the  ego  of  the  State,  or  is 
a  "  loyal  member  of  society  " ;  in  the  opposite  case  the 
property  is  confiscated,  or  made  to  melt  away  by 
vexatious  lawsuits.     The  property,  then,  is  and  re- 
mains State  property,  not  property  of  the  ego.     That 
the  State  does  not  arbitrarily  deprive  the  individual  o: 
what  he  has  from  the  State  means  simply  that  the 
State  does  not  rob  itself.     He  who  is  a  State-ego,  i.  e. 
a  good  citizen  or  subject,  holds  his  fief  undisturbed  as 
such  an  ego,  not  as  being  an  ego  of  his  own.     Accord 
ing  to  the  code,  property  is  what  I  call  mine  "  by  vir- 
tue of  God  and  law."     But  it  is  mine  by  virtue  of 
God  and  law  only  so  long  as — the  State  has  nothing 
against  it. 

In  expropriations,  disarmaments,  and  the  like  (as, 
e.  g.,  the  exchequer  confiscates  inheritances  if  the  heir* 
do  not  put  in  an  appearance  early  enough)  how 
plainly  the  else- veiled  principle  that  only  the  people, 
"  the  State,"  is  proprietor,  while  the  individual  is 
feoffee,  strikes  the  eye! 

The  State,  I  mean  to  say,  cannot  intend  that  any- 
body should  for  his  own  sake  have  property  or  act- 
ually be  rich,  nay,  even  well-to-do;  it  can  acknowledg 
nothing,  yield  nothing,  grant  nothing  to  me  as  me. 
The  State  cannot  check  pauperism,  because  the  poverty 
of  possession  is  a  poverty  of  me.     He  who  is  nothing 


THE  OWNER  335 

but  what  chance  or  another — o>  wit,  the  State — makes 
out  of  him  also  has  quite  rightly  nothing  but  what 
another  gives  him.     And  this  other  will  give  him  only 
what  he  deserves,  i.  e.  what  he  is  worth  by  service.     It 
is  not  he  that  realizes  a  value  from  himself;  the  State 
realizes  a  value  from  him. 

National  economy  busies  itself  much  with  this  sub- 
ject.    It  lies  far  out  beyond  the  u  national,"  however, 
and  goes  beyond  the  concepts  and  horizon  of  the  State, 
which  knows  only  State  property  and  can  distribute 
nothing  else.     For  this  reason  it  binds  the  possession 
of  property  to  conditions, — as  it  binds  everything  to 
them,  e.  g.  marriage,  allowing  validity  only  to  the 
marriage  sanctioned  by  it,  and  wresting  this  out  of  my 
power.      But  property  is  my  property  only  when  I 
hold  it  unconditionally :  only  I,  as  unconditioned  ego, 
have  property,  enter  a  relation  of  love,  carry  on  free 
trade. 

The  State  has  no  anxiety  about  me  and  mine,  but 
about  itself  and  its:  I  count  for  something  to  it  only 
.as  its  child,  as  "  a  son  of  the  country  ";  as  ego  I  am 
nothing  at  all  for  it.     For  the  State's  understanding, 
what  befalls  me  as  ego  is  something  accidental,  my 
wealth  as  well  as  my  impoverishment.     But,  if  I  with 
all  that  is  mine  am  an  accident  in  the  State's  eyes, 
this  proves  that  it  cannot  comprehend  me :  I  go  be- 
yond its  concepts,  or,  its  understanding  is  too  limited 
to  comprehend  me.     Therefore  it  cannot  do  anything 
for  me  either. 

Pauperism  is  the  valuelessness  of  me,  the  phenome- 
non that  I  cannot  realize  value  from  myself.      For  this 
mason  State  and  pauperism  are  one  and  the  same. 


336  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

The  State  does  not  let  me  come  to  my  value,  and  con- 
tinues in  existence  only  through  my  valuelessness :  it 
is  forever  intent  on  getting  benefit  from  me,  i.  e.  ex- 
ploiting me,  turning  me  to  account,  using  me  up, 
even  if  the  use  it  gets  from  me  consists  only  in  my 
supplying  a  proles  (proletariat) ;  it  wants  me  to  be 
"  its  creature." 

Pauperism  can  be  removed  only  when  I  as  ego  real- 
ize value  from  myself,  when  I  give  my  own  self  value, 
and  make  my  price  myself.     I  must  rise  in  revolt  to 
rise  in  the  world. 

What  I  produce,  flour,  linen,  or  iron  and  coal, 
which  I  toilsomely  win  from  the  earth,  etc.,  is  my 
work  that  I  want  to  realize  value  from.      But  then  I 
may  long  complain  that  I  am  not  paid  for  my  work 
according  to  its  value :  the  payer  will  not  listen  to  me, 
and  the  State  likewise  will  maintain  an  apathetic  atti- 
tude so  long  as  it  does  not  think  it  must  "  appease  " 
me  that  /  may  not  break  out  with  my  dreaded  might. 
But  this  "  appeasing  "  will  be  all,  and,  if  it  comes 
into  my  head  to  ask  for  more,  the  State  turns  against 
me  with  all  the  force  of  its  lion-paws  and  eagle-claws: 
for  it  is  the  king  of  beasts,  it  is  lion  and  eagle.     If 
I  refuse  to  be  content  with  the  price  that  it  fixes  for 
my  ware  and  labor,  if  I  rather  aspire  to  determine 
the  price  of  my  ware  myself,  i.  e.  "  to  pay  myself," 
in  the  first  place  I  come  into  a  conflict  with  the 
buyers  of  the  ware.     If  this  were  stilled  by  a  mutual 
understanding,  the  State  would  not  readily  make  ob- 
jections; for  how  individuals  get  along  with  each  other 
troubles  it  little,  so  long  as  therein  they  do  not  get  in 
its  way.     Its  damage  and  its  danger  begin  only 


THE  OWNER  337 

when  they  do  not  agree,  but,  in  the  absence  of 
a  settlement,  take  each  other  by  the  hair.     The  State 
cannot  endure  that  man  stand  in  a  direct  relation  to 
man;  it  must  step  between  as — mediator,  must — inter- 
vene.   '  What  Christ  was,  what  the  saints,  the  Church 
were,  the  State  has  become, — to  wit,  "  mediator."     It 
tears  man  from  man  to  put  itself  between  them  as 
"  spirit."     The  laborers  who  ask  for  higher  pay  are 
treated  as  criminals  as  soon  as  they  want  to  compel  it. 
What  are  they  to  do?      Without  compulsion  they 
don't  get  it,  and  in  compulsion  the  State  sees  a  self- 
help,  a  determination  of  price  by  the  ego,  a  genuine, 
free  realization  of  value  from  his  property,  which  it 
cannot  admit  of.     What  then  are  the  laborers  to 
do?      Look  to  themselves  and  ask  nothing  about  the 
State?— 

But,  as  is  the  situation  with  regard  to  my  material 
work,  so  it  is  with  my  intellectual  too.     The  State 
allows  me  to  realize  value  from  all  my  thoughts  and 
to  find  customers  for  them  (I  do  realize  value  from 
them,  e.  g.,  in  the  very  fact  that  they  bring  me  honor 
from  the  listeners,  and  the  like) ;  but  only  so  long  as 
my  thoughts  are — its  thoughts.     If,  on  the  other 
hand,  I  harbor  thoughts  that  it  cannot  approve  (i.  e. 
make  its  own),  then  it  does  not  allow  me  at  all  to 
realize  value  from  them,  to  bring  them  into  exchange, 
into  commerce.     My  thoughts  are  free  only  if  they  are 
granted  to  me  by  the  State's  grace,  i.  e.  if  they  are 
the  State's  thoughts.     It  lets  me  philosophize  freely 
only  so  far  as  I  approve  myself  a  "  philosopher  of 
State";  again.tt  the  State  I  must  not  philosophize, 
gladly  as  it  tolerates  my  helping  it  out  of  its  "  defi- 


338  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ciencies,"  "  furthering  "  it. — Therefore,  as  I  may  be- 
have only  as  an  ego  most  graciously  permitted  by  the 
State,  provided  with  its  testimonial  of  legitimacy  and 
police  pass,  so  too  it  is  not  granted  me  to  realize  value 
from  what  is  mine,  unless  this  proves  to  be  its,  which  I 
hold  as  fief  from  it.     My  ways  must  be  its  ways,  else  il 
distrains  me;  my  thoughts  its  thoughts,  else  it  stops 
my  mouth. 

The  State  has  nothing  to  be  more  afraid  of  than  the 
value  of  me,  and  nothing  must  it  more  carefully  guard 
against  than  every  occasion  that  offers  itself  to  me 
for  realizing-  value  from  myself.     /  am  the  deadly 
enemy  of  the  State,  which  always  hovers  between  the 
alternatives,  it  or  I.     Therefore  it  strictly  insists  not 
only  on  not  letting  me  have  a  standing,  but  also  on 
keeping  down  what  is  mine.      In  the  State  there  is  no 
— property,  i.  e.  rto  property  of  the  individual,  but 
only  State  property.     Only  through  the  State  have  I 
what  I  have,  as  I  am  only  through  it  what  I  am.     My 
private  property  is  only  that  which  the  State  leaves  to 
me  of  its,  cutting-  off  others  from  it  (depriving  them, 
making  it  private) ;  it  is  State  property. 

But,  in  opposition  to  the  State,  I  feel  more  and  more 
clearly  that  there  is  still  left  me  a  great  might,  the 
might  over  myself,  i.  e.  over  everything  that  pertains 
only  to  me  and  that  exists  only  in  being  my  own. 

What  do  I  do  if  my  ways  are  no  longer  its  ways, 
my  thoughts  no  longer  its  thoughts?      I  look  to  my- 
self, and  ask  nothing  about  it!      In  my  thoughts, 
which  I  get  sanctioned  by  no  assent,  grant,  or  grace,  I 
have  my  real  property,  a  property  with  which  I  can 
trade.     For  as  mine  they  are  my  creatures,  and  I  am 


THE  OWNER  339 

in  a  position  to  give  them  away  in  return  for  other 
thoughts:  I  give  them  up  and  take  in  exchange  for 
them  others,  which  then  are  my  new  purchased 
property. 

What  then  is  my  property?     Nothing  but  what  is 
in  my  power!     To  what  property  am  I  entitled?     To 
every  property  to  which  I — empower  myself.*     I  give 
myself  the  right  of  property  in  taking  property  to  my- 
self, or  giving  myself  the  proprietor's  power,  full 
power,  empowerment. 

Everything  over  which  I  have  might  that  cannot  be 
torn  from  me  remains  my  property;  well,  then  let 
might  decide  about  property,  and  I  will  expect  every- 
thing from  my  might!      Alien  might,  might  that  I 
leave  to  another,  makes  me  an  owned  slave:  then  let 
my  own  might  make  me  an  owner.      Let  me  then  with- 
draw the  might  that  I  have  conceded  to  others  out  of 
ignorance  regarding  the  strength  of  my  own  might! 
Let  me  say  to  myself,  what  my  might  reaches  to  is  my 
property;  and  let  me  claim  as  property  everything 
that  I  feel  myself  strong  enough  to  attain,  and  let  me 
extend  my  actual  property  as  far  as  /  entitle,  i.  e. — em- 
power, myself  to  take. 

Here  egoism,  selfishness,  must  decide;  not  the  prin- 
ciple of  love,  not  love-motives  like  mercy,  gentleness, 
good-nature,  or  even  justice  and  equity  (forjustitia 
too  is  a  phenomenon  of — love,  a  product  of  love) :  love 
knows  only  sacrifices  and  demands  "self-sacrifice." 

Egoism  does  not  think  of  sacrificing  anything,  giv- 
ing away  anything  that  it  wants;  it  simply  decides, 

*  [A  German  idiom  for  "  take  upon  myself,"  "  assume."] 


340  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

What  I  want  I  must  have  and  will  procure. 

All  attempts  to  enact  rational  laws  about  property 
have  put  out  from  the  bay  of  love  into  a  desolate  sea  of 
regulations.     Even  Socialism  and  Communism  cannot 
be  excepted  from  this.      Every  one  is  to  be  provided 
with  adequate  means,  for  which  it  is  little  to  the  point 
whether  one  socialistically  finds  them  still  in  a  per- 
sonal property,  or  communistically  draws  them  from 
the  community  of  goods.     The  individual's  mind  in 
this  remains  the  same  j  it  remains  a  mind  of  depend- 
ence.    The  distributing  board  of  equity  lets  me  have 
only  what  the  sense  of  equity,  its  loving  care  for  all, 
prescribes.     For  me,  the  individual,  there  lies  no  less 
of  a  check  in  collective  wealth  than  in  that  of  individ- 
ual others ;   neither  that  is  mine,  nor  this:  whether  the 
wealth  belongs  to  the  collectivity,  which  confers  part 
of  it  on  me,  or  to  individual  possessors,  is  for  me  the 
same  constraint,  as  I  cannot  decide  about  either  of  the 
two.     On  the  contrary,  Communism,  by  the  abolition 
of  all  personal  property,  only  presses  me  back  still 
more  into  dependence  on  another,  viz.,  on  the  gen- 
erality or  collectivity;  and,  loudly  as  it  always  attacks 
the  "State,"  what  it  intends  is  itself  again  a  State,  a 
status,  a  condition  hindering  my  free  movement,  a 
sovereign  power  over  me.      Communism  rightly  revolts 
against  the  pressure  that  I  experience  from  individual 
proprietors;  but  still  more  horrible  is  the  might  that 
it  puts  in  the  hands  of  the  collectivity. 

Egoism  takes  another  way  to  root  out  the  non-pos- 
sessing rabble.      It  does  not  say:  Wait  for  what  the 
board  of  equity  will — bestow  on  you  in  the  name  of 
the  collectivity  (for  such  bestowal  took  place  in 


THE  OWNER  341 

"  States  "  from  the  most  ancient  times,  each  receiving 
"  according  to  his  desert,"  and  therefore  according  to 
the  measure  in  which  each  was  able  to  deserve  it,  to 
acquire  it  by  service),  but:  Take  hold,  and  take  what 
you  require !      With  this  the  war  of  all  against  all  is 
declared.     /  alone  decide  what  I  will  have. 

"  Now,  that  is  truly  no  new  wisdom,  for  self-seekers 
have  acted  so  at  all  times! "     Not  at  all  necessary 
either  that  the  thing  be  new,  if  only  consciousness  of 
it  is  present.     But  this  latter  will  not  be  able  to  claim 
great  age,  unless  perhaps  one  counts  in  the  Egyptian 
and  Spartan  law;  for  how  little  current  it  is  appears 
even  from  the  stricture  above,  which  speaks  with  con- 
tempt of  "  self-seekers."     One  is  to  know  just  this, 
that  the  procedure  of  taking  hold  is  not  contemptible, 
but  manifests  the  pure  deed  of  the  egoist  at  one  with 
himself. 

Only  when  I  expect  neither  from  individuals  nor 
from  a  collectivity  what  I  can  give  to  myself,  only 
then  do  I  slip  out  of  the  snares  of — love;  the  rabble 
ceases  to  be  rabble  only  when  it  takes  hold.     Only 
the  dread  of  taking  hold,  and  the  corresponding  pun- 
ishment thereof,  makes  it  a  rabble.     Only  that  taking 
hold  is  ffin,  crime, — only  this  dogma  creates  a  rabble. 
For  the  fact  that  the  rabble  remains  what  it  is, 
it  (because  it  allows  validity  to  that  dogma)  is  to 
blame  as  well  as,  more  especially,  those  who  "  self- 
seekingly  "  (to  give  them  back  their  favorite  word) 
demand  that  the  dogma  be  respected.     In  short,  the 
lack  of  consciousness  of  that  "new  wisdom,"  the  old 
consciousness  of  sin,  alone  bears  the  blame. 

If  men  reach  the  point  of  losing  respect  for  prop- 


342  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

erty,  every  one  will  have  property,  as  all  slaves  be- 
come free  men  as  soon  as  they  no  longer  respect  the 
master  as  master.      Unions  will  then,  in  this  matter 
too,  multiply  the  individual's  means  and  secure  his 
assailed  property. 

According  to  the  Communists'  opinion  the  commui 
should  be  proprietor.     On  the  contrary,  /  am  propri 
tor,  and  I  only  come  to  an  understanding  with  others 
about  my  property.      If  the  commune  does  not  do 
what  suits  me,  I  rise  against  it  and  defend  my  prop- 
erty.    I  am  proprietor,  but  property  is  not  sacred. 
I  should  be  merely  possessor?      No,  hitherto  one  was 
only  possessor,  secured  in  the  possession  of  a  parcel  b 
leaving  others  also  in  possession  of  a  parcel ;  but  now 
everything  belongs  to  me,  I  am  proprietor  of  every- 
thing that  I  require  and  can  get  possession  of.     If  it 
said  socialistically,  society  gives  me  what  I  require, — 
then  the  egoist  says,  I  take  what  I  require.     If  the 
Communists  conduct  themselves  as  ragamuffins,  the 
egoist  behaves  as  proprietor. 

All  swan-fraternities,*  and  attempts  at  making  the 
rabble  happy,  that  spring  from  the  principle  of  love, 
must  miscarry.  Only  from  egoism  can  the  rabble  ge 
help,  and  this  help  it  must  give  to  itself  and — will 
give  to  itself.  If  it  does  not  let  itself  be  coerced  into 
fear,  it  is  a  power.  "  People  would  lose  all  respect  ii 
one  did  not  coerce  them  so  into  fear,"  says  bugbear 
Law  in  "  Der  gestiefelte  Kater" 

Property,  therefore,  should  not  and  cannot  be 
abolished;  it  must  rather  be  torn  from  ghostly  hands 

*  [Apparently  some  benevolent  scheme  of  the  clay  ;  compare  note  on 
p.  348.] 


THE  OWNER  343 

and  become  my  property;  then  the  erroneous  con- 
sciousness, that  I  cannot  entitle  myself  to  as  much  as  I 
require,  will  vanish. — 

"  But  what  cannot  man  require!  "     Well,  whoever 
requires  much,  and  understands  how  to  get  it,  has  at 
all  times  helped  himself  to  it,  as  Napoleon  did  with  the 
Continent  and  France  with  Algiers.      Hence  the  exact 
point  is  that  the  respectful  "  rabble  "  should  learn  at 
last  to  help  itself  to  what  it  requires.     If  it  reaches 
out  too  far  for  you,  why,  then  defend  yourselves. 
You  have  no  need  at  all  to  good-heartedly — bestow 
anything  on  it;  and,  when  it  learns  to  know  itself,  it 
— or  rather:  whoever  of  the  rabble  learns  to  know  him- 
self, he — casts  off  the  rabble-quality  in  refusing  your 
alms  with  thanks.     But  it  remains  ridiculous  that  you 
declare  the  rabble  "  sinful  and  criminal "  if  it  is  not 
pleased  to  live  from  your  favors  because  it  can  do 
something  in  its  own  favor.     Your  bestowals  cheat 
it  and  put  it  off.     Defend  your  property,  then  you 
will  be  strong;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  you  want  to  re- 
tain your  ability  to  bestow,  and  perhaps  actually  have 
the  more  political  rights  the  more  alms  (poor-rates) 
you  can  give,  this  .will  work  just  as  long  as  the  recipi- 
ents let  you  work  it.* 

In  short,  the  property  question  cannot  be  solved  so 
amicably  as  the  Socialists,  yes,  even  the  Communists, 
dream.     It  is  solved  only  by  the  war  of  all  against  all. 
The  poor  become  free  and  proprietors  only  when  they 


*  In  a  registration  bill  for  Ireland  the  government  made  the  proposal  to 
let  those  be  electors  who  pay  £5  sterling  of  poor-rates.    He  who  gives  alms, 
therefore,  acquires  oolitical  rights,  or  elsewhere  becomes  a  swan-knight. 
[See  p.  943.] 


344  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

— rise.     Bestow  ever  so  much  on  them,  they  will  still 
always  want  more;  for  they  want  nothing  less  than 
that  at  last — nothing  more  be  bestowed. 

It  will  be  asked,  But  how  then  will  it  be  when  the 
have-nots-  take  heart?      Of  what  sort  is  the  settlement 
to  be?      One  might  as  well  ask  that  I  cast  a  child's 
nativity.     What  a  slave  will  do  as  soon  as  he  has 
broken  his  fetters,  one  must — await. 

In  Kaiser's  pamphlet,  worthless  for  lack  of  form  as 
well  as  substance  ("  Die  Persoenlichkeit  des  Eigen- 
tuemers  in  Bezug  auf  den  Socialismus  und  Commun- 
ismus"  etc.),  he  hopes  from  the  State  that  it  will 
bring  about  a  leveling  of  property.    Always  the  State ! 
Herr  Papa!      As  the  Church  was  proclaimed  and 
looked  upon  as  the  "  mother  "  of  believers,  so  the 
State  has  altogether  the  face  of  the  provident  father. 


Competition  shows  itself  most  strictly  connected  with 
the  principle  of  civism.     Is  it  anything  else  than  equal- 
ity (egalite)  ?      And  is  not  equality  a  product  of  that 
same  Revolution  which  was  brought  on  by  the  com- 
monalty, the  middle  classes?      As  no  one  is  barred 
from  competing  with  all  in  the  State  (except  the 
prince,  because  he  represents  the  State  itself)  and 
working  himself  up  to  their  height,  yes,  overthrowing 
or  exploiting  them  for  his  own  advantage,  soaring 
above  them  and  by  stronger  exertion  depriving  them 
of  their  favorable  circumstances, — this  serves  as  a  clear 
proof  that  before  the  State's  judgment-seat  every  one 
has  only  the  value  of  a  "  simple  individual "  and  may 
not  count  on  any  favoritism.     Outrun  and  outbid 
each  other  as  much  as  you  like  and  can;  that  shall 


THE  OWNER  346 

not  trouble  me,  the  State !      Among  yourselves  you 
are  free  in  competing,  you  are  competitors;  that  is 
your  social  position.     But  before  me,  the  State,  you 
are  nothing  but  "  simple  individuals  "!  * 

What  in  the  form  of  principle  or  theory  was  pro- 
pounded as  the  equality  of  all  has  found  here  in  com- 
petition its  realization  and  practical  carrying  out;  for 
eg-alitt'  is — free  competition.     All  are,  before  the 
State, — simple  individuals;  in  society,  or  in  relation 
to  each  other, — competitors. 

I  need  be  nothing  further  than  a  simple  individual 
to  be  able  to  compete  with  all  others  aside  from  the 
prince  and  his  family:  a  freedom  which  formerly  was 
made  impossible  by  the  fact  that  only  by  means  of 
one's  corporation,  and  within  it,  did  one  enjoy  any 
freedom  of  effort. 

In  the  guild  and  feudality  the  State  is  in  an  intol- 
erant and  fastidious  attitude,  granting  privileges ;  in 
competition  and  liberalism  it  is  in  a  tolerant  and  in- 
dulgent attitude,  granting  only  patents  (letters  assur- 
ing the  applicant  that  the  business  stands  open  [pa- 
tent] to  him)  or  "  concessions."     Now,  as  the  State 
has  thus  left  everything  to  the  applicants,  it  must 
come  in  conflict  with  all,  because  each  and  all  are 
entitled  to  make  application.      It  will  be  "stormed," 
and  will  go  down  in  this  storm. 

Is  "  free  competition  "  then  really  "  free  "?  nay,  is  it 

*  Minister  Stein  used  this  expression  about  Count  von  Reisach,  when  he 
cold-bloodedly  left  the  latter  at  the  mercy  of  the  Bavarian  government  be- 
cause to  him.  as  he  said,  "  RVOVernment  like  Bavaria  must  be  worth  more 
than  a  simple  individual."  Keisach  had  written  against  Montgelas  at 
Stein's  bidding,  and  Stein  later  agreed  to  the  giving  up  of  Reisach,  which 
wwdemanded  by  Montg.-ia*  on  account  of  this  very  book.  See  Hinrichs, 
"  1'olitiackf  \',>rli'xnitgen,"  1,280, 


346  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

really  a  "  competition," — to  wit,  one  of  persons, — as  it 
gives  itself  out  to  be  because  on  this  title  it  bases  its 
right?      It  originated,  you  know,  in  persons  becom- 
ing free  of  all  personal  rule.      Is  a  competition  "  free  " 
which  the  State,  this  ruler  in  the  civic  principle,  hems 
in  by  a  thousand  barriers?     There  is  a  rich  manufac- 
turer doing  a  brilliant  business,  and  I  should  like  to 
compete  with  him.     "  Go  ahead,"  says  the  State,  "  I 
have  no  objection  to  make  to  your  person  as  competi- 
tor."    Yes,  I  reply,  but  for  that  I  need  a  space  for 
buildings,  I  need  money!      "That's  bad;  but,  if  you 
have  no  money,  you  cannot  compete.     You  must  not 
take  anything  from  anybody,  for  I  protect  property 
and  grant  it  privileges."     Free  competition  is  not 
"  free,"  because  I  lack  the  THINGS  for  competition. 
Against  my  person  no  objection  can  be  made,  but  be- 
cause I  have  not  the  things  my  person  too  must  step 
to  the  rear.      And  who  has  the  necessary  things? 
Perhaps  that  manufacturer?      Why,  from  him  I  could 
take  them  away!      No,  the  State  has  them  as  prop- 
erty, the  manufacturer  only  as  fief,  as  possession. 

But,  since  it  is  no  use  trying  it  with  the  manufac- 
turer, I  will  compete  with  that  professor  of  jurispru- 
dence; the  man  is  a  booby,  and  I,  who  know  a  hun- 
dred times  more  than  he,  shall  make  his  class-room 
empty.     "  Have  you  studied  and  graduated,  friend?" 
No,  but  what  of  that?      I  understand  abundantly 
what  is  necessary  for  instruction  in  that  department. 
"  Sorry,  but  competition  is  not  '  free '  here.     Against 
your  person  there  is  nothing  to  be  said,  but  the  thing, 
the  doctor's  diploma,  is  lacking.     And  this  diploma    « 
I,  the  State,  demand.     Ask  me  for  it  respectfully 


THE  OWNER  347 

first;  then  we  will  see  what  is  to  be  done." 

This,  therefore,  is  the  "  freedom  "  of  competition. 
The  State,  my  lord,  first  qualifies  me  to  compete. 

But  do  persons  really  compete?     No,  again  things 
only!      Moneys  in  the  first  place,  etc. 

In  the  rivalry  one  will  always  be  left  behind  another 
(e.  g.  a  poetaster  behind  a  poet).      But  it  makes  a 
difference  whether  the  means  that  the  unlucky  com- 
petitor lacks  are  personal  or  material,  and  likewise 
whether  the  material  means  can  be  won  by  personal 
cncrg'i/  or  are  to  be  obtained  only  by  grace,  only  as  a 
present;  as  when,  c.  g.,  the  poorer  man  must  leave, 
i.  c.  present,  to  the  rich  man  his  riches.     But,  if  I  must 
all  along  wait  for  the  State's  approval  to  obtain  or  to 
use  (c.  g.  in  the  case  of  graduation)  the  means,  I  have 
the  means  by  the  grace  of  the  State.* 

Free  competition,  therefore,  has  only  the  following 
meaning:    To  the  State  all  rank  as  its  equal  chil- 
dren, and  every  one  can  scud  and  run  to  earn  the 
Staters  goods  and  largess.     Therefore  all  do  chase 
after  havings,  holdings,  possessions  (be  it  of  money  or 
offices,  titles  of  honor,  etc.),  after  the  things. 

In  the  mind  of  the  commonalty  every  one  is  pos- 
sessor or  "  owner."     Now,  whence  comes  it  that  the 
most  have  in  fact  next  to  nothing?      From  this, 
that  the  most  are  already  joyful  over  being  posses- 
sors at  all,  even  though  it  be  of  some  rags,  as  children 

*  In  colleges  and  universities,  etc.,  poor  men  compete  with  rich.    But 
they  are  able  to  do  so  in  most  cases  only  through  scholarships,  which— a 
significant  point— almost  all  come  down  to  us  from  a  time  when  free  com- 
petition was  still  far  from  being  a  controlling  principle.    The  principle  of 
competition  founds  no  scholarship,  but:  says.  Help  yourself,  /.  <>.  provide 
yourself  the  means.     What  the  State  gives  for  such  purposes  it  pays  out 
from  interested  motives,  to  educate  "  servants  "  for  itself. 


348  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

are  joyful  in  their  first  trousers  or  even  the  first  penny 
that  is  presented  to  them.     More  precisely,  however, 
the  matter  is  to  be  taken  as  follows.     Liberalism  came 
forward  at  once  with  the  declaration  that  it  belonged 
to  man's  essence  not  to  be  property,  but  proprietor, 
As  the  consideration  here  was  about  "  man,"  not 
about  the  individual,  the  how-much  (which  formed  ex- 
actly the  point  of  the  individual's  special  interest)  was 
left  to  him.     Hence  the  individual's  egoism  retained 
room  for  the  freest  play  in  this  how-much,  and  carried 
on  an  indefatigable  competition. 

However,  the  lucky  egoism  had  to  become  a  snag 
in  the  way  of  the  less  fortunate,  and  the  latter,  still 
keeping  its  feet  planted  on  the  principle  of  humanity 
put  forward  the  question  as  to  the  how-much  of  pos- 
session, and  answered  it  to  the  effect  that  "  man  musi 
have  as  much  as  he  requires." 

Will  it  be  possible  for  my  egoism  to  let  itself  be 
satisfied  with  that?      What  "  man  "  requires  furnishe 
by  no  means  a  scale  for  measuring  me  and  my  needs 
for  I  may  have  use  for  less  or  more.      I  must  rather 
have  so  much  as  I  am  competent  to  appropriate. 

Competition  suffers  from  the  unfavorable  circum- 
stance that  the  means  for  competing  are  not  at  every 
one's  command,  because  they  are  not  taken  from  per- 
sonality, but  from  accident.     Most  are  without  meant 
and  for  this  reason  without  goods. 

Hence  the  Socialists  demand  the  means  for  all,  and 
aim  at  a  society  that  shall  offer  means.  Your  mone}/ 
value,  say  they,  we  no  longer  recognize  as  your  "  com 
petence  " ;  you  must  show  another  competence, — to 
wit,  your  working  force.  In  the  possession  of  a  prop 


THE  OWNER  349 

erty,  or  as  "  possessor,"  man  does  certainly  show  him- 
self as  man ;  it  was  for  this  reason  that  we  let  the 
possessor,  whom  we  called  "  proprietor,"  keep  his 
standing  so  long.     Yet  you  possess  the  things  only 
so  long  as  you  are  not  "  put  out  of  this  property." 

The  possessor  is  competent,  but  only  so  far  as  the 
others  are  incompetent.     Since  your  ware  forms  your 
competence  only  so  long  as  you  are  competent  to  de- 
fend it  (i.  e.,  as  we  are  not  competent  to  do  anything 
with  it),  look  about  you  for  another  competence; 
for  we  now,  by  our  might,  surpass  your  alleged 
competence. 

It  was  an  extraordinarily  large  gain  made,  when 
the  point  of  being  regarded  as  possessors  was  put 
through.     Therein  bondservice  was  abolished,  and 
every  one  who  till  then  had  been  bound  to  the  lord's 
service,  and  more  or  less  had  been  his  property,  now 
became  a  "  lord."      But  henceforth  your  having,  and 
what  you  have,  are  no  longer  adequate  and  no  longer 
recognized;  per  contra,  your  working  and  your  work 
rise  in  value.     We  now  respect  your  subduing 
things,  as  we  formerly  did  your  possessing  them. 
Your  work  is  your  competence!      You  are  lord  or 
possessor  only  of  what  comes  by  work,  not  by  inher- 
itance.    But  as  at  the  time  everything  has  come  by 
inheritance,  and  every  copper  that  you  possess  bears 
not  a  labor-stamp  but  an  inheritance-stamp,  every- 
thing must  be  melted  over. 

But  is  my  work  then  really,  as  the  Communists 
suppose,  my  sole  competence?  or  does  not  this  con- 
sist rather  in  everything  that  I  am  competent  for? 
And  does  not  the  workers'  society  itself  have  to  con- 


330  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

cede  this,  e.  g.  in  supporting  also  the  sick,  children, 
old  men, — in  short,  those  who  are  incapable  of  work? 
These  are  still  competent  for  a  good  deal,  e.  g.  to 
preserve  their  life  instead  of  taking  it.      If  they  are 
competent  to  cause  you  to  desire  their  continued  exist- 
ence, they  have  a  power  over  you.     To  him  who  exer- 
cised utterly  no  power  over  you,  you  would  vouchsafe 
nothing;  he  might  perish. 

Therefore,  what  you  are  competent  for  is  your  com- 
petence !     If  you  are  competent  to  furnish  pleasure  to 
thousands,  then  thousands  will  pay  you  an  honora- 
rium for  it;  for  it  would  stand  in  your  power  to  for- 
bear doing  it,  hence  they  must  purchase  your  deed. 
If  you  are  not  competent  to  captivate  any  one,  you 
may  simply  starve. 

Now  am  I,  who  am  competent  for  much,  perchance 
to  have  no  advantage  over  the  less  competent? 

We  are  all  in  the  midst  of  abundance;  now  shall  I 
not  help  myself  as  well  as  I  can,  but  only  wait  and  sa 
how  much  is  left  me  in  an  equal  division? 

Against  competition  there  rises  up  the  principle  of 
ragamuffin  society, — partition. 

To  be  looked  upon  as  a  mere  part,  part  of  society, 
the  individual  cannot  bear — because  he  is  more ;  his 
uniqueness  puts  from  it  this  limited  conception. 

Hence  he  does  not  await  his  competence  from  the 
sharing  of  others,  and  even  in  the  workers'  society 
there  arises  the  misgiving  that  in  an  equal  partition 
the  strong  will  be  exploited  by  the  weak ;  he  awaits 
his  competence  rather  from  himself,  and  says  now, 
What  I  am  competent  to  have,  that  is  my  competence 
What  competence  does  not  the  child  possess  in  its 


THE  OWNER  351 

smiling,  its  playing,  its  screaming!  in  short,  in  its 
mere  existence !      Are  you  capable  of  resisting  its 
desire?  or  do  you  not  hold  out  to  it,  as  mother,  your 
breast;  as  father,  as  much  of  your  possessions  as  it 
needs?      It  compels  you,  therefore  it  possesses  what 
you  call  yours. 

If  your  person  is  of  consequence  to  me,  you  pay  me 
with  your  very  existence;  if  I  am  concerned  only  with 
one  of  your  qualities,  then  your  compliance,  perhaps, 
or  your  aid,  has  a  value  (a  money  value)  for  me,  and 
I  purchase  it. 

If  you  do  not  know  how  to  give  yourself  any  other 
than  a  money  value  in  my  estimation,  there  may  arise 
the  case  of  which  history  tells  us,  that  Germans,  sons 
of  the  fatherland,  were  sold  to  America.     Should 
those  who  let  themselves  be  traded  in  be  worth  more 
to  the  seller?      He  preferred  the  cash  to  this  living 
ware  that  did  not  understand  how  to  make  itself  pre- 
cious to  him.     That  he  discovered  nothing  more  val- 
uable in  it  was  assuredly  a  defect  of  hi's  competence; 
but  it  takes  a  rogue  to  give  more  than  he  has.     How 
should  he  show  respect  when  he  did  not  have  it,  nay, 
hardly  could  have  it  for  such  a  pack ! 

You  behave  egoistically  when  you  respect  each 
other  neither  as  possessors  nor  as  ragamuffins  or  work- 
ers, but  as  a  part  of  your  competence,  as  "  useful 
bodies.'1''     Then  you  will  neither  give  anything  to  the 
possessor  ("  proprietor")  for  his  possessions,  nor  to 
lii in  who  works,  but  only  to  him  whom  you  require. 
The  North  Americans  ask  themselves,  Do  we  require  a 
king?  and  answer,  Not  a  farthing  are  he  and  his  work 
worth  to  us. 


352  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

If  it  is  said  that  competition  throws  every  thing  open 
to  all,  the  expression  is  not  accurate,  and  it  is  better 
put  thus:  competition  makes  everything  purchasable. 
In  abandoning  *  it  to  them,  competition  leaves  it  to 
their  appraisal  f  or  their  estimation,  and  demands  a 
price  $  for  it. 

But  the  would-be  buyers  mostly  lack  the  means  to 
make  themselves  buyers:  they  have  no  money.     For 
money,  then,  the  purchasable  things  are  indeed  to  be 
had  ("  For  money  everything  is  to  be  had! "),  but  it  is 
exactly  money  that  is  lacking.     Where  is  one  to  get 
money,  this  current  or  circulating  property?      Know 
then,  you  have  as  much  money  §  as  you  have — might; 
for  you  count  ||  for  as  much  as  you  make  yourself 
count  for. 

One  pays  not  with  money,  of  which  there  may  come 
a  lack,  but  with  his  competence,  by  which  alone  we 
are  "competent";^!  for  one  is  proprietor  only  so  far  as 
the  arm  of  our  power  reaches. 

Weitling  has  thought  out  a  new  means  of  payment, 
— work.     But  the  true  means  of  payment  remains,  as 
always,  competence.     With  what  you  have  "  within 
your  competence  "  you  pay.     Therefore  think  on  the 
enlargement  of  your  competence. 

This  being  admitted,  they  are  nevertheless  right 
on  hand  again  with  the  motto,  "  To  each  according 
to  his  competence !  "     Who  is  to  give  to  me  according 
to  my  competence?      Society?     Then  I  should  have  to 
put  up  with  its  estimation.     Rather,  I  shall  take 


*[preisgeben]  t  [Frets]  *  [Preis]  §  [Geld]  II  [gelien] 

II  [Equivalent  in  ordinary  German  use  to  our  "  possessed  of  a  competence."] 


THE  OWNER  353 

according  to  my  competence. 

"  All  belongs  to  all! "     This  proposition  springs 
from  the  same  unsubstantial  theory.     To  each  belongs 
only  what  he  is  competent  for.      If  I  say,  The  world 
belongs  to  me,  properly  that  too  is  empty  talk,  which 
has  a  meaning  only  in  so  far  as  I  respect  no  alien 
property.      But  to  me  belongs  only  as  much  as  I  am 
competent  for,  or  have  within  my  competence. 

One  is  not  worthy  to  have  what  one,  through  weak- 
ness, lets  be  taken  from  him ;  one  is  not  worthy  of  it 
because  one  is  not  capable  of  it. 

They  raise  a  mighty  uproar  over  the  "  wrong  of  a 
thousand  years  "  which  is  being  committed  by  the 
rich  against  the  poor.     As  if  the  rich  were  to  blame 
for  poverty,  and  the  poor  were  not  in  like  manner 
responsible  for  riches!      Is  there  another  difference 
between  the  two  than  that  of  competence  and  incom- 
petence, of  the  competent  and  incompetent?      Wherein, 
pray,  does  the  crime  of  the  rich  consist?      "  In  their 
hardheartedness."     But  who  then  have  maintained 
the  poor?  who  have  cared  for  their  nourishment?  who 
have  given  alms,  those  alms  that  have  even  their  name 
from  mercy  (eleemosyne)  ?      Have  not  the  rich  been 
"  merciful"  at  all  times?  are  they  not  to  this  day 
"  tender-hearted,"  as  poor-taxes,  hospitals,  foundations 
of  all  sorts,  etc.,  prove? 

But  all  this  does  not  satisfy  you !      Doubtless,  then, 
they  are  to  share  with  the  poor?      Now  you  are  de- 
manding that  they  shall  abolish  poverty.     Aside  from 
the  point  that  there  might  be  hardly  one  among  you 
who  would  act  so,  and  that  this  one  would  be  a  fool 
for  it,  do  ask  yourselves:  why  should  the  rich  let  go 


354  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

their  fleeces  and  give  up  themselves,  thereby  pursuing 
the  advantage  of  the  poor  rather  than  their  own  ? 
You,  who  have  your  thaler  daily,  are  rich  above 
thousands  who  live  on  four  groschen.      Is  it  for  your 
interest  to  share  with  the  thousands,  or  is  it  not  rather 
for  theirs? — 

With  competition  is  connected  less  the  intention  to 
do  the  thing  best  than  the  intention  to  make  it  as 
profitable,  as  productive,  as  possible.     Hence  people 
study  to  get  into  the  civil  service  (pot-boiling  study), 
study  cringing  and  flattery,  routine  and  "  acquaint- 
ance with  business,"  work  "  for  appearances."     Hence, 
while  it  is  apparently  a  matter  of  doing  "good  ser- 
vice," in  truth  only  a  "  good  business  "  and  earning 
of  money  are  looked  out  for.     The  job  is  done  only 
ostensibly  for  the  job's  sake,  but  in  fact  on  account  of 
the  gain  that  it  yields.     One  would  indeed  prefer  not 
to  be  censor,  but  one  wants  to  be — advanced;  one 
would  like  to  judge,  administer,  etc.,  according  to  his 
best  convictions,  but  one  is  afraid  of  transference  or 
even  dismissal;  one  must,  above  all  things, — live. 

Thus  these  goings-on  are  a  fight  for  dear  life,  and, 
in  gradation  upward,  for  more  or  less  of  a  "  good 
living." 

And  yet,  withal,  their  whole  round  of  toil  and  care 
brings  in  for  most  only  "  bitter  life  "  and  "  bitter 
poverty."     All  the  bitter  painstaking  for  this! 

Restless  acquisition  does  not  let  us  take  breath, 
take  a  calm  enjoyment :  we  do  not  get  the  comfort  of 
our  possessions. 

But  the  organization  of  labor  touches  only  such 
labors  as  others  can  do  for  us,  e.  g:  slaughtering,  till- 


THE  OWNER  355 

age,  etc.;  the  rest  remain  egoistic,  because,  e.  g.,  no 
one  can  in  your  stead  elaborate  your  musical  composi- 
tions, carry  out  your  projects  of  painting,  etc. ;  nobody 
can  replace  Raphael's  labors.     The  latter  are  labors 
of  a  unique  person,*  which  only  he  is  competent  to 
achieve,  while  the  former  deserved  to  be  called 
"human,"  since  what  is  anybody's  own  in  them  is  of 
slight  account,  and  almost  "  any  man  "  can  be 
trained  to  it. 

Now,  as  society  can  regard  only  labors  for  the  com- 
mon benefit,  hitman  labors,  he  who  does  anything 
unique  remains  without  its  care;  nay,  he  may  find 
himself  disturbed  by  its  intervention.     The  unique 
person  will  work  himself  forth  out  of  society  all  right, 
but  society  brings  forth  no  unique  person. 

Hence  it  is  at  any  rate  helpful  that  we  come  to  an 
agreement  about  human  labors,  that  they  may  not,  as 
under  competition,  claim  all  our  time  and  toil.     So 
far  Communism  will  bear  its  fruits.     For  before  the 
dominion  of  the  commonalty  even  that  for  which  all 
men  are  qualified,  or  can  be  qualified,  was  tied  up  to 
a  few  and  withheld  from  the  rest:  it  was  a  privilege. 
To  the  commonalty  it  looked  equitable  to  leave  free 
all  that  seemed  to  exist  for  every  "  man."      But,  be- 
cause left  f  free,  it  was  yet  given  to  no  one,  but  rather 
left  to  each  to  be  got  hold  of  by  his  human  power. 
By  this  the  mind  was  turned  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
human,  which  henceforth  beckoned  to  every  one;  and 
there  arose  a  movement  which  one  hears  so  loudly 
bemoaned  under  the  name  of  "  materialism." 

*  [Einzige]  t  [Literally,  "  given."] 


356  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Communism  seeks  to  check  its  course,  spreading  the 
belief  that  the  human  is  not  worth  so  much  discom- 
fort, and,  with  sensible  arrangements,  could  be  gained 
without  the  great  expense  of  time  and  powers  which 
has  hitherto  seemed  requisite. 

But  for  whom  is  time  to  be  gained?      For  what 
does  man  require  more  time  than  is  necessary  to  re- 
fresh his  wearied  powers  of  labor?      Here  Communism 
is  silent. 

For  what?     To' take  comfort  in  himself  as  the 
unique,  after  he  has  done  his  part  as  man ! 

In  the  first  joy  over  being  allowed  to  stretch  out  their 
hands  toward  everything  human,  people  forgot  to 
want  anything  else;  and  they  competed  away  vigor- 
ously, as  if  the  possession  of  the  human  were  the 
goal  of  all  our  wishes. 

But  they  have  run  themselves  tired,  and  are  gradu 
ally  noticing  that  "  possession  does  not  give  happi- 
ness." Therefore  they  are  thinking  of  obtaining  the 
necessary  by  an  easier  bargain,  and  spending  on  it  . 
only  so  much  time  and  toil  as  its  indispensableness 
exacts.  Riches  fall  in  price,  and  contented  poverty, 
the  care-free  ragamuffin,  becomes  the  seductive  ideal. 

Should  such  human  activities,  that  every  one  is  co 
fident  of  his  capacity  for,  be  highly  salaried,  and 
sought  for  with  toil  and  expenditure  of  all  life-forces 
Even  in  the  every-day  form  of  speech,  "If  I  were 

minister,  or  even  the ,  then  it  should  go  quite 

otherwise,"  that  confidence  expresses  itself, — that  one 
holds  himself  capable  of  playing  the  part  of  such  a 
dignitary;  one  does  get  a  perception  that  to  things 
of  this  sort  there  belongs  not  uniqueness,  but  only  a 


THE  OWNER  357 

culture  which  is  attainable,  even  if  not  exactly  by  all, 
at  any  rate  by  many  ;  i.  e.  that  for  such  a  thing  one 
need  only  be  an  ordinary  man. 

If  we  assume  that,  as  order  belongs  to  the  essence  of 
the  State,  so  subordination  too  is  founded  in  its  na- 
ture, then  we  see  that  the  subordinates,  or  those  who 
have  received  preferment,  disproportionately  over- 
charge and  overreach  those  who  are  put  in  the  lower 
ranks.      But  the  latter  take  heart  (first  from  the 
Socialist  standpoint,  but  certainly  with  egoistic  con- 
sciousness later,  of  which  we  will  therefore  at  once 
give  their  speech  some  coloring)  for  the  question,  By 
what  then  is  your  property  secure,  you  creatures  of 
preferment? — and  give  themselves  the  answer,  By  our 
refraining  from  interference!      And  so  by  our  protec- 
tion!     And  what  do  you  give  us  for  it?      Kicks  and 
disdain  you  give  to  the  "  common  people  " ;  police 
supervision,  and  a  catechism  with  the  chief  sentence 
"  Respect  what  is  not  yours,  what  belongs  to  others ! 
respect  others,  and  especially  your  superiors ! "      But 
we  reply,  "  If  you  want  our  respect,  buy  it  for  a  price 
agreeable  to  us.     We  will  leave  you  your  property,  if 
you  give  a  due  equivalent  for  this  leaving."     Really, 
what  equivalent  does  the  general  in  time  of  peace 
give  for  the  many  thousands  of  his  yearly  income? 
another  for  the  sheer  hundred-thousands  and  millions 
yearly?      What  equivalent  do  you  give  for  our  chew- 
ing potatoes  and  looking  calmly  on  while  you  swallow 
oysters?      Only  buy  the  oysters  of  us  as  dear  as  we 
have  to  buy  the  potatoes  of  you,  then  you  may  go  on 
eating  them.     Or  do  you  suppose  the  oysters  do  not 
belong  to  us  as  much  as  to  you?      You  will  make  an 


358  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

outcry  over  violence  if  we  reach  out  our  hands  and 
help  consume  them,  and  you  are  right.     Without 
violence  we  do  not  get  them,  as  you  no  less  have  them 
by  doing  violence  to  us. 

But  take  the  oysters  and  have  done  with  it,  and  let 
us  consider  our  nearer  property,  labor;  for  the 
other  is  only  possession.     We  distress  ourselves  twelve 
hours  in  the  sweat  of  our  face,  and  you  offer  us  a  few 
groschen  for  it.     Then  take  the  like  for  your  labor 
too.     Are  you  not  willing?      You  fancy  that  our 
labor  is  richly  repaid  with  that  wage,  while  yours  on 
the  other  hand  is  worth  a  wage  of  many  thousands. 
But,  if  you  did  not  rate  yours  so  high,  and  gave  us  a 
better  chance  to  realize  value  from  ours,  then  we 
might  well,  if  the  case  demanded  it,  bring  \o  pass  still 
more  important  things  than  you  do  for  the  many 
thousand  thalers;  and,  if  you  got  only  such  wages  as 
we,  you  would  soon  grow  more  industrious  in  order  to 
receive  more.      But,  if  you  render  any  service  that 
seems  to  us  worth  ten  and  a  hundred  times  more  than 
our  own  labor,  why,  then  you  shall  get  a  hundred 
times  more  for  it  too;  we,  on  the  other  hand,  think 
also  to  produce  for  you  things  for  which  you  will  re- 
quite us  more  highly  than  with  the  ordinary  day's 
wages.     We  shall  be  willing  to  get  along  with  each 
other  all  right,  if  only  we  have  first  agreed  on  this, — 
that  neither  any  longer  needs  to — present  anything  to 
the  other.     Then  we  may  perhaps  actually  go  so  far  as 
to  pay  even  the  cripples  and  sick  and  old  an  appropri- 
ate price  for  not  parting  from  us  by  hunger  and  wan*; 
for,  if  we  want  them  to  live,  it  is  fitting  also  that  we — - 
purchase  the  fulfilment  of  our  will.     I  say  "purchase," 


THE  OWNER  359 

rind  therefore  do  not  mean  a  wretched  "  alms."     For 
•heir  life  is  the  property  even  of  those  who  cannot 
[work ;  if  we  (no  matter  for  what  reason)  want  them 
if  lot  to  withdraw  this  life  from  us,  we  can  mean  to 
bring  this  to  pass  only  by  purchase;  nay,  we  shall 
perhaps  (maybe  because  we  like  to  have  friendly  faces 
about  us)  even  want  a  life  of  comfort  for  them.     In 
•short,  we  want  nothing  presented  by  you,  but  neither 
will  we  present  you  with  anything.     For  centuries  we 
-have  handed  alms  to  you  from  good-hearted — stupid- 
ity, have  doled  out  the  mite  of  the  poor  and  given  to 
the  masters  the  things  that  are — not  the  masters';  now 
just  open  your  wallet,  for  henceforth  our  ware  rises  in 
price  quite  enormously.     We  do  not  want  to  take 
from  you  anything,  anything  at  all,  only  you  are  to 
pay  better  for  what  you  want  to  have.     What  then 
ihave  you?      '•'  I  have  an  estate  of  a  thousand  acres." 
And  I  am  your  plowman,  and  will  henceforth  attend 
to  your  fields  only  for  one  thaler  a  day  wages. 
"  Then  I'll  take  another."     You  won't  find  any, 
for  we-  plowmen  are  no  longer  doing  otherwise,  and, 
if  one  puts  in  an  appearance  who  takes  less,  then  let 
him  Ixjware  of  us.     There  is  the  housemaid,  she  too  is 
now  demanding  as  much,  and  you  will  no  longer  find 
one  lx?low  this  price.      "  Why,  ,then  it  is  all  over  with 
me."     Not  so  fast!      You  will  doubtless  take  in  as 
much  as  we;  and,  if  it  should  not  be  so,  we  will  take 
off  so  much  that  you  shall  have  wherewith  to  live  like 
us.      "  But  I  am  accustomed  to  live  better."     We 
have  nothing  against  that,  but  it  is  not  our  lookout; 
if  you  can  clear  more,  go  ahead.     Are  we  to  hire  out 
under  rates,  that  you  may  have  a  good  living?     The 


360  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

rich  man  always  puts  off  the  poor  with  the  words, 
"  What  does  your  want  concern  me?      See  to  it  how 
you  make  your  way  through  the  world ;  that  is  your 
affair,  not  mine."     Well,  let  us  let  it  be  our  affair, 
then,  and  let  us  not  let  the  means  that  we  have  to 
realize  value  from  ourselves  be  pilfered  from  us  by  the 
rich.     "  But  you  uncultured  people  really  do  not  need 
so  much."     Well,  we  are  taking  somewhat  more  in 
order  that  for  it  we  may  procure  the  culture  that  we 
perhaps  need.     "  But,  if  you  thus  bring  down  the 
rich,  who  is  then  to  support  the  arts  and  sciences 
hereafter?"     Oh,  well,  we  must  make  it  up  by  num- 
bers; we  club  together,  that  gives  a  nice  little  sum, — 
besides,  you  rich  men  now  buy  only  the  most  tasteless 
books  and  the  most  lamentable  Madonnas  or  a  pair 
of  lively  dancer's  legs.     "  O  ill-starred  equality!  " 
No,  my  good  old  sir,  nothing  of  equality.     We  only 
want  to  count  for  what  we  are  worth,  and,  if  you  are 
worth  more,  you  shall  count  for  more  right  along. 
We  only  want  to  be  worth  our  price,  and  think  to 
show  ourselves  worth  the  price  that  you  will  pay. 

Is  the  State  likely  to  be  able  to  awaken  so  secure 
a  temper  and  so  forceful  a  self-consciousness  in  the 
menial?      Can  it  make  man  feel  himself?  nay,  may 
it  even  do  so  much  as  set  this  goal  for  itself  ?      Can  it 
want  the  individual  to  recognize  his  value  and  realize 
this  value  from  himself  ?      Let  us  keep  the  parts  of  the 
double  question  separate,  and  see  first  whether  the 
State  can  bring  about  such  a  thing.     As  the  unani- 
mity of  the  plowmen  is  required,  only  this*  unanimity 
can  bring  it  to  pass,  and  a  State  law  would  be  evaded 
in  a  thousand  ways  by  competition  and  in  secret. 


THE  OWNER  361 

But  can  the  State  bear  with  it?     The  State  cannot 
possibly  bear  with  people's  suffering  coercion  from  an- 
other than  it;  it  could  not,  therefore,  admit  the  self- 
help  of  the  unanimous  plowmen  against  those  who 
want  to  engage  for  lower  wages.     Suppose,  however, 
that  the  State  made  the  law,  and  all  the  plowmen 
were  in  accord  with  it:  could  the  State  bear  with  it 
then? 

In  the  isolated  case — yes;  but  the  isolated  case  is 
more  than  that,  it  is  a  case  of  principle.     The  ques- 
tion therein  is  of  the  whole  range  of  the  ego's  self- 
realization  of  value  from  himself,  and  therefore  also 
of  his  self-consciousness  against  the  State.     So  far  the 
Communists  keep  company;  but,  as  self-realization  of 
value  from  self  necessarily  directs  itself  against  the 
State,  so  it  does  against  society  too,  and  therewith 
reaches  out  beyond  the  commune  and  the  communistic 
— out  of  egoism. 

Communism  makes  the  maxim  of  the  commonalty, 
that  every  one  is  a  possessor  ("  proprietor"),  into  an 
irrefragable  truth,  into  a  reality,  since  the  anxiety 
about  obtaining  now  ceases  and  every  one  has  from 
the  start  what  he  requires.      In  his  labor-force  he  has 
his  competence,  and,  if  he  makes  no  use  of  it,  that  is 
his  fault.     The  grasping  and  hounding  is  at  an  end, 
and  no  competition  is  left  (as  so  often  now)  without 
fruit,  because  with  every  stroke  of  labor  an  adequate 
supply  of  the  needful  is  brought  into  the  house.     Now 
for  the  first  time  one  is  a  real  possessor,  because  what 
one  has  in  his  labor-force  can  no  longer  escape  from 
him  as  it  was  continually  threatening  to  do  under  the 
system  of  competition.     One  is  a  care-free  and  assured 


362  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

possessor.     And  one  is  this  precisely  by  seeking  his 
competence  no  longer  in  a  ware,  but  in  his  own  labor, 
his  competence  for  labor;  and  therefore  by  being  a 
ragamuffin,  a  man  of  only  ideal  wealth.     /,  how- 
ever, cannot  content  myself  with  the  little  that  I 
scrape  up  by  my  competence  for  labor,  because  my 
competence  does  not  consist  merely  in  my  labor. 

By  labor  I  can  perform  the  official  functions  of  a 
president,  a  minister,  etc.;  these  offices  demand  only  a 
general  culture, — to  wit,  such  a  culture  as  is  generally 
attainable  (for  general  culture  is  not  merely  that 
which  every  one  has  attained,  but  broadly  that  which 
every  one  can  attain,  and  therefore  every  special  cul- 
ture, e.  g.  medical,  military,  philological,  of  which  no 
"  cultivated  man  "  believes  that  they  surpass  his 
powers),  or,  broadly,  only  a  skill  possible  to  all. 

But,  even  if  these  offices  may  vest  in  every  one,  yet 
it  is  only  the  individual's  unique  force,  peculiar  to 
him  alone,  that  gives  them,  so  to  speak,  life  and  sig- 
nificance.    That  he  does  not  nianage  his  office  like  an 
"  ordinary  man,"  but  puts  in  the  competence  of  his 
uniqueness,  this  he  is  not  yet  paid  for  when  he  is  paid 
only  in  general  as  an  official  or  a  minister.     If  he  has 
done  it  so  as  to  earn  your  thanks,  and  you  wish  to  re- 
tain this  thankworthy  force  of  the  unique  one,  you 
must  not  pay  him  like  a  mere  man  who  performed 
only  what  was  human,  but  as  one  who  accomplishes 
what  is  unique.     Do  the  like  with  your  labor,  do! 

There  cannot  be  a  general  schedule-price  fixed  for 
my  uniqueness  as  there  can  for  what  I  do  as  man. 
Only  for  the  latter  can  a  schedule-price  be  set. 

Go  right  on,  then,  setting  up  a  general  appraisal 


THE  OWNER  363 

for  human  labors,  but  do  not  deprive  your  uniqueness 
of  its  desert. 

Human  or  general  needs  can  be  satisfied  through 
society;  for  satisfaction  of  unique  needs  you  must  do 
some  seeking.     A  friend  and  a  friendly  service,  or 
even  an  individual's  service,  society  cannot  procure 
you.     And  yet  you  will  every  moment  be  in  need  of 
such  a  service,  and  on  the  slightest  occasions  require 
somebody  who  is  helpful  to  you.     Therefore  do  not 
rely  on  society,  but  see  to  it  that  you  have  the  where- 
withal to — purchase  the  fulfilment  of  your  wishes. 

Whether  money  is  to  be  retained  among  egoists? — 
To  the  old  stamp  an  inherited  possession  adheres.      If 
you  no  longer  let  yourselves  be  paid  with  it,  it  is 
ruined :   if  you  do  nothing  for  this  money,  it  loses'  all 
power.     Cancel  the  inheritance,  and  you  have  broken 
off  the  executor's  court-seal.      For  now  everything  is 
an  inheritance,  whether  it  be  already  inherited  or 
await  its  heir.      If  it  is  yours,  wherefore  do  you  let  it 
be  sealed  up  from  you?  why  do  you  respect  the  seal? 

But  why  should  you  not  create  a  new  money?      Do 
you  then  annihilate  the  ware  in  taking  from  it  the 
hereditary  stamp?      Now,  money  is  a  ware,  and  an  es- 
sential means  or  competence.      For  it  protects  against 
the  ossification  of  resources,  keeps  them  in  flux  and 
brings  to  pass  their  exchange.      If  you  know  a  better 
medium  of  exchange,  go  ahead;  yet  it  will  be  a 
"  money"  again.     It  is  not  the  money  that  does  you 
damage,  but  your  incompetence  to  take  it.      Let  your 
competence  take  effect,  collect  yourselves,  and  there 
will  IK>  no  lack  of  money — of  your  money,  the  money 
of  your  stamp.      But  working  I  do  not  call  "  letting 


364  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

your  competence  take  effect."     Those  who  are  only 
"  looking  for  work  "  and  "  willing  to  work  hard  "  are 
preparing  for  their  own  selves  the  infallible  upshot — to 
be  out  of  work. 

Good  and  bad  luck  depend  on  money.     It  is  a 
power  in  the  bourgeois  period  for  this  reason,  that  it 
is  only  wooed  on  all  hands  like  a  girl,  indissolubly 
wedded  by  nobody.     All  the  romance  and  chivalry  of 
wooing  for  a  dear  object  come  to  life  again  in  com- 
petition.     Money,  an  object  of  longing,  is  carried  off 
by  the  bold  "  knights  of  industry."* 

He  who  has  luck  takes  home  the  bride.     The  raga- 
muffin has  luck;  he  takes  her  into  his  household, 
"  society,"  and  destroys  the  virgin.     In  his  house  she 
is  no  longer  bride,  but  wife;  and  with  her  virginity 
her  family  name  is  also  lost.     As  housewife  the 
maiden  Money  is  called  "  Labor,"  for  "  Labor  "  is  her 
husband's  name.     She  is  a  possession  of  her  husband's. 

To  bring  this  figure  to  an  end,  the  child  of  Labor 
and  Money  is  again  a  girl,  an  unwedded  one  and 
therefore  Money,  but  with  the  certain  descent  from 
Labor,  her  father.    The  form  of  the  face,  the  "  effigy," 
bears  another  stamp. 

Finally,  as  regards  competition  once  more,  it  has 
a  continued  existence  by  this  very  means,  that  all  do 
not  attend  to  their  affair  and  come  to  an  understand- 
ing with  each  other  about  it.      Bread,  e.  g.,  is  a  need 
of  all  the  inhabitants  of  a  city  ;  therefore  they  might 
easily  agree  on  setting  up  a  public  bakery.     Instead 
of  this,  they  leave  the  furnishing  of  the  needful  to  the 

*  [A  German  phrase  for  sharpers.] 


THE  OWNER  365 

competing  bakers.     Just  so  meat  to  the  butchers,  wine 
to  the  wine-dealers,  etc. 

Abolishing  competition  is  not  equivalent  to  favor- 
ing the  guild.     The  difference  is  this:   In  the  guild 
baking,  etc.,  is  the  affair  of  the  guild-brothers;  in 
competition,  the  affair  of  chance  competitors;  in  the 
union,  of  those  who  require  baked  goods,  and  there- 
fore my  affair,  yours,  the  affair  of  neither  the  guildic 
nor  the  concessionary  baker,  but  the  affair  of  the 
united. 

If  /  do  not  trouble  myself  about  my  affair,  I  must 
be  content  with  what  it  pleases  others  to  vouchsafe 
me.     To  have  bread  is  my  affair,  my  wish  and  desire, 
and  yet  people  leave  that  to  the  bakers  and  hope  at 
most  to  obtain  through  their  wrangling,  their  getting 
ahead  of  each  other,  their  rivalry, — in  short,  their 
competition, — an  advantage  which  one  could  not 
count  on  in  the  case  of  the  guild-brothers  who  were 
lodged  entirely  and  alone  in  the  proprietorship  of  the 
baking  franchise. — What  every  one  requires,  every 
one  should  also  take  a  hand  in  procuring  and  produc- 
ing; it  is  his  affair,  his  property,  not  the  property  of 
the  guildic  or  concessionary  master. 

Let  us  look  back  once  more.     The  world  belongs 
to  the  children  of  this  world,  the  children  of  men ;  it 
is  no  longer  God's  world,  but  man's.     As  much  as 
every  man  can  procure  of  it,  let  him  call  his;  only 
the  true  man,  the  State,  human  society  or  mankind, 
will  look  to  it  that  each  shall  make  nothing  else  his 
own  than  what  he  appropriates  as  man,  i.  e.  in  human 
fashion.      Unhuman  appropriation  is  that  which  is 
not  consented  to  by  man,  i.  e.  it  is  a  "  criminal "  ap- 


366  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

propriation,  as  the  human,  vice  versa,  is  a  "  rightful 
one,  one  acquired  in  the  "  way  of  law." 

So  they  talk  since  the  Revolution. 

But  my  property  is  not  a  thing,  since  this  has  an 
existence  independent  of  me ;  only  my  might  is  my 
own.     Not  this  tree,  but  my  might  or  control  over  it, 
is  what  is  mine. 

Now,  how  is  this  might  perversely  expressed?     They 
say  I  have  a  right  to  this  tree,  or  it  is  my  rightful 
property.     So  I  have  earned  it  by  might.     That  the 
might  must  last  in  order  that  the  tree  may  also  be 
held, — or  better,  that  the  might  is  hot  a  thing  existing 
of  itself,  but  has  existence  solely  in  the  mighty  ego,  in 
me  the  mighty, — is  forgotten.     Might,  like  other  of  my 
qualities  (e.  g.  humanity,  majesty,  etc.),  is  exalted 
to  something  existing  of  itself,  so  that  it  still  exists 
long  after  it  has  ceased  to  be  my  might.     Thus  trans- 
formed into  a  ghost,  might  is — right.     This  eternal- 
ized might  is  not  extinguished  even  with  my  death, 
but  is  transferred  or  "bequeathed." 

Things  now  really  belong  not  to  me,  but  to  right. 

On  the  other  side,  this  is  nothing  but  a  hallucin- 
ation of  vision.     For  the  individual's  might  becomes 
permanent  and  a  right  only  by  others  joining  their 
might  with  his.     The  delusion  consists  in  their  believ- 
ing that  they  cannot  withdraw  their  might.      The 
same  phenomenon  over  again;  might  is  separated 
from  me.     I  cannot  take  back  the  might  that  I  gave 
to  the  possessor.      One  has  "  granted  power  of  attor- 
ney," has  given  away  his  power,  has  renounced  coming 
to  a  better  mind. 

The  proprietor  can  give  up  his  might  and  his  right. 


THE  OWNER  367 

to  a  thing  by  giving  the  thing  away,  squandering  it, 
and  the  like.  And  we  should  not  be  able  likewise  to 
let  go  the  might  that  we  lend  to  him? 

The  rightful  man,  the  just,  desires  to  call  nothing 
his  own  that  he  does  not  have  "  rightly  "  or  have  the 
right  to,  and  therefore  only  legitimate  property. 

Now,  who  is  to  be  judge,  and  adjudge  his  right 
to  him  ?      At  last,  surely,  Man,  who  imparts  to  him 
the  rights  of  man :  then  he  can  say,  in  an  infinitely 
broader  sense  than  Terence,  humani  nihil  a  me 
alienum  puto,  i.  e.  the  human  is  my  property.     How- 
ever he  may  go  about  it,  so  long  as  he  occupies  this 
standpoint  he  cannot  get  clear  of  a  judge;  and  in  our 
time  the  multifarious  judges  that  had  been  selected 
have  set  themselves  against  each  other  in  two  persons 
at  deadly  enmity, — to  wit,  in  God  and  Man.     The 
one  party  appeal  to  divine  right,  the  other  to  human 
right  or  the  rights  of  man. 

So  much  is  clear,  that  in  neither  case  does  the 
individual  do  the  entitling  himself. 

Just  pick  me  out  an  action  to-day  that  would  not  be 
a  violation  of  right!      Every  moment  the  rights  of 
man  are  trampled  under  foot  by  one  side,  while  their 
opponents  cannot  open  their  mouth  without  uttering  a 
blasphemy  against  divine  right.     Give  an  alms,  you 
mock  at  a  right  of  man,  because  the  relation  of  beggar 
and  benefactor  is  an  inhuman  relation;  utter  a  doubt, 
you  sin  against  a  divine  right.     Eat  dry  bread  with 
contentment,  you  violate  the  right  of  man  by  your 
equanimity;  eat  it  with  discontent,  you  revile  divine 
right  by  your  repining.     There  is  not  one  among  you 
who  does  not  commit  a  crime  at  every  moment;  your 


368  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

speeches  are  crimes,  and  every  hindrance  to  your 
freedom  of  speech  is  no  less  a  crime.     Ye  are  criminals 
altogether! 

Yet  you  are  so  only  in  that  you  all  stand  on  the 
ground  of  right;  i.  e.,  in  that  you  do  not  even  know, 
and  understand  how  to  value,  the  fact  that  you  are 
criminals. 

Inviolable  or  sacred  property  has  grown  on  this 
very  ground:  it  is  &  juridical  concept. 

A  dog  sees  the  bone  in  another's  power,  and  stands 
off  only  if  it  feels  itself  too  weak.     But  man  respects 
the  other's  right  to  his  bone.     The  latter  action, 
therefore,  ranks  as  human,  the  former  as  brutal  or 
"  egoistic." 

And  as  here,  so  in  general,  it  is  called  "  human  " 
when  one  sees  in  everything  something  spiritual  (here 
right),  i.  e.  makes  everything  a  ghost  and  takes  his 
attitude  toward  it  as  toward  a  ghost,  which  one  can 
indeed  scare  away  at  its  appearance,  but  cannot  kill. 
It  is  human  to  look  at  what  is  individual  not  as 
individual,  but  as  a  generality. 

In  nature  as  such  I  no  longer  respect  anything,  but 
know  myself  to  be  entitled  to  everything  against  it;  in 
the  tree  in  that  garden,  on  the  other  hand,  I  must 
respect  alienness  (they  say  in  one-sided  fashion  "  prop- 
erty "),  I  must  keep  my  hand  off  it.     This  comes  to  an 
end  only  when  I  can  indeed  leave  that  tree  to  another 
as  I  leave  my  stick,  etc.,  to  another,  but  do  not  in 
advance  regard  it  as  alien  to  me,  i.  e.  sacred.     Rather, 
I  make  to  myself  no  crime  of  felling  it  if  I  will,  and  it 
remains  my  property,  however  long  I  resign  it  to 
others:  it  is  and  remains  mine.     In  the  banker's  for- 


THE  OWNER  369 

tune  I  as  little  see  anything  alien  as  Napoleon  did  in 
the  territories  of  kings:  we  have  no  dread  of  "  con- 
quering "  it,  and  we  look  about  us  also  for  the  means 
thereto.     We  strip  off  from  it,  therefore,  the  spirit  of 
alienness,  of  which  we  had  been  afraid. 

Therefore  it  is  necessary  that  I  do  not  lay  claim  to 
anything  more  as  man,  but  to  everything  as  I,  this  I; 
and  accordingly  to  nothing  human,  but  to  mine;  i.  e. 
nothing  that  pertains  to  me  as  man,  but — what  I  will 
and  because  I  will  it. 

Rightful,  or  legitimate,  property  of  another  will  be 
only  that  which  you  are  content  to  recognize  as  such. 
If  your  content  ceases,  then  this  property  has  lost 
legitimacy  for  you,  and  you  will  laugh  at  absolute 
right  to  it. 

Besides  the  hitherto  discussed  property  in  the 
limited  sense,  there  is  held  up  to  our  reverent  heart 
another  property  against  which  we  are  far  less  "  to 
sin."     This  property  consists  in  spiritual  goods,  in  the 
"sanctuary  of  the  inner  nature."     What  a  man 
holds  sacred,  no  other  is  to  gibe  at;  because,  untrue 
as  it  may  be,  and  zealously  as  one  may  "  in  loving 
and  modest  wise  "  seek  to  convince  of  a  true  sancthy 
the  man  who  adheres  to  it  and  believes  in  it,  yet  tie 
sacred  itself  is  always  to  be  honored  in  it:  the  mis- 
taken man  does  believe  in  the  sacred,  even  though  in 
an  incorrect  essence  of  it,  and  so  his  belief  in  the 
sacred  must  at  least  be  respected. 

In  ruder  times  than  ours  it  was  customary  to  de- 
mand a  particular  faith,  and  devotion  to  a  particular 
sacred  essence,  and  they  did  not  take  the  gentlest  way 
with  those  who  believed  otherwise;  since,  however, 


370  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

"  freedom  of  belief  "  spread  itself  more  and  more 
abroad,  the  "jealous  God  and  sole  Lord"  gradually 
melted  into  a  pretty  general  "  supreme  being,"  and  it 
satisfied  humane  tolerance  if  only  every  one  revered 
"  something  sacred." 

Reduced  to  the  most  human  expression,  this  sacred 
essence  is  "man  himself"  and  "the  human."     With 
the  deceptive  semblance  as  if  the  human  were  alto- 
gether our  own,  and  free  from  all  the  otherworldliness 
with  which  the  divine  is  tainted, — yes,  as  if  Man  were 
as  much  as  I  or  you, — there  may  arise  even  the  proud 
fancy  that  the  talk  is  no  longer  of  a  "  sacred  essence  " 
and  that  we  now  feel  ourselves  everywhere  at  home 
and  no  longer  in  the  uncanny,*  i.  e.  in  the  sacred  and 
in  sacred  awe:  in  the  ecstasy  over  "  Man  discovered  at 
last "  the  egoistic  cry  of  pain  passes  unheard,  and  the 
spook  that  has  become  so  intimate  is  taken  for  our 
true  ego. 

But  "  Humanus  is  the  saint's  name"  (see  Goethe), 
and  the  humane  is  only  the  most  clarified  sanctity. 

The  egoist  makes  the  reverse  declaration.     For  this 
precise  reason,  because  you  hold  something  sacred,  I 
gibe  at  you;  and,  even  if  I  respected  everything  in 
you,  your  sanctuary  is  precisely  what  I  should  not 
respect. 

With  these  opposed  views  there  must  also  be  as- 
sumed a  contradictory  relation  to  spiritual  goods:  the 
egoist  insults  them,  the  religious  man  (i.  e.  every  one 
who  puts  his  "  essence  "  above  himself)  must  con- 
sistently— protect  them.      But  what  kind  of  spiritual 

*  [Literally,  "unhomely."] 


THE  OWNER  371 

goods  are  to  be  protected,  and  what  left  unprotected, 
depends  entirely  on  the  concept  that  one  forms  of  the 
"  supreme  being  " ;  and  he  who  fears  God,  e.  g.,  has 
more  to  shelter  than  he  (the  liberal)  who  fears  Man. 

In  spiritual  goods  we  are  (in  distinction  from  the 
sensuous)  injured  in  a  spiritual  way,  and  the  sin 
against  them  consists  in  a  direct  desecration,  while 
against  the  sensuous  a  purloining  or  alienation  takes 
place ;  the  goods  themselves  are  robbed  of  value  and 
of  consecration,  not  merely  taken  away  ;  the  sacred  is 
immediately  compromised.     With  the  word  "  irrever- 
ence "  or  "  flippancy  "  is  designated  everything  that 
can  be  committed  as  crime  against  spiritual  goods,  i.  e. 
against  everything  that  is  sacred  for  us;  and  scoffing, 
reviling,  contempt,  doubt,  and  the  like,  are  only  differ- 
ent shades  of  criminal  flippancy. 

That  desecration  can  be  practised  in  the  most  mani- 
fold wise  is  here  to  be  passed  over,  and  only  that  dese- 
cration is  to  be  preferentially  mentioned  which  threat- 
ens the  sacred  with  danger  through  an  unrestricted 
press. 

As  long  as  respect  is  demanded  even  for  one  spirit- 
ual essence,  speech  and  the  press  must  be  enthralled  in 
the  name  of  this  essence  ;  for  just  so  long  the  egoist 
might  "  trespass  "  against  it  by  his  utterances,  from 
which  thing  he  must  be  hindered  by  "  due  punish- 
ment "  at  least,  if  one  does  not  prefer  to  take  up  the 
more  correct  means  against  it,  the  preventive  use  of 
police  authority,  e.  g.  censorship. 

What  a  sighing  for  liberty  of  the  press!      What 
then  is  the  press  to  be  liberated  from  ?      Surely  from  a 
dependence,  a  belonging,  and  a  liability  to  service! 


372  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

But  to  liberate  himself  from  that  is  every  one's  affair, 
and  it  may  with  safety  be  assumed  that,  when  you 
have  delivered  yourself  from  liability  to  service,  that 
which  you  compose  and  write  will  also  belong  to  you 
as  your  own  instead  of  having  been  thought  and  in- 
dited in  the  service  of  some  power.     What  can  a  be- 
liever in  Christ  say  and  have  printed,  that  should  be 
freer  from  that  belief  in  Christ  than  he  himself  is? 
If  I  cannot  or  may  not  write  something,  perhaps  the 
primary  fault  lies  with  me.     Little  as  this  seems  to 
hit  the  point,  so  near  is  the  application  nevertheless  to 
be  found.     By  a  press-law  I  draw  a  boundary  for  my 
publications,  or  let  one  be  drawn,  beyond  which  wrong 
and  its  punishment  follows.     I  myself  limit  myself. 

If  the  press  was  to  be  free,  nothing  would  be  so  im- 
portant as  precisely  its  liberation  from  every  coercion 
that  could  be  put  on  it  in  the  name  of  a  law.     And, 
that  it  might  come  to  that,  I  my  own  self  should  have 
to  have  absolved  myself  from  obedience  to  the  law. 

Certainly,  the  absolute  liberty  of  the  press  is  like 
every  absolute  liberty,  a  nonentity.     The  press  can 
become  free  from  full  many  a  thing,  but  always  only 
from  what  I  too  am  free  from.     If  we  make  ourselves 
free  from  the  sacred,  if  we  have  become  graceless  and 
lawless,  our  words  too  will  become  so. 

As  little  as  we  can  be  declared  clear  of  every  coer- 
cion in  the  world,  so  little  can  our  writing  be  with- 
drawn from  it.     But  as  free  as  we  are,  so  free  we  can 
make  it  too. 

It  must  therefore  become  our  own,  instead  of,  as 
hitherto,  serving  a  spook. 

People  do  not  yet  know  what  they  mean  by  their 


THE  OWNER  373 

cry  for  liberty  of  the  press.     What  they  ostensibly 
ask  is  that  the  State  shall  set  the  press  free;  but  what 
they  are  really  after,  without  knowing  it  themselves,  is 
that  the  press  become  free  from  the  State,  or  clear  of 
the  State.     The  former  is  &  petition  to  the  State,  the 
latter  an  insurrection  against  the  State.     As  a 
"petition  for  right,"  even  as  a  serious  demanding  of 
the  right  of  liberty  of  the  press,  it  presupposes  the 
State  as  the  giver,  and  can  hope  only  for  a  present,  a 
permission,  a  chartering.      Possible,  no  doubt,  that  a 
State  acts  so  senselessly  as  to  grant  the  demanded 
present;  but  you  may  bet  everything  that  those  who 
receive  the  present  will  not  know  how  to  use  it  so  long 
as  they  regard  the  State  as  a  truth:  they  will  not 
trespass  against  this  "  sacred  thing,"  and  will  call  for 
a  penal  press-law  against  every  one  who  would  be 
willing  to  dare  this. 

In  a  word,  the  press  does  not  become  free  from 
what  I  am  not  free  from. 

Do  I  perhaps  hereby  show  myself  an  opponent  of 
the  liberty  of  the  press?      On  the  contrary,  I  only  as- 
sert that  one  will  never  get  it  if  one  wants  only  it,  the 
liberty  of  the  press ;  i.  e.  if  one  sets  out  only  for  an 
unrestricted  permission.     Only  beg  right  along  for 
this  permission :  you  may  wait  forever  for  it,  for  there 
is  no  one  in  the  world  who  could  give  it  to  you.     As 
long  as  you  want  to  have  yourselves  "entitled  "  to  the 
use  of  the  press  by  a  permission,  i.  e.  liberty  of  the 
press,  you  live  in  vain  hope  and  complaint. 

"  Nonsense!      Why,  you  yourself,  who  harbor  such 
thoughts  as  stand  in  your  book,  can  unfortunately 
bring  them  to  publicity  only  through  a  lucky  chance 


374  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

or  by  stealth  ;  nevertheless  you  will  inveigh  against 
one's  pressing  and  importuning  his  own  State  till  it 
gives  the  refused  permission  to  print?"     But  an 
author  thus  addressed  would  perhaps — for  the  impu- 
dence of  such  people  goes  far — give  the  following 
reply :   "  Consider  well  what  you  say !      What  then 
do  I  do  to  procure  myself  liberty  of  the  press  for  my 
book?      Do  I  ask  for  permission,  or  do  I  not  rather, 
without  any  question  of  legality,  seek  a  favorable  oc- 
casion and  grasp  it  in  complete  recklessness  of  the 
State  and  its  wishes?      I — the  terrifying  word  must  be 
uttered — I  cheat  the  State.     You  unconsciously  do  the 
same.     From  your  tribunes  you  talk  it  into  the  idea 
that  it  must  give  up  its  sanctity  and  inviolability,  it 
must  lay  itself  bare  to  the  attacks  of  writers,  without 
needing  on  that  account  to  fear  danger.      But  you  are 
imposing  on  it;  for  its  existence  is  done  for  as  soon  as 
it  loses  its  unapproachableness.     To  you  indeed  it 
might  well  accord  liberty  of  writing,  as  England  has 
done;  you  are  believers  in  the  State  and  incapable  of 
writing  against  the  State,  however  much  you  would 
like  to  reform  it  and  *  remedy  its  defects.'     But 
what  if  opponents  of  the  State  availed  themselves  of 
free  utterance,  and  stormed  out  against  Church,  State, 
morals,  and  everything  '  sacred '  with  inexorable 
reasons?      You  would  then  be  the  first,  in  terrible 
agonies,  to  call  into  life  the  September  laws.     Too 
late  would  you  then  rue  the  stupidity  that  earlier 
made  you  so  ready  to  fool  and  palaver  into  compli- 
ance the  State,  or  the  government  of  the  State. — But 
I  prove  by  my  act  only  two  things.     This  for  one, 
that  the  liberty  of  the  press  is  always  bound  to  '  favor- 


THE  OWNER  375 

able  opportunities,'  and  accordingly  will  never  be  an 
absolute  liberty;  but  secondly  this,  that  he  who  would 
enjoy  lit  must  seek  out  and,  if  possible,  create  the 
favorable  opportunity,  availing  himself  of  his  own 
udrantage  against  the  State,  and  counting  himself 
and  his  will  more  than  the  State  and  every  '  superior ' 
power.     Not  in  the  State,  but  only  against  it,  can 
the  liberty  of  the  press  be  carried  through ;  if  it  is 
to  be  established,  it  is  to  be  obtained  not  as  the  con- 
sequence of  a  petition  but  as  the  work  of  an  insur- 
rection.    Every  petition  and  every  motion  for  liberty 
of  the  press  is  already  an  insurrection,  be  it  conscious 
or  unconscious:  a  thing  which  Philistine  halfness 
alone  will  not  and  cannot  confess  to  itself  until,  with  a 
shrinking  shudder,  it  shall  see  it  clearly  and  irrefut- 
ably by  the  outcome.     For  the  requested  liberty  of 
the  press  has  indeed  a  friendly  and  well-meaning  face 
at  the  beginning,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least  minded  ever 
to  let  the  'insolence  of  the  press1  come  into  vogue;  but 
little  by  little  its  heart  grows  more  hardened,  and  the 
inference  flatters  its  way  in  that  really  a  liberty  is  not 
a  liberty  if  it  stands  in  the  service  of  the  State,  of 
morals,  or  of  the  law.     A  liberty  indeed  from  the 
coercion  of  censorship,  it  is  yet  not  a  liberty  from  the 
coercion  of  law.     The  press,  once  seized  by  the  lust 
for  liberty,  always  wants  to  grow  freer,  till  at  last  the 
writer  says  to  himself,  Really  I  am  not  wholly  free 
till  I  ask  about  nothing;  and  writing  is  free  only 
when  it  is  my  own,  dictated  to  me  by  no  power  or 
authority,  by  no  faith,  no  dread;  the  press  must  not 
be  free — that  is  too  little — it  must  be  mine: — ownness 
of  the  press  or  property  in  the  press,  that  is  what  I 


376  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

will  take. 

"  Why,  liberty  of  the  press  is  only  permission  of  the 
press,  and  the  State  never  will  or  can  voluntarily  per- 
mit me  to  grind  it  to  nothingness  by  the  press. 

"  Let  us  now,  in  conclusion,  bettering  the  above 
language,  which  is  still  vague,  owing  to  the  phrase 
'  liberty  of  the  press,'  rather  put  it  thus:  Liberty  of 
the  press,  the  liberals'  loud  demand,  is  assuredly  pos- 
sible in  the  State;  yes,  it  is  possible  only  in  the  State, 
because  it  is  a  permission,  and  consequently  the  per- 
mitter  (the  State)  must  not  be  lacking.     But  as  per- 
mission it  has  its  limit  in  this  very  State,  which  surely 
should  not  in  reason  permit  more  than  is  compatible 
with  itself  and  its  welfare:  the  State  fixes  for  it  this 
limit  as  the  law  of  its  existence  and  of  its  extension. 
That  one  State  brooks  more  than  another  is  only  a 
quantitative  distinction,  which  alone,  nevertheless,  lies 
at  the  heart  of  the  political  liberals :  they  want  in  Ger- 
many, e.  g.,  only  a  '  more  extended,  broader  accordance 
of  free  utterance/     The  liberty  of  the  press  which  is 
sought  for  is  an  affair  of  the  people's,  and  before  the 
people  (the  State)  possesses  it  I  may  make  no  use  of  it. 
From  the  standpoint  of  property  in  the  press,  the  sit- 
uation is  different.     Let  my  people,  if  they  will,  go 
without  liberty  of  the  press,  I  will  manage  to  print  by 
force  or  ruse  ;  I  get  my  permission  to  print  only  from 
— myself  and  my  strength. 

"  If  the  press  is  my  own,  I  as  little  need  a  permis- 
sion of  the  State  for  employing  it  as  I  seek  that  per- 
mission in  order  to  blow  my  nose.  The  press  is  my 
property  from  the  moment  when  nothing  is  more  to 
me  than  myself  ;  for  from  this  moment  State,  Church, 


THE  OWNER  377 

people,  society,  and  the  like,  cease,  because  they  have 
to  thank  for  their  existence  only  the  disrespect  that  I 
have  for  myself,  and  with  the  vanishing  of  this  under- 
valuation they  themselves  are  extinguished:  they  ex- 
ist only  when  they  exist  above  me,  exist  only  as 
powers  and  power-holders.     Or  can  you  imagine  a 
State  whose  citizens  one  and  all  think  nothing  of  it? 
it  would  be  as  certainly  a  dream,  an  existence  in  seem- 
ing, as  *  united  Germany.' 

"  The  press  is  my  own  as  soon  as  I  myself  am  my 
own,  a  self-owned  man :  to  the  egoist  belongs  the 
world,  because  he  belongs  to  no  power  of  the  world. 

"  With  this  my  press  might  still  be  very  unfree,  as 
e.  g.,  at  this  moment.     But  the  world  is  large,  and 
one  helps  himself  as  well  as  he  can.     If  I  were  willing 
to  abate  from  the  property  of  my  press,  I  could  easily 
attain  the  point  where  I  might  everywhere  have  as 
much  printed  as  my  fingers  produced.      But,  as  I  want 
to  assert  my  property,  I  must  necessarily  swindle  my 
enemies.     '  Would  you  not  accept  their  permission  if  it 
were  given  you?'    Certainly,  with  joy;  for  their  per- 
mission would  be  to  me  a  proof  that  I  had  fooled 
them  and  started  them  on  the  road  to  ruin.     I  am 
not  concerned  for  their  permission,  but  so  much  the 
more  for  their  folly  and  their  overthrow.     I  do  not 
sue  for  their  permission  as  if  I  flattered  myself  (like 
the  political  liberals)  that  we  both,  they  and  I,  could 
make  out  peaceably  alongside  and  with  each  other, 
yes,  probably  raise  and  prop  each  other;  but  I  sue  for 
it  in  order  to  make  them  bleed  to  death  by  it,  that 
the  permitters  themselves  may  cease  at  last.      I  act  as 
a  conscious  enemy,  overreaching  them  and  utilizing 


378  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

their  heedlessness. 

"The  press  is  mine  when  I  recognize  outside  myself 
no  judge  whatever  over  its  utilization,  i.  e.  when  my 
writing  is  no  longer  determined  by  morality  or  reli- 
gion or  respect  for  the  State  laws  or  the  like,  but  by 
me  and  my  egoism !  " — 

Now,  what  have  you  to  reply  to  him  who  gives  you 
so  impudent  an  answer? — We  shall  perhaps  put  the 
question  most  strikingly  by  phrasing  it  as  follows: 
Whose  is  the  press,  the  people's  (State's)  or  mine? 
The  politicals  on  their  side  intend  nothing  further 
than  to  liberate  the  press  from  personal  and  arbitrary 
interferences  of  the  possessors  of  power,  without  think- 
ing of  the  point  that  to  be  really  open  for  everybody 
it  would  also  have  to  be  free  from  the  laws,  i.  e.  from 
the  people's  (State's)  will.     They  want  to  make  a 
"  people's  affair  "  of  it. 

But,  having  become  the  people's  property,  it  is  still 
far  from  being  mine;  rather,  it  retains  for  me  the 
subordinate  significance  of  a  permission.     The  people 
plays  judge  over  my  thoughts;  it  has  the  right  of  call- 
ing me  to  account  for  them,  or,  I  am  responsible  to  it 
for  them.     Jurors,  when  their  fixed  ideas  are  attacked, 
have  just  as  hard  heads  and  hearts  as  the  stiffest  des- 
pots and  their  servile  officials. 

In  the  "Liberate  Bestrebung-en"*  E.  Bauer  asserts 
that  liberty  of  the  press  is  impossible  in  the  absolutist 
and  the  constitutional  State,  whereas  in  the  "  free 
State"  it  finds  its  place.    "Here,"  the  statement  is,  "it 
is  recognized  that  the  individual,  because  he  is  no 

*  II,  p.  91  ff,    (See  my  note  above.) 


THE  OWNER  379 

longer  an  individual  but  a  member  of  a  true  and  ra- 
tional generality,  has  the  right  to  utter  his  mind." 
So  not  the  individual,  but  the  "  member,"  has  liberty 
of  the  press.     But,  if  for  the  purpose  of  liberty  of  the 
press  the  individual  must  first  give  proof  of  himself  re- 
garding his  belief  in  the  generality,  the  people ;  if  he 
does  not  have  this  liberty  through  might  of  his  own, — 
then  it  is  a  people's  liberty,  a  liberty  that  he  is  in- 
vested with  for  the  sake  of  his  faith,  his  "  member- 
ship."   The  reverse  is  the  case:  it  is  precisely  as  an  in- 
dividual that  every  one  has  open  to  him  the  liberty  to 
utter  his  mind.     But  he  has  not  the  "  right " :  that 
liberty  is  assuredly  not  his  "  sacred  right."     He  has 
only  the  might ;  but  the  might  alone  makes  him 
owner.      I  need  no  concession  for  the  liberty  of  the 
press,  do  not  need  the  people's  consent  to  it,  do  not 
need  the  "right"  to  it,  nor  any  "justification."      The 
liberty  of  the  press  too,  like  every  liberty,  I  must 
"take";  the  people,  "as  being  the  sole  judge,"  cannot 
give  it  to  me.     It  can  put  up  with  the  liberty  that  I 
take,  or  defend  itself  against  it;  give,  bestow,  grant  it 
it  cannot.     I  exercise  it  despite  the  people,  purely  as 
an  individual;  i.  c.  I  get  it  by  fighting  the  people,  my 
— enemy,  and  obtain  it  only  when  I  really  get  it  by 
such  fighting,  i.  e.  take  it.     But  I  take  it  because  it  is 
my  property. 

Sander,  against  whom  E.  Bauer  writes,  lays  claim 
(page  99)  to  the  liberty  of  the  press  "  as  the  right  and 
the  liberty  of  the  citizen  in  the  State"     What  else 
does  E.  Bauer  do?     To  him  also  it  is  only  a  right  of 
the  free  citizen. 

The  liberty  of  the  press  is  also  demanded  under  the 


380  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

name  of  a  "general  human  right."     Against  this  the 
objection  was  well-founded  that  not  every  man  knew 
how  to  use  it  rightly,  for  not  every  individual  was 
truly  man.     Never  did  a  government  refuse  it  to  Man 
as  such;  but  Man  writes  nothing,  for  the  reason  that 
he  is  a  ghost.     It  always  refused  it  to  individuals 
only,  and  gave  it  to  others,  e.  g.  its  organs.     If  then 
one  would  have  it  for  all,  one  must  assert  outright 
that  it  is  due  to  the  individual,  me,  not  to  man  or  to 
the  individual  so  far  as  he  is  man.      Besides,  another 
than  a  man  (e.  g.  a  beast)  can  make  no  use  of  it. 
The  French  government,  e.  g-.,  does  not  dispute  the 
liberty  of  the  press  as  a  right  of  man,  but  demands 
from  the  individual  a  security  for  his  really  being 
man ;  for  it  assigns  liberty  of  the  press  not  to  the  in- 
dividual, but  to  man. 

Under  the  exact  pretence  that  it  was  not  human, 
what  was  mine  was  taken  from  me !  what  was  human 
was  left  to  me  undiminished. 

Liberty  of  the  press  can  bring  about  only  a  re- 
sponsible press  ;  the  irresponsible  proceeds  solely  from 
property  in  the  press. 

For  intercourse  with  men  an  express  law  (conform- 
ity to  which  one  may  venture  at  times  sinfully  to  for- 
get, but  the  absolute  value  of  which  one  at  no  time 
ventures  to  deny)  is  placed  foremost  among  all  who 
live  religiously :  this  is  the  law — of  love,  to  which  not 
even  those  who  seem  to  fight  against  its  principle,  and 
who  hate  its  name,  have  as  yet  become  untrue;  for 
they  also  still  have  love,  yes,  they  love  with  a  deeper 
and  more  sublimated  love,  they  love  "  man  and  man- 


THE  OWNER  381 

kind." 

If  we  formulate  the  sense  of  this  law,  it  will  be 
about  as  follows:  Every  man  must  have  a  something 
that  is  more  to  him  than  himself.     You  are  to  put 
your  "  private  interest "  in  the  background  when  it  is 
a  question  of  the  welfare  of  others,  the  weal  of  the 
fatherland,  of  society,  the  common  weal,  the  weal  of 
mankind,  the  good  cause,  and  the  like!      Father- 
land, society,  mankind,  etc.,  must  be  more  to  you  than 
yourself,  and  as  against  their  interest  your  "  private 
interest "  must  stand  back;  for  you  must  not  be  an — 
egoist. 

Love  is  a  far-reaching  religious  demand,  which  is 
not,  as  might  be  supposed,  limited  to  love  to  God  and 
man,  but  stands  foremost  in  every  regard.     Whatever 
we  do,  think,  will,  the  ground  of  it  is  always  to  be 
love.     Thus  we  may  indeed  judge,  but  only  "  with 
love."     The  Bible  may  assuredly  be  criticised,  and 
that  very  thoroughly,  but  the  critic  must  before  all 
things  lore  it  and  see  in  it  the  sacred  book.      Is  this 
anything  else  than  to  say  he  must  not  criticise  it  to 
death,  he  must  leave  it  standing,  and  that  as  a  sacred 
thing  that  cannot  be  upset? — In  our  criticism  on  men 
too,  love  must  remain  the  unchanged  key-note.     Cer- 
tainly judgments  that  hatred  inspires  are  not  at  all  oui 
own  judgments,  but  judgments  of  the  hatred  that  rules 
us,  "  rancorous  judgments."     But  are  judgments  that 
love  inspires  in  us  any  more  our  own?   They  are  judg- 
ments of  the  love  that  rules  us,  they  are  "  loving,  leni- 
ent "  judgments,  they  are  not  our  own,  and  accord- 
ingly not  real  judgments  at  all.     He  who  burns  with 
love  for  justice  cries  oui,  Jiat  justitia,  per  eat  mundus! 


382  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

He  can  doubtless  ask  and  investigate  what  justice 
properly  is  or  demands,  and  in  what  it  consists,  but 
not  whether  it  is  anything. 

'  It  is  very  true,  "  He  who  abides  in  love  abides  in 
God,  and  God  in  him."  (I  John  4.  16.)     God  abides 
in  him,  he  does  not  get  rid  of  Gqd,  does  not  become 
godless;  and  he  abides  in  God,  does  not  come  to  him- 
self and  into  his  own  home,  abides  in  love  to  God  and 
does  not  become  loveless. 

"  God  is  love!      All  times, and  all  races  recognize 
in  this  word  the  central  point  of  Christianity."     God, 
who  is  love,  is  an  officious  God:  he  cannot  leave  the 
world  in  peace,  but  wants  to  make  it  blest.     "  God  be- 
came man  to  make  men  divine."*     He  has  his  hand 
in  the  game  everywhere,  and  nothing  happens  without 
it;  everywhere  he  has  his  "  best  purposes,"  his  "  in- 
comprehensible plans  and.,  decrees."     Reason,  which 
he  himself  is,  is  to  be  forwarded  and  realized  in  the 
whole  world.     His  fatherly  care  deprives  us  of  all  in- 
dependence.    We  can  do  nothing  sensible  without  its 
being  said,  God  did  that!  and  can  bring  upon  our- 
selves no  misfortune  without  hearing,  God  ordained 
that;  we  have  nothing  that  we  have  not  from  him,  he 
"  gave  "  everything.     But,  as  God  does,  so  does  Man. 
God  wants  perforce  to  make  the  world  blest,  and  Man 
wants  to  make  it  happy,  to  make  all  men  happy. 
Hence  every  "  man  "  wants  to  awaken  in  all  men  the 
reason  which  he  supposes  his  own  self  to  have :  every- 
thing is  to  be  rational  throughout.     God  torments 
himself  with  the  devil,  and  the  philosopher  does  it 

*  Athannsius. 


THE  OWNER  383 

with  unreason  and  the  accidental.     God  lets  no  being 
go  its  own  gait,  and  Man  likewise  wants  to  make  us 
walk  only  in  human  wise. 

But  whoso  is  full  of  sacred  (religious,  moral,  hu- 
mane) love  loves  only  the  spook,  the  "  true  man,"  and 
persecutes  with  dull  mercilessness  the  individual,  the 
real  man,  under  the  phlegmatic  legal  title  of  measures 
against  the  "  un-man."      He  finds  it  praiseworthy  and 
indispensable  to  exercise  pitilessness  in  the  harshest 
measure;  for  love  to  the  spook  or  generality  commands 
him  to  hate  him  who  is  not  ghostly,  i.  e.  the  egoist  or 
individual;  such  is  the  meaning  of  the  renowned  love- 
phenomenon  that  is  called  "justice." 

The  criminally  arraigned  man  can  expect  no  for- 
bearance, and  no  one  spreads  a  friendly  veil  over  his 
unhappy  nakedness.     Without  emotion  the  stern  judge 
tears  the  last  rags  of  excuse  from  the  body  of  the  poor 
accused  ;  without  compassion  the  jailer  drags  him  into 
his  damp  abode  ;  without  placability,  when  the  time 
of  punishment  has  expired,  he  thrusts  the  branded 
man  again  among  men,  his  good,  Christian,  loyal 
brethren !  who  contemptuously  spit  on  him.     Yes, 
without  grace  a  criminal  "  deserving  of  death  "  is  led 
to  the  scaffold,  and  before  the  eyes  of  a  jubilating 
crowd  the  appeased  moral  law  celebrates  its  sublime — 
revenge.     For  only  one  can  live,  the  moral  law  or  the 
criminal.     Where  criminals  live  unpunished,  the 
moral  law  has  fallen  ;  and,  where  this  prevails,  those 
must  go  down.     Their  enmity  is  indestructible. 

The  Christian  age  is  precisely  that  of  mercy,  love, 
solicitude  to  have  men  receive  what  is  due  them,  yes, 
to  bring  them  to  fulfil  their  human  (divine)  calling. 


384  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Therefore  the  principle  has  been  put  foremost  for 
intercourse,  that  this  and  that  is  man's  essence  and 
consequently  his  calling,  to  which  either  God  has 
called  him  or  (according  to  the  concepts  of  to-day) 
his  being  man  (the  species)  calls  him.     Hence  the  zeal 
for  conversion.     That  the  Communists  and  the  hu- 
mane expect  from  man  more  than  the  Christians  do 
does  not  change  the  standpoint  in  the  least.     Man 
shall  get  what  is  human!      If  it  was  enough  for  the 
pious  that  what  was  divine  became  his  part,  the  hu- 
mane demand  that  he  be  not  curtailed  of  what  is 
human.     Both  set  themselves  against  what  is  egoistic. 
Of  course ;  for  what  is  egoistic  cannot  be  accorded  to 
him  or  vested  in  him  (a  fief) ;  he  must  procure  it 
for  himself.      Love  imparts  the  former,  the  latter  can 
be  given  to  me  by  myself  alone. 

Intercourse  hitherto  has  rested  on  love,  regardful 
behavior,  doing  for  each  other.     As  one  owed  it  to 
himself  to  make  himself  blessed,  or  owed  himself  the 
bliss  of  taking  up  into  himself  the  supreme  essence 
and  bringing  it  to  a  verite  (a  truth  and  reality),  so 
one  owed  it  to  others  to  help  them  realize  their  essence 
and  their  calling:  in  both  cases  one  owed  it  to  the 
essence  of  man  to  contribute  to  its  realization. 

But  one  owes  it  neither  to  himself  to  make  anything 
out  of  himself,  nor  to  others  to  make  anything  out  of 
them  ;  for  one  owes  nothing  to  his  essence  and  that  of 
others.     Intercourse  resting  on  essence  is  an  inter- 
course with  the  spook,  not  with  anything  real.      If  I 
hold  intercourse  with  the  supreme  essence,  I  am  not 
holding  intercourse  with  myself,  and,  if  I  hold  inter- 
course with  the  essence  of  man,  I  am  not  holding 


THE  OWNER  385 

intercourse  with  men. 

The  natural  man's  love  becomes  through  culture  a 
commandment.     But  as  commandment  it  belongs  to 
Man  as  such,  not  to  me;  it  is  my  essence*  about 
which  much  ado  f  is  made,  not  my  property.     Man, 
i.  e.  humanity,  presents  that  demand  to  me;  love  is 
demanded,  it  is  my  duty.     Instead,  therefore,  of  being 
really  won  for  me,  it  has  been  won  for  the  generality, 
Man,  as  his  property  or  peculiarity:  "  it  becomes 
man,  i.  e.  every  man,  to  love ;  love  is  the  duty  and 
calling  of  man,"  etc. 

Consequently  I  must  again  vindicate  love  for  my- 
self, and  deliver  it  out  of  the  power  of  Man  with  the 
great  M. 

What  was  originally  mine,  but  accidentally  mine, 
instinctively  mine,  I  was  invested  with  as  the  property 
of  Man ;   I  became  feoffee  in  loving,  I  became  the  re- 
tainer of  mankind,  only  a  specimen  of  this  species,  and 
acted,  loving,  not  as  /.  but  as  man,  as  a  specimen  of 
man,  i.  e.  humanly.     The  whole  condition  of  civiliza- 
tion is  the  feudal  system,  the  property  being  Man's  or 
mankind's,  not  mine.     A  monstrous  feudal  State  was 
founded,  the  individual  robbed  of  everything,  every- 
thing left  to  "  man."     The  individual  had  to  appear 
at  last  as  a  "  sinner  through  and  through." 

Am  I  perchance  to  have  no  lively  interest  in  the 
person  of  another,  are  his  joy  and  his  weal  not  to  lie 
at  my  heart,  is  the  enjoyment  that  I  furnish  him  not 
to  be  more  to  me  than  other  enjoyments  of  my  own? 
On  the  contrary,  I  can  with  joy  sacrifice  to  him  num- 

*[Wesen]  t  [Wesenl 


386  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

berless  enjoyments,  I  can  deny  myself  numberless 
things  for  the  enhancement  of  his  pleasure,  and  I  can 
hazard  for  him  what  without  him  was  the  dearest  to 
me,  my  life,  my  welfare,  my  freedom.     Why,  it  con- 
stitutes my  pleasure  and  my  happiness  to  refresh  my- 
self with  his  happiness  and  his  pleasure.     But  myself, 
my  own  self,  I  do  not  sacrifice  to  him,  but  remain  an 
egoist  and — enjoy  him.     If  I  sacrifice  to  him  every- 
thing that  but  for  my  love  to  him  I  should  keep,  that 
is  very  simple,  and  even  more  usual  in  life  than  it 
seems  to  be;  but  it  proves  nothing  further  than  that 
this  one  passion  is  more  powerful  in  me  than  all  the 
rest.     Christianity  too  teaches  us  to  sacrifice  all  other 
passions  to  this.     But,  if  to  one  passion  I  sacrifice 
others,  I  do  not  on  that  account  go  so  far  as  to  sacri- 
fice myself,  nor  sacrifice  anything  of  that  whereby  I 
truly  am  myself;   I  do  not  sacrifice  my  peculiar  value, 
my  ownness.     Where  this  bad  case  occurs,  love  cuts  no 
better  figure  than  any  other  passion  that  I  obey 
blindly.     The  ambitious  man,  who  is  carried  away  by 
ambition  and  remains  deaf  to  every  warning  that  a 
calm  moment  begets  in  him,  has  let  this  passion  grow 
up  into  a  despot  against  whom  he  abandons  all  power 
of  dissolution :  he  has  given  up  himself,  because  he 
cannot  dissolve  himself,  and  consequently  cannot  ab- 
solve himself  from  the  passion:  he  is  possessed. 

I  love  men  too, — not  merely  individuals,  but  every 
one.     But  I  love  them  with  the  consciousness  of  ego- 
ism ;  I  love  them  because  love  makes  me  happy,  I  love 
because  loving  is  natural  to  me,  because  it  pleases  me. 
I  know  no  "  commandment  of  love."     I  have  a  fellow- 
feeling  with  every  feeling  being,  and  their  torment 


THE  OWNER  38t 

torments,  their  refreshment  refreshes  me  too;  I  can  kill 
them,  not  torture  them.     Per  contra,  the  high-souled, 
virtuous  Philistine  prince  Rudolph  in  "The  Mysteries 
of  Paris,"  because  the  wicked  provoke  his  "  indigna- 
tion," plans  their  torture.     That  fellow-feeling  proves 
only  that  the  feeling  of  those  who  feel  is  mine  too,  my 
property;  in  opposition  to  which  the  pitiless  dealing 
of  the  "  righteous"  man  (e.  g.  against  notary  Ferrand) 
is  like  the  unfeelingness  of  that  robber  who  cut  off  or 
stretched  his  prisoners'  legs  to  the  measure  of  his  bed- 
stead: Rudolph's  bedstead,  which  he  cuts  men  to  fit, 
is  the  concept  of  the  "  good."     The  feeling  for  right, 
virtue,  etc.,  makes  people  hard-hearted  and  intolerant. 
Rudolph  does  not  feel  like  the  notary,  but  the  reverse; 
he  feels  that  "  it  serves  the  rascal  right ";  that  is  no 
fellow-feeling. 

You  love  man,  therefore  you  torture  the  individual 
man,  the  egoist;  your  philanthropy  (love  of  men)  is 
the  tormenting  of  men. 

If  I  see  the  loved  one  suffer,  I  suffer  with  him,  and  I 
know  no  rest  till  I  have  tried  everything  to  comfort 
and  cheer  him ;  if  I  see  him  glad,  I  too  become  glad 
over  his  joy.     From  this  it  does  not  follow  that  suffer- 
ing or  joy  is  caused  in  me  by  the  same  thing  that 
brings  out  this  effect  in  him,  as  is  sufficiently  proved 
by  every  bodily  pain  which  I  do  not  feel  as  he  does ; 
his  tooth  pains  him,  but  his  pain  pains  me. 

But,  because  /  cannot  bear  the  troubled  crease  on 
the  beloved  forehead,  for  that  reason,  and  therefore 
for  my  sake,  I  kiss  it  away.     If  I  did  not  love  this 
person,  he  might  go  right  on  making  creases,  they 
would  not  trouble  me;  I  am  only  driving  away  my 


388  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

trouble. 

How  now,  has  anybody  or  anything,  whom  and 
which  I  do  not  love,  a  right  to  be  loved  by  me?      Is 
my  love  first,  or  is  his  right  first?      Parents,  kinsfolk, 
fatherland,  nation,  native  town,  etc.,  finally  fellow- 
men  in  general  ("brothers,  fraternity"),  assert  that 
they  have  a  right  to  my  love,  and  lay  claim  to  it  with- 
out further  ceremony.     They  look  upon  it  as  their 
property,  and  upon  me,  if  I  do  not  respect  this,  as  a 
robber  who  takes  from  them  what  pertains  to  them 
and  is  theirs.     I  should  love.     If  love  is  a  command- 
ment and  law,  then  I  must  be  educated  into  it,  culti- 
vated up  to  it,  and,  if  I  trespass  against  it,  punished. 
Hence  people  will  exercise  as  strong  a  "  moral  influ- 
ence "  as  possible  on  me  to  bring  me  to  love.     And 
there  is  no  doubt  that  one  can  work  up  and  seduce 
men  to  love  as  one  can  to  other  passions, — e.  g.,  if  you 
like,  to  hate.     Hate  runs  through  whole  races  merely 
because  the  ancestors  of  the  one  belonged  to  the 
Guelphs,  those  of  the  other  to  the  Ghibellines. 

But  love  is  not  a  commandment,  but,  like  each  of 
my  feelings,  my  property.     Acquire,  i.  e.  purchase,  my 
property,  and  then  I  will  make  it  over  to  you.     A 
church,  a  nation,  a  fatherland,  a  family,  etc.,  that  does 
not  know  how  to  acquire  my  love,  I  need  not  love; 
and  I  fix  the  purchase  price  of  my  love  quite  at  my 
pleasure. 

Selfish  love  is  far  distant  from  unselfish,  mystical, 
or  romantic  love.     One  can  love  everything  possible, 
not  merely  men,  but  an  "  object "  in  general  (wine, 
one's  fatherland,  etc.).     Love  becomes  blind  and  crazy 
by  a  must  taking  it  out  of  my  power  (infatuation), 


THE  OWNER  389 

romantic  by  a  should  entering  into  it,  i.  e.  the 
"  object's  "  becoming  sacred  for  me,  or  my  becoming 
bound  to  it  by  duty,  conscience,  oath.     Now  the 
object  no  longer  exists  for  me,  but  I  for  it. 

Love  is  a  possessedness,  not  as  my  feeling — as  such 
I  rather  keep  it  in  my  possession  as  property — ,  but 
through  the  alienness  of  the  object.     For  religious 
love  consists  in  the  commandment  to  love  in  the  be- 
loved a  "  holy  one,"  or  to  adhere  to  a  holy  one  ;  for 
unselfish  love  there  are  objects  absolutely  lovable  for 
which  my  heart  is  to  beat, — e.  g.  fellow-men,  or  my 
wedded  mate,  kinsfolk,  etc.     Holy  love  loves  the 
holy  in  the  beloved,  and  therefore  exerts  itself  also  to 
make  of  the  beloved  more  and  more  a  holy  one  (e.  g. 
a  "  man  "). 

The  beloved  is  an  object  that  should  be  loved  by 
me.     He  is  not  an  object  of  my  love  on  account  of, 
because  of,  or  by,  my  loving  him,  but  is  an  object  of 
love  in  and  of  himself.     Not  I  make  him  an  object  of 
love,  but  he  is  such  to  begin  with ;  for  it  is  here  irrele- 
vant that  he  has  become  so  by  my  choice,  if  so  it  be 
(as  with  &  fiancee,  a  spouse,  and  the  like),  since  even 
so  he  has  in  any  case,  as  the  person  once  chosen,  ob- 
tained a  "  right  of  his  own  to  my  love,"  and  I,  be- 
cause I  have  loved  him,  am  under  obligation  to  love 
him  forever.      He  is  therefore  not  an  object  of  my 
love,  but  of  love  in  general :    an  object  that  should  be 
loved.      Love  appertains  to  him,  is  due  to  him,  or  is 
his  right,  while  I  am  under  obligation  to  love  him. 
My  love,  i.  e.  the  toll  of  love  that  I  pay  him,  is  in 
truth  his  love,  which  he  only  collects  from  me  as  toll. 

Every  love  to  which  there  clings  but  the  smallest 


390  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

speck  of  obligation  is  an  unselfish  love,  and,  so  far  as 
this  speck  reaches,  a  possessedness.      He  who  believes 
that  he  owes  the  object  of  his  love  anything  loves  ro- 
mantically or  religiously. 

Family  love,  e.  g\,  as  it  is  usually  understood  as 
"  piety,?'  is  a  religious  love  ;  love  of  fatherland, 
preached  as  "  patriotism,"  likewise.     All  our  romantic 
love  moves  in  the  same  pattern :  everywhere  the  hy- 
pocrisy, or  rather  self-deception,  of  an  "unselfish 
love,"  an  interest  in  the  object  for  the  object's  sake, 
not  for  my  sake  and  mine  alone. 

Religious  or  romantic  love  is  distinguished  from 
sensual  love  by  the  difference  of  the  object  indeed,  bu1 
not  by  the  dependence  of  the  relation  to  it.     In  the 
latter  regard  both  are  possessedness ;  but  in  the 
former  the  one  object  is  profane,  the  other  sacred. 
The  dominion  of  the  object  over  me  is  the  same  in 
both  cases,  only  that  it  is  one  time  a  sensuous  one, 
the  other  time  a  spiritual  (ghostly)  one.     My  love  is 
my  own  only  when  it  consists  altogether  in  a  selfish 
and  egoistic  interest,  and  when  consequently  the  ob- 
ject of  my  love  is  really  my  object  or  my  property.     I 
owe  my  property  nothing,  and  have  no  duty  to  it,  as 
little  as  I  might  have  a  duty  to  my  eye;  if  neverthe- 
less I  guard  it  with  the  greatest  care,  I  do  so  on  my 
account. 

Antiquity  lacked  love  as  little  as  do  Christian 
times;  the  god  of  love  is  older  than  the  God  of  Love. 
But  the  mystical  possessedness  belongs  to  the  moderns 

The  possessedness  of  love  lies  in  the  alienation  of 
the  object,  or  in  my  powerlessness  as  against  its  alien- 
ness  and  superior  power.     To  the  egoist  nothing  is 


THE  OWNER  391 

high  enough  for  him  to  humble  himself  before  it, 
nothing  so  independent  that  he  would  live  for  love  of 
it,  nothing  so  sacred  that  he  would  sacrifice  himself  to 
it.     The  egoist's  love  rises  in  selfishness,  flows  in  the 
bed  of  selfishness,  and  empties  into  selfishness  again. 

Whether  this  can  still  be  called  love?      If  you 
know  another  word  for  it,  go  ahead  and  choose  it; 
then  the  sweet  word  love  may  wither  with  the  departed 
world;  for  the  present  I  at  least  find  none  in  our 
Christian  language,  and  hence  stick  to  the  old  sound 
and  "  love  "  my  object,  my — property. 

Only  as  one  of  my  feelings  do  I  harbor  love;  but  as 
a  power  above  me,  as  a  divine  power  (Feuerbach),  as 
a  passion  that  I  am  not  to  cast  off,  as  a  religious  and 
moral  duty,  I — scorn  it.     As  my  feeling  it  is  mine ; 
as  a  principle  to  which  I  consecrate  and  "  vow  "  my 
soul  it  is  a  dominator  and  divine,  just  as  hatred  as  a 
principle  is  diabolical;  one  not  better  than  the  other. 
In  short,  egoistic  love,  i.  e.,  my  love,  is  neither  holy 
nor  unholy,  neither  divine  nor  diabolical. 

"  A  love  that  is  limited  by  faith  is  an  untrue  love. 
The  sole  limitation  that  does  not  contradict  the  es- 
sence of  love  is  the  self-limitation  of  love  by  reason, 
intelligence.      Love  that  scorns  the  rigor,  the  law,  of 
intelligence,  is  theoretically  a  false  love,  practically  a 
ruinous  one."*     So  love  is  in  its  essence  rational! 
So  thinks  Feuerbach ;  the  believer,  on  the  contrary, 
thinks,  Love  is  in  its  essence  believing.     The  one  in- 
veighs against  irrational,  the  other  against  unbeliev- 
ing-, love.     To  both  it  can  at  most  rank  as  a  splen- 

*  Feuerbach,  "  Essence  of  Chr.,"  394. 


392  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

didum  vitium.     Do  not  both  leave  love  standing,  even 
in  the  form  of  unreason  and  unbelief  ?     They  do  not 
dare  to  say,  irrational  or  unbelieving  love  is  nonsense, 
is  not  love;  as  little  as  they  are  willing  to  say,  irra- 
tional or  unbelieving  tears  are  not  tears.     But,  if  even 
irrational  love,  etc.,  must  count  as  love,  and  if  they 
are  nevertheless  to  be  unworthy  of  man,  there  follows 
simply  this:  love  is  not  the  highest  thing,  but  reason 
or  faith ;  even  the  unreasonable  and  the  unbelieving 
can  love;  but  love  has  value  only  when  it  is  that  of  a 
rational  or  believing  person.     It  is  an  illusion  when 
Feuerbach  calls  the  rationality  of  love  its  "  self-limita- 
tion " ;  the  believer  might  with  the  same  right  call 
belief  its  "  self-limitation."     Irrational  love  is  neither 
"  false  "  nor  "  ruinous  ";  it  does  its  service  as  love. 

Toward  the  world,  especially  toward  men,  I  am  to 
assume  a  particular  feeling,  and  "  meet  them  with 
love,"  with  the  feeling  of  love,  from  the  beginning. 
Certainly,  in  this  there  is  revealed  far  more  free-will 
and  self-determination  than  when  I  let  myself  be 
stormed,  by  way  of  the  world,  by  all  possible  feelings, 
and  remain  exposed  to  the  most  checkered,  most  acci- 
dental impressions.     I  go  to  the  world  rather  with  a 
preconceived  feeling,  as  if  it  were  a  prejudice  and  a 
preconceived  opinion ;  I  have  prescribed  to  myself  in 
advance  my  behavior  toward  it,  and,  despite  all  its 
temptations,  feel  and  think  about  it  only  as  I  have 
once  determined  to.     Against  the  dominion  of  the 
world  I  secure  myself  by  the  principle  of  love;  for, 
whatever  may  come,  I — love.    The  ugly — e.g. — makes 
a  repulsive  impression  on  me;  but,  determined  to  love, 
I  master  this  impression  as  I  do  every  antipathy. 


THE  OWNER  393 

But  the  feeling  to  which  I  have  determined  and — 
condemned  myself  from  the  start  is  a  narrow  feeling, 
because  it  is  a  predestined  one,  of  which  I  myself  am 
not  able  to  get  clear  or  to  declare  myself  clear.     Be- 
cause preconceived,  it  is  a  prejudice.     I  no  longer 
show  myself  in  face  of  the  world,  but  my  love  shows 
itself.     The  world  indeed  does  not  rule  me,  but  so 
much  the  more  inevitably  does  the  spirit  of  love  rule 
me.     I  have  overcome  the  world  to  become  a  slave  of 
this  spirit. 

If  I  first  said,  I  love  the  world,  I  now  add  likewise: 
I  do  not  love  it,  for  I  annihilate  it  as  I  annihilate 
myself;  /  dissolve  it.     I  do  not  limit  myself  to  one 
feeling  for  men,  but  give  free  play  to  all  that  I  am 
capable  of.     Why  should  I  not  dare  speak  it  out  in 
all  its  glaringness  ?      Yes,  /  utilize  the  world  and 
men !     With  this  I  can  keep  myself  open  to  every 
impression  without  being  torn  away  from  myself  by 
one  of  them.      I  can  love,  love  with  a  full  heart,  and 
let  the  most  consuming  glow  of  passion  burn  in  my 
heart,  without  taking  the  beloved  one  for  anything 
else  than  the  nourishment  of  my  passion,  on  which  it 
ever  refreshes  itself  anew.     All  my  care  for  him  ap- 
plies only  to  the  object  of  my  love,  only  to  him  whom 
my  love  requires,  only  to  him,  the  "  warmly  loved." 
How  indifferent  would  he  be  to  me  without  this — my 
love!      I  feed  only  my  love  with  him,  I  utilize  him  for 
this  only:   I  enjoy  him. 

Let  us  choose  another  convenient  example.  I  see 
how  men  are  fretted  in  dark  superstition  by  a  swarm 
of  ghosts.  If  to  the  extent  of  my  powers  I  let  a  bit 
of  daylight  fall  in  on  the  nocturnal  spookery,  is  it  per- 


394  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

chance  because  love  to  you  inspires  this  in  me?      Do  I 
write  out  of  love  to  men?      No,  I  write  because  I  want 
to  procure  for  my  thoughts  an  existence  in  the  world; 
and,  even  if  I  foresaw  that  these  thoughts  would  de- 
prive you  of  your  rest  and  your  peace,  even  if  I  saw 
the  bloodiest  wars  and  the  fall  of  many  generations 
springing  up  from  this  seed  of  thought, — I  would 
nevertheless  scatter  it.     Do  with  it  what  you  will  and 
can,  that  is  your  affair  and  does  not  trouble  me.     You 
will  perhaps  have  only  trouble,  combat,  and  death 
from  it,  very  few  will  draw  joy  from  it.     If  your  weal 
lay  at  my  heart,  I  should  act  as  the  church  did  in 
withholding  the  Bible  from  the  laity,  or  Christian 
governments,  which  make  it  a  sacred  duty  for  them- 
selves to  "  protect  the  common  people  from  bad 
books." 

But  not  only  not  for  your  sake,  not  even  for  truth's 
sake  either  do  I  speak  out  what  I  think.     No — 

I  sing  as  the  bird  sings 

That  on  the  bough  alights; 
The  song  that  from  me  springs 

Is  pay  that  well  requites. 

I  sing  because — I  am  a  singer.      But  I  use  *  you 
for  it  because  I — need  f  ears. 

Where  the  world  comes  in  my  way — and  it  comes 
in  my  way  everywhere — I  consume  it  to  quiet  the 
hunger  of  my  egoism.     For  me  you  are  nothing  but — 
my  food,  even  as  I  too  am  fed  upon  and  turned  to  use 
by  you.     We  have  only  one  relation  to  each  other, 
that  of  usableness,  of  utility,  of  use.     We  owe  each 

*  [  gebrauche]  t  [brauchf] 


THE  OWNER  395 

oilier  nothing,  for  what  I  seem  to  owe  you  I  owe  at 
most  to  myself.     If  I  show  you  a  cheery  air  in  order  to 
cheer  you  likewise,  then  your  cheeriness  is  of  conse- 
quence to  me,  and  my  air  serves  my  wish;  to  a  thou- 
sand others,  whom  I  do  not  aim  to  cheer,  I  do  not 
show  it. 


One  has  to  be  educated  up  to  that  love  which 
founds  itself  on  the  "  essence  of  man,"  or,  in  the 
ecclesiastical  and  moral  period,  lies  upon  us  as  a 
"  commandment."     In  what  fashion  moral  influence, 
the  chief  ingredient  of  our  education,  seeks  to  regulate 
t-he  intercourse  of  men  shall  here  be  looked  at  with 
egoistic  eyes  in  one  example  at  least. 

Those  who  educate  us  make  it  their  concern  early  to 
break  us  of  lying  and  to  inculcate  the  principle  that 
ene  must  always  tell  the  truth.      If  selfishness  were 
made  the  basis  for  this  rule,  every  one  would  easily 
understand  how  by  lying  he  fools  away  that  confidence 
in  him  which  he  hopes  to  awaken  in  others,  and  how 
correct  the  maxim  proves,  Nobody  believes  a  liar  even 
when  he  tells  the  truth.     Yet,  at  the  same  time,  he 
would  also  feel  that  he  had  to  meet  with  truth  only 
him  whom  he  authorized  to  hear  the  truth.     If  a  spy 
walks  in  disguise  through  the  hostile  camp,  and  is 
asked  who  he  is,  the  askers  are  assuredly  entitled  to 
inquire  after  his  name,  but  the  disguised  man  does  not 
give  them  the  right  to  learn  the  truth  from  him ;  he 
tells  them  what  he  likes,  only  not  the  fact.     And  yet 
morality  demands,  " Thou  shalt  not  lie! "     By  moral- 
ity those  persons  are  vested  with  the  right  to  expect 
the  truth;  but  by  me  they  are  not  vested  with  that 


396  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

right,  and  I  recognize  only  the  right  that  /  impart. 
In  a  gathering  of  revolutionists  the  police  force  their 
way  in  and  ask  the  orator  for  his  name;  everybody 
knows  that  the  police  have  the  right  to  do  so,  but  they 
do  not  have  it  from  the  revolutionist,  since  he  is  their 
enemy;  he  tells  them  a  false  name  and — cheats  them 
with  a  lie.     The  police  do  not  act  so  foolishly  either 
as  to  count  on  their  enemies'  love  of  truth;  on  the 
contrary,  they  do  not  believe  without  further  cere- 
mony, but  have  the  questioned  individual  "  identi- 
fied "  if  they  can.     Nay,  the  State  everywhere  pro- 
ceeds incredulously  with  individuals,  because  in  their 
egoism  it  recognizes  its  natural  enemy;  it  invariably 
demands  a  "  voucher,"  and  he  who  cannot  show 
vouchers  falls  a  prey  to  its  investigating  inquisition. 
The  State  does  not  believe  nor  trust  the  individual, 
and  so  of  itself  places  itself  with  him  in  the  convention 
of  lying ;  it  trusts  me  only  when  it  has  convinced  itself 
of  the  truth  of  my  statement,  for  which  there  often  re- 
mains to  it  no  other  means  than  the  oath.     How 
clearly,  too,  this  (the  oath)  proves  that  the  State  does 
not  count  on  our  credibility  and  love  of  truth,  but  on 
our  interest,  our  selfishness:  it  relies  on  our  not  want- 
ing to  fall  foul  of  God  by  a  perjury. 

Now,  let  one  imagine  a  French  revolutionist  in  the 
year  1788,  who  among  friends  let  fall  the  now  well- 
known  phrase,  "the  world  will  have  no  rest  till  the 
last  king  is  hanged  with  the  guts  of  the  last  priest." 
The  king  then  still  had  all  power,  and,  when  the  ut- 
terance is  betrayed  by  an  accident,  yet  without  its 
ing  possible  to  produce  witnesses,  confession  is  de- 
manded from  the  accused.     Is  he  to  confess  or  not? 


• 


THE  OWNER  397 

If  he  denies,  he  lies  and — remains  unpunished ;  if  he 
confesses,  he  is  candid  and — is  beheaded.     If  truth  is 
more  than  everything  else  to  him,  all  right,  let  him 
die.     Only  a  paltry  poet  could  try  to  make  a  tragedy 
out  of  the  end  of  his  life;  for  what  interest  is  there  in 
seeing  how  a  man  succumbs  from  cowardice?      But, 
if  he  had  the  courage  not  to  b*e  a  slave  of  truth  and 
sincerity,  he  would  ask  somewhat  thus:  Why  need 
the  judges  know  what  I  have  spoken  among  friends? 
If  I  had  wished  them  to  know,  I  should  have  said  it  to 
them  as  I  said  it  to  my  friends.     I  will  not  have  them 
know  it.     They  force  themselves  into  my  confidence 
without  my  having  called  them  to  it  and  made  them 
my  confidants;  they  will  learn  what  I  will  keep  secret. 
Come  on  then,  you  who  wish  to  break  my  will  by 
your  will,  and  try  your  arts.     You  can  torture  me 
by  the  rack,  you  can  threaten  me  with  hell  and 
eternal  damnation,  you  can  make  me  so  nerveless 
that  I  swear  a  false  oath,  but  the  truth  you  shall  not 
press  out  of  me,  for  I  will  lie  to  you  because  I  have 
given  you  no  claim  and  no  right  to  my  sincerity. 
Let  God,  "  who  is  truth,"  look  down  ever  so  threaten- 
ingly on  me,  let  lying  come  ever  so  hard  to  me,  I  have 
nevertheless  the  courage  of  a  lie;  and,  even  if  I  were 
weary  of  my  life,  even  if  nothing  appeared  to  me  more 
welcome  than  your  executioner's  sword,  you  neverthe- 
less should  not  have  the  joy  of  finding  in  me  a  slave 
of  truth,  whom  by  your  priestly  arts  you  make  a 
traitor  to  his  will     When  I  spoke  those  treasonable 
words,  I  would  not  have  had  you  know  anything  of 
them ;   I  now  retain  the  same  will,  and  do  not  let  my- 
self be  frightened  by  the  curse  of  the  lie. 


398  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Sigismund  is  not  a  miserable  caitiff  because  he 
broke  his  princely  word,  but  he  broke  the  word  be- 
cause he  was  a  caitiff;  he  might  have  kept  his  word 
and  would  still  have  been  a  caitiff,  a  priest-ridden 
man.     Luther,  driven  by  a  higher  power,  became  un- 
faithful to  his  monastic  vow:  he  became  so  for  God's 
sake.     Both  broke  their  oath  as  possessed  persons: 
Sigismund,  because  he  wanted  to  appear  as  a  sincere 
professor  of  the  divine  truth,  i.  e.  of  the  true,  genuinely 
Catholic  faith;  Luther,  in  order  to  give  testimony  for 
the  gospel  sincerely  and  with  entire  truth,  with  body 
and  soul;  both  became  perjured  in  order  to  be  sincere 
toward  the  "  higher  truth."     Only,  the  priests  ab- 
solved the  one,  the  other  absolved  himself.     What  else 
did  both  observe  than  what  is  contained  in  those 
apostolic  words,  "  Thou  hast  not  lied  to  men,  but  to 
God  "?     They  lied  to  men,  broke  their  oath  before 
the  world's  eyes,  in  order  not  to  lie  to  God,  but  to 
serve  him.     Thus  they  show  us  a  way  to  deal  with 
truth  before  men.     For  God's  glory,  and  for  God's 
sake,  a — breach  of  oath,  a  lie,  a  prince's  word  broken ! 

How  would  it  be,  now,  if  we  changed  the  thing 
a  little  and  wrote,  A  perjury  and  lie  for — my  sake  ? 
Would  not  that  be  pleading  for  every  baseness?      It 
seems  so  assuredly,  only  in  this  it  is  altogether  like  the 
"  for  God's  sake."     For  was  not  every  baseness  com- 
mitted for  God's  sake,  were  not  all  the  scaffolds  filled 
for  his  sake  and  all  the  auto-da^fes  held  for  his  sake, 
was  not  all  stupefaction  introduced  for  his  sake?  and 
do  they  not  to-day  still  for  God's  sake  fetter  the 
mind  in  tender  children  by  religious  education? 
Were  not  sacred  vows  broken  for  his  sake,  and  do  not 


THE  OWNER  399 

missionaries  and  priests  still  go  around  every  day  to 
bring  Jews,  heathen,  Protestants  or  Catholics,  etc.,  to 
treason  against  the  faith  of  their  fathers, — for  his 
sake  ?      And  that  should  be  worse  with  theyor  my 
sake  ?     What  then  does  on  my  account  mean  ?     There 
people  immediately  think  of  "  filthy  lucre."     But  he 
who  acts  from  love  of  filthy  lucre  does  it  on  his  own 
account  indeed,  as  there  is  nothing  anyhow  that  one 
does  not  do  for  his  own  sake, — among  other  things, 
everything  that  is  done  for  God's  glory;  yet  he,  for 
whom  he  seeks  the  lucre,  is  a  slave  of  lucre,  not  raised 
above  lucre;  he  is  one  who  belongs  to  lucre,  the 
money-bag,  not  to  himself;  he  is  not  his  own.     Must 
not  a  man  whom  the  passion  of  avarice  rules  follow 
the  commands  of  this  master?  and,  if  a  weak  good- 
naturedness  once  beguiles  him,  does  this  not  appear  as 
simply  an  exceptional  case  of  precisely  the  same  sort 
as  when  pious  believers  are  sometimes  forsaken  by 
their  Lord's  guidance  and  ensnared  by  the  arts  of  the 
"devil"?      So  an  avaricious  man  is  not  a  self-owned 
man,  but  a  servant;  and  he  can  do  nothing  for  his 
own  sake  without  at  the  same  time  doing  it  for  his 
lord's  sake,— precisely  like  the  godly  man. 

Famous  is  the  breach  of  oath  which  Francis  II 
committed  against  Emperor  Charles  V.     Not  later, 
when  he  ripely  weighed  his  promise,  but  at  once,  when 
he  swore  the  oath,  King  Francis  took  it  back  in 
thought  as  well  as  by  a  secret  protestation  document- 
arily  subscribed  before  his  councillors;  he  uttered  a 
perjury  aforethought.     Francis  did  not  show  himself 
disinclined  to  buy  his  release,  but  the  price  that 
Charles  put  on  it  seemed  to  him  too  high  and  unrea- 


400  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

sonable.      Even  though  Charles  behaved  himself  in  a 
sordid  fashion  when  he  sought  to  extort  as  much  as 
possible,  it  was  yet  shabby  of  Francis  to  want  to  pur- 
chase his  freedom  for  a  lower  ransom;  and  his  later 
dealings,  among  which  there  occurs  yet  a  second 
breach  of  his  word,  prove  sufficiently  how  the  huckster 
spirit  held  him  enthralled  and  made  him  a  shabby 
swindler.     However,  what  shall  we  say  to  the  re- 
proach of  perjury  against  him?      In  the  first  place, 
surely,  this  again :  that  not  the  perjury,  but  his  sor- 
didness.  shamed  him;  that  he  did  not  deserve  con- 
tempt for  his  perjury,  but  made  himself  guilty  of 
perjury  because  he  was  a  contemptible  man.     But 
Francis's  perjury,  regarded  in  itself,  demands  another 
judgment.     One  might  say  Francis  did  not  respond  to 
the  confidence  that  Charles  put  in  him  in  setting  him 
free.      But,  if  Charles  had  really  favored  him  with 
confidence,  he  would  have  named  to  him  the  price  thai 
he  considered  the  release  worth,  and  would  then  have 
set  him  at  liberty  and  expected  Francis  to  pay  the 
redemption-sum.     Charles  harbored  no  such  trust,  but 
only  believed  in  Francis's  impotence  and  credulity, 
which  would  not  allow  him  to  act  against  his  oath; 
but  Francis  deceived  only  this — credulous  calculation. 
When  Charles  believed  he  was  assuring  himself  of  his 
enemy  by  an  oath,  right  there  he  was  freeing  him 
from  every  obligation.     Charles  had  given  the  king 
credit  for  a  piece  of  stupidity,  a  narrow  conscience, 
and,  without  confidence  in  Francis,  counted  only  on 
Francis's  stupidity,  i.  e.  conscientiousness:  he  let  him 
go  from  the  Madrid  prison  only  to  hold  him  the  more 
securely  in  the  prison  of  conscientiousness,  the  great 


THE  OWNER  4O1 

jail  built  about  the  mind  of  man  by  religion:  he  sent 
him  back  to  France  locked  fast  in  invisible  chains, 
what  wonder  if  Francis  sought  to  escape  and  sawed 
the  chains  apart  ?      No  man  would  have  taken  it  amiss 
of  him  if  he  had  secretly  fled  from  Madrid,  for  he  was 
in  an  enemy's  power ;  but  every  good  Christian  cries 
out  upon  him,  that  he  wanted  to  loose  himself  from 
God's  bonds  too.      (It  was  only  later  that  the  pope 
absolved  him  from  his  oath.) 

It  is  despicable  to  deceive  a  confidence  that  we  vol- 
untarily call  forth;  but  it  is  no  shame  to  egoism  to 
let  every  one  who  wants  to  get  us  into  his  power  by  an 
oath  bleed  to  death  by  the  unsuccessfulness  of  his 
untrustful  craft.     If  you  have  wanted  to  bind  me, 
then  learn  that  I  know  how  to  burst  your  bonds. 

The  point  is  whether  /  give  the  confider  the  right  to 
confidence.      If  the  pursuer  of  my  friend  asks  me 
where  he  has  fled  to,  I  shall  surely  put  him  on  a  false 
trail.     Why  does  he  ask  precisely  me,  the  pursued 
man's  friend?      In  order  not  to  be  a  false,  traitorous 
friend,  I  prefer  to  be  false  to  the  enemy.      I  might  cer- 
tainly, in  courageous  conscientiousness,  answer  "  I 
will  not  tell "  (so  Fichte  decides  the  case) ;  by  that  I 
should  salve  my  love  of  truth  and  do  for  my  friend  as 
much  as — nothing,  for,  if  I  do  not  mislead  the  enemy, 
he  may  accidentally  take  the  right  street,  and  my  love 
of  truth  would  have  given  up  my  friend  as  a  prey, 
because  it  hindered  me  from  the — courage  for  a  lie. 
He  who  has  in  the  truth  an  idol,  a  sacred  thing,  must 
humble  himself  before  it,  must  not  defy  its  demands, 
not  resist  courageously ;  in  short,  he  must  renounce 
the  heroism  of  the  lie.     For  to  the  lie  belongs  not  less 


402  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

courage  than  to  the  truth:  a  courage  that  young  men 
are  most  apt  to  be  defective  in,  who  would  rather  con- 
fess the  truth  and  mount  the  scaffold  for  it  than  con- 
found the  enemy's  power  by  the  impudence  of  a  lie. 
To  them  the  truth  is  "sacred,"  and  the  sacred  at  all 
times  demands  blind  reverence,  submission,  and  self- 
sacrifice.     If  you  are  not  impudent,  not  mockers  of 
the  sacred,  you  are  tame  and  its  servants.     Let  one 
but  lay  a  grain  of  truth  in  the  trap  for  you,  you  peck 
at  it  to  a  certainty,  and  the  fool  is  caught.     You  will 
not  lie?      Well,  then,  fall  as  sacrifices  to  the  truth 
and  become — martyrs!      Martyrs! — for  what?      For 
yourselves,  for  self-ownership?      No,  for  your  god- 
dess,— the  truth.     You  know  only  two  services,  only 
two  kinds  of  servants :  servants  of  the  truth  and  ser- 
vants of  the  lie.     Then  in  God's  name  serve  the  truth ! 

Others,  again,  serve  the  truth  also;  but  they  serve 
it  "  in  moderation,"  and  make,  e.  g.,  a  great  distinc- 
tion between  a  simple  lie  and  a  lie  sworn  to.     And  yet 
the  whole  chapter  of  the  oath  coincides  with  that  of 
the  lie,  since  an  oath,  everybody  knows,  is  only  a 
strongly  assured  statement.     You  consider  yourselves 
entitled  to  lie,  if  only  you  dp  not  swear  to  it  besides? 
One  who  is  particular  about  it  must  judge  and  con- 
demn a  lie  as  sharply  as  a  false  oath.     But  now  there 
has  been  kept  up  in  morality  an  ancient  point  of  con- 
troversy, which  is  customarily  treated  of  under  the 
name  of  the  "lie  of  necessity."     No  one  who  dares 
plead  for  this  can  consistently  put  from  him  an  "  oath 
of  necessity."     If  I  justify  my  lie  as  a  lie  of  necessity, 
I  should  not  be  so  pusillanimous  as  to  rob  the  justified 
lie  of  the  strongest  corroboration.     Whatever  I  do, 


THE  OWNER  403 

why  should  I  not  do  it  entirely  and  without  reserva- 
tion (reservatio  mentalis)?      If  I  once  lie,  why  then 
not  lie  completely,  with  entire  consciousness  and  all 
my  might?      As  a  spy  I  should  have  to  swear  to  each 
of  my  false  statements  at  the  enemy's  demand  ;  deter- 
mined to  lie  to  him,  should  I  suddenly  become  cow- 
ardly and  undecided  in  face  of  an  oath?     Then  I 
should  have  been  ruined  in  advance  for  a  liar  and 
spy;  for,  you  see,  I  should  be  voluntarily  putting  into 
the  enemy's  hands  a  means  to  catch  me. — The  State 
too  fears  the  oath  of  necessity,  and  for  this  reason  does 
not  give  the  accused  a  chance  to  swear.     But  you  do 
not  justify  the  State's  fear;  you  lie,  but  do  not  swear 
falsely.      If,  e.  g.,  you  show  some  one  a  kindness,  and 
he  is  not  to  know  it,  but  he  guesses  it  and  tells  you 
so  to  your  face,  you  deny;  if  he  insists,  you  say  "hon- 
estly, no !  "     If  it  came  to  swearing,  then  you  would 
refuse;  for,  from  fear  of  the  sacred,  you  always  stop 
half  way.     Against  the  sacred  you  have  no  will  ()f 
your  own.     You  lie  in — moderation,  as  you  are  free 
"in  moderation,"  religious  "in  moderation"  (the 
clergy  are  not  to  "  encroach  " ;  over  this  point  the 
most  vapid  of  controversies  is  now  being  carried  on, 
on  the  part  of  the  university  against  the  church),  mon- 
archically  disposed  "  in  moderation  "  (you  want  a 
monarch  limited  by  the  constitution,  by  a  funda- 
mental law  of  the  State),  everything  nicely  tempered, 
lukewarm,  half  God's,  half  the  devil's. 

There  was  a  university  where  the  usage  was  that 
every  word  of  honor  that  must  be  given  to  the  univer- 
sity judge  was  looked  upon  by  the  students  as  null 
and  void.     For  the  students  saw  in  the  demanding  of 


404  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

it  nothing  but  a  snare,  which  they  could  not  escape 
otherwise  than  by  taking  away  all  its  significance. 
He  who  at  that  same  university  broke  his  word  of 
honor  to  one  of  the  fellows  was  infamous;  he  who 
gave  it  to  the  university  judge  derided,  in  union  with 
these  very  fellows,  the  dupe  who  fancied  that  a  word 
had  the  same  value  among  friends  and  among  foes. 
It  was  less  a  correct  theory  than  the  constraint  of 
practice  that  had  there  taught  the  students  to  act  so, 
as,  without  that  means  of  getting  out,  they  would  have 
been  pitilessly  driven  to  treachery  against  their  com- 
rades.     But,  as  the  means  approved  itself  in  practice, 
so  it  has  its  theoretical  probation  too.     A  word  of 
honor,  an  oath,  is  one  only  for  him  whom  /  entitle 
to  receive  it;  he  who  forces  me  to  it  obtains  only  a 
forced,  i.  e.  a  hostile  word,  the  word  of  a  foe,  whom 
one  has  no  right  to  trust;  for  the  foe  does  not  give  us 
the  right. 

Aside  from  this,  the  courts  of  the  State  do  not  even 
recognize  the  inviolability  of  an  oath.     For,  if  I  had 
sworn  to  one  who  comes  under  examination  that  I 
would  not  declare  anything  against  him,  the  court 
would  demand  my  declaration  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
an  oath  binds  me,  and,  in  case  of  refusal,  would  lock 
me  up  till  I  decided  to  become — an  oath-breaker. 
The  court  "absolves  me  from  my  oath"; — how  mag- 
nanimous!     If  any  power  can  absolve  me  from  the 
oath,  I  myself  am  surely  the  very  first  power  that  has 
a  claim  to. 

As  a  curiosity,  and  to  remind  us  of  customary  oaths 
of  all  sorts,  let  place  be  given  here  to  that  which 
Emperor  Paul  commanded  the  captured  Poles  (Kos- 


THE  OWNER  405 

ciusko,  Potocki,  Niemcewicz,  etc.)  to  take  when  he 
released  them :  "  We  not  merely  swear  fidelity  and 
obedience  to  the  emperor,  but  also  further  promise  to 
pour  out  our  blood  for  his  glory;  we  obligate  our- 
selves to  discover  everything  threatening  to  his  person 
or  his  empire  that  we  ever  learn;  we  declare  finally 
that,  in  whatever  part  of  the  earth  we  may  be,  a  single 
word  of  the  emperor  shall  suffice  to  make  us  leave 
everything  and  repair  to  him  at  once." 

In  one  domain  the  principle  of  love  seems  to  have 
been  long  outsoared  by  egoism,  and  to  be  still  in  need 
only  of  sure  consciousness,  as  it  were  of  victory  with  a 
good  conscience.     This  domain  is  speculation,  in  its 
double  manifestation  as  thinking  and  as  trade.     One 
thinks  with  a  will,  whatever  may  come  of  it;  one 
speculates,  however  many  may  suffer  under  our  specu- 
lative undertakings.      But,  when  it  finally  becomes 
serious,  when  even  the  last  remnant  of  religiousness, 
romance,  or  "  humanity  "  is  to  be  done  away,  then  the 
pulse  of  religious  conscience  beats,  and  one  at  least 
professes  humanity.     The  avaricious  speculator  throws 
some  coppers  into  the  poor-box  and  "  does  good,"  the 
bold  thinker  consoles  himself  with  the  fact  that  he  is 
working  for  the  advancement  of  the  human  race  and 
that  his  devastation  "turns  to  the  good"  of  mankind, 
or,  in  another  case,  that  he  is  "  serving  the  idea  " ; 
mankind,  the  idea,  is  to  him  that  something  of  which 
he  must  say,  It  is  more  to  me  than  myself. 

To  this  day  thinking  and  trading  have  been  done 
for — God's  sake.     Those  who  for  six  days  were  tramp- 
ling down  everything  by  their  selfish  aims  sacrificed  on 


406  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  seventh  to  the  Lord;  and  those  who  destroyed 
a  hundred  "  good  causes  "  by  their  reckless  thinking 
still  did  this  in  the  service  of  another  "  good  cause," 
and  had  yet  to  think  of  another — besides  themselves — 
to  whose  good  their  self-indulgence  should  turn:  of 
the  people,  mankind,  and  the  like.     But  this  other 
thing  is  a  being  above  them,  a  higher  or  supreme 
being;  and  therefore  I  say,  they  are  toiling  for  God's 
sake. 

Hence  I  can  also  say  that  the  ultimate  basis  of  their 
actions  is — love.     Not  a  voluntary  love  however,  not 
their  own,  but  a  tributary  love,  or  the  higher  being's 
own  (i.  e.  God's,  who  himself  is  love) ;  in  short,  not  the 
egoistic,  but  the  religious;  a  love  that  springs  from 
their  fancy  that  they  must  discharge  a  tribute  of  love, 
i.  e.  that  they  must  not  be  "  egoists." 

If  we  want  to  deliver  the  world  from  many  kinds  of 
unfreedom,  we  want  this  not  on  its  account  but  on 
ours ;  for,  as  we  are  not  world-liberators  by  profession 
and  out  of  "  love,"  we  only  want  to  win  it  away  from 
others.     We  want  to  make  it  our  own  ;  it  is  not  to  be 
any  longer  owned  as  serf  by  God  (the  church)  nor  by 
the  law  (State),  but  to  be  our  own;  therefore  we  seek 
to  "  win  "  it,  to  "  captivate  "  it,  and,  by  meeting  it 
half-way  and  "  devoting  "  ourselves  to  it  as  to  our- 
selves as  soon  as  it  belongs  to  us,  to  complete  and 
make  superfluous  the  force  that  it  turns  against  us. 
If  the  world  is  ours,  it  no  longer  attempts  any  force 
against  us,  but  only  with  us.     My  selfishness  has  an 
interest  in  the  liberation  of  the  world,  that  it  may 
become — my  property. 

Not  isolation  or  being  alone,  but  society,  is  man's 


THE  OWNER  407 

original  state.     Our  existence  begins  with  the  most 
intimate  conjunction,  as  we  are  already  living  with 
our  mother  before  we  breathe;  when  we  see  the  light 
of  the  world,  we  at  once  lie  on  a  human  being's  breast 
again,  her  love  cradles  us  in  the  lap,  leads  us  in  the 
go-cart,  and  chains  us  to  her  person  with  a  thousand 
ties.     Society  is  our  state  of  nature.     And  this  is  why, 
the  more  we  learn  to  feel  ourselves,  the  connection 
that  was  formerly  most  intimate  becomes  ever  looser 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  original  society  more  unmis- 
takable.    To  have  once  again  for  herself  the  child 
that  once  lay  under  her  heart,  the  mother  must  fetch 
it  from  the  street  and  from  the  midst  of  its  playmates. 
The  child  prefers  the  intercourse  that  it  enters  into 
with  its  fellows  to  the  society  that  it  has  not  entered 
into,  but  only  been  born  in. 

But  the  dissolution  of  society  is  intercourse  or  union. 
A  society  does  assuredly  arise  by  union  too,  but  only 
as  a  fixed  idea  arises  by  a  thought, — to  wit,  by  the 
vanishing  of  the  energy  of  the  thought  (the  thinking 
itself,  this  restless  taking  back  all  thoughts  that  make 
themselves  fast)  from  the  thought.     If  a  union  *  has 
crystallized  into  a  society,  it  has  ceased  to  be  a  coali- 
tion; j-  for  coalition  is  an  incessant  self-uniting;  it  has 
become  a  unitedness,  come  to  a  standstill,  degenerated 
into  a  fixity;  it  is — dead  as  a  union,  it  is  the  corpse  of 
the  union  or  the  coalition,  i.  e.  it  is — society,  com- 
munity.    A  striking  example  of  this  kind  is  furnished 
by  the  party. 

That  a  society  (e.  g.  the  society  of  the  State)  di- 


*  [  Feretnl  t  [  Verein igung] 


408  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

minishes  my  liberty  offends  me  little.  Why,  I  have  to 
let  my  liberty  be  limited  by  all  sorts  of  powers  and  by 
every  one  who  is  stronger;  nay,  by  every  fellow-man; 

and,  were  I  the  autocrat  of  all  the  R ,  I  yet 

should  not  enjoy  absolute  liberty.     But  ownness  I  will 
not  have  taken  from  me.     And  ownness  is  precisely 
what  every  society  has  designs  on,  precisely  what  is  to 
succumb  to  its  power.    • 

A  society  which  I  join  does  indeed  take  from  me 
many  liberties,  but  in  return  it  affords  me  other  liber- 
ties ;  neither  does  it  matter  if  I  myself  deprive  my- 
self of  this  and  that  liberty  (e.  g.  by  any  contract). 
On  the  other  hand,  I  want  to  hold,  jealously  to  my 
ownness.     Every  community  has  the  propensity, 
stronger  or  weaker  according  to  the  fulness  of  its 
power,  to  become  an  authority  to  its  members  and  to 
set  limits  for  them :  it  asks,  and  must  ask,  for  a  "  sub- 
ject's limited  understanding  ";  it  asks  that  those  who 
belong  to  it  be  subject  to  it,  be  its  "subjects'";  it  exists 
only  by  subjection.     In  this  a  certain  tolerance  need 
by  no  means  be  excluded  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  society 
will  welcome  improvements,  corrections,  and  blame,  so 
far  as  such  are  calculated  for  its  gain:  but  the  blame 
must  be  "  well-meaning,"  it  may  not  be  "  insolent  and 
disrespectful," — in  other  words,  one  must  leave  unin- 
jured, and  hold  sacred,  the  substance  of  the  society. 
The  society  demands  that  those  who  belong  to  it  shall 
not  go  beyond  it  and  exalt  themselves,  but  remain 
"  within  the  bounds  of  legality,"  i.  e.  allow  themselves 
only  so  much  as  the  society  and  its  law  allow  them. 

There  is  a  difference  whether  my  liberty  or  my  own 
ness  is  limited  by  a  society.     If  the  former  only  is  the 


THE  OWNER  409 

case,  it  is  a  coalition,  an  agreement,  a  union ;  but,  if 
ruin  is  threatened  to  ownness,  it  is  a  power  of  itself,  a 
power  above  me,  a  thing  unattainable  by  me,  which  I 
can  indeed  admire,  adore,  reverence,  respect,  but  can- 
not subdue  and  consume,  and  that  for  the  reason  that 
I  am  resigned.     It  exists  by  my  resignation,  my  self- 
renunciation,  my  spiritlessness,*  called — HUMILITY.! 
My  humility  makes  its  courage,  :£  my  submissiveness 
gives  it  its  dominion. 

But  in  reference  to  liberty  State  and  union  are  sub- 
ject to  no  essential  difference.     The  latter  can  just  as 
little  come  into  existence,  or  continue  in  existence, 
without  liberty's  being  limited  in  all  sorts  of  ways,  as 
the  State  is  compatible  with  unmeasured  liberty. 
Limitation  of  liberty  is  inevitable  everywhere,  for  one 
cannot  get  rid  of  everything;  one  cannot  fly  like  a 
bird  merely  because  one  would  like  to  fly  so,  for  one 
does  not  get  free  from  his  own  weight;  one  cannot 
live  under  water  as  long  as  he  likes,  like  a  fish,  be- 
cause one  cannot  do  without  air  and  cannot  get  free 
from  this  indispensable  necessity;  and  the  like.     As 
religion,  and  most  decidedly  Christianity,  tormented 
man  with  the  demand  to  realize  the  unnatural  and 
self-contradictory,  so  it  is  to  be  looked  upon  only  as 
the  true  logical  outcome  of  that  religious  overstrain- 
ing and  overwroughtness  that  finally  liberty  itself,  ab- 
solute liberty,  was  exalted  into  an  ideal,  and  thus  the 
nonsense  of  the  impossible  had  to  come  glaringly  to 
the  light. — The  union  will  assuredly  offer  a  greater 
measure  of  liberty,  as  well  as  (and  especially  because 

*[Mnlhlosigkcit]  t  [Demuth]  i[Muth] 


410  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

by  it  one  escapes  all  the  coercion  peculiar  to  State  and 
society  life)  admit  of  being  considered  as  "  a  new  lib- 
erty " ;  but  nevertheless  it  will  still  contain  enough  of 
unfreedom  and  involuntariness.     For  its  object  is  not 
this — liberty  (which  on  the  contrary  it  sacrifices  to 
ownness),  but  only  ownness.     Referred  to  this,  the  dif- 
ference between  State  and  union  is  great  enough. 
The  former  is  an  enemy  and  murderer  of  ownness,  the 
latter  a  son  and  co-worker  of  it;  the  former  a  spirit 
that  would  be  adored  in  spirit  and  in  truth,  the  latter 
my  work,  my  product;  the  State  is  the  lord  of  my 
spirit,  who  demands  faith  and  prescribes  to  me  articles 
of  faith,  the  creed  of  legality ;  it  exerts  moral  influence, 
dominates  my  spirit,  drives  away  my  ego  to  put  itself 
in  its  place  as  "  my  true  ego, " — in  short,  the  State  is 
sacred,  and  as  against  me,  the  individual  man,  it  is  the 
true  man,  the  spirit,  the  ghost;  but  the  union  is  my 
own  creation,  my  creature,  not  sacred,  not  a  spiritual 
power  above  my  spirit,  as  little  as  any  association  of 
whatever  sort.     As  I  am  not  willing  to  be  a  slave 
of  my  maxims,  but  lay  them  bare  to  my  continual 
criticism  without  any  warrant,  and  admit  no  bail 
at  all  for  their  persistence,  so  still  less  do  I  obligate 
myself  to  the  union  for  my  future  and  pledge  my  soul 
to  it,  as  is  said  to  be  done  with  the  devil  and  is  really 
the  case  with  the  State  and  all  spiritual  authority;  but 
I  am  and  remain  more  to  myself  than  State,  Church, 
God,  and  the  like;  consequently  infinitely  more  than 
the  union  too. 

That  society  which  Communism  wants  to  found 
seems  to  stand  nearest  to  coalition.      For  it  is  to  aim 
at  the  "  welfare  of  all,"  oh,  yes,  of  all,  cries  Weitling 


THE  OWNER  411 

innumerable  times,  of  all!      That  does  really  look  as  if 
in  it  no  one  needed  to  take  a  back  seat.     But  what 
then  will  this  welfare  be?      Have  all  one  and  the  same 
welfare,  are  all  equally  well  off  with  one  and  the  same 
thing?      If  that  be  so,  the  question  is  of  the  "  true 
welfare."     Do  we  not  with  this  come  right  to  the  point 
where  religion  begins  its  dominion  of  violence? 
Christianity  says,  Look  not  on  earthly  toys,  but  seek 
your  true  welfare,  become — pious  Christians;  being 
Christians  is  the  true  welfare.     It  is  the  true  welfare  of 
"  all,"  because  it  is  the  welfare  of  Man  as  such  (this 
spook).     Now,  the  welfare  of  all  is  surely  to  be  your 
and  my  welfare  too?      But,  if  you  and  I  do  not 
look  upon  that  welfare  as  our  welfare,  will  care  then 
be  taken  for  that  in  which  we  feel  well?      On  the  con- 
trary, society  has  decreed  a  welfare  as  the  "  true 
welfare  " ;  and,  if  this  welfare  were  called  e.  g.  "  enjoy- 
ment honestly  worked  for,"  but  you  preferred  enjoy- 
able laziness,  enjoyment  without  work,  then  society, 
which  cares  for  the  "  welfare  of  all,"  would  wisely 
avoid  caring  for  that  in  which  you  are  well  off. 
Communism,  in  proclaiming  the  welfare  of  all,  annuls 
outright  the  well-being  of  those  who  hitherto  lived  on 
their  income  from  investments  and  apparently  felt 
better  in  that  than  in  the  prospect  of  Weitling's  strict 
hours  of  labor.     Hence  the  latter  asserts  that  with  the 
welfare  of  thousands  the  welfare  of  millions  cannot 
exist,  and  the  former  must  give  up  their  special  welfare 
"  for  the  sake  of  the  general  welfare."     No,  let  people 
not  be  summoned  to  sacrifice  their  special  welfare  for 
the  general,  for  this  Christian  admonition  will  not 
carry  you  through;  they  will  better  understand  the 


412  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

opposite  admonition,  not  to  let  their  own  welfare  be 
snatched  from  them  by  anybody,  but  to  put  it  on  a 
permanent  foundation.     Then  they  are  of  themselves 
led  to  the  point  that  they  care  best  for  their  welfare 
if  they  unite  with  others  for  this  purpose,  i.  e.  "  sacri- 
fice a  part  of  their  liberty,"  yet  not  to  the  welfare 
of  others,  but  to  their  own.     An  appeal  to  men's 
self-sacrificing  disposition  and  self-renouncing  love 
ought  at  last  to  have  lost  its  seductive  plausibility 
when,  after  an  activity  of  thousands  of  years,  it  has 
left  nothing  behind  but  the — misere  of  to-day.     Why 
then  still  fruitlessly  expect  self-sacrifice  to  bring  us 
better  times?   why  not  rather  hope  for  them  from 
usurpation  ?     Salvation  comes  no  longer  from  the 
giver,  the  bestower,  the  loving  one,  but  from  the  taker, 
the  appropriator  (usurper),  the  owner.     Communism, 
and,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  egoism-reviling 
humanism,  still  count  on  love. 

If  community  is  once  a  need  of  man,  and  he  finds 
himself  furthered  by  it  in  his  aims,  then  very  soon, 
because  it  has  become  his  principle,  it  prescribes  to 
him  its  laws  too,  the  laws  of — society.     The  principle 
of  men  exalts  itself  into  a  sovereign  power  over  them, 
becomes  their  supreme  essence,  their  God,  and,  as 
such, — lawgiver.      Communism  gives  this  principle  the 
strictest  effect,  and  Christianity  is  the  religion  of  so- 
ciety, for,  as  Feuerbach  rightly  says  although  he  does 
not  mean  it  rightly,  love  is  the  essence  of  man;  i.  e. 
the  essence  of  society  or  of  societary  (Communistic) 
man,     All  religion  is  a  cult  of  society,  this  principle 
by  which  societary  (cultivated)  man  is  dominated; 
neither  is  any  god  an  ego's  exclusive  god,  but  always  a 


THE  OWNER  413 

society's  or  community's,  be  it  of  the  society  "family'7 
(Lar,  Penates)  or  of  a  "people"  ("national  god")  or 
of  "  all  men  "  ("he  is  a  Father  of  all  men  "). 

Consequently  one  has  a  prospect  of  extirpating  re- 
ligion down  to  the  ground  only  when  one  antiquates 
society  and  everything  that  flows  from  this  principle. 
But  it  is  precisely  in  Communism  that  this  principle 
seeks  to  culminate,  as  in  it  everything  is  to  become 
common  for  the  establishment  of — "  equality."     If  this 
"equality"  is  won,  "liberty"  too  is  not  lacking.     But 
whose  liberty?     Society's!     Society  is  then  all  in  all, 
and  men  are  only  "  for  each  other."     It  would  be 
the  glory  of  the — love-State. 

But  I  would  rather  be  referred  to  men's  selfishness 
than  to  their  "  kindnesses,"*  their  mercy,  pity,  etc. 
The  former  demands  reciprocity  (as  thou  to  me,  so  I  to 
thee),  does  nothing  "gratis,"  and  may  be  won  and — 
bought.     But  with  what  shall  I  obtain  the  kindness? 
It  is  a  matter  of  chance  whether  I  am  at  the  time  hav- 
ing to  do  with  a  "  loving  "  person.     The  affectionate 
one's  service  can  be  had  only  by — begging,  be  it  by 
my  lamentable  appearance,  by  my  need  of  help,  my 
misery,  my — suffering.     What  can  I  offer  him  for  his 
assistance?      Nothing!      I  must  accept  it  as  a — pres- 
ent.     Love  is  unpayable,  or  rather,  love  can  assuredly 
be  paid  for,  but  only  by  counter-love  ("  One  good  turn 
deserves  another  ").     What  paltriness  and  beggarlinesS 
does  it  not  take  to  accept  gifts  year  in  and  year  out 
without  service  in  return,  as  they  are  regularly  col- 
lected e.  g.  from  the  poor  day-laborer?      What  can 

*  [Literally,  "  love-sen-ices."] 


414  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  receiver  do  for  him  and  his  donated  pennies,  in 
which  his  wealth  consists?     The  day-laborer  would 
really  have  more  enjoyment  if  the  receiver  with  his 
laws,  his  institutions,  etc.,  all  of  which  the  day-laborer 
has  to  pay  for  though,  did  not  exist  at  all.     And 
yet,  with  it  all,  the  poor  wight  loves  his  master. 

No,  community,  as  the  "  goal "  of  history  hitherto, 
is  impossible.      Let  us  rather  renounce  every  hypocrisy 
of  community,  and  recognize  that,  if  we  are  equal  as 
men,  we  are  not  equal  for  the  very  reason  that  we  are 
not  men.     We  are  equal  only  in  thoughts,  only  when 
"  we  "  are  thought,  not  as  we  really  and  bodily  are. 
I  am  ego,  and  you  are  ego:  but  I  am  not  this  thought- 
of  ego;  this  ego  in  which  we  are  all  equal  is  only  my 
thought.     I  am  man,  and  you  are  man:  but  "  man  " 
is  only  a  thought,  a  generality;  neither  you  nor  I 
are  speakable,  we  are  unutterable,  because  only 
thoughts  are  speakable  and  consist  in  speaking. 

Let  us  therefore  not  aspire  to  community,  but  to 
one-sidedness.      Let  us  not  seek  the  most  comprehen- 
sive commune,  "human  society,"  but  let  us  seek  in 
others  only  means  and  organs  which  we  may  use  as 
our  property!      As  we  do  not  see  our  equals  in  the 
tree,  the  beast,  so  the  presupposition  that  others  are 
our  equals  springs  from  a  hypocrisy.     No  one  is  my 
equal,  but  I  regard  him,  equally  with  all  other  beings, 
as  my  property.     In  opposition  to  this  I  am  told  that 
I  should  be  a  man  among  "fellow-men  "  ("  Juden- 
frage"  p.  60);  I  should  "respect"  the  fellow-man 
in  them.     For  me  no  one  is  a  person  to  be  resf 
not  even  the  fellow-man,  but  solely,  like  other  being 
an  object  in  which  I  take  an  interest  or  else  do  not, 


THE  OWNER  415 

an  interesting  or  uninteresting  object,  a  usable  or 
unusable  person. 

And,  if  I  can  use  him,  I  doubtless  come  to  an 
understanding  and  make  myself  at  one  with  him,  in 
order,  by  the  agreement,  to  strengthen  my  power,  and 
by  combined  force  to  accomplish  more  than  individual 
force  could  effect.     In  this  combination  I  see  nothing 
whatever  but  a  multiplication  of  my  force,  and  I  re- 
tain it  only  so  long  as  it  is  my  multiplied  force.     But 
thus  it  is  a — union. 

Neither  a  natural  ligature  nor  a  spiritual  one  holds 
the  union  together,  and  it  is  not  a  natural,  not  a 
spiritual  league.     It  is  not  brought  about  by  one 
blood,  not  by  one  faith  (spirit).     In  a  natural  league — 
like  a  family,  a  tribe,  a  nation,  yes,  mankind — the  in- 
dividuals have  only  the  value  of  specimens  of  the  same 
species  or  genus;  in  a  spiritual  league — like  a  com- 
mune, a  church — the  individual  signifies  only  a  mem- 
ber of  the  same  spirit;  what  you  are  in  both  cases  as  a 
unique  person  must  be — suppressed.     Only  in  the 
union  can  you  assert  yourself  as  unique,  because  the 
union  does  not  possess  you,  but  you  possess  it  or  make 
it  of  use  to  you. 

Property  is  recognized  in  the  union,  and  only  in  the 
union,  because  one  no  longer  holds  what  is  his  as  a 
fief  from  any  being.     The  Communists  are  only  con- 
sistently carrying  further  what  had  already  been  long 
present  during  religious  evolution,  and  especially  in 
the  State ;  to  wit,  propertylessness,  i.  e.  the  feudal 
system. 

The  State  exerts  itself  to  tame  the  desirous  man  ;  in 
other  words,  it  seeks  to  direct  his  desire  to  it  alone, 


416  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

and  to  content  that  desire  with  what  it  offers.     To  sate 
the  desire  for  the  desirous  man's  sake  does  not  come 
into  its  mind:  on  the  contrary,  it  stigmatizes  as  an 
"egoistic  man"  the  man  who  breathes  out  unbridled 
desire,  and  the  "  egoistic  man  "  is  its  enemy.     He  is 
this  for  it  because  the  capacity  to  agree  with  him  is 
wanting  to  the  State;  the  egoist  is  precisely  what  it 
cannot  "  comprehend."     Since  the  State  (as  nothing 
else  is  possible)  has  to  do  only  for  itself,  it  does  not 
take  care  for  my  needs,  but  takes  care  only  of  how  it 
shall  make  away  with  me,  i.  e.  make  out  of  me  another 
ego,  a  good  citizen.     It  takes  measures  for  the  "  im- 
provement of  morals." — And  with  what  does  it  win  in- 
dividuals for  itself  ?     With  itself,  i.  e.  with  what  is  the 
State's,  with  State  property.     It  will  be  unremittingly 
active  in  making  all  participants  in  its  "goods,"  pro- 
viding all  with  the  "good  things  of  culture":  it  pre- 
sents them  its  education,  opens  to  them  the  access  to 
its  institutions  of  culture,  capacitates  them  to  come  to 
property  (i.  e.  to  a  fief)  in  the  way  of  industry,  etc. 
For  all  these  Jiefs  it  demands  only  the  just  rent  of  con- 
tinual thanks.     But  the  "  unthankful "  forget  to  'pay 
these  thanks. — Now,  neither  can  "society"  do  essen- 
tially otherwise  than  the  State. 

You  bring  into  a  union  your  whole  power,  your 
competence,  and  make  yourself  count ;  in  a  society  you 
are  employed,  with  your  working  power;  in  the  former 
you  live  egoistically,  in  the  latter  humanly,  i.  e.  re- 
ligiously, as  a  "  member  in  the  body  of  this  Lord"; 
to  a  society  you  owe  what  you  have,  and  are  in  duty 
bound  to  it,  are — possessed  by  "social  duties";  a 
union  you  utilize,  and  give  it  up  undutifully  and  un- 


THE  OWNER  417 

faithfully  when  you  see  no  way  to  use  it  further.     If  a 
society  is  more  than  you,  then  it  is  more  to  you  than 
yourself;  a  union  is  only  your  instrument,  or  the 
sword  with  which  you  sharpen  and  increase  your 
natural  force;  the  union  exists  for  you  and  through 
you,  the  society  conversely  lays  claim  to  you  for  itself 
and  exists  even  without  you;  in  short,  the  society  is 
sacred,  the  union  your  own;  the  society  consumes  you, 
you  consume  the  union. 

Nevertheless  people  will  not  be  backward  with  the 
objection  that  the  agreement  which  has  been  concluded 
may  again  become  burdensome  to  us  and  limit  our 
freedom ;  they  will  say,  we  too  would  at  last  come  to 
this,  that  "  every  one  must  sacrifice  a  part  of  his  free- 
dom for  the  sake  of  the  generality."      But  the  sacrifice 
would  not  be  made  for  the  "generality's"  sake  a  bit, 
as  little  as  I  concluded  the  agreement  for  the  "  gen- 
erality's" or  even,  for  any  other  man's  sake;  rather  I 
came  into  it  only  for  the  sake  of  my  own  benefit,  from 
selfishness.*     But,  as  regards  the  sacrificing,  surely 
I  "  sacrifice  "  only  that  which  does  not  stand  in  my 
power,  i.  e.  I  "  sacrifice  "  nothing  at  all. 

To  come  back  to  property,  the  lord  is  proprietor. 
Choose  then  whether  you  want  to  be  lord,  or  whether 
society  shall  be !      On  this  depends  whether  you  are  to 
be  an  owner  or  a  ragamuffin !     The  egoist  is  owner, 
the  Socialist  a  ragamuffin.      But  ragamuffinism  or 
propertylessness  is  the  sense  of  feudalism,  of  the  feudal 
system,  which  since  the  last  century  has  only  changed 
its  overlord,  putting  "  Man  "  in  the  place  of  God,  and 

*  [Literally,  "own-benefit."] 


418  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

accepting  as  a  fief  from  Man  what  had  before  been  a 
fief  from  the  grace  of  God.     That  the  ragamuffinism 
of  Communism  is  carried  out  by  the  humane  principle 
into  the  absolute  or  most  ragamuffinly  ragamuffinism 
has  been  shown  above;  but  at  the  same  time  also,  how 
ragamuffinism  can  only  thus  swing  around  into  own- 
ness.     The  old  feudal  system  was  so  thoroughly 
trampled  into  the  ground  in  the  Revolution  that 
since  then  all  reactionary  craft  has  remained  fruitless, 
and  will  always  remain  fruitless,  because  the  dead  is — 
dead;  but  the  resurrection  too  had  to  prove  itself  a 
truth  in  Christian  history,  and  has  so  proved  itself: 
for  in  another  world  feudalism  is  risen  again  with  a 
glorified  body,  the  new  feudalism  under  the  suzer- 
ainty of  "  Man." 

Christianity  is  not  annihilated,  but  the  faithful  are 
right  in  having  hitherto  trustfully  assumed  of  every 
combat  against  it  that  this  could  serve  only  for  the 
purgation  and  confirmation  of  Christianity ;  for  it  has 
really  only  been  glorified,  and  "  Christianity  exposed  " 
is  the — human  Christianity.     We  are  still  living 
entirely  in  the  Christian  age,  and  the  very  ones  who 
feel  worst  about  it  are  the  most  zealously  contributing 
to  "  complete  "  it.     The  more  human,  the  dearer 
has  feudalism  become  to  us;  for  we  the  less  believe 
that  it  still  is  feudalism,  we  take  it  the  more  con- 
fidently for  ownness  and  think  we  have  found  what  is 
"  most  absolutely  our  own  "  when  we  discover  "  the 
human." 

Liberalism  wants  to  give  me  what  is  mine,  but  it 
thinks  to  procure  it  for  me  not  under  the  title  of 
mine,  but  under  that  of  the  "  human."     As  if  it  were 


THE  OWNER  419 

attainable  under  this  mask!      The  rights  of  man,  the 
precious  work  of  the  Revolution,  have  the  meaning 
that  the  Man  in  me  entitles  *  me  to  this  and  that;  I 
as  individual,  i.  e.  as  this  man,  am  not  entitled,  but 
Man  has  the  right  and  entitles  me.     Hence  as  man  I 
may  well  be  entitled;  but,  as  I  am  more  than  man,  to 
wit,  a  special  man,  it  may  be  refused  to  this  very  me, 
the  special  one.      If  on  the  other  hand  you  insist  on 
the  value  of  your  gifts,  keep  up  their  price,  do  not 
let  yourselves  be  forced  to  sell  out  below  price,  do  not 
let  yourselves  be  talked  into  the  idea  that  your  ware  is 
not  worth  its  price,  do  not  make  yourselves  ridiculous 
by  a  "  ridiculous  price,"  but  imitate  the  brave  man 
who  says,  I  will  sell  my  life  (property)  dear,  the 
enemy  shall  not  have  it  at  a  cheap  bargain ;  then  you 
have  recognized  the  reverse  of  Communism  as  the  cor- 
rect thing,  and  the  word  then  is  not  "  Give  up  your 
property!  "  but  "  Get  the  value  out  of  your  property!  " 

Over  the  portal  of  our  time  stands  not  that  "  Know 
thyself"  of  Apollo,  but  a  "  Get  the  value  out  of 
thyself!" 

Proudhon  calls  property  "robbery"  (le  vol}. 
But  alien  property — and  he  is  talking  of  this  alone — 
is  not  less  existent  by  renunciation,  cession,  and  hu- 
mility; it  is  a  present.     Why  so  sentimentally  call 
for  compassion  as  a  poor  victim  of  robbery,  when  one 
is  just  a  foolish,  cowardly  giver  of  presents?     Why 
here  again  put  the  fault  on  others  as  if  they  were 
robbing  us,  while  we  ourselves  do  bear  the  fault  in 
leaving  the  others  unrobbed  ?     The  poor  are  to 

*  [Literally,  furnishes  me  with  a  right.] 


420 


THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


blame  for  there  being  rich  men. 

Universally,  no  one  grows  indignant  at  his,  but  at 
alien  property.     They  do  not  in  truth  attack  property 
but  the  alienation  of  property.     They  want  to  be  able 
to  call  more,  not  less,  theirs;  they  want  to  call  every- 
thing theirs.     They  are  fighting,  therefore,  against 
alienness,  or,  to  form  a  word  similar  to  property, 
against  alienty.     And  how  do  they  help  themselves 
therein  ?      Instead  of  transforming  the  alien  into 
own,  they  play  impartial  and  ask  only  that  all  prop- 
erty be  left  to  a  third  party  (e.  g.  human  society). 
They  revendicate  the  alien  not  in  their  own  name  but 
in  a  third  party's.     Now  the  "  egoistic  "  coloring  is 
wiped  off,  and  everything  is  so  clean  and — human! 

Property lessness  or  ragamuffinism,  this  then  is  the 
"essence  of  Christianity,"  as  it  is  the  essence  of  all 
religiousness  (i.  e.  godliness,  morality,  humanity),  and 
only  announced  itself  most  clearly,  and,  as  glad  tid- 
ings, became  a  gospel  capable  of  development,  in  the 
"  absolute  religion."     We  have  before  us  the  most 
striking  development  in  the  present  fight  against 
property,  a  fight  which  is  to  bring  "  Man"  to  victory 
and  make  propertylessness  complete:  victorious  hu- 
manity is  the  victory  of — Christianity.     But  the 
"  Christianity  exposed  "  thus  is  feudalism  completed, 
the  most  all-embracing  feudal  system,  i.  e.  perfect 
ragamuffinism. 

Once  more  then,  doubtless,  a  "  revolution  "  against 
the  feudal  system? — 

Revolution  and  insurrection  must  not  be  looked 
upon  as  synonymous.     The  former  consists  in  an  o\ 
turning  of  conditions,  of  the  established  condition  or 


THE  OWNER  421 

status,  the  State  or  society,  and  is  accordingly  a  politi- 
cal or  social  act;  the  latter  has  indeed  for  its  unavoid- 
able consequence  a  transformation  of  circumstances, 
yet  does  not  start  from  it  but  from  men's  discontent 
with  themselves,  is  not  an  armed  rising,  but  a  rising 
of  individuals,  a  getting  up,  without  regard  to  the 
arrangements  that  spring  from  it.     The  Revolution 
aimed  at  new  arrangements;  insurrection  leads  us  no 
longer  to  let  ourselves  be  arranged,  but  to  arrange 
ourselves,  and  sets  no  glittering  hopes  on  "  institu- 
tions."     It  is  not  a  fight  against  the  established, 
since,  if  it  prospers,  the  established  collapses  of  itself; 
it  is  only  a  working  forth  of  me  out  of  the  established. 
If  I  leave  the  established,  it  is  dead  and  passes  into 
decay.     Now,  as  my  object  is  not  the  overthrow  of  an 
established  order  but  my  elevation  above  it,  my  pur- 
pose and  deed  are  not  a  political  or  social  but  (as  di- 
rected toward  myself  and  my  ownness  alone)  an  egois- 
tic purpose  and  deed. 

The  revolution  commands  one  to  make  arrange- 
ments, the  insurrection  *  demands  that  he  rise  or  ex- 
alt himself.^     What  constitution  was  to  be  chosen, 
this  question  busied  the  revolutionary  heads,  and  the 
whole  political  period  foams  with  constitutional  fights 
and  constitutional  questions,  as  the  social  talents  too 
were  uncommonly  inventive  in  societary  arrangement? 
(phalansteries  and  the  like).     The  insurgent  $  strives 
to  become  constitutionless. 

*  [Empoerung]  t  [sich  auf-  oder  emporzurichlen  ] 

t  To  secure  myself  against  a  criminal  charge  I  superfluously  make  the 
express  remark  that  I  choose  the  word  "  insurrection  "  on  account  of  its 
etymological  sense,  and  therefore  am  not  using  it  in  the  limited  sense  which 
is  disallowed  by  the  penal  code. 


422  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

While,  to  get  greater  clearness,  I  am  thinking  up  a 
comparison,  the  founding  of  Christianity  comes  unex- 
pectedly into  my  mind.     On  the  liberal  side  it  is 
noted  as  a  bad  point  in  the  first  Christians  that  they 
preached  obedience  to  the  established  heathen  civil 
order,  enjoined  recognition  of  the  heathen  authorities, 
and  confidently  delivered  a  command,  "  Give  to  the 
emperor  that  which  is  the  emperor's."     Yet  how  much 
disturbance  arose  at  the  same  time  against  the  Roman 
supremacy,  how  mutinous  did  the  Jews  and  even  the 
Romans  show  themselves  against  their  own  temporal 
government!  in  short,  how  popular  was  "political 
discontent"!      Those  Christians  would  hear  nothing 
of  it;  would  not  side  with  the  "  liberal  tendencies." 
The  time  was  politically  so  agitated  that,  as  is  said  in 
the  gospels,  people  thought  they  could  not  accuse  the 
founder  of  Christianity  more  successfully  than  if  they 
arraigned  him  for  "  political  intrigue,"  and  yet  the 
same  gospels  report  that  he  was  precisely  the  one  who 
took  least  part  in  these  political  doings.     But  why 
was  he  not  a  revolutionist,  not  a  demagogue,  as  the 
Jews  would  gladly  have  seen  him?  why  was  he  not  a 
liberal?      Because  he  expected  no  salvation  from  a 
change  of  conditions,  and  this  whole  business  was  in- 
different to  him.     He  was  not  a  revolutionist  like  e.  g. 
Caesar,  but  an  insurgent;  not  a  State-overturner, 
but  one  who  straightened  himself  up.     That  was 
why  it  was  for  him  only  a  matter  of  "  Be  ye  wise 
as  serpents,"  which  expresses  the  same  sense  as,  in  the 
special  case,  that  "  Give  to  the  emperor  that  which  is 
the  emperor's  " ;  for  he  was  not  carrying  on  any  liberal 
or  political  fight  against  the  established  authorities, 


THE  OWNER  423 

but  wanted  to  walk  his  own  way,  untroubled  about, 
and  undisturbed  by,  these  authorities.     Not  less  indif- 
ferent to  him  than  the  government  were  its  enemies, 
for  neither  understood  what  he  wanted,  and  he  had 
only  to  keep  them  off  from  him  with  the  wisdom  of 
the  serpent.     But,  even  though  not  a  ringleader  of 
popular  mutiny,  not  a  demagogue  or  revolutionist,  he 
(and  every  one  of  the  ancient  Christians)  was  so  much 
the  more  an  insurgent,  who  lifted  himself  above  every- 
thing that  seemed  sublime  to  the  government  and  its 
opponents,  and  absolved  himself  from  everything 
that  they  remained  bound  to,  and  who  at  the  same 
time  cut  off  the  sources  of  life  of  the  whole  heathen 
world,  with  which  the  established  State  must  wither 
away  as  a  matter  of  course ;  precisely  because  he  put 
from  him  the  upsetting  of  the  established,  he  was  its 
deadly  enemy  and  real  annihilator ;  for  he  walled  it 
in,  confidently  and  recklessly  carrying  up  the  building 
of  his  temple  over  it,  without  heeding  the  pains  of  ijhe 
immured. 

Now,  as  it  happened  to  the  Jbe«then  order  of  the 
world,  will  the  Christian  order  fare  likewise?      A 
revolution  certainly  does  not  bring  on  the  end  if  an 
insurrection  is  not  consummated  first! 

My  intercourse  with  the  world,  what  does  it  aim  at? 
I  want  to  have  the  enjoyment  of  it,  therefore  it  must 
be  my  property,  and  therefore  I  want  to  win  it.      I  do 
not  want  the  liberty  of  men,  nor  their  equality;   I 
want  only  my  power  over  them,  I  want  to  make  them 
my  property,  i.  e.  material  for  enjoyment.     And,  if  I 
do  not  succeed  in  that,  well,  then  I  call  even  the 
power  over  life  and  death,  which  Church  and  State 


424  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

reserved  to  themselves, — mine.      Brand  that  officer's 
widow  who,  in  the  flight  in  Russia,  after  her  leg  has 
been  shot  away,  takes  the  garter  from  it,  strangles  h 
child  therewith,  and  then  bleeds  to  death  alongside  th 
corpse, — brand  the  memory  of  the — infanticide. 
Who  knows,  if  this  child  had  remained  alive,  how 
much  it  might  have  "  been  of  use  to  the  world  " ! 
The  mother  murdered  it  because  she  wanted  to  die 
satisfied  and  at  rest.     Perhaps  this  case  still  appeals  t 
your  sentimentality,  and  you  do  not  know  how  to 
read  put  of  it  anything  further.     Be  it  so;  I  on  my 
part  use  it  as  an  example  for  this,  that  my  satisfactior 
decides  about  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  I  do  not 
renounce,  from  any  access  of  humility,  even  the  powei 
over  life  and  death. 

As  regards  "social  duties  "  in  general,  another  doe, 
not  give  me  my  position  toward  others,  therefore 
neither  God  nor  humanity  prescribes  to  me  my  rela- 
tion to  men,  but  I  give  myself  this  position.     This  is 
more  strikingly  said  thus:  I  have  no  duty  to  others, 
as  I  have  a  duty  even  to  myself  (e.  g.  that  of  self- 
preservation,  and  therefore  not  suicide)  only  so  long 
as  I  distinguish  myself  from  myself  (my  immortal 
soul  from  my  earthly  existence,  etc.). 

I  no  longer  humble  myself  before  any  power,  and  I 
recognize  that  all  powers  are  only  my  power,  which  I 
have  to  subject  at  once  when  they  threaten  to  become 
a  power  against  or  above  me;  each  of  them  must  be 
only  one  of  my  means  to  carry  my  point,  as  a  hound 
is  our  power  against  game,  but  is  killed  by  us  if  it 
should  fall  upon  us  ourselves.     All  powers  that  domi- 
nate me  I  then  reduce  to  serving  me.     The  idols  exisl 


THE  OWNER  425 

hrough  me;   I  need  only  refrain  from  creating  them 
mew,  then  they  exist  no  longer:  "higher  powers" 
•xist  only  through  my  exalting  them  and  abasing 
nyself. 

Consequently  my  relation  to  the  world  is  this:   I  no 
onger  do  anything  for  it  "  for  God's  sake,"  I  do  noth- 
ng  "  for  man's  sake,"  but  what  I  do  I  do  "  for  my 
>ake."     Thus  alone  does  the  world  satisfy  me,  while  it 
s  characteristic  of  the  religious  standpoint,  in  which 

include  the  moral  and  humane  also,  that  from  it 
everything  remains  a.  pious  wish  (pium  desiderium) , 
.  e.  an  other-world  matter,  something  unattained." 
fhus  the  general  salvation  of  men,  the  moral  world  of 

general  love,  eternal  peace,  the  cessation  of  egoism, 
itc.     "  Nothing  in  this  world  is  perfect."     With  this 
niserable  phrase  the  good  part  from  it,  and  take 
light  into  their  closet  to  God,  or  into  their  proud 

self-consciousness."      But  we  remain  in  this  "  imper- 
ect "  world,  because  even  so  we  can  use  it  for  our — 
elf-enjoyment. 

My  intercourse  with  the  world  consists  in  my  enjoy- 
ng  it,  and  so  consuming  it  for  my  self-enjoyment. 
Intercourse  is  the  etijoyinent  oftlie  world,  and  belongs 
o  my — self-enjoyment. 


III.— MY  SELF-ENJOYMENT 

We  stand  at  the  boundary  of  a  period.     The  world 
hitherto  took  thought  for  nothing  but  the  gain  of  life, 
took  care  for — life.     For  whether  all  activity  is  put 
on  the  stretch  for  the  life  of  this  world  or  of  the  other, 
for  the  temporal  or  for  the  eternal,  whether  one  hank- 


426  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ers  for  "  daily  bread  "  ("  Give  us  our  daily  bread  ")    I 
or  for  "  holy  bread  "  ("  the  true  bread  from  heaven  " ; 
"the  bread  of  God,  that  comes  from  heaven  and  gives 
life  to  the  world";  "the  bread  of  life,"  John  6), 
whether  one  takes  care  for  "  dear  life  "  or  for  "  life  to 
eternity," — this  does  not  change  the  object  of  the 
strain  and  care,  which  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other 
shows  itself  to  be  life.      Do  the  modern  tendencies  an- 
nounce themselves  otherwise?      People  now  want  no- 
body to  be  embarrassed  for  the  most  indispensable 
necessaries  of  life,  but  want  every  one  to  feel  secure  as 
to  these;  and  on 'the  other  hand  they  teach  that  man 
has  this  life  to  attend  to  and  the  real  world  to  adapt 
himself  to,  without  vain  care  for  another. 

Let  us  take  up  the  same  thing  from  another  side.     ' 
When  one  is  anxious  only  to  live,  he  easily,  in  this  so- 
licitude, forgets  the  enjoyment  of  life.      If  his  only  con- 
cern is  for  life,  and  he  thinks  "  if  I  only  have  my  dear 
life,"  he  does  not  apply  his  full  strength  to  using, 
i.  e.  enjoying,  life.      But  how  does  one  use  life?      In 
using  it  up,  like  the  candle,  which  one  uses  in  burn- 
ing it  up.     One  uses  life,  and  consequently  himself  the 
living  one,  in  consuming  it  and  himself.     Enjoyment 
of  life  is  using  life  up. 

Now — we  are  in  search  of  the  enjoyment  of  life ! 
And  what  did  the  religious  world  do?      It  went  in 
search  of  life.     "  Wherein  consists  the  true  life,  the 
blessed  life,  etc.?      How  is  it  to  be  attained?      What 
must  man  do  and  become  in  order  to  become  a  truly 
living  man?      How  does  he  fulfil  this  calling?"    These 
and  similar  questions  indicate  that  the  askers  were 
still  seeking  for  themselves, — to  wit,  themselves  in  the 


THE  OWNER  427 

true  sense,  in  the  sense  of  true  living.     "  What  I  am  is 
foam  and  shadow;  what  I  shall  be  is  my  true  self." 
To  chase  after  this  self,  to  produce  it,  to  realize  it,  con- 
stitutes the  hard  task  of  mortals,  who  die  only  to  rise 
again,  live  only  to  die,  live  only  to  find  the  true  life. 

Not  till  I  am  certain  of  myself,  and  no  longer  seek- 
ing for  myself,  am  I  really  my  property;  I  have  my- 
self, therefore  I  use  and  enjoy  myself.     On  the  other 
hand,  I  can  never  take  comfort  in  myself  so  long  as  I 
think  that  I  have  still  to  find  my  true  self  and  that  it 
must  come  to  this,  that  not  I  but  Christ  or  some  other 
spiritual,  i.  e.  ghostly,  self  (e.  g.  the  true  man,  the  es- 
sence of  man,  and  the  like)  lives  in  me. 

A  vast  interval  separates  the  two  views.     In  the  old 
I  go  toward  myself,  in  the  new  I  start  from  myself;  in 
the  former  I  long  for  myself,  in  the  latter  I  have  my- 
self and  do  with  myself  as  one  does  with  any  other 
property, — I  enjoy  myself  at  my  pleasure.      I  am  no 
longer  afraid  for  my  life,  but  "  squander  "  it. 

Henceforth  the  question  runs,  not  how  one  can 
acquire  life,  but  how  one  can  squander,  enjoy  it;    or, 
not  how  one  is  to  produce  the  true  self  in  himself,  but 
how  one  is  to  dissolve  himself,  to  live  himself  out. 

What  else  should  the  ideal  be  but  the  sought-for, 
ever-distant  self  ?      One  seeks  for  himself,  consequently 
one  does  not  yet  have  himself;  one  aspires  toward 
what  one  ought  to  be,  consequently  one  is  not  it. 
One  lives  in  longing  and  has  lived  thousands  of  years 
in  it,  in  hope.     Living  is  quite  another  thing  in — 
enjoyment ! 

Does  this  perchance  apply  only  to  the  so-called 
pious?     No,  it  applies  to  all  who  belong  to  the  de- 


428  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

parting  period  of  history,  even  to  its  men  of  pleasure. 
For  them  too  the  work-days  were  followed  by  a  Sun- 
day, and  the  rush  of  the  world  by  the  dream  of  a 
better  world,  of  a  general  happiness  of  humanity ;  in 
short,  by  an  ideal.      But  philosophers  especially  are 
contrasted  with  the  pious.     Now,  have  they  been 
thinking  of  anything  else  than  the  ideal,  been  planning 
for  anything  else  than  the  absolute  self  ?      Longing 
and  hope  everywhere,  and  nothing  but  these.     For  me, 
call  it  romanticism. 

If  the  enjoyment  of  life  is  to  triumph  over  the  long- 
ing for  life  or  hope  of  life,  it  must  vanquish  this  in 
its  double  significance,  which  Schiller  introduces  in  his 
"Ideal  and  Life";  it  must  crush  spiritual  arid  secular 
poverty,  exterminate  the  ideal  and — the  want  of  daily 
bread.     He  who  must  expend  his  life  to  prolong  life 
cannot  enjoy  it,  and  he  who  is  still  seeking  for  his  life 
does  not  have  it  and  can  as  little  enjoy  it:  both  are 
poor,  but  "  blessed  are  the  poor." 

Those  who  are  hungering  for  the  true  life  have  no 
power  over  their  present  life,  but  must  apply  it  for  the 
purpose  of  thereby  gaining  that  true  life,  and  must 
sacrifice  it  entirely  to  this  aspiration  and  this  task. 
If  in  the  case  of  those  devotees  who  hope  for  a  life  in 
the  other  world,  and  look  upon  that  in  this  world  as 
merely  a  preparation  for  it,  the  tributariness  of  their 
earthly  existence,  which  they  put  solely  into  the  service 
of  the  hoped-for  heavenly  existence,  is  pretty  distinctly 
apparent;  one  would  yet  go  far  wrong  if  one  wanted 
to  consider  the  most  rationalistic  and  enlightened  as 
less  self-sacrificing.     Oh,  there  is  to  be  found  in  the 
"  true  life  "  a  much  more  comprehensive  significance 


THE  OWNER  429 

than  the  "  heavenly  "  is  competent  to  express.     Now, 
is  not — to  introduce  the  liberal  concept  of  it  at  once — 
the  "  human"  and  "truly  human  "  life  the  true  one? 
And  is  every  one  already  leading  this  truly  human  life 
from  the  start,  or  must  he  first  raise  himself  to  it  with 
hard  toil?      Does  he  already  have  it  as  his  present  life, 
or  must  he  struggle  for  it  as  his  future  life,  which  will 
become  his  part  only  when  he  "is  no  longer  tainted 
with  any  egoism  "?      In  this  view  life  exists  only  to 
gain  life,  and  one  lives  only  to  make  the  essence  of 
man  alive  in  oneself,  one  lives  for  the  sake  of  this  es- 
sence.    One  has  his  life  only  in  order  to  procure  by 
means  of  it  the  "  true"  life  cleansed  of  all  egoism. 
Hence  one  is  afraid  to  make  any  use  he  likes  of  his 
life:  it  is  to  serve  only  for  the  "  right  use." 

In  short,  one  has  a  calling'  in  life,  a  task  in  life; 
one  has  something  to  realize  and  produce  by  his  life,  a 
something  for  which  our  life  is  only  means  and  imple- 
ment, a  something  that  is  worth  more  than  this  life,  a 
something  to  which  one  owes  his  life.     One  has  a  God 
who  asks  a  living  sacrifice.     Only  the  rudeness  of  hu- 
man sacrifice  has  been  lost  with  time;  human  sacrifice 
itself  has  remained  unabated,  and  criminals  hourly  fall 
sacrifices  to  justice,  and  we  "  poor  sinners  "  slay  our 
own  selves  as  sacrifices  for  "  the  human  essence,"  the 
"  idea  of  mankind,"  "humanity,"  and  whatever  the 
idols  or  gods  are  called  besides. 

But,  because  we  owe  our  life  to  that  something, 
therefore — this  is  the  next  point — we  have  no  right  to 
take  it  from  us. 

The  conservative  tendency  of  Christianity  does  not 
permit  thinking  of  death  otherwise  than  with  the  pur- 


430  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

pose  to  take  its  sting  from  it  and — live  on  and  pre- 
serve oneself  nicely.     The  Christian  lets  everything 
happen  and  come  upon  him  if  he — the  arch- Jew — can 
only  haggle  and  smuggle  himself  into  heaven ;  he 
must  not  kill  himself,  he  must  only — preserve  himself 
and  work  at  the  "  preparation  of  a  future  abode." 
Conservatism  or  "  conquest  of  death"  lies  at  his  heart; 
"  the  last  enemy  that  is  abolished  is  death."*     "Christ 
has  taken  the  power  from  death  and  brought  life  and 
imperishable  being  to  light  by  the  gospel."f     "Im- 
perishableness,"  stability.  •-*,«•-- 

The  moral  man  wants  the  good,  the  right;  and,  if 
he  takes  to  the  means  that  lead  to  this  goal,  really 
lead  to  it,  then  these  means  are  not  his  means,  but 
those  of  the  good,  right,  etc.,  itself.     These  means  are 
never  immoral,  because  the  good  end  itself  mediates  it- 
self through  them :  the  end  sanctifies  the  means. 
They  call  this  maxim  Jesuitical,  but  it  is  "moral" 
through  and  through.     The  moral  man  acts  in  the 
service  of  an  end  or  an  idea:  he  makes  himself  the 
tool  of  the  idea  of  the  good,  as  the  pious  man  counts 
it  his  glory  to  be  a  tool  or  instrument  of  God.     To 
await  death  is  what  the  moral  commandment  postu- 
lates as  the  good;  to  give  it  to  oneself  is  immoral  and 
bad :  suicide  finds  no  excuse  before  the  judgment-seat 
of  morality.     If  the  religious  man  forbids  it  because 
"  you  have  not  given  yourself  life,  but  God,  who  along 
can  also  take  it  from  you  again  "  (as  if,  even  talking    . 
in  this  conception,  God  did  not  take  it  from  me  just 
as  much  when  I  kill  myself  as  when  a  tile  from  the 

*  1  Cor,  15.  ?«,  t*Tim,  J.  \\ 


THE  OWNER  431 

roof,  or  a  hostile  bullet,  fells  me  ;  for  he  would  have 
aroused  the  resolution  of  death  in  me  too! ),  the  moral 
man  forbids  it  because  I  owe  my  life  to  the  father- 
land, etc.,  "  because  I  do  not  know  whether  I  may  not 
yet  accomplish  good  by  my  life."    Of  course,  for  in  me 
good  loses  a  tool,  as  God  does  an  instrument.     If  I  am 
immoral,  the  good  is  served  in  my  amendment ;  if  I  am 
"  ungodly,"  God  has  joy  in  my  penitence.     Suicide, 
therefore,  is  ungodly  as  well  as  nefarious.      If  one 
whose  standpoint  is  religiousness  takes  his  own  life,  he 
acts  in  forgetfulness  of  God ;  but,  if  the  suicide's 
standpoint  is  morality,  he  acts  in  forgetfulness  of 
duty,  immorally.      People  worried  themselves  much 
with  the  question  whether  Emilia  Galotti's  death  can 
be  justified  before  morality  (they  take  it  as  if  it  were 
suicide,  which  it  is  too  in  substance).     That  she  is  so 
infatuated  with  chastity,  this  moral  good,  as  to  yield 
up  even  her  life  for  it  is  certainly  moral;  but,  again, 
that  she  fears  the  weakness  of  her  flesh  is  immoral.* 


*  [See  the  next  to  the  last  scene  of  the  tragedy : 

ODOARDO.    Under  the  pretext  of  a  judicial  investigation  he  tears  you  out 
of  our  arms  and  takes  you  to  Grimaldi.    ... 

KMII.IA.    Give  me  that  dagger,  father,  me  !    ... 

ODOARDO.     No,  no !    Reflect — You  too  have  only  one  life  to  lose. 

KMI.I  IA.     Ami  only  one  innocence  ! 

ODOARDO.     Which  is  above  the  reach  of  any  violence.— 

KMII.IA.     But  not  above  the  reach  of  any  seduction. — Violence  !  violence  '. 
who  cannot  defy  violence?    What  is  called  violence  is  nothing  :  seduction 
is  the  true  violence.— I  have  blood,  father;  blood  as  youthful  and  warm  as 
anybody's.     My  senses  are  senses. — I  can  warrant  nothing,     I  am  sure  of 
nothing.     I  know  Grimaldi's  house.    It  is  the  house  of  pleasure.    An  hour 
there,  under  my  mother's  eyes— and  there  arose  in  my  soul  so  much  tumult 
as  Uie  strictest  exercises  of  religion  could  hardly  quiet  in  weeks.— Religion  ! 
And  what  rel'gion  ? — To  escape  nothing  worse,  thousands  sprang  into  the 
water  and  are  saints.— Give  me  that  dagger,  father,  give  it  to  me.     ,  .  . 

KMII.IA.     Once  indeed  there  was  a  father  who,  to  save  his  daughter  from 
shame,  drove  into  her  heart  whatever  steel  he  could  quickest  find     gave  life 
t;>  her  for  the  second  time.    But  all  such  deeds  arc  of  th.e  past ',    Of  such 
fathers  there  are  no  more  ! 

ODOARDO,    Yes,  daughter,  yes ',    (Stabs  her.)  ] 


4-32  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Such  contradictions  form  the  tragic  conflict  universally 
in  the  moral  drama;  and  one  must  think  and  feel 
morally  to  be  able  to  take  an  interest  in  it. 

What  holds  good  of  piety  and  morality  will  neces- 
sarily apply  to  humanity  also,  because  one  owes  his 
life  likewise  to  man,  mankind  or  the  species.     Only 
when  I  am  under  obligation  to  no  being  is  the  main- 
taining of  life — my  affair.     "  A  leap  from  this  bridge 
makes  me  free !  " 

But,  if  we  owe  the  maintaining  of  our  life  to  that 
being  that  we  are  to  make  alive  in  ourselves,  it  is  not 
less  our  duty  not  to  lead  this  life  according  to  our 
pleasure,  but  to  shape  it  in  conformity  to  that  being. 
All  my  feeling,  thinking,  and  willing,  all  my  doing 
and  designing,  belongs  to — him. 

What  is  in  conformity  to  that  being  is  to  be  in- 
ferred from  his  concept;  and  how  differently  has  this 
concept  been  conceived!  or  how  differently  has  that 
being  been  imagined!      What  demands  the  Supreme 
Being  makes  on  the  Mohammedan;  what  different  ones 
the  Christian,  again,  thinks  he  hears  from  him;  how 
divergent,  therefore,  must  the  shaping  of  the  lives  of 
the  two  turn  out!      Only  this  do  all  hold  fast,  that  the 
Supreme  Being  is  io  judge  *  our  life. 

But  the  pious  who  have  their  judge  in  God,  and  in 
his  word  a  book  of  directions  for  their  life,  I  every- 
where pass  by  only  reminiscently,  because  they  be- 
long to  a  period  of  development  that  has  been  lived 
through,  and  as  petrifactions  they  may  remain  in 
their  fixed  place  right  along;  in  our  time  it  is  no 

*[Or,  "regulate"  (richten)] 


THE  OWNER  433 

longer  the  pious,  but  the  liberals,  who  have  the  floor, 
and  piety  itself  cannot  keep  from  reddening  its  pale 
face  with  liberal  coloring.      But  the  liberals  do  not 
adore  their  judge  in  God,  and  do  not  unfold  their  life 
by  the  directions  of  the  divine  word,  but  regulate  * 
themselves  by  man:  they  want  to  be  not  "divine"  but 
"  human,"  and  to  live  so. 

Man  is  the  liberal's  supreme  being,  man  the  judge 
of  his  life,  humanity  his  directions,  or  catechism. 
God  is  spirit,  but  man  is  the  "  most  perfect  spirit,"  the 
final  result  of  the  long  chase  after  the  spirit  or  of  the 
"  searching  in  the  depths  of  the  Godhead,"  i.  e.  in  the 
depths  of  the  spirit: 

Every  one  of  your  traits  is  to  be  human ;  you  your- 
self are  to  be  so  from  top  to  toe,  in  the  inward  as  in 
the  outward;  for  humanity  is  your  calling. 

Calling — destiny — task !  — 

What  one  can  become  he  does  become.     A  born 
poet  may  well  be  hindered  by  the  disfavor  of  circum- 
stances from  standing  on  the  high  level  of  his  time, 
and,  after  the  great  studies  that  are  indispensable  for 
this,  producing  consummate  works  of  art ;  but  he  will 
make  poetry,  be  he  a  plowman  or  so  lucky  as  to  live 
at  the  court  of  Weimar.     A  born  musician  will  make 
music,  no  matter  whether  on  all  instruments  or  only 
on  an  oaten  pipe.     A  born  philosophical  head  can 
give  proof  of  itself  as  university  philosopher  or  as  vil- 
lage philosopher.     Finally,  a  born  dolt,  who,  as  is  very 
well  compatible  with  this,  may  at  the  same  time  be  a 
sly-boots,  will  (as  probably  every  one  who  has  visited 

*  Irichten] 


434  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

schools  is  in  a  position  to  exemplify  to  himself  by 
many  instances  of  fellow-scholars)  always  remain  a 
blockhead,  let  him  have  been  drilled  and  trained  into 
the  chief  of  a  bureau,  or  let  him  serve  that  same  chief 
as  bootblack.     Nay,  the  born  shallow-pates  indisput- 
ably form  the  most  numerous  class  of  men.     And  why, 
indeed,  should  not  the  same  distinctions  show  them- 
selves in  the  human  species  that  are  unmistakable  in 
every  species  of  beasts?     The  more  gifted  and  the  less 
gifted  are  to  be  found  everywhere. 

Only  a  few,  however,  are  so  imbecile  that  one  could 
not  get  ideas  into  them.      Hence  people  usually  con- 
sider all  men  capable  of  having  religion.     In  a  cer- 
tain degree  they  may  be  trained  to  other  ideas  too, 
e.  g:  to  some  musical  intelligence,  even  some  phil- 
osophy, etc.     At  this  point  then  the  priesthood  of 
religion,  of  morality,  of  culture,  of  science,  etc.,  takes 
its  start,  and  the  Communists,  e.  g..  want  to  make 
everything  accessible  to  all  by  their  "  public  school." 
There  is  heard  a  common  assertion  that  this  "  great 
mass  "  cannot  get  along  without  religion ;  the  Com- 
munists broaden  it  into  the  proposition  that  not  only 
the  "  great  mass,"  but  absolutely  all,  are  called  to 
everything. 

Not  enough  that  the  great  mass  has  been  trained  to 
religion,  now  it  is  actually  to  have  to  occupy  itself 
with  "  everything  human."     Training  is  growing 
ever  more  general  and  more  comprehensive. 

You  poor  beings  who  could  live  so  happily  if  you 
might  skip  according  to  your  mind,  you  are  to  dance 
to  the  pipe  of  schoolmasters  and  bear-leaders,  in  ord 
to  perform  tricks  that  you  yourselves  would  never  use 


i 

•der 
ase 


THE  OWNER  43A 

yourselves  for.     And  you  do  not  even  kick  out  of  the 
traces  at  last  against  being  always  taken  otherwise 
than  you  want  to  give  yourselves.     No,  you  mechani- 
cally recite  to  yourselves  the  question  that  is  recited  to 
you:  "  What  am  I  called  to?      What  ought  I  to  do?" 
You  need  only  ask  thus,  to  have  yourselves  told  what 
you  ought  to  do  and  ordered  to  do  it,  to  have  your 
willing  marked  out  for  you,  or  else  to  order  yourselves 
and  impose  it  on  yourselves  according  to  the  spirit's 
prescription.     Then  in  reference  to  the  will  the  word 
is,  I  will  to  do  what  I  ought. 

A  man  is  "  called  "  to  nothing,  and  has  no  "  call- 
ing," no  "  destiny,"  as  little  as  a  plant  or  a  beast  has 
a  "calling."     The  flower  does  not  follow  the  calling 
to  complete  itself,  but  it  spends  all  its  forces  to  enjoy 
and  consume  the  world  as  well  as  it  can, — I.  e.  it  sucks 
in  as  much  of  the  juices  of  the  earth,  as  much  air  of 
the  ether,  as  much  light  of  the  sun,  as  it  can  get  and 
lodge.     The  bird  lives  up  to  no  calling,  but  it  uses  its 
forces  as  much  as  is  practicable;  it  catches  beetles  and 
sings  to  its  heart's  delight.      But  the  forces  of  the 
flower  and  the  bird  are  slight  in  comparison  to  those 
of  a  man,  and  a  man  who  applies  his  forces  will  affect 
the  world  much  more  powerfully  than  flower  and 
beast.     A  calling  he  has  not,  but  he  has  forces  that 
manifest  themselves  where  they  are  because  their  being 
consists  solely  in  their  manifestation,  and  are  as  little 
able  to  abide  inactive  as  life,  which,  if  it  "  stood  still  " 
only  a  second,  would  no  longer  be  life.     Now,  one 
might  call  out  to  the  man,  "  use  your  force."     Yet  to 
this  imperative  would  be  given  the  meaning  that  it 
was  man's  task  to  use  his  force.      It  is  not  so.     Rather, 


436  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

each  one  really  uses  his  force  without  first  looking 
upon  this  as  his  calling:  at  all  times  every  one  uses  as 
much  force  as  he  possesses.     One  does  say  of  a  beaten 
man  that  he  ought  to  have  exerted  his  force  more; 
but  one  forgets  that,  if  in  the  moment  of  succumbing 
he  had  had  the  force  to  exert  his  forces  (e.  g.  bodily 
forces),  he  would  not  have  failed  to  do  it:  even  if  it 
was  only  the  discouragement  of  a  minute,  this  was  yet 
a — destitution  of  force,  a  minute  long.     Forces  may 
assuredly  be  sharpened  and  redoubled,  especially  by 
hostile  resistance  or  friendly  assistance;  but  where  one 
misses  their  application  one  may  be  sure  of  their  ab- 
sence too.     One  can  strike  fire  out  of  a  stone,  but 
without  the  blow  none  comes  out;  in  like  manner  a 
man  too  needs  "  impact." 

Now,  for  this  reason  that  forces  always  of  themselves 
show  themselves  operative,  the  command  to  use  them 
would  be  superfluous  and  senseless.     To  use  his  forces 
is  not  man's  calling-  and  task,  but  is  his  act,  real  and 
extant  at  all  times.     Force  is  only  a  simpler  word  for 
manifestation  of  force. 

Now,  as  this  rose  is  a  true  rose  to  begin  with,  this 
nightingale  always  a  true  nightingale,  so  I  am  not  for 
the  first  time  a  true  man  when  I  fulfil  my  calling,  live 
up  to  my  destiny,  but  I  am  a  "  true  man  "  from  the 
start.     My  first  babble  is  the  token  of  the  life  of  a 
"  true  man,"  the  struggles  of  my  life  are  the  outpour- 
ings of  his  force,  my  last  breath  is  the  last  exhalation 
of  the  force  of  the  "man." 

The  true  man  does  not  lie  in  the  future,  an  object 
of  longing,  but  lies,  existent  and  real,  in  the  present. 
Whatever  and  whoever  I  may  be,  joyous  and  suffering. 


THE  OWNER  437 

a  child  or  a  graybeard,  in  confidence  or  doubt,  in 
sleep  or  in  waking,  I  am  it,  I  am  the  true  man. 

But,  if  I  am  Man,  and  have  really  found  in  myself 
him  whom  religious  humanity  designated  as  the  dis- 
tant goal,  then  everything  "  truly  human  "  is  also  my 
own.     What  was  ascribed  to  the  idea  of  humanity  be- 
longs to  me.     That  freedom  of  trade,  e.  g.,  which  hu- 
manity has  yet  to  attain, — and  which,  like  an  en-      , 
chanting  dream,  people  remove  to  humanity's  golden 
future, — I  take  by  anticipation  as  my  property,  andy 
carry  it  on  for  the  time  in  the  form  of  smuggling. 
There  may  indeed  be  but  few  smugglers  who  have 
sufficient  understanding  to  thus  account  to  themselves 
for  their  doings,  but  the  instinct  of  egoism  replaces 
their  consciousness.     Above  I  have  shown  the  same 
thing  about  freedom  of  the  press. 

Everything  is  my  own,  therefore  I  bring  back  to 
myself  what  wants  to  withdraw  from  me;  but  above  all 
I  always  bring  myself  back  when  I  have  slipped  away 
from  myself  to  any  tributariness.      But  this  too  is  not 
my  calling,  but  my  natural  act. 

Enough,  there  is  a  mighty  difference  whether  I 
make  myself  the  starting-point  or  the  goal.     As  the 
latter  I  do  not  have  myself,  am  consequently  still 
alien  to  myself,  am  my  essence,  my  "  true  essence," 
and  this  "  true  essence,"  alien  to  me,  will  mock  me  as 
a  spook  of  a  thousand  different  names.      Because  I  am 
not  yet  I,  another  (like  God,  the  true  man,  the  truly 
pious  man,  the  rational  man,  the  freeman,  etc.)  is  I, 
my  ego. 

Still  far  from  myself,  I  separate  myself  into  two 
halves,  of  which  one,  the  one  unattained  and  to  be  ful- 


438  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

filled,  is  the  true  one.     The  one,  the  untrue,  must  be 
brought  as  a  sacrifice;  to  wit,  the  unspiritual  one. 
The  other,  the  true,  is  to  be  the  whole  man;  to  wit, 
the  spirit.     Then  it  is  said,  "  The  spirit  is  man's 
proper  essence,""  or,  "  man  exists  as  man  only  spiritu- 
ally."    Now  there  is  a  greedy  rush  to  catch  the  spirit, 
as  if  one  would  then  have  bagged  himself;  and  so,  in 
chasing  after  himself,  one  loses  sight  of  himself,  whom 
he  is. 

And,  as  one  stormily  pursues  his  own  self,  the 
never-attained,  so  one  also  despises  shrewd  people's 
rule  to  take  men  as  they  are,  and  prefers  to  take  them 
as  they  should  be;  and,  for  this  reason,  hounds  every 
one  on  after  his  should-be  self  and  "  endeavors  to  make 
all  into  equally  entitled,  equally  respectable,  equally 
moral  or  rational  men."* 

Yes,  "  if  men  were  what  they  should  be,  could  be,  if 
all  men  were  rational,  all  loved  each  other  as  broth- 
ers," then  it  would  be  a  paradisiacal  life.f — All  right, 
men  are  as  they  should  be,  can  be.     What  should 
they  be?      Surely  not  more  than  they  can  be!      And 
what  can  they  be?     Not  more,  again,  than  they — can, 
i.  e.  than  they  have  the  competence,  the  force,  to  be. 
But  this  they  really  are,  because  what  they  are  not 
they  are  incapable  of  being;  for  to  be  capable  means 
— really  to  be.      One  is  not  capable  for  anything  that 
one  really  is  not;  one  is  not  capable  of  anything  that 
one  does  not  really  do.     Could  a  man  blinded  by 
cataract  see?      Oh,  yes,  if  he  had  his  cataract  success- 
fully removed.     But  now  he  cannot  see  because  he  does 

*  "  Der  Kommunismus  in  der  Schtveiz,"  p.  24.  t  Ibid.  p.  63. 


THE  OWNER  439 

not  see.  Possibility  and  reality  always  coincide.  One 
can  do  nothing  that  one  does  not,  as  one  does  nothing 
that  one  cannot. 

The  singularity  of  this  assertion  vanishes  when  one 
reflects  that  the  words  "  it  is  possible  that  .  .  ."  al- 
most never  contain  another  meaning  than  "  I  can 
magine  that  .  .  .,"  e.  g.,  It  is  possible  for  all  men  to 
live  rationally,  i.  e.  I  can  imagine  that  all,  etc.     Now, 

>ince  my  thinking  cannot,  and  accordingly  does  not, 
cause  all  men  to  live  rationally,  but  this  must  still  be 
left  to  the  men  themselves, — general  reason  is  for  me 
only  thinkable,  a  thinkableness,  but  as  such  in  fact  a 
•eality  that  is  called  a  possibility  only  in  reference  to 
what  I  can  not  bring  to  pass,  to  wit,  the  rationality  of 
others.     So  far  as  depends  on  you,  all  men  might  be 
rational,  for  you  have  nothing  against  it;  nay,  so  far 
as  your  thinking  reaches,  you  perhaps  cannot  dis- 
cover any  hindrance  either,  and  accordingly  nothing 
does  stand  in  the  way  of  the  thing  in  your  thinking; 
it  is  thinkable  to.  you. 

As  men  are  not  all  rational,  though,  it  is  probable 
that  they — cannot  be  so. 

If  something  which  one  imagines  to  be  easily  pos- 
sible is  not,  or  does  not  happen,  then  one  may  be 
assured  that  something  stands  in  the  way  of  the  thing, 
and  that  it  is — impossible.     Our  time  has  its  art, 
science,  etc.;  the  art  may  be  bad  in  all  conscience; 
but  may  one  say  that  we  deserved  to  have  a  better, 
and  "  could  "  have  it  if  we  only  would?      We  have 
just  as  much  art  as  we  can  have.     Our  art  of  to-day 
is  the  only  art  possible,  and  therefore  real,  at  the 
time. 


440  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

Even  in  the  sense  to  which  one  might  at  last  still 
reduce  the  word  "possible,"  that  it  should  mean 
"  future,"  it  retains  the  full  force  of  the  "  real."     If 
one  says,  e.  g.,  "  It  is  possible  that  the  sun  will  rise 
to-morrow," — this  means  only,  "  for  to-day  to-morrow 
is  the  real  future  ";  for  I  suppose  there  is  hardly  need 
of  the  suggestion  that  a  future  is  real  "  future  "  only 
when  it  has  not  yet  appeared. 

Yet  wherefore  this  dignifying  of  a  word?      If  the 
most  prolific  misunderstanding  of  thousands  of  years . 
were  not  in  ambush  behind  it,  if  this  single  concept 
of  the  little  word  "  possible"  were  not  haunted  by 
all  the  spooks  of  possessed  men,  its  contemplation 
should  trouble  us  little  here. 

The  thought,  it  was  just  now  shown,  rules  the  pos- 
sessed world.     Well,  then,  possibility  is  nothing  but 
thinkableness,  and  innumerable  sacrifices  have  hitherto 
been  made  to  hideous  thinkableness.     It  was  thinkable 
that  men  might  become  rational;  thinkable,  that 
they  might  know  Christ;  thinkable,  that  they  might 
become  moral  and  enthusiastic  for  the  good  ;  think- 
able, that  they  might  all  take  refuge  in  the  Church's 
lap;    thinkable,  that  they  might  meditate,  speak,  and 
do,  nothing  dangerous  to  the  State;  thinkable,  that 
they  might  be  obedient  subjects;  but,  because  it  was 
thinkable,  it  was — so  ran  the  inference — possible,  and 
further,  because  it  was  possible  to  men  (right  here  lies 
the  deceptive  point:  because  it  is  thinkable  to  me,  it 
is  possible  to  men),  therefore  they  might  to  be  so,  it 
was  their  calling;  and  finally — one  is  to  take  men 
only  according  to  this  calling,  only  as  called  men, 
"  not  as  they  are,  but  as  they  ought  to  be." 


THE  OWNER  441 

And  the  further  inference?     Man  is  not  the  indi- 
vidual, but  man  is  a  thought,  an  ideal,  to  which  the 
individual  is  related  not  even  as  the  child  to  the  man, 
but  as  a  chalk  point  to  a  point  thought  of,  or  as  a — 
finite  creature  to  the  eternal  Creator,  or,  according  to 
modern  views,  as  the  specimen  to  the  species.     Here 
then  comes  to  light  the  glorification  of  "  humanity," 
the  "  eternal,  immortal,"  for  whose  glory  (in  majorem 
humanitatis  gloriam)  the  individual  must  devote  him- 
self and  find  his  "  immortal  renown  "  in  having  done 
something  for  the  "  spirit  of  humanity." 

Thus  the  thinkers  rule  in  the  world  as  long  as  the 
age  of  priests  or  of  schoolmasters  lasts,  and  what  they 
;hink  of  is  possible,  but  what  is  possible  must  be  real- 
ized.    They  think  an  ideal  of  man,  which  for  the  time 

real  only  in  their  thoughts;  but  they  also  think  the 
possibility  of  carrying  it  out,  and  there  is  no  chance 
for  dispute,  the  carrying  out  is  really — thinkable,  it 
is  an — idea. 

But  you  and  I,  we  may  indeed  be  people  of  whom 
a  Krummacher  can  think  that  we  might  yet  become 
good  Christians;  if,  however,  he  wanted  to  "labor 
with  "  us,  we  should  soon  make  it  palpable  to  him 
that  our  Christianity  is  only  thinkable,  but  in  other 
respects  impossible ;  if  he  grinned  on  and  on  at  us 
with  his  obtrusive  thoughts,  his  "  good  belief,"  he 
would  have  to  learn  that  we  do  not  at  all  need  to  be- 
come what  we  do  not  like  to  become. 

And  so  it  goes  on,  far  beyond  the  most  pious  of  the 
pious.     "  If  all  men  were  rational,  if  all  did  right, 
if  all  were  guided  by  philanthropy,  etc." !      Reason, 
right,  philanthropy,  etc.,  are  put  before  the  eyes  of 


442  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

men  as  their  calling,  as  the  goal  of  their  aspiration. 
And  what  does  being  rational  mean?      Giving  one- 
self a  hearing?  *     No,  reason  is  a  book  full  of  laws,   • 
which  are  all  enacted  against  egoism. 

History  hitherto  is  the  history  of  the  intellectual    '' 
man.     After  the  period  of  sensuality,  history  proper 
begins;  i,  e.,  the  period  of  intellectuality,!  spiritual- 
ity, J  non-sensuality,  super-sensuality,  nonsensicality. 
Man  now  begins  to  want  to  be  and  become  something. 
What?      Good,  beautiful,  true;  more  precisely,  moral, 
pious,  agreeable,  etc.      He  wants  to  make  of  himself  a 
"proper  man,"  "something  proper."     Man  is  his 
goal,  his  ought,  his  destiny,  calling,  task,  his — ideal; 
he  is  to  himself  a  future,  otherworldly  he.     And  what 
makes  a  "  proper  fellow  "  of  him?      Being  true,  being 
good,  being  moral,  and  the  like.     Now  he  looks  ask- 
ance at  every  one  who  does  not  recognize  the  same 
"  what,"  seek  the  same  morality,  have  the  same  faith; 
he  chases  out  "  separatists,  heretics,  sects,"  etc. 

No  sheep,  no  dog,  exerts  itself  to  become  a  "  proper 
sheep,  a  proper  dog";  no  beast  has  its  essence  appear 
to  it  as  a  task,  i.  e.  as  a  concept  that  it  has  to  real- 
ize.    It  realizes  itself  in  living  itself  out,  i.  e.  dissolv 
ing  itself,  passing  away.     It  does  not  ask  to  be  or  tc 
become  anything  other  than  it  is. 

Do  I  mean  to  advise  you  to  be  like  the  beasts? 
That  you  ought  to  become  beasts  is  an  exhortation 
which  I  certainly  cannot  give  you,  as  that  would 
again  be  a  task,  an  ideal  ("  How  doth  the  little  busy 
bee  improve  each  shining  hour  ...     In  works  of  lab 

*  iCt,  note  p.  81,] 


THE  OWNER  443 

or  of  skill  I  would  be  busy  too,  for  Satan  finds  some 
mischief  still  for  idle  hands  to  do  ").      It  would  be  the 
same,  too,  as  if  one  wished  for  the  beasts  that  they 
should  become  human  beings.     Your  nature  is,  once 
for  all,  a  human  one;  you  are  human  natures,  i.  e.  hu- 
man beings.     But,  just  because  you  already  are  so, 
you  do  not  still  need  to  become  so.     Beasts  too  are 
"trained,"  and  a  trained  beast  executes  many  un- 
natural things.      But  a  trained  dog  is  no  better  for  it- 
self than  a  natural  one,  and  has  no  profit  from  it,  even 
if  it  is  more  companionable  for  us. 

Exertions  to  "  form  "  all  men  into  moral,  rational, 
pious,  human,  etc.,  "  beings  "  (i.  e.  training)  were  in 
vogue  from  of  yore.     They  are  wrecked  against  the 
indomitable  quality  of  I,  against  own  nature,  against 
egoism.     Those  who  are  trained  never  attain  their 
ideal,  and  only  profess  with  their  mouth  the  sublime 
principles,  or  make  a  profession,  a  profession  of  faith. 
In  face  of  this  profession  they  must  in  life  "  acknowl- 
edge themselves  sinners  altogether,"  and  they  fall  short 
of  their  ideal,  are  "  weak  men,"  and  bear  with  them 
the  consciousness  of  "  human  weakness." 

It  is  different  if  you  do  not  chase  after  an  ideal  as 
your  "  destiny,"  but  dissolve  yourself  as  time  dissolves 
everything.     The  dissolution  is  not  your  "  destiny," 
because  it  is  present  time. 

Yet  the  culture,  the  religiousness,  of  men  has  as- 
suredly made  them  free,  but  only  free  from  one  lord, 
to  lead  them  to  another.     I  have  learned  by  religion 
to  tame  my  appetite,  I  break  the  world's  resistance  by 
the  cunning  that  is  put  in  my  hand  by  science ;  I  even 
nerve  no  man:  "  I  am  rio  man's  lackey,"     Bui;  then,  it 


444  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

comes,  You  must  obey  God  more  than  man.     Just  so 
I  am  indeed  free  from  irrational  determination  by  my 
impulses,  but  obedient  to  the  master  Reason.     I  have 
gained  "  spiritual  freedom,"  "  freedom  of  the  spirit." 
But  with  that  /  have  then  become  subject  to  that  very 
spirit.     The  spirit  gives  me  orders,  reason  guides  me, 
they  are  my  leaders  and  commanders.     The  "  ra- 
tional," the  "  servants  of  the  spirit,"  rule.     But,  if  / 
am  not  flesh,  I  am  in  truth  not  spirit  either.     Free- 
dom of  the  spirit  is  servitude  of  me,  because  I  am 
more  than  spirit  or  flesh. 

Without  doubt  culture  has  made  me  powerful.     It 
has  given  me  power  over  all  motives,  over  the  impulses 
of  my  nature  as  well  as  over  the  exactions  and  vio- 
lences of  the  world.     I  know,  and  have  gained  the 
force  for  it  by  culture,  that  I  need  not  let  myself  be 
coerced  by  any  of  my  appetites,  pleasures,  emotions, 
etc.;  I  am  their — master;  in  like  manner  I  become, 
through  the  sciences  and  arts,  the  master  of  the  refrac- 
tory world,  whom  sea  and  earth  obey,  and  to  whom 
even  the  stars  must  give  an  account  of  themselves. 
The  spirit  has  made  me  master. — But  I  have  no  power 
over  the  spirit  itself.     From  religion  (culture)  I  do 
learn  the  means  for  the  "  vanquishing  of  the  world,' 
but  not  how  I  am  to  subdue  God  too  and  become 
master  of  him  ;  for  God  "  is  the  spirit."     And  this 
same  spirit,  of  which  I  am  unable  to  become  master, 
may  have  the  most  manifold  shapes:  he  may  be  call 
God  or  National  Spirit,  State,  Family,  Reason,  also — 
Liberty,  Humanity,  Man. 

/  receive  with  thanks  what  the  centuries  of  culture 
have  acquired  for  me;  I  am  not  willing  to  throw 


i 
lied 


THE  OWNER  445 

away  and  give  up  anything  of  it:  /  have  not  lived  in 
vain.     The  experience  that  I  have  power  over  my 
nature,  and  need  not  be  the  slave  of  my  appetites, 
shall  not  be  lost  to  me;  the  experience  that  I  can  sub- 
due the  world  by  culture's  means  is  too  dear-bought 
for  me  to  be  able  to  forget  it.     But  I  want  still  more. 

People  ask,  what  can  man  do?  what  can  he  accom- 
plish? what  goods  procure?  and  put  down  the  highest 
of  everything  as  a  calling.     As  if  everything  were  pos- 
sible to  me! 

If  one  sees  somebody  going  to  ruin  in  a  mania,  a 
passion,  etc.  (e.  g.  in  the  huckster-spirit,  in  jealousy), 
the  desire  is  stirred  to  deliver  him  out  of  this  posses- 
sion and  to  help  him  to  "  self-conquest."     "  We  want 
to  make  a  man  of  him !  "     That  would  be  very  fine  if 
another  possession  were  not  immediately  put  in  the 
place  of  the  earlier  one.     But  one  frees  from  the  love 
of  money  him  who  is  a  thrall  to  it,  only  to  deliver  him 
over  to  piety,  humanity,  or  some  principle  else,  and  to 
transfer  him  to  &  fixed  standpoint  anew. 

This  transference  from  a  narrow  standpoint  to  a 
sublime  one  is  declared  in  the  words  that  the  sense 
must  not  be  directed  to  the  perishable,  but  to  the  im- 
perishable alone:  not  to  the  temporal,  but  to  the 
eternal,  absolute,  divine,  purely  human,  etc., — to  the 
spiritual. 

People  very  soon  discerned  that  it  was  not  indiffer- 
ent what  one  set  his  affections  on,  or  what  one  occu- 
pied himself  with;  they  recognized  the  importance  of 
the  object.     An  object  exalted  above  the  individuality 
of  things  is  the  essence  of  things;  yes,  the  essence  is 
alone  the  thinkable  in  them,  it  is  for  the  thinking 


446 


THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


man.     Therefore  direct  no  longer  your  sense  to  the 
things,  but  your  thoughts  to  the  essence.     "  Blessed 
are  they  who  see  not,  and  yet  believe";  i.  e.,  blessed 
are  the  thinkers,  for  they  have  to  do  with  the  invisit 
and  believe  in  it.    Yet  even  an  object  of  thought,  tl 
constituted  an  essential  point  of  contention  centuries 
long,  comes  at  last  to  the  point  of  being  "  no  longer 
worth  speaking  of."     This  was  discerned,  but  never- 
theless people  always  kept  before  their  eyes  again  a 
self-valid  importance  of  the  object,  an  absolute  value 
of  it,  as  if  the  doll  were  not  the  most  important  thii 
to  the  child,  the  Koran  to  the  Turk.     As  long  as  I 
am  not  the  sole  important  thing  to  myself,  it  is  indiJ 
ferent  of  what  object  I  "  make  much,"  and  only  my 
greater  or  lesser  delinquency  against  it  is  of  value. 
The  degree  of  my  attachment  and  devotion  marks  tl 
standpoint  of  my  liability  to  service,  the  degree  of 
sinning  shows  the  measure  of  my  ownness. 

But  finally,  and  in  general,  one  must  know  how  to 
"  put  everything  out  of  his  mind,"  if  only  so  as  to 
able  to — go  to  sleep.     Nothing  may  occupy  us  with 
which  we  do  not  occupy  ourselves:  the  victim  of  ami 
tion  cannot  run  away  from  his  ambitious  plans,  nor 
the  God-fearing  man  from  the  thought  of  God  ;  in- 
fatuation and  possessedness  coincide. 

To  want  to  realize  his  essence  or  live  conformably 
to  his  concept  (which  with  believers  in  God  signifies 
as  much  as  to  be  "  pious,"  and  with  believers  in  hu- 
manity means  living  "  humanly  ")  is  what  only  the 
sensual  and  sinful  man  can  propose  to  himself,  the 
h\an  so  long  as  he  h|p  the  anxious  choice  between 
happiness  of  sense  and  peace  of  soul,  so  long  as  he  is 


THE  OWNER  447 

a  "  poor  sinner."     The  Christian  is  nothing  but  a  sen- 
sual man  who,  knowing  of  the  sacred  and  being  con- 
scious that  he  violates  it,  sees  in  himself  a  poor  sinner: 
sensualness,  recognized  as  "  sinfulness,"  is  Christian 
consciousness,  is  the  Christian  himself.     And  if  "  sin  " 
and  "  sinfulness  "  are  now  no  longer  taken  into  the 
mouths  of  moderns,  but,  instead  of  that,  "egoism," 
"  self-seeking,"  "  selfishness,"  and  the  like,  engage 
them  ;  if  the  devil  has  been  translated  into  the  "  mi- 
man"  or  "egoistic  man," — is  the  Christian  less  pres- 
ent then  than  before?      Is  not  the  old  discord  between 
good  and  evil, — is  not  a  judge  over  us,  man,- — is  not  a 
calling,  the  calling  to  make  oneself  man — left?      If 
they  no  longer  name  it  calling,  but  "task  "  or,  very 
likely,  "  duty,V  the  change  of  name  is  quite  correct, 
because  "  man  "  is  not,  like  God,  a  personal  being     ' 
that  can  "  call";  but  outside  the  name  the  thing 
remains  as  of  old. 


Every  one  has  a  relation  to  objects,  and  more,  every 
one  is  differently  related  to  them.     Let  us  choose  as 
an  example  that  book  to  which  millions  of  men  had  a 
relation  for  two  thousand  years,  the  Bible.     What  is 
it,  what  was  it,  to  each?      Absolutely,  only  what  he 
made  out  of  it!     For  him  who  makes  to  himself  noth- 
ing at  all  out  of  it,  it  is  nothing  at  all;  for  him  who 
uses  it  as  an  amulet,  it  has  solely  the  value,  the  signifi- 
cance, of  a  means  of  sorcery  ;  for  him  who,  like  chil- 
dren, plays  with  it,  it  is  nothing  but  a  plaything ;  etc. 

Now,  Christianity  asks  that  it  shall  be  the  same  for 
til/:  suv,  the  sucred  book  or  the  "sacred  Scriptures." 
This  means  as  much  as  that  the  Christian's  view  shall 


448 


THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


also  be  that  of  other  men,  and  that  no  one  may  be 
otherwise  related  to  that  object.     And  with  this  the 
ownness  of  the  relation  is  destroyed,  and  one  mind, 
one  disposition,  is  fixed  as  the  "true,"  the  " only 
true  "  one.     In  the  limitation  of  the  freedom  to  mak< 
of  the  Bible  what  I  will,  the  freedom  of  making  in 
general  is  limited;  and  the  coercion  of  a  view  or  a 
judgment  is  put  in  its  place.     He  who  should  pass  tl 
judgment  that  the  Bible  was  a  long  error  of  mankind 
would  judge — criminally. 

In  fact,  the  child  who  tears  it  to  pieces  or  plays  wit 
it,  the  Inca  Atahualpa  who  lays  his  ear  to  it  and 
throws  it  away  contemptuously  when  it  remains  duml 
judges  just  as  correctly  about  the  Bible  as  the  priest 
who  praises  in  it  the  "  Word  of  God,"  or  the  critic 
who  calls  it  a  job  of  men's  hands.     For  how  we  toss 
things  about  is  the  affair  of  our  option,  our  free  will  : 
we  use  them  according  to  our  heart's  pleasure,  or, 
more  clearly,  we  use  them  just  as  we  can.     Why,  wh* 
do  the  parsons  scream  about  when  they  see  how  H( 
and  the  speculative  theologians  make  speculative 
thoughts  out  of  the  contents  of  the  Bible?      Precisely 
this,  that  they  deal  with  it  according  to  their  heart's 
pleasure,  or  "  proceed  arbitrarily  with  it." 

But,  because  we  all  show  ourselves  arbitrary  in  the 
handling  of  objects,  i.  e.  do  with  them  as  we  like 
at  our  liking  (the  philosopher  likes  nothing  so  well 
as  when  he  can  trace  out  an  "  idea"  in  everything, 
as  the  God-fearing  man  likes  to  make  God  his 
friend  by  everything,  and  so,  e.  g.,  by  keeping  the 
Bible  sacred),  therefore  we  nowhere  meet  such  griev- 
ous arbitrarinsss,  such  a  frightful  tendency  to  vio- 


THE  OWNER  449 

lence,  such  stupid  coercion,  as  in  this  very  domain  of 
our — orwn  free  will.     If  we  proceed  arbitrarily  in 
taking  the  sacred  objects  thus  or  so,  how  is  it  then 
that  we  want  to  take  it  ill  of  the  parson-spirits  if  they 
take  us  just  as  arbitrarily  in  their  fashion,  and  esteem 
us  worthy  of  the  heretic's  fire  or  of  another  punish- 
ment, perhaps  of  the — censorship? 

What  a  man  is,  he  makes  out  of  things;  "  as  you 
look  at  the  world,  so  it  looks  at  you  again."     Then 
the  wise  advice  makes  itself  heard  again  at  once,  You 
must  only  look  at  it  "  rightly,  unbiasedly,"  etc.     As 
if  the  child  did  not  look  at  the  Bible  "  rightly  and  un- 
biasedly  "  when  it  makes  it  a  plaything.    That  shrewd 
precept  is  given  us,  e.  g.,  by  Feuerbach.     One  does 
look  at  things  rightly  when  one  makes  of  them  what 
one  will  (by  things  objects  in  general  are  here  under- 
stood, such  as  God,  our  fellow-men,  a  sweetheart,  a 
book,  a  beast,  etc.).     And  therefore  the  things  and  the 
looking  at  them  are  not  first,  but  I  am,  my  will  is. 
One  will  bring  thoughts  out  of  the  things,  will  dis- 
cover reason  in  the  world,  will  have  sacredness  in  it: 
therefore  one  shall  find  them.     "  Seek  and  ye  shall 
find."      What  I  will  seek,  /  determine:  J  want,  e.  £•., 
to  get  edification  from  the  Bible;  it  is  to  be  found;  I 
want  to  read  and  test  the  Bible  thoroughly;  my  out- 
come will  be  a  thorough  instruction  and  criticism — to 
the  extent  of  my  powers.      I  elect  for  myself  what  I 
have  a  fancy  for,  and  in  electing  I  show  myself — 
arbitrary. 

Connected  with  this  is  the  discernment  that  every 
judgment  which  I  pass  upon  an  object  is  the  creature 
of  my  will;  and  that  discernment  again  leads  me  to 


450  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

not  losing  myself  in  the  creature,  the  judgment,  but 
remaining  the  creator,  the  judger,  who  is  ever  creati 
•anew.      All  predicates  of  objects  are  my  statements, 
my  judgments,  my — creatures.     If  they  want  to  tear 
themselves  loose  from  me  and  be  something  for  them- 
selves, or  actually  overawe  me,  then  I  have  nothing 
more  pressing  to  do  than  to  take  them  back  into  their 
nothing,  i.  e.  into  me  the  creator.     God,  Christ, 
trinity,  morality,  the  good,  etc.,  are  such  creatures,  of 
which  I  must  not  merely  allow  myself  to  say  that  they 
are  truths,  but  also  that  they  are  deceptions.     As  I 
once  willed  and  decreed  their  existence,  so  I  want  to 
have  license  to  will  their  non-existence  too  ;  I  must 
not  let  them  grow  over  my  head,  must  not  have  the 
weakness  to  let  them  become  something  "  absolute," 
whereby  they  would  be  eternalized  and  withdrawn  from 
my  power  and  decision.     With  that  I  should  fall  a 
prey  to  the  principle  of  stability,  the  proper  life-prin- 
ciple of  religion,  which  concerns  itself  with  creating 
"  sanctuaries  that  must  not  be  touched,"  "  eternal 
truths," — in  short,  that  which  shall  be  "  sacred,"- 
and  depriving  you  of  what  is  yours. 

The  object  makes  us  into  possessed  men  in  its 
sacred  form  just  as  in  its  profane ;  as  a  supersensuous 
object,  just  as  it  does  as  a  sensuous  one.     The  appetite 
or  mania  refers  to  both,  and  avarice  and  longing  for 
heaven  stand  on  a  level.     When  the  rationalists 
wanted  to  win  people  for  the  sensuous  world,  Lavater 
preached  the  longing  for  the  invisible.     The  one 
party  wanted  to  call  forth  emotion,  the  other  motion, 
activity. 

The  conception  of  objects  is  altogether  diverse,  even 


THE  OWNER  451 

as  God,  Christ,  the  world,  etc.,  were  and  are  conceived 
of  in  the  most  manifold  wise.      In  this  every  one  is  a 
"  dissenter,"  and  after  bloody  combats  so  much  has 
at  last  been  attained,  that  opposite  views  about  one 
and  the  same  object  are  no  longer  condemned  as  here- 
sies worthy  of  death.     The  "dissenters"  reconcile 
themselves  to  each  other.     But  why  should  I  only  dis- 
sent (think  otherwise)  about  a  thing?  why  not  push 
the  thinking  otherwise  to  its  last  extremity,  viz., 
that  of  no  longer  having  any  regard  at  all  for  the 
thing,  and  therefore  thinking  its  nothingness,  crushing 
it?     Then  the  conception  itself  has  an  end,  because 
there  is  no  longer  anything  to  conceive  of.     Why  am 
I  to  say,  let  us  suppose,  "  God  is  not  Allah,  not 
Brahma,  not  Jehovah,  but — God";  but  not,  "God  is 
nothing  but  a  deception"?      Why  do  people  brand 
me  if  I  am  an  "  atheist"?      Because  they  put  the 
creature  above  the  creator  ("They  honor  and  serve  the 
creature  more  than  the  Creator"*)  and  require  a  rul- 
ing- object,  that  the  subject  may  be  right  submissive. 
I  am  to  bend  beneath  the  absolute,  I  ought  to. 

By  the  "  realm  of  thoughts  "  Christianity  has  com- 
pleted itself;  the  thought  is  that  inwardness  in  which 
all  the  world's  lights  go  out,  all  existence  becomes  ex- 
istenceless,  the  inward  man  (the  heart,  the  head)  is  all 
in  all.     This  realm  of  thoughts  awaits  its  deliverance, 
awaits,  like  the  Sphinx,  CEdipus's  key-word  to  the 
riddle,  that  it  may  enter  in  at  last  to  its  death.     I  am 
the  annihilator  of  its  continuance,  for  in  the  creator's 
realm  it  no  longer  forms  a  realm  of  its  own,  not  a 


452  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

State  in  the  State,  but  a  creature  of  my  creative — 
thoughtlessness.     Only  together  and  at  the  same  time 
with  the  benumbed  thinking  world  can  the  world  of 
Christians,  Christianity  and  religion  itself,  come  to  its 
downfall;  only  when  thoughts  run  out  are  there  no 
more  believers.     To  the  thinker  his  thinking  is  a 
"  sublime  labor,  a  sacred  activity,"  and  it  rests  on 
a  firm  faith,  the  faith  in  truth.     At  first  praying  is  a 
sacred  activity,  then  this  sacred  "  devotion  "  passes 
over  into  a  rational  and  reasoning  "  thinking,"  which 
however,  likewise  retains  in  the  "  sacred  truth  "  its  un 
derangeable  basis  of  faith,  and  is  only  a  marvelous 
machine  that  the  spirit  of  truth  winds  up  for  its  ser- 
vice.    Free  thinking  and  free  science  busy  me — for  it 
is  not  I  that  am  free,  not  /  that  busy  myself,  but 
thinking  is  free  and  busies  me — with  heaven  and  the 
heavenly  or  "divine";  that  is,  properly,  with  the 
world  and  the  worldly,  not  this  world  but  "  another  " 
world;  it  is  only  the  reversing  and  deranging  of 
the  world,  a  busying  with  the  essence  of  the  world, 
therefore  a  derangement.     The  thinker  is  blind  to  the 
immediateness  of  things,  and  incapable  of  master- 
ing them :  he  does  not  eat,  does  not  drink,  does  not 
enjoy;  for  the  eater  and  drinker  is  never  the  thinker, 
nay,  the  latter  forgets  eating  and  drinking,  his  getthij 
on  in  life,  the  cares  of  nourishment,  etc.,  over  his 
thinking;  he  forgets  it  as  the  praying  man  too  for- 
gets it.     This  is  why  he  appears  to  the  forceful  son  of 
nature  as  a  queer  Dick,  a  fool, — even  if  he  does  look 
upon  him  as  holy,  just  as  lunatics  appeared  so  to  the 
ancients.     Free  thinking  is  lunacy,  because  it  is  pure 
movement  of  the  inwardness,  of  the  merely  inward 


THE  OWNER  453 

man,  which  guides  and  regulates  the  rest  of  the  man. 
The  shaman  and  the  speculative  philosopher  mark  the 
bottom  and  top  rounds  on  the  ladder  of  the  inward 
man,  the — Mongol.     Shaman  and  philosopher  fight 
with  ghosts,  demons,  spirits,  gods. 

Totally  different  from  this  free  thinking  is  own 
thinking,  my  thinking,  a  thinking  which  does  not 
guide  me,  but  is  guided,  continued,  or  broken  off,  by 
me  at  my  pleasure.     The  distinction  of  this  own 
thinking  from  free  thinking  is  similar  to  that  of  own 
sensuality,  which  I  satisfy  at  pleasure,  from  free,  un- 
ruly sensuality  to  which  I  succumb. 

Feuerbach,  in  the  "  Principles  of  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Future,"  is  always  harping  upon  being.     In  this 
he  too,  with  all  his  antagonism  to  Hegel  and  the 
absolute  philosophy,  is  stuck  fast  in  abstraction ;  for 
"  being  "  is  abstraction,  as  is  even  "  the  I."     Only  / 
am  not  abstraction  alone:  /  am  all  in  all,  conse- 
quently even  abstraction  or  nothing;  I  am  all  and 
nothing;  I  am  not  a  mere  thought,  but  at  the  same 
time  I  am  full  of  thoughts,  a  thought- world.     Hegel 
condemns  the  own,  mine,* — "opinion."!     "  Absolute 
thinking  "  is  that  thinking  which  forgets  that  it  is  my 
thinking,  that  /  think,  and  that  it  exists  only  through 
me.     But  I,  as  I,  swallow  up  again  what  is  mine,  am 
its  master;  it  is  only  my  opinion,  which  I  can  at  any 
moment  change,  i.  e.  annihilate,  take  back  into  my- 
self, and  consume.     Feuerbach  wants  to  smite  Hegel's 
"  absolute  thinking  "  with  nnconquered  being.      But 
in  me  being  is  as  much  conquered  as  thinking  is.      It 


[das  Me inigv]  t  [die—  '  Meinun g 


454  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

is  my  being,  as  the  other  is  my  thinking. 

With  this,  of  course,  Feuerbach  does  not  get  further 
than  to  the  proof,  trivial  in  itself,  that  I  require  the 
senses  for  everything,  or  that  I  cannot  entirely  do 
without  these  organs.     Certainly  I  cannot  think  if  I 
do  not  exist  sensuously.     But  for  thinking  as  well  as 
for  feeling,  and  so  for  the  abstract  as  well  as  for  the 
sensuous,  I  need  above  all  things  myself,  this  quite 
particular  myself,  this  unique  myself.     If  I  were  not 
this  one,  e.  g.  Hegel,  I  should  not  look  at  the  world 
as  I  do  look  at  it,  I  should  not  pick  out  of  it  that 
'philosophical  system  which  just  I  as  Hegel  do,  etc.'    I 
should  indeed  have  senses,  as  do  other  people  too,  but 
I  should  not  utilize  them  as  I  do. 

Thus  the  reproach  is  brought  up  against  Hegel  by 
Feuerbach  *  that  he  misuses  language,  understanding 
by  many  words  something  else  than  what  natural  con- 
sciousness takes  them  for;  and  yet  he  too  commits  the 
same  fault  when  he  gives  the  "  sensuous  "  a  sense  of 
unusual  eminence.     Thus  it  is  said,  p.  69,  "  the  sensu- 
ous is  not  the  profane,  the  destitute  of  thought,  the 
obvious,  that  which  is  understood  of  itself."     But,  if 
it  is  the  sacred,  the  full  of  thought,  the  recondite,  that 
which  can  be  understood  only  through  mediation, — 
well,  then  it  is  no  longer  what  people  call  the  sensuous. 
The  sensuous  is  only  that  which  exists  for  the  senses; 
what,  on  the  other  hand,  is  enjoyable  only  to  those 
who  enjoy  with  more  than  the  senses,  who  go  beyond 
sense-enjoyment  or  sense-reception,  is  at  most  mediated 
or  introduced  by  the  senses,  i.  e.  the  senses  constitute 

*  P.  47  ff. 


THE  OWNER  455 

a  condition  for  obtaining  it,  but  it  is  no  longer  any- 
thing sensuous.     The  sensuous,  whatever  it  may  be, 
when  taken  up  into  me  becomes  something  non-sensu- 
ous, which,  however,  may  again  have  sensuous  effects, 
•  by  the  stirring  of  my  emotions  and  my  blood. 

It  is  well  that  Feuerbach  brings  sensuousness  to 
honor,  but  the  only  thing  he  is  able  to  do  with  it  is  to 
clothe  the  materialism  of  his  "  new  philosophy  "  with 
what  had  hitherto  been  the  property  of  idealism,  the 
"  absolute  philosophy."     As  little  as  people  let  it 
be  talked  into  them  that  one  can  live  on  the  "  spirit- 
ual "  alone  without  bread,  so  little  will  they  believe 
his  word  that  as  a  sensuous  being  one  is  already  every- 
thing, and  so  spiritual,  full  of  thoughts,  etc. 

Nothing  at  all  is  justified  by  being.     What  is 
thought  of  is  as  well  as  what  is  not  thought  of;  the 
stone  jn  the  street  is,  and  my  notion  of  it  is  too. 
Both  are  only  in  different  spaces,  the  former  in  airy 
space,  the  latter  in  my  head,  in  me;  for  I  am  space 
like  the  street. 

The  professionals,  the  privileged,  brook  no  freedom 
of  thought,  i.  e.  no  thoughts  that  do  not  come  from 
the  "  Giver  of  all  good,"  be  he  called  God,  pope, 
church,  or  whatever  else.     If  anybody  has  such  illegiti- 
mate thoughts,  he  must  whisper  them  into  his  confes- 
sor's ear,  and  have  himself  chastised  by  him  till  the 
slave-whip  becomes  unendurable  to  the  free  thoughts. 
In  other  ways  too  the  professional  spirit  takes  care 
that  free  thoughts  shall  not  come  at  all:  first  and  fore- 
most, by   a  wise  education.      He  on  whom  the  prin- 
ciples of  morality  have  been  duly  inculcated  never  be- 
comes free  again  from  moralizing  thoughts,  and  rob- 


456  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

bery,  perjury,  overreaching,  and  the  like,  remain  to 
him  fixed  ideas  against  which  no  freedom  of  thought 
protects  him.     He  has  his  thoughts  "from  above," 
and  gets  no  further. 

It  is  different  with  the  holders  of  concessions  or 
patents.     Every  one  must  be  able  to  have  and  form 
thoughts  as  he  will.     If  he  has  the  patent,  or  the  con 
cession,  of  a  capacity  to  think,  he  needs  no  special 
privilege.     But,  as  "all  men  are  rational,"  it  is  free 
to  every  one  to  put  into  his  head  any  thoughts  what- 
ever, and,  to  the  extent  of  the  patent  of  his  natural  en- 
dowment, to  have  a  greater  or  less  wealth  of  thoughts. 
Now  one  hears  the  admonitions  that  one  "is  to  honor 
all  opinions  and  convictions,"  that  "  every  conviction 
is  authorized,"  that  one  must  be  "  tolerant  to  the 
views  of  others,"  etc. 

But  "your  thoughts  are  not  my  thoughts,  and  your 
ways  are  not  my  ways."     Or  rather,  I  mean  the  re- 
verse :  Your  thoughts  are  my  thoughts,  which  I  dispose 
of  as  I  will,  and  which  I  strike  down  unmercifully ; 
they  are  my  property,  which  I  annihilate  as  I  list.     I 
do  not  wait  for  authorization  from  you  first,  to  decom- 
pose and  blow  away  your  thoughts.     It  does  not  mat- 
ter to  me  that  you  call  these  thoughts  yours  too,  they 
remain  mine  nevertheless,  and  how  I  will  proceed  with 
them  is  my  affair,  not  a  usurpation.     It  may  please 
me  to  leave  you  in  your  thoughts;  then  I  keep  still. 
Do  you  believe  thoughts  fly  around  free  like  birds,  so 
that  every  one  may  get  himself  some  which  he  may 
then  make  good  against  me  as  his  inviolable  property? 
What  is  flying  around  is  all — mine. 

Do  you  believe  you  have  your  thoughts  for  your- 


THE  OWNER  457 

selves  and  need  answer  to  no  one  for  them,  or,  as  you 
do  also  say,  you  have  to  give  an  account  of  them  to 
God  only?      No,  your  great  and  small  thoughts  belong 
to  me,  and  I  handle  them  at  my  pleasure. 

The  thought  is  my  own  only  when  I  have  no  mis- 
giving about  bringing  it  in  danger  of  death  every 
moment,  when  I  do  not  have  to  fear  its  loss  as  a  loss 
for  me,  a  loss  of  me.     The  thought  is  my  own  only 
when  I  can  indeed  subjugate  it,  but  it  never  can  sub- 
jugate me,  never  fanaticizes  me,  makes  me  the  tool  of 
its  realization. 

So  freedom  of  thought  exists  when  I  can  have  all 
}x>ssible  thoughts;  but  the  thoughts  become  property 
only  by  not  being  able  to  become  masters.     In  the 
time  of  freedom  of  thought,  thoughts  (ideas)  rule ; 
but,  if  I  attain  to  property  in  thought,  they  stand  as 
my  creatures. 

If  the  hierarchy  had  not  so  penetrated  men  to  the 
innermost  as  to  take  from  them  all  courage  to  pursue 
free  thoughts,  i.  e.  thoughts  perhaps  displeasing  to 
God,  one  would  have  to  consider  freedom  of  thought 
just  as  empty  a  word  as,  say,  a  freedom  of  digestion. 

According  to  the  professionals'  opinion,  the 
thought  is  given  to  me;  according  to  the  freethinkers', 
/  seek  the  thought.     There  the  truth  is  already  found 
and  extant,  only  I  must — receive  it  from  its  Giver  by 
grace;  here  the  truth  is  to  be  sought  and  is  my  goal, 
lying  in  the  future,  toward  which  I  have  to  run. 

In  both  cases  the  truth  (the  true  thought)  lies  out- 
side me,  and  I  aspire  to  get  it,  be  it  by  presentation 
(grace),  be  it  by  earning  (merit  of  my  own).     There- 
fore, (1)  The  truth  is  a  privilege,  (2)  No,  the  way  to 


458  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

it  is  patent  to  all,  and  neither  the  Bible  nor  the  holy 
fathers  nor  the  church  nor  any  one  else  is  in  possessi( 
of  the  truth ;  but  one  can  come  into  possession  of  it 
— speculating. 

Both,  one  sees,  are  propertyless  in  relation  to  the 
truth:  they  have  it  either  as  &  fief  (for  the  "holy 
father,"  e.  g.,  is  not  a  unique  person;  as  unique  he  is 
this  Sixtus,  Clement,  etc.,  but  he  does  not  have  the 
truth  as  Sixtus,  Clement,  etc.,  but  as  "  holy  father," 
i.  e.  as  a  spirit)  or  as  an  ideal.    As  a  fief,  it  is  only  for 
a  few  (the  privileged) ;  as  an  ideal,  for  all  (the 
patentees). 

Freedom  of  thought,  then,  has  the  meaning  that  we 
do  indeed  all  walk  in  the  dark  and  in  the  paths  of 
error,  but  every  one  can  on  this  path  approach  the 
truth  and  is  accordingly  on  the  right  path  ("  All 
roads  lead  to  Rome,  to  the  world's  end.  etc.").     Hena 
freedom  of  thought  means  this  much,  that  the  true 
thought  is  not  my  own ;  for,  if  it  were  this,  how 
should  people  want  to  shut  me  off  from  it? 

Thinking  has  become  entirely  free,  and  has  laid 
down  a  lot  of  truths  which  /  must  accommodate  my- 
self to.     It  seeks  to  complete  itself  into  a  system  and 
to  bring  itself  to  an  absolute  "  constitution."     In  the 
State  e.  g.  it  seeks  for  the  idea,  say,-  till  it  has  brough 
out  the  "  rational  State,"  in  which  I  am  then  obliged 
to  be  suited;  in  man  (anthropology),  till  it  "has 
found  man." 

The  thinker  is  distinguished  from  the  believer  only 
by  believing  much  more  than  the  latter,  who  on  his 
part  thinks  of  much  less  as  signified  by  his  faith 
(creed).     The  thinker  has  a  thousand  tenets  of  faith 


THE  OWNER  439 

where  the  believer  gets  along  with  few;  but  the  former 
brings  colierence  into  his  tenets,  and  takes  the  coher- 
ence in  turn  for  the  scale  to  estimate  their  worth  by. 
If  one  or  the  other  does  not  fit  into  his  budget,  he 
throws  it  out. 

The  thinkers  run  parallel  to  the  believers  in  their 
pronouncements.     Instead  of  "  If  it  is  from  God  you 
will  not  root  it  out,"  the  word  is  "  If  it  is  from  the 
truth,  is  true,  etc.";  instead  of  "  Give  God  the  glory," 
— "  Give  truth  the  glory."     But  it  is  very  much  the 
same  to  me  whether  God  or  the  truth  wins;  first  and 
foremost  /  want  to  win. 

Aside  from  this,  how  is  an  "  unlimited  freedom  "  to 
be  thinkable  inside  of  the  State  or  society  ?     The  State 
may  well  protect  one  against  another,  but  yet  it  must 
not  let  itself  be  endangered  by  an  unmeasured  free- 
dom, a  so-called  unbridledness.     Thus  in  "  freedom  of 
instruction  "  the  State  declares  only  this, — that  it  is 
suited  with  every  one  who  instructs  as  the  State  (or, 
speaking  more  comprehensibly,  the  political  power)  . 
would  have  it.     The  point  for  the  competitors  is  this 
"  as  the  State  would  have  it."     If  the  clergy,  e.  g-., 
does  not  will  as  the  State  does,  then  it  itself  excludes 
itself  from  competition  (vid.  France).     The  limit 
that  is  necessarily  drawn  in  the  State  for  any  and  all 
competition  is  called  "  the  oversight  and  superintend- 
ence of  the  State."     In  bidding  freedom  of  instruction 
keep  within  the  due  bounds,  the  State  at  the  same 
time  fixes  the  scope  of  freedom  of  thought ;  because,  as 
a  rule,  people  do  not  think  farther  than  their  teachers 
have  thought. 

Hear  Minister  Guizot:  "The  great  difficulty  of 


460  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

to-day  is  the  guiding  and  dominating  of  the  mind. 
Formerly  the  church  fulfilled  this  mission  ;  now  it  is 
not  adequate  to  it.     It  is  from  the  university  that  this 
great  service  must  be  expected,  and  the  university  will 
not  fail  to  perform  it.     We,  the  government,  have  the 
duty  of  supporting  it  therein.     The  charter  calls  for 
the  freedom  of  thought  and  that  of  conscience."*     So, 
in  favor  of  freedom  of  thought  and  conscience,  the 
minister  demands  "  the  guiding  and  dominating  of  the 
mind." 

Catholicism  haled  the  examinee  before  the  forum  of 
ecclesiasticism,  Protestantism  before  that  of  biblical 
Christianity.     It  would  be  but  little  bettered  if  one 
haled  him  before  that  of  reason,  as  Huge,  e.  g.,  wants 
to.f     Whether  the  church,  the  Bible,  or  reason  (to 
which,  moreover,  Luther  and  Huss  already  appealed) 
is  the  sacred  authority  makes  no  difference  in 
essentials. 

The  "  question  of  our  time  "  does  not  become  solu- 
ble even  when  one  puts  it  thus:  Is  anything  general 
authorized,  or  only  the  individual?      Is  the  generality 
(such  as  State,  law,  custom,  morality,  etc.)  authorized, 
or  individuality?      It  becomes  soluble  for  the  first  time 
when  one  no  longer  asks  after  an  "  authorization  "  at 
all,  and  does  not  carry  on  a  mere  fight  against  "  privi- 
leges."— A  "  rational  "  freedom  of  teaching,  which 
"  recognizes  only  the  conscience  of  reason,"  $  does  not 
bring  us  to  the  goal;  we  require  an  egoistic  freedom 
of  teaching  rather,  a  freedom  of  teaching  for  all  own- 

*  Chamber  of  peers,  Apr.  25, 1844. 

t  "Anecdota,"  1.  120.  t  "Anecdota,"  1.  127. 


THE  OWNER  461 

ness,  wherein  7  become  audible  and  can  announce 
myself  unchecked.     That  I  make  myself  "  audible"  * 
this  alone  is  "reason,"  f  be  I  ever  so  irrational;  in  my 
making  myself  heard,  and  so  hearing  myself,  others  as 
well  as  I  myself  enjoy  me,  and  at  the  same  time  con- 
sume me. 

What  would  be  gained  if,  as  formerly  the  orthodox 
I,  the  loyal  I,  the  moral  I,  etc.,  was  free,  now  the 
rational  I  should  become  free?      Would  this  be  the 
freedom  of  me? 

If  I  am  free  as  "  rational  I,"  then  the  rational  in 
me,  or  reason,  is  free;  and  this  freedom  of  reason,  or 
freedom  of  the  thought,  was  the  ideal  of  the  Christian 
world  from  of  old.     They  wanted  to  make  thinking — 
and,  as  aforesaid,  faith  is  also  thinking,  as  thinking  is 
faith — free;  the  thinkers,  i.  e.  the  believers  as  well  as 
the  rational,  were  to  be  free;  for  the  rest  freedom  was 
impossible.      But  the  freedom  of  thinkers  is  the  "  free- 
dom of  the  children  of  God,"  and  at  the  same  time  the 
most  merciless — hierarchy  or  dominion  of  the  thought; 
for  /  succumb  to  the  thought.     If  thoughts  are  free,  I 
am  their  slave;  I  have  no  power  over  them,  and  am 
dominated  by  them.     But  I  want  to  have  the  thought, 
want  to  be  full  of  thoughts,  but  at  the  same  time  I 
want  to  be  thoughtless,  and,  instead  of  freedom  of 
thought,  I  preserve  for  myself  thoughtlessness. 

If  the  point  is  to  have  myself  understood  and  to 
make  communications,  then  assuredly  I  can  make  use 
only  of  human  means,  which  are  at  my  command 
because  I  am  at  the  same  time  man.     And  really  I 

*  [rcrnchmltar]  t  [  Vernunft] 


462  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

have  thoughts  only  as  man ;  as  I,  I  am  at  the  same 
time  thoughtless.*     He  who  cannot  get  rid  of  a 
thought  is  so  far  only  man,  is  a  thrall  of  language, 
this  human  institution,  this  treasury  of  human 
thoughts.     Language  or  "  the  word  "  tyrannizes 
hardest  over  us,  because  it  brings  up  against  us  a 
whole  army  oijixed  ideas.     Just  observe  yourself  in 
the  act  of  reflection,  right  now,  and  you  will  find  how 
you  make  progress  only  by  becoming  thoughtless  and 
speechless  every  moment.    You  are  not  thoughtless 
and  speechless  merely  in  (say)  sleep,  but  even  in  the 
deepest  reflection  ;  yes,  precisely  then  most  so.      And 
only  by  this  thoughtlessness,  this  unrecognized  "  free- 
dom of  thought "  or  freedom  from  the  thought,  are 
you  your  own.     Only  from  it  do  you  arrive  at  putting 
language  to  use  as  your  property. 

If  thinking  is  not  my  thinking,  it  is  merely  a  spun- 
out  thought ;  it  is  slave  work,  or  the  work  of  a  "  ser- 
vant obeying  at  the  word."     For  not  a  thought,  but  I, 
am  the  beginning  for  my  thinking,  arid  therefore  I  am 
its  goal  too,  even  as  its  whole  course  is  only  a  course 
of  my  self-enjoyment ;  for  absolute  or  free  thinking, 
on  the  other  hand,  thinking  itself  is  the  beginning, 
and  it  plagues  itself  with  propounding  this  beginning 
as  the  extremest  "abstraction"  (e.  g.  as  being). 
This  very  abstraction,  or  this  thought,  is  then  spun 
out  further. 

Absolute  thinking  is  the  affair  of  the  human  spirit, 
and  this  is  a  holy  spirit.      Hence  this  thinking  is  an 
affair  of  the  parsons,  who  have  "  a  sense  for  it,"  a  sense 

*  [  Literally  "  thought-rid."] 


THE  OWNER  463 

for  the  "highest  interests  of  mankind,"  for  "the 
spirit." 

To  the  believer,  truths  are  a  settled  thing,  a  fact; 
to  the  freethinker,  a  thing  that  is  still  to  be  settled. 
Be  absolute  thinking  ever  so  unbelieving,  its  incred- 
ulity has  its  limits,  and  there  does  remain  a  belief  in 
the  truth,  in  the  spirit,  in  the  idea  and  its  final  vic- 
tory: this  thinking  does  not  sin  against  the  holy 
spirit.     But  all  thinking  that  does  not  sin  against 
the  holy  spirit  is  belief  in  spirits  or  ghosts. 

I  can  as  little  renounce  thinking  as  feeling,  the 
spirit's  activity  as  little  as  the  activity  of  the  senses. 
As  feeling  is  our  sense  for  things,  so  thinking  is  our 
sense  for  essences  (thoughts).      Essences  have  their  ex- 
istence in  everything  sensuous,  especially  in  the  word. 
The  power  of  words  follows  that  of  things :  first  one  is 
coerced  by  the  rod,  afterward  by  conviction.     The 
might  of  things  overcomes  our  courage,  our  spirit; 
against  the  power  of  a  conviction,  and  so  of  the  word, 
even  the  rack  and  the  sword  lose  their  overpowering- 
ness  and  force.     The  men  of  conviction  are  the 
priestly  men,  who  resist  every  enticement  of  Satan. 

Christianity  took  away  from  the  things  of  this  world 
only  their  irresistibleness,  made  us  independent  of 
them.      In  like  manner  I  raise  myself  above  truths  and 
their  power:  as  I  am  supersensual,  so  I  am  super- 
true.     Before  me  truths  are  as  common  and  as  indiffer- 
ent as  things;  they  do  not  carry  me  away,  and  do  not 
inspire  me  with  enthusiasm.     There  exists  not  even 
one  truth,  not  right,  not  freedom,  humanity,  etc.,  that 
has  stability  before  me,  and  to  which  I  subject  myself. 
They  are  words,  nothing  but  words,  as  all  things  are 


464  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

to  the  Christian  nothing  but  "  vain  things."     In 
words  and  truths  (every  word  is  a  truth,  as  Hegel  as- 
serts that  one  cannot  tell  a  lie)  there  is  no  salvation 
for  me,  as  little  as  there  is  for  the  Christian  in  things 
and  vanities.     As  the  riches  of  this  world  do  not 
make  me  happy,  so  neither  do  its  truths.     It  is  now  no 
longer  Satan,  but  the  spirit,  that  plays  the  story  of 
the  temptation;  and  he  does  not  seduce  by  the  things 
of  this  world,  but  by  its  thoughts,  by  the  "  glitter  of 
the  idea." 

Along  with  worldly  goods,  all  sacred  goods  too  must 
be  put  away  as  no  longer  valuable. 

Truths  are  phrases,  ways  of  speaking,  words 
(Xoyos) ;  brought  into  connection,  or  into  an  articu- 
late series,  they  form  logic,  science,  philosophy. 

For  thinking  and  speaking  I  need  truths  and  words, 
as  I  do  foods  for  eating;  without  them  I  cannot  think 
nor  speak.     Truths  are  men's  thoughts,  set  down  in 
words  and  therefore  just  as  extant  as  other  things,  al- 
though extant  only  for  the  mind  or  for  thinking. 
They  are  human  institutions  and  human  creatures, 
and,  even  if  they  are  given  out  for  divine  revelations, 
there  still  remains  in  them  the  quality  of  alienness 
for  me ;  yes,  as  my  own  creatures  they  are  already 
alienated  from  me  after  the  act  of  creation. 

The  Christian  man  is  the  man  with  faith  in  think- 
ing, wljo  believes  in  the  supreme  dominion  of  thoughts 
and  wants  to  bring  thoughts,  so-called  "principles,"  to 
dominipn.     Many  a  one  does  indeed  test  the  thoughts, 
and  chooses  none  of  them  for  his  master  without 
criticism,  but  in  this  he  is  like  the  dog  who  sniffs  at 
people  to  smell  out  "  his  master  " :  he  is  always  aim- 


THE  OWNER  465 

ing  at  the  ruling  thought.     The  Christian  may  re- 
form and  revolt  an  infinite  deal,  may  demolish  the 
ruling  concepts  of  centuries;  he  will  always  aspire 
to  a  new  "  principle  "  or  new  master  again,   always 
set  up  a  higher  or  "deeper"  truth  again,  always  call 
forth  a  cult  again,  always  proclaim  a  spirit  called  to 
dominion,  lay  down  a  law  for  all. 

If  there  is  even  one  truth  only  to  which  man  has  to 
devote  his  life  and  his  powers  because  he  is  man,  then 
he  is  subjected  to  a  rule,  dominion,  law,  etc. ;  he  is  a 
servingman.     It  is  supposed  that,  e.  £\,  man,  human- 
ity, liberty,  etc.,  are  such  truths. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  can  say  thus:  Whether  you 
will  further  occupy  yourself  with  thinking  depends  on 
you;  only  know  that,  if 'in  your  thinking  you  would 
like  to  make  out  anything  worthy  of  notice,  many  hard 
problems  are  to  be  solved,  without  vanquishing  which 
you  cannot  get  far.     There  exists,  therefore,  no  duty 
and  no  calling  for  you  to  meddle  with  thoughts  (ideas, 
truths) ;  but,  if  you  will  do  so,  you  will  do  well  to 
utilize  what  the  forces  of  others  have  already  achieved 
toward  clearing  up  these  difficult  subjects. 

Thus,  therefore,  he  who  will  think  does  assuredly 
have  a  task,  which  he  consciously  or  unconsciously  sets 
for  himself  in  willing  that;  but  no  one  has  the  task  of 
thinking  or  of  believing. — In  the  former  case  it  may 
be  said,  You  do  not  go  far  enough,  you  have  a  narrow 
and  biased  interest,  you  do  not  go  to  the  bottom  of  the 
thing;  in  short,  you  do  not  completely  subdue  it.    But, 
on  the  other  hand,  however  far  you  may  come  at  any 
time,  you  are  still  always  at  the  end,  you  have  no  call 
to  step  farther,  and  you  can  have  it  as  you  will  or  as 


466  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

you  are  able.     It  stands  with  this  as  with  any  other 
piece  of  work,  which  you  can  give  up  when  the  humor 
for  it  wears  off.    Just  so,  if  you  can  no  longer  believe  a 
thing,  you  do  not  have  to  force  yourself  into  faith  or 
to  busy  yourself  lastingly  as  if  with  a  sacred  truth  of 
the  faith,  as  theologians  or  philosophers  do,  but  you 
can  tranquilly  draw  back  your  interest  from  it  and  let 
it  run.     Priestly  spirits  will  indeed  expound  this  your 
lack  of  interest  as  "  laziness,  thoughtlessness,  obdur- 
acy, self-deception,"  and  the  like.      But  do  you  just  let 
the  trumpery  lie,  notwithstanding.     No  thing,*  no 
so-called  "  highest  interest  of  mankind,"  no  "  sacred 
cause,"f  *s  worth  your  serving  it,  and  occupying  your- 
self with  it  for  its  sake;  you  may  seek  its  worth  in 
this  alone,  whether  it  is  worth  anything  to  you  for 
your  sake.     Become  like  children,  the  biblical  saying 
admonishes  us.      But  children  have  no  sacred  interest 
and  know  nothing  of  a  "  good  cause."     They  know 
all  the  more  accurately  what  they  have  a  fancy  for; 
and  they  think  over,  to  the  best  of  their  powers,  how 
they  are  to  arrive  at  it. 

Thinking  will  as  little  cease  as  feeling.     But  the 
power  of  thoughts  and  ideas,  the  dominion  of  theories 
and  principles,  the  sovereignty  of  the  spirit,  in  short 
the — hierarchy,  lasts  as  long  as  the  parsons,  i.  e.  theo- 
logians, philosophers,  statesmen,  philistines,  liberals, 
schoolmasters,  servants,  parents,  children,  married 
couples,  Proudhon,  George  Sand,  Bluntschli,  etc.,  etc., 
have  the  floor;  the  hierarchy  will  endure  as  long  as 
people  believe  in,  think  of,  or  even  criticise,  principles; 


[Sache] 


THE  OWNER  467 

for  even  the  most  inexorable  criticism,  which  under- 
mines all  current  principles,  still  does  finally  believe  in 
the  principle. 

Every  one  criticises,  but  the  criterion  is  different. 
People  run  after  the  "  right "  criterion.     The  right 
criterion  is  the  first  presupposition.     The  critic  starts 
from  a  proposition,  a  truth,  a  belief.     This  is  not  a 
creation  of  the  critic,  but  of  the  dogmatist;  nay,  com- 
monly it  is  actually  taken  up  out  of  the  culture  of  the 
time  without  further  ceremony,  like  e.  g.  "  liberty," 
"  humanity,"  etc.     The  critic  has  not  "  discovered 
man,"  but  this  truth  has  been  established  as  "  man  " 
by  the  dogmatist,  and  the  critic  (who,  besides,  may  be 
the  same  person  with  him)  believes  in  this  truth,  this 
article  of  faith.      In  this  faith,  and  possessed  by  this 
faith,  he  criticises. 

The  secret  of  criticism  is  some  "  truth  "  or  other: 
this  remains  its  energizing  mystery. 

But  I  distinguish  between  servile  and  own  criticism. 
If  I  criticise  under  the  presupposition  of  a  supreme 
being,  my  criticism  serves  the  being  and  is  carried  on 
for  its  sake:  if,  e.  g.,  I  am  possessed  by  the  belief  in  a 
"free  State,"  then  everything  that  has  a  bearing  on 
it  I  criticise  from  the  standpoint  of  whether  it  is  suit- 
able to  this  State,  for  I  love  this  State  ;  if  I  criticise 
as  a  pious  man,  then  for  me  everything  falls  into  the 
classes  of  divine  and  diabolical,  and  before  my  criti- 
cism nature  consists  of  traces  of  God  or  traces  of  the 
devil  (hence  names  like  Godsgift,  Godmount,  the 
Devil's  Pulpit,  etc.),  men  of  believers  and  unbelievers, 
etc.;  if  I  criticise  while  believing  in  man  as  the  "true 
essence,"  then  for  me  everything  falls  primarily  into 


468  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

the  classes  of  man  and  the  un-man,  etc. 

Criticism  has  to  this  day  remained  a  work  of  love : 
for  at  all  times  we  exercised  it  for  the  love  of  some 
being.     All  servile  criticism  is  a  product  of  love,  a 
possessedness,  and  proceeds  according  to  that  New 
Testament  precept,  "  Test  everything  and  hold  fast  the 
good."*     "The  good"  is  the  touchstone,  the  criterion. 
The  good,  returning  under  a  thousand  names  and 
forms,  remained  always  the  presupposition,  remained 
the  dogmatic  fixed  point  for  this  criticism,  remained 
the— fixed  idea. 

The  critic,  in  setting  to  work,  impartially  presup- 
poses the  "  truth,"  and  seeks  for  the  truth  in  the  be- 
lief that  it  is  to  be  found.     He  wants  to  ascertain  the 
true,  and  has  in  it  that  very  "good." 

Presuppose  means  nothing  else  than  put  a  thought 
in  front,  or  think  something  before  everything  else  and 
think  the  rest  from  the  starting-point  of  this  that  has 
been  thought,  i.  e.  measure  and  criticise  it  by  this. 
In  other  words,  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  thinking 
is  to  begin  with  something  already  thought.      If  think- 
ing began  at  all,  instead  of  being  begun,  if  thinking 
were  a  subject,  an  acting  personality  of  its  own,  as 
even  the  plant  is  such,  then  indeed  there  would  be  no 
abandoning  the  principle  that  thinking  must  begin 
with  itself.     But  it  is  just  the  personification  of  think- 
ing that  brings  to  pass  those  innumerable  errors.      In 
the  Hegelian  system  they  always  talk  as  if  thinking  or 
"  the  thinking  spirit "  (  i.  e.  personified  thinking, 
thinking  as  a  ghost)  thought  and  acted;  in  critical 

*  1  Thess.  5.  21. 


THE  OWNER  469 

liberalism  it  is  always  said  that  "criticism  "  does  this 
and  that,  or  else  that  "  self-consciousness  "  finds  this 
and  that.     But,  if  thinking  ranks  as  the  personal 
actor,  thinking  itself  must  be  presupposed;  if  criticism 
ranks  as  such,  a  thought  must  likewise  stand  in  front. 
Thinking  and  criticism  could  be  active  only  starting 
from  themselves,  would  have  to  be  themselves  the  pre- 
supposition of  their  activity,  as  without  being  they 
could  not  be  active.     But  thinking,  as  a  thing  presup- 
posed, is  a  fixed  thought,  a  dog-ma ;  thinking  and 
criticism,  therefore,  can  start  only  from  a  dogma,  i.  e. 
from  a  thought,  a  fixed  idea,  a  presupposition. 

With  this  we  come  back  again  to  what  was  enunci- 
ated above,  that  Christianity  consists  in  the  develop- 
ment of  a  world  of  thoughts,  or  that  it  is  the  proper 
"  freedom  of  thought,"  the  "  free  thought,"  the  "  free 
spirit."     The  "  true  "  criticism,  which  I  called  "  ser- 
vile," is  therefore  just  as  much  "  free  "  criticism,  for  it 
is  not  my  own. 

The  case  stands  otherwise  when  what  is  yours  is  not 
made  into  something  that  is  of  itself,  not  personified, 
not  made  independent  at,  a  "  spirit "  to  itself.      Your 
thinking  has  for  a  presupposition  not  "  thinking,"  but 
you.      But  thus  you  do  presuppose  yourself  after  all? 
Yes,  but  not  for  myself,  but  for  my  thinking.     Before 
my  thinking,  there  is — I.     From  this  it  follows  that 
my  thinking  is  not  preceded  by  a  thought,  or  that  my 
thinking  is  without  a  "  presupposition."      For  the  pre- 
supposition which  I  am  for  my  thinking  is  not  one 
made  by  thinking,  not  one  thought  of,  but  it  is  posited 
thinking  itself,  it  is  the  owner  of  the  thought,  and 
proves  only  that  thinking  is  nothing  more  than— prop- 


470  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

erty,  i.  e.  that  an  "  independent "  thinking,  a  "  think- 
ing spirit."  does  not  exist  at  all. 

This  reversal  of  the  usual  way  of  regarding  things 
might  so  resemble  an  empty  playing  with  abstractions 
that  even  those  against  whom  it  is  directed  would  ac- 
quiesce in  the  harmless  aspect  I  give  it,  if  practical 
consequences  were  not  connected  with  it. 

To  bring  these  into  a  concise  expression,  the  asser-  i 
tion  now  made  is  that  man  is  not  the  measure  of  all    J 
things,  but  I  am  this  measure.     The  servile  critic  has 
before  his  eye  another  being,  an  idea,  which  he  means 
to  serve;  therefore  he  only  slays  the  false  idols  for  his 
God.     What  is  done  for  the  love  of  this  being,  what 
else  should  it  be  but  a — work  of  love?      But  I,  when  I 
criticise,  do  not  even  have  myself  before  my  eyes,  but 
am  only  doing  myself  a  pleasure,  amusing  myself  ac- 
cording to  my  taste;  according  to  my  several  needs  I 
chew  the  thing  up  or  only  inhale  its  odor. 

The  distinction  between  the  two  attitudes  will  come 
out  still  more  strikingly  if  one  reflects  that  the  servile 
critic,  because  love  guides  him,  supposes  he  is  serving 
the  thing  [cause]  itself. 

The  truth,  or  "truth  in  general,"  people  are  bound 
not  to  give  up,  but  to  seek  for.     What  else  is  it  but 
the  etre  supreme,  the  highest  essence?      Even  "true 
criticism  "  would  have  to  despair  if  it  lost  faith  in  the 
truth.     And  yet  the  truth  is  only  a — thought;  but  it 
is  not  merely  "  a  "  thought,  but  the  thought  that  is 
above  all  thoughts,  the  irrefragable  thought;  it  is  the 
thought  itself,  which  gives  the  first  hallowing  to  all 
others;  it  is  the  consecration  of  thoughts,  the  "abso- 
lute," the  "sacred"  thought.     The  truth  wears  longer 


THE  OWNER  471 

than  all  the  gods;  for  it  is  only  in  the  truth's  service, 
and  for  love  of  it,  that  people  have  overthrown  the 
gods  and  at  last  God  himself.     "The  truth"  outlasts 
the  downfall  of  the  world  of  gods,  for  it  is  the  immor- 
tal soul  of  this  transitory  world  of  gods,  it  is  Deity 
itself. 

I  will  answer  Pilate's  question,  What  is  truth? 
Truth  is  the  free  thought,  the  free  idea,  the  free  spirit ; 
truth  is  what  is  free  from  you,  what  is  not  your  own, 
what  is  not  in  your  power.     But  truth  is  also  the 
completely  unindependent,  impersonal,  unreal,  and  in- 
corporeal; truth  cannot  step  forward  as  you  do,  can- 
not move,  change,  develop;  truth  awaits  and  receives 
everything  from  you,  and  itself  is  only  through  you ; 
for  it  exists  only — in  your  head.     You  concede  that 
the  truth  is  a  thought,  but  say  that  not  every  thought 
is  a  true  one,  or,  as  you  are  also  likely  to  express  it,  not 
every  thought  is  truly  and  really  a  thought.     And  by 
what  do  you  measure  and  recognize  the  thought? 
By  your  impotence,  to  wit,  by  your  being  no  longer 
able  to  make  any  successful  assault  on  it!      When  it 
overpowers  you,  inspires  you,  and  carries  you  away, 
then  you  hold  it  to  be  the  true  one.     Its  dominion 
over  you  certifies  to  you  its  truth ;  and,  when  it  pos- 
sesses you,  and  you  are  possessed  by  it,  then  you  feel 
well  with  it,  for  then  you  have  found  your — lord  and 
master.     When  you  were  seeking  the  truth,  what  did 
your  heart  then  long  for?      For  your  master!      You 
did  not  aspire  to  your  might,  but  to  a  Mighty  One, 
and  wanted  to  exalt  a  Mighty  One  ("  Exalt  ye  the 
Lord  our  God! ").     The  truth,  my  dear  Pilate,  is — 
the  Lord,  and  all  who  seek  the  truth  are  seeking  and 


472  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

praising  the  Lord.     Where  does  the  Lord  exist? 
Where  else  but  in  your  head?      He  is  only  spirit,  and, 
wherever  you  believe  you  really  see  him,  there  he  is  a 
— ghost;  for  the  Lord  is  merely  something  that  is 
thought  of,  and  it  was  only  the  Christian  pains  and 
agony  to  make  the  invisible  visible,  the  spiritual  cor- 
poreal, that  generated  the  ghost  and  was  the  frightful 
misery  of  the  belief  in  ghosts. 

As  long  as  you  believe  in  the  truth,  you  do  not  be- 
lieve in  yourself,  and  you  are  a — servant,  a — reli- 
gious man.     You  alone  are  the  truth,  or  rather,  you 
are  more  than  the  truth,  which  is  nothing  at  all  before 
you.     You  too  do  assuredly  ask  about  the  truth,  you 
too  do  assuredly  "  criticise,"  but  you  do  not  ask  about 
a  "  higher  truth," — to  wit,  one  that  should  be  higher 
than  you, — nor  criticise  according  to  the  criterion 
of  such  a  truth.     You  address  yourself  to  thoughts 
and  notions,  as  you  do  to  the  appearances  of  things, 
only  for  the  purpose  of  making  them  palatable  to  you, 
enjoyable  to  you,  and  your  own :  you  want  only  to 
subdue  them  and  become  their  owner,  you  want  to 
orient  yourself  and  feel  at  home  in  them,  and  you  find 
them  true,  or  see  them  in  their  true  light,  when  they 
can  no  longer  slip  away  from  you,  no  longer  have 
any  unseized  or  uncomprehended  place,  or  when  they 
are  right  for  you,  when  they  are  your  property.     If 
afterward  they  become  heavier  again,  if  they  wriggle 
themselves  out  of  your  power  again,  then  that  is  just 
their  untruth, — to  wit,  your  impotence.     Your  impo- 
tence is  their  power,  your  humility  their  exaltation. 
Their  truth,  therefore,  is  you,  or  is  the  nothing  which 
you  are  for  them  and  in  which  they  dissolve :  their 


THE  OWNER  473 

truth  is  their  nothingness.     - 

Only  as  the  property  of  me  do  the  spirits,  the 
truths,  get  to  rest ;  and  they  then  for  the  first  time 
really  are,  when  they  have  been  deprived  of  their 
sorry  existence  and  made  a  property  of  mine,  when 
it  is  no  longer  said  "  the  truth  develops  itself,  rules, 
asserts  itself ;  history  (also  a  concept)  wins  the  vic- 
tory," and  the  like.     The  truth  never  has  won  a  vic- 
tory, but  was  always  my  means  to  the  victory,  like  the 
sword  ("the  sword  of  truth").     The  truth  is  dead,  a 
letter,  a  word,  a  material  that  I  can  use  up.     All 
truth  by  itself  is  dead,  a  corpse  ;  it  is  alive  only  in  the 
same  way  as  my  lungs  are  alive, — to  wit,  in  the  mea- 
sure of  my  own  vitality.     Truths  are  material,  like 
vegetables  and  weeds;  as  to  whether  vegetable  or 
weed,  the  decision  lies  in  me. 

Objects  are  to  me  only  material  that  I  use  up. 
Wherever  I  put  my  hand  I  grasp  a  truth,  which  I 
trim  for  myself.     The  truth  is  certain  to  me,  and  I  do 
not  need  to  long  after  it.     To  do  the  truth  a  service 
is  in  no  case  my  intent;  it  is  to  me  only  a  nourish- 
ment for  my  thinking  head,  as  potatoes  are  for  my 
digesting  stomach,  or  as  a  friend  is  for  my  social  heart. 
As  long  as  I  have  the  humor  and  force  for  thinking, 
every  truth  serves  me  only  for  me  to  work  it  up  accord- 
ing to  my  powers.     As  reality  or  worldliness  is  "  vain 
and  a  thing  of  naught "  for  Christians,  so  is  the  truth 
for  me.     It  exists,  exactly  as  much  as  the  things  of  this 
world  go  on  existing  although  the  Christian  has 
proved  their  nothingness;  but  it  is  vain,  because  it 
has  its  value  not  in  itself  bui  in  me.      Of  itself  it  is 
valueless.     The  truth  is  a — creature. 


474  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

As  you  produce  innumerable  things  by  your  act- 
ivity, yes,  shape  the  earth's  surface  anew  and  set  up 
works  of  men  everywhere,  so  too  you  may  still  ascer- 
tain numberless  truths  by  your  thinking,  and  we  will 
gladly  take  delight  in  them.     Nevertheless,  as  I  do  not 
please  to  hand  myself  over  to  serve  your  newly  dis- 
covered machines  mechanically,  but  only  help  to  set 
them  running  for  my  benefit,  so  too  I  will  only  use 
your  truths,  without  letting  myself  be  used  for  their 
demands. 

All  truths  beneath  me  are  to  my  liking;  a  truth 
above  me,  a  truth  that  I  should  have  to  direct  myself 
by,  I  am  not  acquainted  with.     For  me  there  is  no 
truth,  for  nothing  is  more  than  I !      Not  even  my 
essence,  not  even  the  essence  of  man,  is  more  than  I ! 
than  I,  this  "  drop  in  the  bucket,"  this  "  insig- 
nificant man  " ! 

You  believe  that  you  have  done  the  utmost  when 
you  boldly  assert  that,  because  every  time  has  its  own 
truth,  there  is  no  "  absolute  truth."     Why,  with  this 
you  nevertheless  still  leave  to  each  time  its  truth,  and 
thus  you  quite  genuinely  create  an  "  absolute  truth," 
a  truth  that  no  time  lacks,  because  every  time,  how- 
ever its  truth  may  be,  still  has  a  "  truth."     . 

Is  it  meant  only  that  people  have  been  thinking  in 
every  time,  and  so  have  had  thoughts  or  truths,  and 
that  in  the  subsequent  time  these  were  other  than  they 
were  in  the  earlier?     No,  the  word  is  to  be  that  every 
time  had  its  "  truth  of  faith  " ;  and  in  fact  none  has 
yet  appeared  in  which  a  "higher  truth"  has  not  been 
recognized,  a  truth  that  people  believed  they  must 
subject  themselves  to  as  "  highness  and  majesty." 


THE  OWNER  475 

Every  truth  of  a  time  is  its  fixed  idea,  and,  if  people 
later  found  another  truth,  this  always  happened  only 
because  they  sought  for  another;  they  only  reformed 
the  folly  and  put  a  modern  dress  on  it.     For  they  did 
want — who  would  dare  doubt  their  justification  for 
this? — they  wanted  to  be  "  inspired  by  an  idea." 
They  wanted  to  be  dominated, — possessed,  by  a 
thought !     The  most  modern  ruler  of  this  kind  is 
"our  essence,"  or  "man." 

For  all  free  criticism  a  thought  was  the  criterion; 
for  own  criticism  I  am,  I  the  unspeakable,  and  so  not 
the  merely  thought-of;  for  what  is  merely  thought  of 
is  always  speakable,  because  word  and  thought  coin- 
cide.    That  is  true  which  is  mine,  untrue  that  whose 
own  I  am;  true,  e.  g.,  the  union;  untrue,  the  State 
and  society.     "  Free  and  true  "  criticism  takes  care 
for  the  consistent  dominion  of  a  thought,  an  idea,  a 
spirit;  "  own  "  criticism,  for  nothing  but  my  self-en- 
j<>//i/icnt.     But  in  this  the  latter  is  in  fact — and  we 
will  not  spare  it  this  "  ignominy  "!  — like  the  bestial 
criticism  of  instinct.     I,  like  the  criticising  beast,  am 
concerned  only  for  myself,  not  "for  the  cause."     /  am 
the  criterion  of  truth,  but  I  am  not  an  idea,  but  more 
than  idea,  i.  e.  unutterable.     My  criticism  is  not  a 
"  free  "  criticism,  not  free  from  me,  and  not  "  servile," 
not  in  the  service  of  an  idea,  but  an  own  criticism. 

True  or  human  criticism  makes  out  only  whether 
something  is  suitable  to  man,  to  the  true  man;  but  by 
own  criticism  you  ascertain  whether  it  is  suitable  to 
you. 

Free  criticism  busies  itself  with  ideas,  and  therefore 
is  ahvavs  theoretical.      However  it  may  rage  against 


476  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

ideas,  it  still  does  not  get  clear  of  them.     It  pitches 
into  the  ghosts,  but  it  can  do  this  only  as  it  holds 
them  to  be  ghosts.     The  ideas  it  has  to  do  with  do 
not  fully  disappear;  the  morning  breeze  of  a  new  day 
does  not  scare  them  away. 

The  critic  may  indeed  come  to  ataraxy  before  ideas, 
but  he  never  gets  rid  of  them,  i.  e.  he  will  never  com- 
prehend that  above  the  bodily  man  there  does  not  exist 
something  higher, — to  wit,  liberty,  his  humanity,  etc. 
He  always  has  a  "  calling  "  of  man  still  left,  "  human- 
ity."    And  this  idea  of  humanity  remains  unrealized, 
just  because  it  is  an  "  idea  "  and  is  to  remain  such. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  I  grasp  the  idea  as  my  idea, 
then  it  is  already  realized,  because  /  am  its  reality;  its 
reality  consists  in  the  fact  that  I,  the  bodily,  have  it. 

They  say.  the  idea  of  liberty  realizes  itself  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world.     The  reverse  is  the  case ;  this  idea 
is  real  as  a  man  thinks  it,  and  it  is  real  in  the  measure 
in  which  it  is  idea,  i.  e.  in  which  I  think  it  or  have 
it.     It  is  not  the  idea  of  liberty  that  develops  itself, 
but  men  develop  themselves,  and,  of  course,  in  this 
self-development  develop  their  thinking  too. 

In  short,  the  critic  is  not  yet  owner,  because  he  sti 
fights  with  ideas  as  with  powerful  aliens, — as  the 
Christian  is  not  owner  of  his  "  bad  desires  "  so  long 
as  he  has  to  combat  them;  for  him  who  contends 
against  vice,  vice  exists. 

Criticism  remains  stuck  fast  in  the  "  freedom  of 
knowing,"  the  freedom  of  the  spirit,  and  the  spirit 
gains  its  proper  freedom  when  it  fills  itself  with  the 
pure,  true  idea ;  this  is  the  freedom  of  thinking,  which 
cannot  be  without  thoughts. 


THE  OWNER  477 

Criticism  smites  one  idea  only  by  another,  e.  g. 
that  of  privilege  by  that  of  manhood,  or  that  of  ego- 
ism by  that  of  unselfishness. 

In  general,  the  beginning  of  Christianity  comes  on 
the  stage  again  in  its  critical  end,  egoism  being  com- 
bated here  as  there.     I  am  not  to  make  myself  (the 
individual)  count,  but  the  idea,  the  general. 

Why,  warfare  of  the  priesthood  with  egoism,  of  the 
spiritually-minded  with  the  worldly-minded,  consti- 
tutes the  substance  of  all  Christian  history.     In  the 
newest  criticism  this  war  only  becomes  all-embracing, 
fanaticism  complete.     Indeed,  neither  can  it  pass 
away  till  it  passes  thus,  after  it  has  had  its  life  and  its 
rage  out. 

Whether  what  I  think  and  do  is  Christian,  what  do 
I  care?      Whether  it  is  human,  liberal,  humane, 
whether  unhuman,  illiberal,  inhuman,  what  do  I  ask 
about  that?      If  only  it  accomplishes  what  I  want,  if 
only  I  satisfy  myself  in  it,  then  overlay  it  with  predi- 
cates as  you  will;  it  is  all  alike  to  me. 

Perhaps  I  too,  in  the  very  next  moment,  defend  my- 
self against  my  former  thoughts ;  I  too  am  likely  to 
change  suddenly  my  mode  of  action ;  but  not  on  ac- 
count of  its  not  corresponding  to  Christianity,  not  on 
account  of  its  running  counter  to  the  etsrnal  rights  of 
man,  not  on  account  of  its  affronting  the  idea  of  man- 
kind, humanity,  and  humanitarianism,  but — because  I 
am  no  longer  all  in  it,  because  it  no  longer  furnishes 
me  any  full  enjoyment,  because  I  doubt  the  earlier 
thought  or  no  longer  please  myself  in  the  mode  of 
action  just  now  practised. 


478  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

As  the  world  as  property  has  become  a  material 
with  which  I  undertake  what  I  will,  so  the  spirit  too 
as  property  must  sink  down  into  a  material  before 
which  I  no  longer  entertain  any  sacred  dread.     Then, 
firstly,  I  shall  shudder  no  more  before  a  thought,  let  it 
appear  as  presumptuous  and  "  devilish  "  as  it  will,  be- 
cause, if  it  threatens  to  become  too  inconvenient  and 
unsatisfactory  for  me,  its  end  lies  in  my  power;  but 
neither  shall  I  recoil  from  any  deed  because  there 
dwells  in  it  a  spirit  of  godlessness,  immorality,  wrong- 
fulness,  as  little  as  St.  Boniface  pleased  to  desist, 
through  religious  scrupulousness,  from  cutting  down 
the  sacred  oak  of  the  heathens.      If  the  things  of  the 
world  have  once  become  vain,  the  thoughts  of  the 
spirit  must  also  become  vain. 

No  thought  is  sacred,  for  let  no  thought  rank  as 
"  devotions";  *  no  feeling  is  sacred  (no  sacred  feeling 
of  friendship,  mother's  feelings,  etc.),  no  belief  is 
sacred.     They  are  all  alienable,  my  alienable  property, 
and  are  annihilated,  as  they  are  created,  by  me. 

The  Christian  can  lose  all  things  or  objects,  the 
most  loved  persons,  these  "  objects  "  of  his  love,  with- 
out giving  up  himself  (i.  e.,  in  the  Christian  sense,  his 
spirit,  his  soul)  as  lost.     The  owner  can  cast  from  hir 
all  the  thoughts  that  were  dear  to  his  heart  and  kin- 
dled his  zeal,  and  will  likewise  "  gain  a  thousandfold 
again,"  because  he,  their  creator,  remains. 

Unconsciously  and  involuntarily  we  all  strive  to- 
ward ownness,  and  there  will  hardly  be  one  among  us 
who  has  not  given  up  a  sacred  feeling,  a  sacred 


*  [Andacht,  a  compound  form  of  the  word  ''  thought."] 


THE  OWNER  479 

thought,  a  sacred  belief;  nay,  we  probably  meet  no 
one  who  could  not  still  deliver  himself  from  one  or 
another  of  his  sacred  thoughts.     All  our  contention 
against  convictions  starts  from  the  opinion  that  maybe 
we  are  capable  of  driving  our  opponent  out  of  his  in- 
trenchments  of  thought.     But  what  I  do  unconsciously 
I  half  do,  and  therefore  after  every  victory  over  a  faith 
I  become  again  the  prisoner  (possessed)  of  a  faith 
which  then  takes  my  whole  self  anew  into  its  service, 
and  makes  me  an  enthusiast  for  reason  after  I  have 
ceased  to  be  enthusiastic  for  the  Bible,  or  an  enthu- 
siast for  the  idea  of  humanity  after  I  have  fought  long 
enough  for  that  of  Christianity. 

Doubtless,  as  owner  of  thoughts,  I  shall  cover  my 
property  with  my  shield,  just  as  I  do  not,  as  owner 
of  things,  willingly  let  everybody  help  himself  to  them ; 
but  at  the  same  time  I  shall  look  forward  smilingly  to 
the  outcome  of  the  battle,  smilingly  lay  the  shield  on 
the  corpses  of  my  thoughts  and  my  faith,  smilingly 
triumph  when  I  am  beaten.     That  is  the  very  humor 
of  the  thing.     Every  one  who  has  "  sublimer  feelings  " 
is  able  to  vent  his  humor  on  the  pettinesses  of  men; 
but  to  let  it  play  with  all  "  great  thoughts,  sublime 
feelings,  noble  inspiration,  and  sacred  faith  "  presup- 
poses that  I  am  the  owner  of  all. 

If  religion  has  set  up  the  proposition  that  we  are 
sinners  altogether,  I  set  over  against  it  the  other:  we 
are  perfect  altogether!      For  we  are,  every  moment, 
all  that  we  can  be;  and  we  never  need  be  more. 
Since  no  defect  cleaves  to  us,  sin  has  no  meaning 
either.     Show  me  a  sinner  in  the  world  still,  if  no  one 
any  longer  needs  to  do  what  suits  a  superior!      If  I 


480  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

only  need  do  what  suits  myself,  I  am  no  sinner  if  I 
do  not  do  what  suits  myself,  as  I  do  not  injure  in  my- 
self a  "  holy  one  " ;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  to  be 
pious,  then  I  must  do  what  suits  God ;  if  I  am  to  act 
humanly,  I  must  do  what  suits  the  essence  of  man,  the 
idea  of  mankind,  etc.     What  religion  calls  the  "  sin- 
ner," humanitarianism  calls  the  "  egoist."     But,  once 
more:  if  I  need  not  do  what  suits  any  other,  is  the 
"  egoist,"  in  whom  humanitarianism  has  borne  to  it- 
self a  new-fangled  devil,  anything  more  than  a  piece 
of  nonsense?      The  egoist,  before  whom  the  humane 
shudder,  is  a  spook  as  much  as  the  devil  is:  he  exists 
only  as  a  bogie  and  phantasm  in  their  brain.      If 
they  were  not  unsophisticatedly  drifting  back  and 
forth  in  the  antediluvian  opposition  of  good  and  evil, 
to  which  they  have  given  the  modern  names  of  "  hu- 
man "  and  "  egoistic,"  they  would  not  have  freshened 
up  the  hoary  "  sinner  "  into  an  "  egoist "  either,  and 
put  a  new  patch  on  an  old  garment.     But  they  could 
not  do  otherwise,  for  they  hold  it  for  their  task  to  be 
"men."     They  are  rid  of  the  Good  One;  good  is 
left!* 

We  are  perfect  altogether,  and  on  the  whole  earth 
there  is  not  one  man  who  is  a  sinner!      There  are 
crazy  people  who  imagine  that  they  are  God  the 
Father,  God  the  Son,  or  the  man  in  the  moon,  and  so 
too  the  world  swarms  with  fools  who  seem  to  them- 
selves to  be  sinners;  but,  as  the  former  are  not  the 
man  in  the  moon,  so  the  latter  are — not  sinners. 
Their  sin  is  imaginary. 


*  [See  note  on  p.  112.] 


THE  OWNER  481 

Yet,  it  is  insidiously  objected,  their  craziness  or 
their  possessedness  is  at  least  their  sin.     Their  pos- 
sessedness  is  nothing  but  what  they — could  achieve, 
the  result  of  their  development,  just  as  Luther's  faith 
in  the  Bible  was  all  that  he  was— competent  to  make 
out.     The  one  brings  himself  into  the  madhouse  with 
his  development,  the  other  brings  himself  therewith 
into  the  Pantheon  and  to  the  loss  of — Valhalla. 

There  is  no  sinner  and  no  sinful  egoism! 

Get  away  from  me  with  your  "  philanthropy"! 
Creep  in,  you  philanthropist,  into  the  "  dens  of  vice," 
linger  awhile  in  the  throng  of  the  great  city:  will  you 
not  everywhere  find  sin,  and  sin,  and  again  sin? 
Will  you  not  wail  over  corrupt  humanity,  not  lament 
at  the  monstrous  egoism?      Will  you  see  a  rich  man 
without  finding  him  pitiless  and  "egoistic"?      Per- 
haps you  already  call  yourself  an  atheist,  but  you 
remain  true  to  the  Christian  feeling  that  a  camel  will 
sooner  go  through  a  needle's  eye  than  a  rich  man 
not  be  an  "  un-man."     How  many  do  you  see  any- 
how that  you  would  not  throw  into  the  "  egoistic 
mass  "  ?      What,  therefore,  has  your  philanthropy 
[love  of  man]  found  ?      Nothing  but  unlovable  men ! 
And  where  do  they  all  come  from  ?      From  you,  from 
your  philanthropy!      You  brought  the  sinner  with 
you  in  your  head,  therefore  you  found  him,  therefore 
you  inserted  him  everywhere.     Do  not  call  men  sin- 
ners, and  they  are  not:    you  alone  are  the  creator  of 
sinners;  you,  who  fancy  that  you  love  men,  are  the 
very  one  to  throw  them  into  the  mire  of  sin,  the  very 
one  to  divide  them  into  vicious  and  virtuous,  into  men 
and  un-men,  the  very  one  to  befoul  them  with  the 


482  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

slaver  of  your  possessedness;  for  you  love  not  men,  but 
man.    But  I  tell  you,  you  have  never  seen  a  sinner, 
you  have  only — dreamed  of  him. 

Self-enjoyment  is  embittered  to  me  by  my  thinking 
I  must  serve  another,  by  my  fancying  myself  under 
obligation  to  him,  by  my  holding  myself  called  to 
"self-sacrifice,"  "resignation,"  "enthusiasm."     All 
right:  if  I  no  longer  serve  any  idea,  any  "  higher 
essence,"  then  it  is  clear  of  itself  that  I  no  longer  serve 
any  man  either,  but — under  all  circumstances — myself. 
But  thus  I  am  not  merely  in  fact  or  in  being,  but  also 
for  my  consciousnesss,  the — unique.* 

There  pertains  to  you  more  than  the  divine,  the 
human,  etc. ;  yours  pertains  to  you. 

Look  upon  yourself  as  more  powerful  than  they  give 
you  out  for,  and  you  have  more  power;  look  upon 
yourself  as  more,  and  you  have  more. 

You  are  then  not  merely  called  to  everything  divine, 
entitled  to  everything  human,  but  owner  of  what  is 
yours,  i.  e.  of  all  that  you  possess  the  force  to  make 
your  own ;  f  i.  e.  you  are  appropriate  £  and  capacitated 
for  everything  that  is  yours. 

People  have  always  supposed  that  they  must  give 
me  a  destiny  lying  outside  myself,  so  that  at  last  they 
demanded  that  I  should  lay  claim  to  the  human  be- 
cause I  am  =  man.    This  is  the  Christian  magic 
circle.     Fichte's  ego  too  is  the  same  essence  outside 
me,  for  every  one  is  ego ;  and,  if  only  this  ego  has 
rights,  then  it  is  "  the  ego,"  it  is  not  I.     But  I  am  not 
an  ego  along  with  other  egos,  but  the  sole  ego:   I  am 

*  [Einzigel '  t  [eigen]  t  [geeignet] 


THE  OWNER  483 

unique.     Hence  my  wants  too  are  unique,  and  my 
deeds;  in  short,  everything  about  me  is  unique.     And 
it  is  only  as  this  unique  I  that  I  take  everything  for 
my  own,  as  I  set  myself  to  work,  and  develop  myself, 
only  as  this.     I  do  not  develop  man,  nor  as  man,  but, 
as  I,  I  develop — myself. 

This  is  the  meaning  of  the — unique  one. 


THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 


III 
THE  UNIQUE  ONE 

Pre-Christian  and  Christian  times  pursue  opposite 
goals;  the  former  wants  to  idealize  the  real,  the  latter 
to  realize  the  ideal;  the  former  seeks  the  "holy  spirit," 
the  latter  the  "  glorified  body."     Hence  the  former 
closes  with  insensitiveness  to  the  real,  with  "  con- 
tempt for  the  world  " ;  the  latter  will  end  with  the 
casting  off  of  the  ideal,  with  "  contempt  for  the  spirit."" 

The  opposition  of  the  real  and  the  ideal  \s  an  irrec- 
oncilable one,  and  the  one  can  never  become  the  other : 
if  the  ideal  became  the  real,  it  would  no  longer  'be  the 
ideal ;  and,  if  the  real  became  the  ideal,  the  ideal 
alone  would  be,  but  not  at  all  the  real.  •  The  oppo- 
sition of  the  two  is  not  to  be  vanquished  otherwise 
than  if  some  one  annihilates  both.     Only  in  this  "  some 
one,"  the  third  party,  does  the  opposition  find  its  end; 
otherwise  idea  and  reality  will  ever  fail  to  coincide. 
The  idea  cannot  be  so  realized  as  to  remain  idea,  but 
is  realized  only  when  it  dies  as  idea ;  and  it  is  the 
same  with  the  real. 

But  now  we  have  before  us  in  the  ancients  adherents 
of  the  idea,  in  the  moderns  adherents  of  reality. 
Neither  can  get  clear  of  the  opposition,  and  both  pine 
only,  the  one  party  for  the  spirit,  and,  when  this  crav- 


THE  UNIQUE  ONE  485 

ing  of  the  ancient  world  seemed  to  be  satisfied  and 
this  spirit  to  have  come,  the  others  immediately  for  the 
secularization  of  this  spirit  again,  which  must  forever 
remain  a  "  pious  wish." 

The  pious  wish  of  the  ancients  was  sanctity,  the 
pious  wish  of  the  moderns  is  corporeity.      But,  as  an- 
tiquity had  to  go  down  if  its  longing  was  to  be  satisfied 
(for  it  consisted  only  in  the  longing),  so  too  corporeity 
can  never  be  attained  within  the  ring  of  Christian- 
ness.     As  the  trait  of  sanctification  or  purification  goes 
through  the  old  world  (the  washings,  etc.),  so  that  of 
incorporation  goes  through  the  Christian  world:  God 
plunges  down  into  this  world,  becomes  flesh,  and 
wants  to  redeem  it,  i.  e.  fill  it  with  himself;  but,  since 
he  is  "the  idea"  or  "the  spirit,"  people  (e.  g.  Hegel) 
in  the  end  introduce  the  idea  into  everything,  into  the 
world,  and  prove  "  that  the  idea  is,  that  reason  is,  in 
everything."     "  Man  "  corresponds  in  the  culture  of 
to-day  to  what  the  heathen  Stoics  set  up  as  "  the  wise 
man";  the  latter,  like  the  former,  a — -Jleshless  being. 
The  unreal  "  wise  man,"  this  bodiless  "  holy  one  "  of 
the  Stoics,  became  a  real  person,  a  bodily  "  Holy 
One,"  in  God  made  flesh ;  the  unreal  "  man,"  the 
bodiless  ego,  will  become  real  in  the  corporeal  ego,  in 
me. 

There  winds  its  way  through  Christianity  the  ques- 
tion about  the  "  existence  of  God,"  which,  taken  up 
ever  and  ever  again,  gives  testimony  that  the  craving 
for  existence,  corporeity,  personality,  reality,  was 
incessantly  busying  the  heart  because  it  never  found  a 
satisfying  solution.     At  last  the  question  about  the 
existence  of  God  fell,  but  only  to  rise  up  again  in  the 


486  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

proposition  that  the  "divine"  had  existence  (Feuer- 
bach).      But  this  too  has  no  existence,  and  neither  will 
the  last  refuge,  that  the  "  purely  human  "  is  realiz- 
able, afford  shelter  much  longer.     No  idea  has  exist- 
ence, for  none  is  capable  of  corporeity.     The  scholastic 
contentiorf  of  realism  and  nominalism  has  the  same 
content;  in  short,  this  spins  itself  out  through  all 
Christian  history,  and  cannot  end  in  it. 

The  world  of  Christians  is  working  at  realizing 
ideas  in  the  individual  relations  of  life,  the  institutions 
and  laws  of  the  Church  and  the  State;  but  they  make 
resistance,  and  always  keep  back  something  unem-    • 
bodied  (unrealizable).     Nevertheless  this  embodiment 
is  restlessly  rushed  after,  no  matter  in  what  degree 
corporeity  constantly  fails  to  result. 

For  realities  matter  little  to  the  realizer,  but  it  mat- 
ters everything  that  they  be  realizations  of  the  idea. 
Hence  he  is  ever  examining  anew  whether  the  realized 
does  in  truth  have  the  idea,  its  kernel,  dwelling  in  it; 
and  in  testing  the  real  he  at  the  same  time  tests  the 
idea,  whether  it  is  realizable  as  he  thinks  it,  or  is  only 
thought  by  him  incorrectly,  and  for  that  reason 
unfeasibly. 

The  Christian  is  no  longer  to  care  for  family,  State, 
etc.,  as  existences;  Christians  are  not  to  sacrifice  them- 
selves for  these  "  divine  things  "  like  the  ancients,  but 
these  are  only  to  be  utilized  to  make  the  spirit  alive  in 
them.     The  real  family  has  become  indifferent,  and 
there  is  to  arise  out  of  it  an  ideal  one  which  would 
then  be  the  "  truly  real,"  a  sacred  family,  blessed  by 
God,  or,  according  to  the  liberal  way  of  thinking,  a 
"  rational  "  family.     With  the  ancients  family,  State, 


THE  UNIQUE  ONE  48? 

fatherland,  etc.,  is  divine  as  a  thing  extant ;  with  the 
moderns  it  is  still  awaiting  divinity,  as  extant  it  is 
only  sinful,  earthly,  and  has  still  to  be  "  redeemed," 
i.  e.  to  become  truly  real.     This  has  the  following 
meaning:  The  family,  etc.,  is  not  the  extant  and  real, 
but  the  divine,  the  idea,  is  extant  and  real;  whether 
this  family  will  make  itself  real  by  taking  up  the  truly 
real,  the  idea,  is  still  unsettled.     It  is  not  the  individ- 
ual's task  to  serve  the  family  as  the  divine,  but,  re- 
versely, to  serve  the  divine  and  to  bring  to  it  the  still 
undivine  family,  i.  e.  to  subject  everything  in  the 
idea's  name,  to  set  up  the  idea's  banner  everywhere,  to 
bring  the  idea  to  real  efficacy. 

But,  since  the  concern  of  Christianity,  as  of  anti- 
quity, is  for  the  divine,  they  always  come  out  at  this 
again  on  their  opposite  ways.     At  the  end  of  heathen- 
ism  the  divine  becomes  the  extramundane,  at  the  end 
of  Christianity  the  intramundane.      Antiquity  does 
not  succeed  in  putting  it  entirely  outside  the  world, 
and,  when  Christianity  accomplishes  this  task,  the 
divine  instantly  longs  to  get  back  into  the  world  and 
wants  to  "  redeem  "  the  world.     But  within  Christian- 
ity it  does  not  and  cannot  come  to  this,  that  the 
divine  as  intramundane  should  really  become  the 
mundane  itself:  there  is  enough  left  that  does  and 
must  maintain  itself  unpenetrated  as  the  "  bad,"  irra- 
tional, accidental,  "  egoistic,"  the  "  mundane  "  in  the 
bad  sense.     Christianity  begins  with  God's  becoming 
man,  and  carries  on  its  work  of  conversion  and  re- 
demption through  all  time  in  order  to  prepare  for  God 
a  reception  in  all  men  and  in  everything  human,  and 
to  penetrate  everything  with  the  spirit:  it  sticks  to 


488  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

preparing  a  place  for  the  "  spirit." 

When  the  accent  was  at  last  laid  on  Man  or  man- 
kind, it  was  again  the  idea  that  they  "pronounced 
eternal."     "  Man  does  not  die!  "     They  thought  they 
had  now  found  the  reality  of  the  idea:  Man  is  the 
I  of  history,  of  the  world's  history  ;  it  is  he,  this 
ideal,  that  really  develops,  i.  e.  realizes,  himself.     He 
is  the  really  real  and  corporeal  one,  for  history  is  his 
body,  in  which  individuals  are  only  members.     Christ 
is  the  I  of  the  world's  history,  even  of  the  pre-Chris- 
tian; in  modern  apprehension  it  is  man,  the  figure  of 
Christ  has  developed  into  the  figure  of  man:  man  as 
such,  man  absolutely,  is  the  *'  central  point"  of  his- 
tory.    In  "  man  "  the  imaginary  beginning  returns 
again;  for  "  man  "  is  as  imaginarv  as  Christ  is. 
"  Man,"  as  the  I  of  the  world's  history,  closes  the 
cycle  of  Christian  apprehensions. 

Christianity's  magic  circle  would  be  broken  if  the 
strained  relation  between  existence  and  calling,  i.  e. 
between  me  as  I  am  and  me  as  I  should  be,  ceased;  it 
persists  only  as  the  longing  of  the  idea  for  its  bodili- 
ness,  and  vanishes  with  the  relaxing  separation  of  the 
two:  only  when  the  idea  remains — idea,  as  man  or 
mankind  is  indeed  a  bodiless  idea,  is  Christianity  still 
extant.     The  corporeal  idea,  the  corporeal  or  "  com- 
pleted "  spirit,  floats  before  the  Christian  as  "  the  end 
of  the  days  "  or  as  the  "  goal  of  history  " ;  it  is  not 
present  time  to  him. 

The  individual  can  only  have  a  part  in  the  found- 
ing of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  or,  according  to  the 
modern  notion  of  the  same  thing,  in  the  development 
and  history  of  humanity;  and  only  so  far  as  he  has  a 


THE  UNIQUE  ONE  489 

part  in  it  does  a  Christian,  or  according  to  the  modern 
expression  human,  value  pertain  to  him;  for  the  rest 
he  is  dust  and  a  worm-bag. 

That  the  individual  is  of  himself  a  world's  history, 
and  possesses  his  property  in  the  rest  of  the  world's 
history,  goes  beyond  what  is  Christian.     To  the  Chris- 
tian the  world's  history  is  the  higher  thing,  because  it 
is  the  history  of  Christ  or  "  man  ";  to  the  egoist  only 
his  history  has  value,  because  he  wants  to  develop  only 
himself,  not  the  mankind-idea,  not  God's  plan,  not  the 
purposes  of  Providence,  not  liberty,  and  the  like.      He 
does  not  look  upon  himself  as  a  tool  of  the  idea  or  a 
vessel  of  God,  he  recognizes  no  calling,  he  does  not 
fancy  that  he  exists  for  the  further  -development  of 
mankind  and  that  he  must  contribute  his  mite  to  it, 
but  he  lives  himself  out,  careless  of  how  well  or  ill  hu- 
manity may  fare  thereby.      If  it  were  not  open  to  con- 
fusion with  the  idea  that  a  state  of  nature  is  to  be 
praised,  one  might  recall  Lenau's  "  Three  Gypsies."- 
What,  am  I  in  the  world  to  realize  ideas?     To  do  my 
part  by  my  citizenship,  say,  toward  the  realization 
of  the  idea  "  State,"  or  by  marriage,  as  husband  and 
father,  to  bring  the  idea  of  the  family  into  an  exist- 
ence?     What  does  such  a  calling  concern  me!      I  live 
after  a  calling  as  little  as  the  flower  grows  and  gives 
fragrance  after  a  calling. 

The  ideal  "  Man  "  is  realized  when  the  Christian 
apprehension  turns  about  and  becomes  the  proposition, 
"  I,  this  unique  one,  am  man."     The  conceptual  ques- 
tion, "  what  is  man  ?  " — has  then  changed  into  the 
personal  question,  "  who  is  man  ?  "     With  "  what " 
the  concept  was  sought  for,  in  order  to  realize  it;  with 


490  THE  EGO  AND  HIS  OWN 

"  who  "  it  is  no  longer  any  question  at  all,  but  the 
answer  is  personally  on  hand  at  once  in  the  asker:  the 
question  answers  itself. 

They  say  of  God,  "  Names  name  thee  not."     That 
holds  good  of  me:  no  concept  expresses  me,  nothing 
that  is  designated  as  my  essence  exhausts  me;  they  are 
only  names.     Likewise  they  say  of  God  that  he  is  per- 
fect and  has  no  calling  to  strive  after  perfection. 
That  too  holds  good  of  me  alone. 

I  am  owner  of  my  might,  and  I  am  so  when  I  know 
myself  as  unique.    In  the  unique  one  the  owner  himself 
returns  into  his  creative  nothing,  out  of  which  he  is 
born.     Every  higher  essence  above  me,  be  it  God,  be  it 
man,  weakens  the  feeling  of  my  uniqueness,  and  pales 
only  before  the  sun  of  this  consciousness.     If  I  concern 
myself  for  myself,*  the  unique  one,  then  my  concern 
rests  on  its  transitory,  mortal  creator,  who  consumes 
himself,  and  I  may  say: 

All  things  are  nothing  to  me.^ 


*  \_Stell'  Ich  avj  Mich  meine  Sache.    Literally,  "  if  I  set  my  affair  on 
myself."] 

t["7c7i  liab'  Mein'  Sack'  auf  Nichts  gestellt."    Literally,  "  I  have  set  my 
affair  on  nothing."    See  note  on  p.  3.] 


INDEX  491 


INDEX 

The  following  index  to  this  translation  of  "  Der  Einzige  und  sein 
Eigentum  "  is  intended  to  help  one,  after  reading  the  book,  to  find 
a  passage  which  he  remembers.    It  is  not  a  concordance  to  aid  in 
analytical  study.     Hence  the  designations  of  the  matter  referred  to 
are  in  a  form  intended  to  be  recognized  by  the  person  who  remem- 
l>ers  the  passage;  I  have  generally  preferred,  so  far  as  convenience 
permitted,  to  use  the  words  of  the  text  itself,  being  confident  that  a 
description  of  the  subject-matter  in  words  more  appropriate  to  the 
summary  form  of  the  index  would  never  help  any  person  to  find 
his  passage.     If  the  designations  are  recognizable,  I  have  permitted 
them  to  be  rough. 

Of  necessity  the  index  has  been  made  hastily,  and  I  hereby  con- 
fess it  to  be  guilty  of  all  the  faults  that  an  index  can  possess* 
though  I  hope  that  the  page  numbers  will  prove  to  be  accurate. 
The  faults  that  I  am  most  ashamed  of  are  the  incompleteness 
which  usually  omits  the 'shorter  occurrences  of  a  given  word  or  idea 
and  the  indefiniteness  of  the  "ff."  which  does  not  tell  the  reader 
how  far  the  reference  extends.     It  has  actually  not  been  in  my 
power  to  avoid  either  of  these  faults,  and  I  hope  they  will  not  pre- 
vent the  index  from  being  of  very  considerable  use  to  those  who 
pay  continued  attention  to  the  book.     These  two  faults  will  be 
found  least  noticeable  in  the  references  to  proper  names  and  quo- 
tations: therefore  the  reader  who  wants  to  find  a  passage  will  do 
l>est  to  remember,  if  possible,  a  conspicuous  proper  name  or  a 
quotation  whose  source  is  known — perhaps  oftenest  from  the  Bible — 
and  look  up  his  passage  by  that.     In  the  indexing  of  quotations, 
however,  I  have  omitted  anonymous  proverbs,  lines  of  German 
hymns,  and  quotations  of  whose  authorship  I  was  (whether  par- 
donably or  unpardonably)  ignorant. 

The  abbreviations  are:  ftn.,  "footnote";  f.,  "and  next  page"; 
ff.,  "and  following  pages." 

S.  T.  B. 


492 


INDEX 


Age:  coming  of  age,  220. 

Alcibiades:  282  f. 

Alexis,  Wilibald:  "Cabanis," 

291. 

Algiers:  343. 
Alien:  the  same  in  German  as 

"strange,"  47  ftn. 
America: 

citizens  presumed  respectable, 
233. 

duelists  how  treated,  314. 

Germans  sold  to,  351. 

kings  not  valued  in,  351. 
Ananias  and  Sapphira:  102. 
Anarchism:  xv  n. 
Ancients:  17  ff. 

conquered  the  world,  120  ff. 
Aristippus:  26. 
Aristotle:    "zoon  politicon,"  56, 

307. 

Arnim:  see  Bettina. 
Art:  support  of,  360. 
Atahualpa:  448. 
Athanasius:  "God  making  men 

divine,"  382. 
Athenians :  age  of  their  popular 

freedom,  281  ff. 
Augsburg  Confession:  Art.  11, 

117  f. 

Authorization:  limits  constitu- 
tional legislatures,  etc.,  146  f. 
Autun  and  Barrere,  bishop  of: 

131. 

Babeuf^Babouvism,  245,  248. 

Bacon:  "clear  head,"  no  phil- 
osopher, 111. 

Bailly: 

"no  extra  reason,"  306. 
what  is  my  property,  131. 

Bauer,  Bruno: 

"Anekdota"  2.152:     108. 
"  Denkvmerdigkeiten  "  6.6-7 : 
96,  102. 


"Die  gute  Sache  der  Freihtit" 

pp.  62-63:     178  f. 
"Judenjrage"  p.  60:  180,  414. 
61 :     229. 
66:     178. 
84:    235. 
114:     185. 
"Lii.Ztg."      5.18:     164. 

No.   8:     190  ff. 

8.22-    321. 
"  man  just  discovered, "  8, 

180,  326,  467. 

treats  Jew  question  as  relat- 
ing to  privilege,  271  ff.     I 
who  he  was,  163  ftn. 
Bauer,  E.: 

"Liberate  Bestrelnmgen" 
2.50-94:     299 ff. 
2.95  ff.:    378  f. 
2.130:    301. 
2.132:     302. 
Bavaria:  its  government  worth 

more  than  a  man,  345  ftn. 
Beasts:  how  they  live,  435,  442 

Becker,  A.: 

"  Vdksphilosophie  unserer 
Tage"  p.  22  f.:  103,  249. 

32:     103. 
Bee: 

in  beehood,  303  ff. 
little  busy,  442. 
Being: 

in  Feuerbach's  philosophy, 

453  ff. 
same  word  in  German  as  "  es- '• 

sence,"  41  ftn. 
see  also  Essence;  also 

Supreme. 

Bettina:  "This  book  belongs  to 
the  King"  pp.  374-385: 

261  ff. 
Bible: 

Gen.     22.1-12:     198. 


INDEX 


493 


Ex.       20.13:    65. 
Deut.      5.16:     216,  249. 

32.3-    459. 

Ps.        46.3:     121. 

99.9:     471. 

Prov.      3.2:     216. 

Is.         55.8:     338,  456. 

55.9:     26. 
Jer.       13.16:     459. 
Matt.      4.1-11:     464. 
5.18:     125. 
5.22:     56. 
5.48:    321. 
6.11:    426. 
6.13:     181. 
6.24:     279. 
6.34:     166. 
7.7:    449. 
8.22:     19. 
9.11:     70. 
10.16:     22,  422. 
10.35:     114. 
11.27:     122. 
12.30:     259. 
12.45:     102. 
13.25:     213. 
16.24:     215. 
16.26:    36. 
18.3:    466. 
19.21:     102. 
19.24:     481. 
22.21 :     359,  422. 
23.24:     297. 
26.53:     282. 
Mark      2.21 :     480. 
3.29:     240. 
9.23:     122. 
10.29:     11,  19. 
Luke      5.11:     102. 
6.20:     428. 
10.7:     157. 
11.13:     14. 
14.11:    46,  105. 
17.6:     122. 


23.2:     422. 
John       1.14:    269. 

1.18  Revised  Version 

margin:  34. 
2.4:     114. 
3.4:    304. 
3.6:    34,  35. 
4.24a:     14,  23,  33, 

39,  40,  60, 
112,  140, 
433,  444, 
472. 

4.24b:    410. 
6.32-35:    426. 
8.44:     240. 
16.33:    33. 
18.36:     13. 
18.38:     13,  28,  471. 
20.22:     42. 
20.29:    446. 
Acts        5.1-2:     102. 
5.4:    398. 
5.29:     11,  215,  444. 
5.39:     459. 
Rom.      1.25:    451 
6.18:     205. 
8.9:    42. 
8.14,  16:     226. 
8.21:    461. 
9.21:     259. 
12.1:     429. 

1  Cor.    2.10:    3,  13,  33,  433. 

3.16:  42. 
8.4:  133. 
15.26,  55:  430. 

2  Cor.    5.17:    30. 

6.15:     212. 
Gal.       2.20:     66,  93,  427. 

4.26:     19,  205. 
Phil.       2.9:     170. 
lThess.5.21:    468. 
2  Tim.   1.10:    430. 
Heb.     11.13:    18,34. 
James     1.17:    455, 


494 


INDEX 


2.12:     206. 
1  Pet.     2.16(?):     205. 

5.2:    399. 
1  John  3.10:     226. 

4.8:    4,  51,  61,  74, 

382. 

4.16:    382. 
different  men's  relation  to, 

447  ff. 

quotations  from,  xx. 
Birthright:  248  ff. 
Blanc,  Louis:  "Histoire  des  Dix 

Ans"  I.  138:  139. 
Bluntschli:  466. 
Body  recognized  in  manhood: 

14  ff. 

Boniface,  St.: 
cuts  down  sacred  oak,  218, 

478. 

risks  life  as  missionary,  77. 
Bourgeoisie:  see  Commonalty. 
Burns,  Robert:  433. 

Caitiff:  398. 
Calling: 

helping  men  to  realize,  383  f . 

no  calling,  one  does  what  he 

can,  433  ff . 

Calvinism:  puritanical,  120. 
Capacities: 

common  to  all,  434. 

differ,  433  f.,  438  f. 
Carriere: 

"Koelner  Dom,"  305. 
Catholicism:  lets  the  profane 

world  stand,  116  ff. 
Catholics:  had  regard  for 

church,  290. 

Cause:  mine  and  others,  3  ff. 
Censorship:  more  legal  than 

murder,  65. 
Chamisso:  "Valley  of  Murder," 

247. 
Charles  V:  399  ff. 


Children:  9  ff. 

competent  to  get  *  living, 

350  f. 
Chinese:  family  respoasibility, 

291. 

Chinese  ways:  86  ff. 
Christ: 

no  revolutionist,  422. 

would  not  call  legions  of 


Christianity: 
founding  of,  422  f . 
liberalism  completes,  226  ff. 
Christianizing:  25,6. 
Christians : 
asserting  their  distinctiveness, 

271  ff. 
trying  to  conquer  the  Spirit, 

122  ff. 
Cicero:  28. 
Clericalism:  98  ff. 
Clootz,  Anacharsis:  276. 
Commonalty: 

holds  that  a  man's  a  man, 

129  ff. 

magnifies  desert,  136. 
Communism : 
see  Proudhon,  Socialism, 

Weitling. 

all  for  society,  412  f. 
an  advanced  feudalism,  415  ff. 
not  advantageous  to  all,  410 

ff. 

runs  to  regulations,  340. 
useful,  355  f. 
Competence:  348  ff. 
Competition: 
characteristic  of  bourgeois: 

society,  344. 
how  to  abolish,  364  f. 
produces  poor  work,  354. 
restricted  by  control  of  op- 
portunities, 345  ff. 
Confidence:  breach  of,  400  ff, 


INDEX 


495 


Conscience  in  Protestantism, 
115. 

Consequences  are  not  penal- 
ties, 314  f. 

Constitutional  monarchy:  300 
ff. 

Corporeity  the  modern  wish, 

Cotters:  327  f. 
Crime: 

a  man's  own  affair,  317. 

results  from  the  recognition 
of  Man  and  right,  266  ff. 

the  only  way  to  beat  the  law, 
258. 

treatment  as  disease,  316  f. 
Criminal : 

how  to  make  him  ashamed, 
265. 

ill  treated,  383. 

made  by  the  State,  261  ff. 
Cripples:  wages  to,  358  f. 
Crispin   St.:  64  f. 
Critical  philosophy:  its  new 

morality,  72  ff. 
Criticism: 

limited  by  love,  381  f. 

makes  progress,  190  ff. 

of  Bible,  163  ftn,  381,  448  f. 

servile  and  own,  467  ff. 

starts  from  presuppositions, 
467  ff. 

victorious,  195. 

what  it  was,  163  ftn. 
Crito:  72. 

Culture:  its  results.  443  ff; 
Cultured  people:  94  ff. 
Curative  means  against  crime: 

316  f. 

Curtius  leaps  into  chasm,  99. 
Custom  makes  earth  a  heaven, 

87  ff. 

Dudmhardt,  Marie:  xi. 


Descartes:  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  "I 

think,  therefore  I  am,"  25, 

109  f.,  112,  173. 

Despicable:  401. 

Desert,  watchword  of  bour- 
geoisie, 136. 

Devil,  natural  objects  named 
after,  467 

Diogenes:  26. 

"  Get  out  of  my  sunshine, " 
307. 

Directions  for  life:  432  f. 

Disgruntlement:  192. 

Dissolving:  the  price  of  liberty, 
188. 

Divine:  ancient  and  modern 
times  are  concerned  for  the, 
486  ff. 

Dogma:  194  f. 

Dueling: 

boycotted  in  America,  314  f . 
prohibited  by  State,  243. 

Dupin:  296. 

Education:  320  f. 
Ego:  in  title  of  this  book,  ix  f. 
Egoism : 

everybody  repudiates,  185  ff. 
exemplified  in  God,  races, 

States,  etc.,  3  ff. 
hypocritical,  216  f. 
remains  under  democracy  and 

Socialism,  163  ff. 
the  enemy  of  liberalism, 

185  ff. 
Egoists: 

all  bodies  of  men  are  unjust 

to,  284. 
have  brought  peoples  to  ruin, 

277  ff. 

involuntary,  46. 
F.inzige  (der) :  translation  of  the 

word,  ix  f. 
Ends:  78  f. 


496 


INDEX 


England : 

allows  free  press,  374. 

disregards  popular  turmoil, 
297  f. 

law-abiding,  254. 
Enjoyment:  rather  than  life,  as 

object,  426  ff. 
Epicureans:  27  f. 
Equal:  who  are  our  equals? 

225  ff. 
Equality: 

of  political  rights,  133  ff. 

to  result  from  Communism, 

154  ff. 
Essence: 

essences  are  spooks,  50  ff. 

higher  and  highest  essences, 
47  ff.  See  also  Supreme 
Being. 

of  man,  as  supreme,  40  f. 

recognized  in  men,  52  ff. 

same  as  "being,"  41  ftn. 
Established:  293  f. 
Estates:  previous  to  Revolution, 

134  f. 

Euripides:  "Orestes,"  418:  254. 
Exclusiveness: 

criticism  excludes,  176  ff. 

in  Jew  and  Christian,  271  ff. 

Faith:  in  morality.  57  ff. 
Family: 

as  court  judging  son,  291 

depends  on  piety,  288  ff. 

respect  for  idea  of,  113  f. 

self  must  be  sacrificed  to, 


Fellow-feeling:  386  f. 

Feudalism:  ended  by  Revolu- 
tion, 132  ff. 

Feuerbach : 

"Anekdota"  2.64:  60. 
"Essence  of  Christianity, 
40  ff. 


p.  394:    391  f. 
401:     238. 
402:     41. 
402,  403: 

74. 

403:     118. 
408:    75. 
"  Principles  of  the  Philosophy 

of  the  Future,"  453  ff. 
humanizing  the  divine,  227. 
insists  on  "being,"  453  ff. 
look  "rightly  and 

unbiasedly,"  449. 
love  a  divine  power,  391. 
love  is  the  essence  of  man, 

412. 
"  man  the  supreme  being, " 

8,  189. 

opposes  Hegel,  453  ff. 
religion  displaces  the  human, 

320. 

the  "divine"  exists,  486. 
"  theology  is  anthropology, " 

74. 
"the  world  a  truth  to  the 

ancients,"  18,  30. 
Fichte: 

his  ego  is  not  I,  482. 
on  casuistry  of  lying,  401. 
"The  ego  is  all,"  237. 
Fixed  idea:  55  ff. 
Forces:  man  is  to  exert,  435  f. 
Fortune:  weak  point  of  present 

society,  158  ff. 
France:  laws  about  education, 

459  f. 

Francis  II  (of  France):  399  f. 
Franke:  77. 
Frederick  the  Great: 
his  cane,  176. 
tolerant,  230. 
Freedom: 

all  want  freedom,  but  not 
the  same  freedom,  208  ff 


INDEX 


497 


an  ignoble  cause,  214. 

Guizot:  460. 

if  given,  is  a  sham,  219  ff. 

Gustavus  Adolphus:  176. 

is  riddance,  203  ff.,  214  f. 

Gutenberg:  served  mankind, 

of  press,  259  ff. 

164. 

of  thought,  455  ff. 

thirsting  for,  203  ff. 

Habit:  see  Custom. 

Fun  prohibited,  259  ff. 

Hah":  see  Hypocrisy-. 
Hartmann,  Eduard  von:  xiii  f. 

Galotti,  Emilia:  70,  431. 

Heart: 

German  unity:  303  ff. 

cultivated  by  Socrates,  20  ff. 

a  dream,  377. 

cultivated  by  the  Reforma- 

Germany: millennial  anniver- 

tion, 31. 

sary,  284  f. 

Heartlessness  :  is  crime,  265  f. 

God: 

Heautontimorumenos  :  216. 

my  God  and  the  God  of  all, 

Heaven-storming:  88  f. 

189  f. 

Hegel: 

natural  objects  named  after, 
467. 

"absolute  philosophy,"  453  ff. 
condemns  "opinion"  and 

God-man:  202,  241. 

what  is  "mine,"  453. 

Goethe: 

finds  his  oyvn  speculations  in 

"Faust,"  159:     108. 

Bible,  448. 

1624-5:     250,  252. 

in  Christian  party,  311. 

2154:     112,  215,  480. 

insists  on  reality,  "things," 

"Vanitas!  vantiaium  vani- 

95. 

tas!" 

it  is  impossible  to  tell  a  lie, 

3,  196,  328,  330,  353, 

464. 

377,  490. 

personifies  thinking,  468. 

"Venetian  Epigrams,"  46. 
"Humanus  the  saint's  name," 

philosopher  of  bourgeoisie, 
137. 

370. 
"The  spirit  'tis  that  builds 

proves  philosophy  religious, 
62. 

itself  the  body,"  110. 

puts  the  idea  into  everything, 

poet  of  bourgeoisie,  137. 

485. 

in  lucky  circumstances,  433. 
Good  intentions:  as  pavement 

systematizes  religion,  125. 
wants  match-making  left  to 

(proverbially),  96. 

parents,  291. 

Government:  everybody  feels 

wants  to  remain  Lutheran, 

competent  for,  356  f. 

120. 

Grandmother:  saw  spirits,  42. 

Henry  VII,  Emperor:  120. 

Greeks: 

Hess: 

intrigue  ended  their  liberty, 

"Ein  und  zwanzig  Bogen," 

282  f. 

p.  12:     138. 

their  philosophy,  19  f. 
Guerrillas  in  Spain:  65. 

89  ff.:    321. 
"Triarchit,"  p.  76:     234. 

INDEX 


Hierarchy:  95  ff. 

Higher  world:  "introduction 

of,"  43,  91. 
Highest:  same  as  "supreme," 

41  ftn. 
Hinrichs:  "  Pditische  Vorle- 

mngen,"  1.280:     345  ftn. 
History:  as  dominant  thought, 

473,  488  f. 

Holbach:  head  of  "clot,"  57. 
Holy:  the  same  in  German  as 

"sacred,"  50  ftn. 
Holy  Spirit:  has  to  be  con- 
quered by  Christians,  122  ff. 
Horace: 

"impavidum  ierient  ruinae" 
121. 

"  nil  admirari,"  121. 

his  philosophy,  28. 
Human: 

exclusive  regard  for  general 
human  interests,  168  ff . 

you  are  more  than  human 
being,  166  f. 

human  beings  desire  democ- 
racy, 128. 
Humanism:  30. 
Humanity: 

labor  must  relate  to,  170  ff. 

laborers  must  be  allowed  to 

develop,  157  ff. 
Hume:  "clear  head,"  111. 
Huss:  460. 
Hvpocrisy:  half  moral  and  half 

egoist,  66  ff. 

Idea: 

accepted  as  truth,  and  fixed, 
474  ff. 

as  object  of  respect,  112  ff. 

see  Fixed. 
Ideal: 

constitutes  religion,  321. 

versus  real,  484  ff. 


Immoral:  only  class  known  to 

moralists  besides  "moral," 

69  ff. 

Imparted  feelings:  82  ff. 
Inca:  448. 

Individual:  "simple,"  344  f. 
Inequality:  see  Equality. 
Infanticide:  424. 
Insurrection:  420  ff. 
Intercourse: 

not  made  by  a  hall,  285  ff. 

preferred  to  society,  407. 
Interests:  ideal  and  personal, 

98  ff. 
Ireland:  suffrage  in,  343. 

Jesuits: 

substantially  grant  indul- 
gences, 116  f 
"the  end  hallows  the  means," 

118  ff.,  140,  430. 
Jews: 

asserting  their  distinctiveness, 

271  ff. 

emancipated,  220  f. 
heathen,  29,  123. 
not  altogether  egoistic  or  ex- 
clusive, 235  f. 
unspiritual,  24. 
whether  they  are  men,  166  ff. 
will  not  read  this  book,  35  f. 
Judge: 

Supreme  Being  as,  432  f. 
Judges: 

mechanical:  253. 

what  makes  them  unreliable, 

223  f. 
Juliet:  290. 

Justice:  a  hate  commanded  by 
love,  383. 

Kaiser :  worthless  pamphlet, 

344. 
Kant:  176. 


INDEX 


499 


Klopstock:  83. 
Koerner:  77. 

" Kommunisten  in  der  Schweiz" : 
report  on,  p.  3:     245. 
pp.  24,  63:    438. 
Kosciusko:  404. 
Kotzebue:  64  f. 
Krummacher:  58,  266,  441. 

Labor: 

fundamental  in  Communist 

society,  156  ff. 
human  vs.  unique,  354  ff. 
lofty  and  petty,  174  if. 
must  be  thoroughly  human, 

170  ff. 

must  not  be  drudgery,  157  ff. 
of  the  right  kind  develops 

man,  173  ff. 
problem,  149  ff. 
too  narrow,  163  ff. 
wanting  higher  pay,  336  f. 
Lais:  80. 

Lang,  Hitter  von:  69. 
Lavater:  450. 
Law: 

common  or  general  law, 

same  word  in  German  as 
"right,"  242  ftn. 
particular  law,  not  same  word 

as  "right,"  254  ftn. 
how  to  break,  258. 
is  a  declaration  of  will,  255  f. 
is  impersonal,  141  f. 
paralyzes  will,  256  ff. 
:sacred  in  the  State,  313  ff. 
to  be  respected  as  such,  254 

ff. 
Leisure: 

to  be  enjoyed  humanly,  164 

f.,  172. 

to  be  enjoyed  uniquely,  356. 
Lenau:  "Three  Gypsies,"  489. 
Lessing: 


"  Emilia  Galotti,"  7d,  431. 

"Nathan  der  Weise,"  71. 
Level:  rascal  and  honest  man 

on  same,  69  f . 
Liberalism : 

completes  Christianity,  226  If. 

has  made  valuable  gains,  188 

rational,  137  f. 

sees  only  Man  in  me,  225  ff. 
Liberals:  the  most  modern 

moderns,  127. 
Liberty: 

individual,  does  not  mean 
the  individual  is  free, 
140  ff. 

political,  means  direct  sub- 
jection to  State,  138  ff. 

of  the  people,  is  not  mine, 
280ff 

no  objection  to  its  diminu- 
tion, 408  ff. 
Lie:  395  ff. 
Life: 

caring  for,  425  ff. 

should  conform  to  the  Su- 
preme Being,  432  ff. 

true,  426  ff. 
"Lit.  Ztg.": 

5.12  ff :     185. 

5.15,  23:     185. 

5.24:     173,  186. 

5.26:     166. 

No.  8:     190  ff. 

see  also  Bauer. 
Love: 

as  law  of  our  intercourse, 
380  ff. 

how  it  goes  wrong,  388  ff. 

how  originated,  388. 

in  egoism,  385  ff. 
Lunatics:  see  Fixed  Idea. 
Lusatia:  304. 
Luther: 


500 


INDEX 


appealed  to  reason,  460. 
broke  his  vow,  398. 
demanded  safe  conduct  to 

Worms,  282. 
did  his  best,  481. 
"Here  I  stand,  I  cannot  do 

otherwise,"  78. 
"He  who  believes  is  a  God," 

109. 

not  understood  at  first,  30. 
shows  the  way  to  truth,  107  ff . 
Lutheranism:  goes  beyond 
Puritanism,  120. 

Mackay,  John  Henry:  vii  f., 

xi,  xiii,  163  ftn. 
Making  something  out  of  us: 

320  f. 

Man  (adult  male):  14  ff. 
Man  (with  capital  M): 

by  being  man  we  are  equal, 
225  ff. 

cared  for  to  the  disregard  of 
men,  100  ff. 

criticism  begins  to  gibe  at, 
194. 

every  laborer  must  be,  170  ff. 

I  am  not,  41. 

I  am  the  real,  233  ff. 

I  am  true  man,  436  ff. 

nothing  else  recognized  in 
me,  225  ff. 

takes  the  place  of  God  in 
the  new  morality,  72  ff. 

see  also  Human,  Humanity. 
Manlius:  99. 
Marat:  99. 

Marriage:  against  will  of  fam- 
ily, 289  ff. 
Marx:  " t)eidsch-jranzoesische 

J ahrbuecher'"  p.  197:     229. 
Masses : 

attacked  by  criticism,  185  ff. 

attacked  as  "a  spiritual  be- 


ing" by  criticism,  191  ff. 
Maxim:  as  fixed  idea,  80  f. 
Metternich:  "path  of  genuine 

freedom,"  209. 
Middle  class:  not  idealistic, 

96  f.,  99,  102. 
Might:  stereotyped  into  right, 

366  f. 
Mind: 

in  antiquity,  19  ff. 

in  youth,  11  ff. 

same  German  word  as 

"  spirit,"  10  ftn. 
Mirabeau:  131. 

the  people  the  source  of  right 

and  power,  131. 
no  power  may  command  the 
nation's  representatives, 
306. 

Misalliance:  289  ff. 
Moderation:  403. 
Moderns:  30  ff. 
Monarchy:  Revolution  pro- 
duces an  absolute,  132  ff. 
Money:  what  we  shall  do  about, 

363  ff. 

Mongolism:  85  ff. 
Montgelas:  345  ftn. 
Moral  influence:  105  ff. 
Morality: 

a  form  of  faith,  and  Chris- 
tian, 57  ff. 

becomes  a  religion  when 
critically  completed, 
73  ff. 

in  critical  philosophy,  72  ff. 
is  religious,  59  ff. 
Napoleon : 

did  not  object  to  conquering, 

369. 

helped  himself,  343. 
Nationality:  322. 
"Nationals"  of  Germany: 
303  ff. 


INDEX 


501 


Nauwerk:  307  ff. 
Negroid  age  of  Caucasian 

history:  86. 
Nero:  68  ff. 
Nietzsche:  viii,  xiv  ff. 
Ninon:  80. 

Oath:  399  ff.,  402  ff. 

O'Connell:  his  motives,  77  f. 

Old:  wages  to,  358  f. 

Opposition  ends  when  com- 
pleted, 273  f. 

Opposition  party:  66  ff. 

Order:  in  State,  293. 

Orders:  must  not  be  given, 
141  f. 

Origen:  71. 

Ownness: 

inalienable,  20d  ff. 
meaning,  203  ftn. 
must  be  defended  against 

society,  408  ff. 
served  by  union,  410  ff. 

Pages  cited:  xx. 

Parcellation:  327  ff. 

Party:  310  ff. 

Paul,  Emperor  of  Russia:  404. 

Pauperism  a  consequence  of 

the  State,  333  ff. 
Penalty:  product  of  right,  266 

ff. 
People: 

general  name  for  societies, 
276  f. 

German,  its  thousand  years' 
history,  284  f. 

hound  the  police  on,  318. 

its  liberty  is  not  mine,  280  ff. 

peoples  have  filled  history, 

276  ff. 

Periclean  age:  19  ff,,  281  ff. 
Personification:  468  f. 
Pettifoggery:  282  f. 


Philanthropism:  100  f. 
Philanthropy:  hates  men,  481  f. 
Philosophy: 

Greek,  see  Ancients. 

modern,  109  ff. 
Piety: 

family  depends  on,  288  ff. 

meaning  of  word,  288  ftn. 
Pilate:  13,  28,  471  f. 
Plowmen:  wages  for,  359  ff. 
Plumb-line:  xvii. 
Poles:  oath  imposed  upon, 

404  f. 

Poor-rates:  voting  by,  343. 
Possession :  the  how  much  of, 

347  f. 


depend  on  the  State,  150  ff. 
fundamental  in  bourgeois 

society,  147  ff. 
inward  or  spiritual,  324  ff., 


to  be  respected,  126  f.,  323  ff. 
Possibility: 

coincides  with  reality,  438  ff. 

means  thinkableness,  439  ff. 
Precepts:  are  Mongoloid,  87  ff. 
Press: 

why  not  left  free,  259  ff. 

liberty  of,  how  to  get,  371  ff. 
Presupposition:  199  f.,  467  ff. 
Principle:  as  fixed  idea,  80  f. 
Prison  society  and  intercourse: 

286  ff. 
Private: 

criticism  has  to  leave  the 
private  free,  178  f. 

the  private  not  recognized  by 

liberalism,  168  ff. 
Privilege:  270  ff. 
Proletariat :  147  ff. 
Propaganda: 320. 
Property: 

civic  and  egoistic,  contrasted, 


502 


INDEX 


326  ff. 

definitions  in  Roman  law, 
331  ff. 

derived  from  man  through 
Right,  365  ff. 

individual,  opposed  by  Social- 
ism, 154  ff . 

is  what  men  really  want  when 
they  say  freedom,  204  ff. 

mine  is  what  I  make  my 
might  cover,  338  ff. 

Proudhon  on,  328  ff. 

recognition  of  under  egoism, 


Proprietors,  small:  327  ff. 
Protestantism : 

conscientious,  115  ff. 
consecrates  everything,  116  ff. 
Proudhon: 

"Creation  de  I'Ordre,"  60. 

p.  414:  162. 
485:  302. 

"  Qu'est-ce  que  la  Propriete?  " 
p.  83:  328. 
90:  331. 
as  parson,  466. 
property  a  fact,  332. 
"property  is  robbery,"  100, 

330  ff.,  419. 
substantially  agrees  with  Stir- 

ner,  xv. 

Provence,  Count  of:  209. 
Punishment:  involves  sacred- 
ness,  315  ff. 
Pyrrho:  28. 

Rabble:  341  ff. 

Ragamuffin:.  152  ff. 
going  beyond  ragamuffinhood, 
184. 

Raphael:  355. 

Rational:  etymology  of  "ration- 
al" in  German,  81  ftn. 


Reality:  versus  ideality,  484  ff. 
Realizing  value  from  self:  335 

ff.,  360  f. 

Reason:  as  supreme,  460  f. 
Reciprocity:  413  f. 
References  to  pages:  xx. 
Reform  is  Mongoloid,  86  ff. 
Reformation  (the  Protestant) : 

takes  hold  of  heart,  31. 

alters  hierarchy,  107  ff. 
Regulus:  99. 
Reimarus:  "Most  Notable 

Truths  of  Natural  Reli- 
gion," 62  f. 

Reisach,  Count  von:  345  ftn. 
Relation:  of  different  persons 

to  objects,  447  ff. 
Religion : 

is  freedom  of  mind,  62  f. 

morality  is  religious,  59  ff. 

of  humanity,  229  f. 

tolerance  in,  229  ff. 
Republic:  299  f. 
Revenge: 

the  people's  just,  266  ff. 
Reverence:  92  ff. 
Revolution  (the  French) : 

began  over  property,  130. 

equality  of  rights,  246. 

established  absolute  gov- 
ernment, 132  ff. 

immoral,  72. 

its  true  nature,  143  ff. 

made  men  citizens,  155  f. 
Revolutionist:  is  to  lie,  396  f. 
Rid:  freedom  is  being  rid, 

203  ff.,  214  f. 
Right: 

absolute,  269. 

as  basis  of  property,  366  ff. 

commonwealth  of  lltechts- 
staat),  244,  253. 

equality  of,  270  ff. 

is  a  law  foreign  to  me,  242  ff 


INDEX 


ios 


ttiy  right  derived  from  my- 
self, ?45  if. 

rights  by  birth,  248  ff. 

same  word  in  German  as 
"law,"  242  ftn. 

serves  him  right,  254. 

well-earned  rights,  248  ff. 

rights  change  hands  at  the 

Revolution,  132  ff. 
Robespierre:  77. 

a  priest,  99. 

consistent,  102. 

devoted  to  virtue,  77. 

not  serviceable  to  middle 

class,  102  f. 
Romans: 

in  philosophy,  28. 

killed  children,  250. 
Romanticists : 

rehabilitate  the  idea  of 

spirits,  43. 

Rome:  decline  and  fall  of,  277  f. 
Rousseau:  hostile  to  culture, 

96  ftn. 

Rudolph  (in  Sue's  story):  387. 
Ruge:  "Anelsdala"  1.  120,  127: 

460. 
Russia: 

boundary  sentinels,  247. 

flight  of  army  in,  424. 
Russians:  as  Mongolian,  86. 

Sacred: 

gibing  at,  369  ff. 

the  same  in  German  as 

"holy, '"'50  ftn. 
things  are  sacred  of  them- 
selves, 118ff. 
wherein  the  sacred  consists, 

92  ff. 
Sacred  things: 

their  diagnosis  and  exten- 
sion, 45  ff. 
Sacrifice:  when  I  sacrifice 


body  else's  comfort  to  my 
principles,  etc.,  97  f. 
"  Saechftinche  Vaterlandsblaetter" : 

57. 
Saint- Just:  99. 

"Political  Speeches,"  10,  p. 

153:     268. 
"criminal  for  not  hating," 

267. 
Sake: 

acting  for  one's  own  sake, 

210  ff. 
immoralities  for  God's  sake 

and  for  mine,  398  f. 
Sand,  George:  466. 
Sand  (murderer  of  Kotzebue) : 

64  f. 

Sander:  379. 
Schiller: 

"Ideal  and  Life,"  428. 
"The  Maiden  from  a  Foreign 

Land,"  35. 

"Warte  des  Glauben*,"  111. 
complete  in  his  poems,  175. 
have  I  a  right  to  my  nose? 

246. 

Swabian,  176. 
Schlemihl,  Peter:  25. 
Schlosser:  "  Achtzehntes  Jahr- 

hundert,"  57. 
Scholarships  at  universities: 

347  ftn. 
Seducing  young  people  to 

morality,  212  f. 
Self: 

as  starting-point  or  goal, 

427  f.,  437  f. 
Self -discovery:  first,  11,  second, 

15. 
Selfishness: 

groundlessly  decried,  221  ff. 
in  "unselfish"  acts,  77  f. 
the  only  thing  that  is  really 
trusted,  223  f. 


504 


INDEX 


Self-renunciation:  of  holy  and 

unholy  men,  75  ff. 
Self-sacrificing: 

discussion  of  the  implications 
of  the  German  word, 
96  ff. 

literal  force  of  the  German 

word,  97  ftn. 
Self-seekers  always  acted  so: 

341. 
Sensuality:  in  Protestantism  and 

Catholicism,  116  ff. 
September  laws:  374. 
Seriousness:  85. 
Settled  life:  necessary  to  re- 
spectability, 147  f. 
Shabbiness:  400. 
Shakspere:  "Romeo  and 

Juliet,"  290. 
Sick:  wages  to,  358  f. 
Sigismund:  398. 
Simonides:  26. 

Sinner:  does  not  exist,  479  ff. 
Skeptics  (Greek):  22,  28. 
Small  properties:  327  ff. 
Socialism:  152  ff. 
Society: 

is  to  be  sole  owner,  153  ff. 

its  character  depends  on  its 
members,  276  f. 

made  by  a  hall,  285  ff. 

man's  state  of  nature,  406  ff. 

may  provide  consequences 
where  State  provides 
penalties,  314  f. 
Socrates: 

in  history  of  philosophy,  20  f. 

should  not  have  respected 
the  sentence  of  the 
court,  281  f. 

too  moral  to  break  jail,  72. 
Sophists:  19  ff. 
Sordidness:  400. 
Spartans:  killed  children,  250. 


Speculation:  405. 
Sphinx-  451. 
Spirit: 

as  the  essential  part  of  man, 

36  ff. 

free  from  the  world,  32  ff.     . 
has  to  be  conquered  by 

moderns,  122  ff. 
same  German  word  as 

"mind,"  10  ftn. 
the  seat  of  equality  226  ff. 
Spirits:  are  all  around  us, 

42  ff. 
Spiritual  goods:  shall  we  hold 

them  sacred?  369  ff. 
Spook:  "essences"  are  spooks, 

50  ff. 

Spy:  395,  403. 

Standpoint:  as  fixed  idea,  80  ff. 
State: 

a  fellowship  of  human  beings, 

128  ff. 
cannot  exist  if  I  have  a  will 

of  my  own,  255  ff. 
cares  not  for  me,  but  for  it- 
self, 333  ff. 

Christianizes  people,  296. 
claims  to  be  a  person,  295  f. 
criticism  gives  up,  190  f. 
has  to  be  harsh,  259  ff., 

262  ff. 

holds  laws  sacred,  313  ff. 
is  the  established  293  f. 
its  relation  to  property, 

333  ff. 

means  order,  293. 
officials  and  plutocrats  over- 
charge us,  151  f.,  357  f. 
sick,  262. 

taking  part  in,  307  ff. 
Stein:  his  disloyalty  to  a 

"simple. individual,"  345  ftn. 
Stirner:  motives  for  writing, 
393  f.,  406. 


INDEX 


505 


Stoics:  27  f. 

apathy,  121. 

"wise  man,"  121,  485. 
Strange;  the  same  in  German 

as  "alien,"  47  ftn. 
Strike:  359  ff. 
Students: 

are  immature  Philistines,  144. 

custom  of,  as  to  word  of 

honor,  403  f. 

Sue:  "Mysteries  of  Paris,"  387. 
Suicide:  429  ff. 
Suit:  "it  suits  me"  expressed 

in  German  by  "right," 

248  ftn. 
Supreme:  same  as  "highest," 

41  ftn. 
Supreme  Being: 

according  to  Feuerbach, 
40  ff.  (See  also  Feuer- 
bach.) 

see  also  Essence  (highest). 
Swan-knights:  342  f. 

Tak  Kak:  vii,  xi  ff. 
Terence: 

"  Heautontimorumenos,"  25, 
216. 

"humani  nihil  alienum  pufo," 

367. 
Theft:  99  f. 

depends  on  property,  331  f. 
Tilings:  essential  in  competi- 
tion, 346  ff. 

Third:  end  of  opposition,  484. 
Thinkable:  real  sense  of 

"possible,"  122,  439  ff. 
Thinker:  characteristics  of 

452  ff. 
Thought: 

freedom  of,  455  ff. 

I  do  not  respect  your  inde- 
pendence of,  456  f. 

necessary  conditions  of, 


465  ff. 

optional,  465  f. 

realm  of,  451  ff. 
Thoughts: 

as  owned,  477  ff. 

combated  by  disregard,  196 
ff. 

combated  by  force,  197  ff. 

combated  by  thinking,  194  ff. 

criticism  moves  only  in, 
'      194  ff. 
Tie: 

everything  sacred  is,  283. 

man  the  enemy  of,  283. 
Tieck:  "Der  gestiejelte  Kater," 

342. 

Timon:  28. 

Title  of  this  book:  ix  f. 
Tolerance:  229  ff. 
Training:  434  f.,  443  ff. 
Truth: 

telling,  395  ff. 

to  possess  truth  you  must  be 
true,  106  ff. 

what  is,  471  ff. 

I  am  above  truths,  463  ff. 

Understanding:  in  antiquity, 

19  ff. 
Unhuman:  an  artificial  name 

for  the  real,  193. 
Union : 

distinction  from  society,  407 
ff.,  415  ff. 

everything  is  mine  in  415  ff. 
Uniqueness :  constitutes  greatness 

175  f. 
Un-man : 

real  man,  230  ff. 

the  "devil"  of  liberalism,  184  ff . 
Unselfishness: 

literal  sense  of  the  German 
word,  77  ftn. 

supposed,  and  real,  77  ff. 


506  INDEX 


Vagabonds:  147  S. 
Value: 

of  me,  86,  333  ff. 

to  be  realized  from  self,  335 

ff.,  360  f. 

Von  Hartmann:  xiii  f. 
"  Vossische  Zeitung" :  244,  253. 

Wages: 

instead  of  alms,  358  f. 

of  the  upper  classes  and  the 

lower,  151  f.,  357  ff. 
Walker,  James  L.:  vii,  xi  ff. 
War  of  all  against  all:  341,  343. 
Weitling: 

"Trio,"  on  head  of  people 

302. 
Communism  seeks  welfare 

of  all,  410. 

"harmony  of  society,"  284. 
hours  of  labor,  411. 
on  crime  and  "curative 

means,"  316  f. 
on  property,  331  f. 
preaches  "society,"  245. 
substitutes  work  for  money, 

352. 

Welcker:  on  dependence  of 
'     s,  223  f. 
in  the  head: 


formal  aspects  of,  75  ff. 

what  are  such,  54  ff. 
Will: 

incompatible  with  the  State, 
255  ff. 

law  is  a  declaration  of,  255  f. 

law  paralyzes,  255  ff. 

morality  commands  submis- 
sion of,  66  ff. 

the  only  practical  agency  of 

reform,  68  ff. 
Words: 

power  of,  4P2  ff. 

Stirner's  style  of  using,  xix  f. 
Work: 

for  pay's  sake,  354. 

is  not  the  only  competence, 

349  ff. 
World: 

among  ancients,  18  ff. 

conquered  by  the  ancients, 
120  ff. 

is  haunte.l,  and  is  itself  a 
ghost,  43  f. 

spirit  free  from,  32  ff. 
Writing;  Stirner's  motives  for, 

393  f.,  406. 

Youth:  11  ff. 


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JOHN  HENRY  MACKAYi 

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BT 

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God  and  the  State 

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TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  FRENCH  BY 

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Their  Nature^  Essence^  and  Maintenance 

AX   ABRIDGMENT   AXD   RE  ARRANGE  ME  XT  OF 

LYSANDER  SPOONER'S  "TRIAL  BY  JURY" 

EDITED   BY 

VICTOR  YARROS 

One  of  the  most  important  works  in  the  propaganda 

of  Anarchism 

CHAPTERS 

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BENJ.  R.  TUCKER 

An  examination  of  the  special  jury  law  passed  by  the  New  Tor 
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Instead  of  a  Book 

BY  A  MAN  TOO  BUSY  TO  WRITE  ONE 

A  FRAGMENTARY  EXPOSITION  OF 

PHILOSOPHICAL  ANARCHISM 

Culled  from  the  writings  of 
BENJ.     R.     TUCKER 

EDITOR  OP  LIBERTY 

With  a  Full-Page  Half. Tone  Portrait  of  the  Author 


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(2)  The  Individual,  Society,  and  the  State;  (3)  Money  and 
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